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Ascending Combinatorial Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders

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dc.contributor.authorKemal Güler
dc.contributor.authorGÖLER, KEMAL
dc.contributor.authorMartin Bichler
dc.contributor.authorIoannis Petrakis
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0003-2175-3477
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0001-5491-2935
dc.date.accessioned2025-11-13T22:37:01Z
dc.date.issued2017-10-26
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471609.015
dc.identifier.endpage293
dc.identifier.openalexW4235438554
dc.identifier.startpage264
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11421/14749
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471609.015
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofCambridge University Press eBooks
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.subjectAllocative efficiency
dc.subjectCommon value auction
dc.subjectMicroeconomics
dc.subjectProcurement
dc.subjectIncentive
dc.subjectKey (lock)
dc.subjectVickrey–Clarke–Groves auction
dc.subjectValue (mathematics)
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectGovernment procurement
dc.subjectBusiness
dc.subjectComputer science
dc.subjectAuction theory
dc.subjectMarketing
dc.subjectComputer security
dc.subject.sdg8
dc.titleAscending Combinatorial Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders
dc.typebook-chapter
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.authorid.openalexA5072324882

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