

**SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, RESISTANCE, AND MEDIA PRACTICE:  
CONTRIBUTION TO AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL  
CONFLICTS, AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN THE REPUBLIC  
OF GUINEA**

**Doctorate Thesis**

**Soumaila Ibrahima Doré**

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OF GUINEA**

**SOUMAILA IBRAHIMA DORÉ**

**DOCTORATE THESIS**

**Department of Sociology**

**Advisor: Prof. Dr. Fuat Güllüpmar**

**Eskişehir**

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**Institute of Social Sciences**

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Üye (Tez Danışmanı)	Prof. Dr. Fuat Güllüpnar	.....
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## JURY AND INSTITUTE FINAL APPROVAL

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Jury members	Names and Surname	Signing
Advisor:	Prof. Dr. Fuat Güllüþınar	.....
Member:	.....	.....
Member:	.....	.....
Member:	.....	.....
Member:	.....	.....

.....

Director of the institute

## **ABSTRACT**

### **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, RESISTANCE, AND MEDIA PRACTICE: CONTRIBUTION TO AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL CONFLICTS, AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA**

Soumaila Ibrahima Doré

Department of Sociology

Anadolu University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, June 2023

Consultant: Prof. Dr. Fuat Güllüpinar

Over the past 20 years, Africa has experienced major political crises and intense protests. These political crises sometimes take forms that are difficult to understand. From climate change and the food crisis to the questioning of the quality of democracy and the type of regime that citizens themselves are trying to define, there is no doubt that much remains to be done.

Since 2010, Guinea has been grappling with structural crises after elections, both political and ethnic, and has seen hundreds of demonstrations. It is clear that strategies to gain power and influence have taken precedence over justice, and that social inequalities have been sidelined. The lack of trust between political parties and the government, with local media sometimes seen as too partisan, paves the way for a new category of actors to assert themselves in the digital public sphere.

This study provides a detailed analysis of social movements in Guinea based on field research. Through a sequential mixed explanatory study, a survey of 350 respondents was conducted between 2019 and 2021, and in-depth interviews with 25 respondents were conducted to further explain the findings of the quantitative study. In conclusion, this study addresses a number of endogenous factors that have led to instability in the Republic of Guinea and seeks to explain the relationship between endogenous and exogenous factors and the possibilities and capacities of social movements for resistance, media opportunities and sources of social inequality.

**KEYWORDS:** Social movements, Resistance, Social inequalities, Media practices, Conflicts, Power, and social networks.

## Özet

# TOPLUMSAL HAREKETLER, DİRENİŞ VE MEDYA UYGULAMALARI: GİNE CUMHURİYETİNDEKİ SOSYOPOLİTİK ÇATIŞMALAR VE EŞİTSİZLİK

Soumaila Ibrahima Doré

Sosyoloji Anabilim Dalı

Anadolu Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü , Haziran 2023

Danışman : Prof. Dr. Fuat Güllüoınar

Son 20 yılda Afrika'da büyük siyasi krizler ve yoğun protestolar yaşandı. Bu siyasi krizler bazen anlaşılması zor biçimler alıyor. İklim değışikliği ve gıda krizinden, demokrasinin kalitesinin sorgulanmasına ve vatandaşların kendilerinin tanımlamaya çalıştığı rejim türüne kadar, yapılması gereken çok şey olduğuna şüphe yok.

2010 yılından bu yana Gine, hem siyasi hem de etnik seçimlerin ardından yapısal krizlerle boğuşmakta ve yüzlerce gösteriye sahne olmaktadır. Güç ve nüfuz kazanma stratejilerinin adaletin önüne geçtiği ve sosyal eşitsizliklerin göz ardı edildiği açıktır. Siyasi partiler ve hükümet arasındaki güven eksikliği ve yerel medyanın bazen fazla partizan olarak görülmesi, yeni bir aktör kategorisinin dijital kamusal alanda kendini göstermesinin önünü açıyor. Bu çalışma, saha araştırmasına dayalı olarak Gine'deki toplumsal hareketlerin detaylı bir analizini sunmaktadır.

Sıralı karma açıklayıcı bir çalışma aracılığıyla, 2019-2021 yılları arasında 350 katılımcıyla bir anket yapılmış ve nicel çalışmanın bulgularını daha fazla açıklamak için 25 katılımcıyla derinlemesine görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma Gine Cumhuriyeti'nde istikrarsızlığa yol açan bir dizi içsel faktörü ele almakta ve içsel ve dışsal faktörler ile toplumsal hareketlerin direniş imkân ve kapasiteleri, medya olanakları ve toplumsal eşitsizlik kaynakları arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

**ANAHTAR KELİMELELER :** Toplumsal hareketler, Direniş, Toplumsal eşitsizlikler, Medya uygulamaları, Çatışmalar, Güç ve sosyal ağlar

## **DECLARATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND RULES**

I hereby declare that this thesis is my personal and original work; that I have acted in accordance with the principles and rules of scientific ethics at all stages of my study, including preparation, data collection, analysis, and presentation of information; that I have cited references for all data and information obtained in this study and have included these references in the bibliography; that this study has been analyzed by the "scientific plagiarism detection program" used by Anadolu University and does not contain any plagiarism. If at any time a situation contrary to the declaration I have made regarding my study is found, I hereby declare that I accept the moral and legal consequences.

Student Name and Surnames

Soumaila Ibrahima Doré

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**"God be praised" for life and its benefits.**

The realization of this thesis is far from being the fruit of a solitary exercise. The meetings and exchanges with the professors during my studies have allowed me to improve, but also, have enriched this work. I would like to thank in particular some people without whom the accomplishment of this work would not have been possible. My first thanks go straight to my thesis director, Prof.Dr. Fuat Gllpinar.

I would like to thank him in particular for his kindness, his patience, and the trust he has placed in me since the beginning of our acquaintance. His availability, his attention and his encouragement have always accompanied me throughout these years of study. I am extremely grateful to him for all his advice and for having allowed me to reach my goal.

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*I dedicate this thesis to my wife and my kids.*

**Sita, Fatou and Ibrahim**

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## 1.1. Introduction

Studies on social movements have developed considerably in recent decades, extending from sociology and political science to other fields of knowledge as varied as psychology, anthropology, history, geography, and economics, which apply different theories to this phenomenon for an explanation better adapted to our current societies.

By the twenty-first century, people all over the world recognized the term 'social movement' as a trumpet call, as a counterweight to oppressive power, as a summons to popular action against a wide range of scourges<sup>1</sup>.

Social movements, whether labor movements or new social movements, seek to transform aspects of everyday life that are normally experienced as "givens" outside of history; they question "truths" such as the market, the inferiority of women's wages or the superiority of one race over another, the ecological or ethnic question. With their intervention, the ordinary reproduction of social structures and institutions can be radically interrupted, and the "naturalness" of social institutions is questioned<sup>2</sup>.

The analysis of social movements has grown dramatically in recent times all over the world and especially in Western countries. The interest in this phenomenon is not only related to the fact that theorists have been focusing more on the movements themselves, but also to a new turn of history and rapid societal changes that vary according to space and time.

However, while the study of social movements is of great interest in America, Europe, Asia, and even North Africa, it is less visible in the sub-Saharan part of the African continent. Apparently, Scholars of social movements and global protest have long neglected social movements in Africa, ostensibly because African societies are too rural, too tradition- or ethnicity bound, or lacking advanced class formations. Those who have broached the topic tend to focus on South Africa's labor movement and anti-apartheid struggle. Even less addressed is how social movements in various parts of the continent

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<sup>1</sup>Charles, T., Ernesto, C., & Lesley, J. W. (2020). *Social Movements, 1768–2018* (éd. 4e). New York and London: Routledge.p.5

<sup>2</sup> Wieviorka, M. (2003). *Un autre Monde...Contestations, dérives et surprises dans l'antimondialisation*. Paris: Balland.p.155

have affected each other. A continent-wide approach however shows that protests in sub-Saharan Africa preceded the North African uprisings, by almost a decade. These protests had similar objectives and faced comparable obstacles, yet much of the scholarship on the “Arab Spring” has ignored the sub-Saharan connections and precedents<sup>3</sup>.

The resurgence of social movements in their new form in Africa has brought about radical changes and generated new actors different from the trade unions in Marx's macro-historical theory. The characteristic of these movements is that they raise several problems at the same time which are not only inherent to the economic and labor crises, but one could say that these social movements now bear new ideologies, witnessing the reformulation of the social and political question.

The work in this thesis is not to go back and try to interconnect the Arab Spring movements with those of sub-Saharan Africa, even if we will try to touch on the part. Rather, this study will examine the social movements in the Republic of Guinea, their characteristics, and the forms they have tended to take in recent times.

The need to examine this phenomenon in our country stems from the fact that social movements, strikes, violence, and political contestation are becoming ubiquitous in daily life in Guinea. Social protests, inter-ethnic confrontations, before, during, and after the election, periods have become even more widespread. However, instead of scientific research and rigorous examination of this fact, many intellectuals are content with debates on the country's radio and television stations and with a few published articles without seeking to investigate deeply the real causes of these movements. The fundamental contextual ingredient of this research will allow us to understand the motivations that drive actors to take to the streets, to call for resistance, and to seek to understand how these efforts lead to change and political opportunities.


## **1.2. Chapters Summary**

This thesis is presented in twelve chapters. This research begins with a presentation of the literature on the subject of social movements, followed by the establishment of

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<sup>3</sup>Hisham, A. (2018, Novembre). Africa's New Social Movements: A Continental Approach. Policy Brief, p. 1.

conceptual and theoretical frameworks that will enable us to develop an understanding of the notions of social movements, media and their uses, and inequality and politics.



In the first chapter, the meaning of the definitions and the basic terms used in our study are explicitly understood. We give the definitions of some authors in order to place these words in their appropriate contexts. We also provide a theoretical framework that can explain social movements and how different authors understand their meaning over time. The theories listed in this section provide a coherent set of explanations around our central theme.

In the second chapter, the method section focuses on the development of explanatory knowledge about these phenomena, which will allow us to confirm or refute our hypothesis and then seek to generalize the result to our target population. The study involved 350 informants to measure their perceptions of the riots. This result will be corroborated by interviews with another 25 resource persons to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon.

The third chapter is an analysis of the literature on social movements in Guinea. Ideas are compared and analyzed in order to identify the limitations of these authors. It's an exercise to understand the shortcomings of our predecessors and to see how our scholarly contribution in this direction can help us better understand the reasons why people take to the streets. On the other hand, to understand also how has the ethnicization of politics contributed to fueling violence.

In chapter four, we provide a summary of social movements and their emergence. We provide a synthesis of social movements in Europe, Asia, America, and Africa. The discontent of the actors and the popular insurrection that followed this anger towards the leaders of certain countries, who were previously unable to cope with new crises, not only compromised freedom but also made life increasingly difficult. In Africa, these leaders now embody the identity of false shepherds who deprive the children of Africa of their milk. The chapter focuses on the various waves of protests since independence on the African continent, with Guinea as the country of focus.

The content of the fifth chapter is focused on the management during the second and the third Republic. It explains in particular the bad practices of governance under the presidency of the late General Lansana Conté. The chapter reminds us of a little of the slippage and abuse of power by the military and certain executives who took advantage of the country's wealth at their leisure. The squandering of funds, injustice, and open

corruption will eventually trigger the exit of civil society actors, trade union centers, and a population that had taken its pain in patience to express their desolations against the dignitaries of this regime. The chapter also talks about the putsch of Captain Dadis and other forms of protests and demonstrations in Guinea.

The chapter six is the narrative on democratic issues and the voting procedure in Guinea. The chapter unpacks the strategies of political leaders and alliances in the run-up to and during elections. This reading on the elections also reveals the ethnic groups that come into play and the categories of actors who expose themselves to all the risks in order to obtain an absolute majority for their candidates. The chapter also highlights the preferred communication style of leaders and activists such as propaganda, victimization, sabotage, psychological camouflage, and rumors in the media and on the ground during election campaigns. It describes electoral behavior and the influence of opinion leaders on ballot box results.

The chapter seven highlights the common problem in most dictatorial regimes in Francophone Africa. It highlights the difficulties of non-compliance with constitutional texts which leads democracy to the brink of collapse. The chapter also mentions the difficulties experienced by heads of state in applying laws adapted to the socio-cultural reality of the population. This section also discusses the manipulation of a predominantly illiterate population and the lack of credibility of certain entities in charge of adopting laws in Guinea.

Chapter eighth reviews the historical highlights of the coup's d'état in Guinea. Since the death of the late president Ahmed Sékou Touré, the process of opening up to the world and integrating as a young state into democracy has not been without incident. The chapter explains the successive seizures of power and the intervention of the army in political bodies during periods of crisis. We also talk about the reasons for these interferences in political affairs and the role of ECOWAS as a coordinating body for actions in the West African zone.

Chapter nine focuses generally on information and communication in the technology era. The chapter refers specifically to the use of these tools by political actors and activists to achieve their goals. It explains the role of 2.0 technology as a relay for local media that are sometimes influenced by their agendas, as well as the partisan behavior of journalists

that makes young bloggers be the eyes and informants of thousands of other people who feel the need for political information. The chapter also explains how social media has become a space for free speech and the circulation of fake news.

The chapter ten discusses the real difficulties faced by Guinean citizens over the past several years. Inequalities are growing daily between the working class and the minority of executives, businessmen, and big traders. The paragraphs in this section explain some types of social inequalities that exist between genders and professional categories, the difficulties that Guineans experience in accessing social services and housing, and the reproduction of these inequalities in several arteries of state functioning. The explanations go beyond the national context to present a local African reality in relation to the digital divide, access to which remains difficult until now.

The eleventh chapter is the one that seeks to project a little further the reflections not only on the internal factors that keep the country in a state of underdevelopment but especially on those external. We all agree that the interconnection established between poor and rich countries through globalization has always benefited the latter. Moreover, the political and economic strategies that are implemented through the financial institutions of aid to development and the accredited representations have as a first principle to make good politics by defending their interests and by imposing to the others the respect of a roadmap sometimes not adapted to the reality of these communities. The chapter challenges the reader on these problems that persist in the 21<sup>st</sup>-century world and issues between Guinea and its foreign partners.

The final chapter is a synthesis of all the literature provided. It is in this chapter that the results of the first quantitative research are discussed, analyzed and interpreted. This part provides a wealth of information on the reality of problems in Guinea, such as daily difficulties and the means used by citizens to survive or overcome these periods.

The remainder of the work required the contribution of interviews drawn from the qualitative study to better support the quantitative results. This part is reinforced by the expressions of the informants who provided data based on their experiences, but also their political and social view of the situation and the judgment they make on collective behavior.

In this respect, the presentation of our results highlighted our theoretical contribution, concluding with the conclusion we have drawn from this scientific project.

## 1.2. Presentation of the Country

The Republic of Guinea is a coastal country located in southwestern West Africa. Its surface area is 245 857 km<sup>2</sup>. It shares its borders with six countries, including Guinea-Bissau to the northwest, Senegal and Mali to the north, Côte d'Ivoire to the east, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to the south. It is a coastal country with 300 km of Atlantic coastline. This country has important hydrographic resources and a rich mining potential: two thirds of the world's bauxite reserve (75% of the world's reserves), gold, diamonds, high quality iron (Simandou blocks), manganese, zinc, cobalt, nickel, uranium. These resources are still largely under-exploited. The national economy, torn between economic development and environmental preservation, is essentially driven by the agricultural (which employs 80% of the population) and mining (bauxite, diamond, gold, iron) sectors<sup>4</sup>.

Its population is estimated at thirteen million (13,000,000) in 2020 according to the World Bank. The term Guinea emerged in the fifteenth century according to some historians and refers to the land inhabited by the Black people. And it is the name that the colonists gave to most of the countries of the Gulf of Guinea and wherever they met Black people.

The Guinean population is characterized by cultural diversity and the presence of important ethnic groups distributed mainly as follows: The Soussous (Maritime Guinea), Fulanis or Fulani in (Middle Guinea) Malinkés (Upper Guinea), and Forest Guinea between Koniankés, Kisis, Konons, Tomas, and Guerzés mainly. There are also other ethnic groups throughout the country such as Toucouleurs, Diakankés, Bagas, Nalous, Landoumas, Mikoforès, Manons, Badiarankés, Kourankos, Bassaris, Koniaguis, Lélés, Foulakoundas, Tomamanians, Djallonkés, Maoukas, etc. There are cultural and lineage relationships among some of these groups, but also very similar dialects.

Like other countries on the continent, the Republic of Guinea has a population characterized by extreme youth (55.5% are under 20 years of age and more than six out of ten inhabitants (64.1%) are under 25 years of age) and by a sex ratio that favors women, who represent 52% of the overall population.

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<sup>4</sup>RGPH. (2022, 01 23). Guinée Politique. Found on <https://guineepolitique.org/presentation-generale-de-la-guinee/>

French is the national official language and the language of communication used by the State in the exercise of its sovereign mission. However, the local languages are valued by the Guinean population. They are spoken in all regions, everywhere, and especially in the informal sector. English and Arabic are also taught in some public and private institutions. Our anthem is Freedom, and the motto is Work, Justice, and Solidarity.

The majority of the Guinean population is Muslim (88%) and they are overrepresented in all natural regions of the country. There is also a large Christian community (6.8%). These religions are strongly influenced by traditional beliefs which represent 1.6% animists, 01% other religions, and 2.4% atheists.

Guinea is a unified country, inseparable, secular, democratic and social with cultural diversity. National supremacy is exercised by the people who exercise it through their elected representatives. The president ensures the proper functioning of public power and the continuity of the state and is the primary guarantor of the Republic. He appoints the Prime Minister who forms the government.

From the point of view of a contact with Europeans, it can be said that the Portuguese were the first to approach the Guinean coast. They were later ousted by the English and the French, who became the main animators of the slave trade. It was at the beginning of the 19th century that France clearly manifested its intentions for Guinea. Thus, following compromises between the rival powers on the one hand and numerous agreements, treaties and conventions concluded with the traditional chiefs on the other, France effectively occupied the "Southern Rivers" from 1875 onwards<sup>5</sup>.

The territorial limits of French Guinea were definitively fixed on July 1, 1912, by a Franco-English treaty that specified its borders in relation to the English colony of Sierra Leone. Colonial penetration was met with resistance from the population throughout Guinea. The fiercest opposition was led by Almamy Samory Touré, whose troops fought the French invaders for eighteen years. Subjected to a system of "Direct Administration", Guinea underwent sixty years of colonization which ended only with the referendum of September 28, 1958, the result of which was the crowning achievement of all the political and trade union struggles waged by the Guinean people against the colonial occupation,

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<sup>5</sup>Diallo, M. B. (2022, 23 01).p.3 Found on <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR109/01Chapitre01.pdf>

particularly since 1945. Guinea thus acceded to international sovereignty by proclaiming its independence on October 2, 1958<sup>6</sup>.

Sociologically, the Guinean population, although influenced by modernity, remains attached to traditional culture and is animated by a spirit of sovereignty which remains a non-negotiable issue in the eyes of the population.

Contrary to the idea put forward by some French or foreign neo-colonialists who say that they have civilized the African population and that the price to pay has been to indulge in all sorts of perversities towards the populations and the plundering of resources are only reflections of their less than virtuous mentalities.

The African civilization is very old and existed long before the discovery of the continent by the Europeans. Many European scientists were inspired by the works in ancient Egypt. For example, the hieroglyphs, the pyramid, the units of measurement etc.

In Africa, there were kingdoms and empires with a solid social and political organization. The laws, institutions, mores, and customs that governed the life of the inhabitants were in perfect harmony with their temperament and their environment. This stability, this balance had aroused since the fourteenth century, the amazement and admiration of Arab travelers. Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldoun, El Bekri described, in great detail, the Negro civilizations they admired during their travels in "Africa south of the Sahara". They affirmed in their reports free of bias that in these black states reigned peace, solidarity, security, and prosperity<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ousmane, D. (1959). *Guinée Indépendente*. Présence Africaine, p.48. Found on <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24345609>

Figure 1. Map of the Republic of Guinea



#### 1.4. Problem

The situation of socio-political crisis that Guinea is going through is a problem that characterizes the realities of many other countries in West Africa, and if we do not abuse language, we can say that it is an African reality. Realities that very often have their sources in the structural crises of the past, usually of a political, economic, and socio-cultural nature. The mobilization of actors in the street or in public places to demand change has become a recurrent action that calls everyone to question the possible transformations and the major role of these actors engaged in the daily struggle.

Social movements are not, it is suggested, and best understood as authentic and unproblematic movements of the people, simply counterposed to powerful and exploitative forces in society. They are rather an expression of the contradictions and hierarchies of the society in which they operate, whose debates and conflicts express inequalities of resources, influence and education and differences of class, gender, and ethnicity, amongst others. This does not make them 'inauthentic' representatives of the poor or exploited; rather, it makes them venues or spaces in which political difference is articulated in societies characterized by inequality, exploitation, and social conflict<sup>8</sup>.

In the ideology of restructuring certain human values once scorned, the struggles on the continent have gone through several phases strewn with painful memories. However, the lessons learned from this history, of whatever nature, have been of little use to many African countries and especially the leaders.

Guinean society has been wounded since political independence was achieved in 1958. The blows came from those who controlled power, but also from those who contested it or wanted to take control<sup>9</sup>.

As far back as 1958, the country's various political parties and regionally based organizations were divided over the issue of a referendum on whether or not Guinea should remain in the Franco-African community proposed by General de Gaulle,

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<sup>8</sup>Larmer, M. (2010). Social movement struggles in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 252. Found on <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2010.510623>

<sup>9</sup>FIDH, & al. (2018). *Mémoire collective: Une histoire plurielle des violences politiques en Guinée*. Conakry: Harmatthan Guinée, 18.

president of France during the colonial era. And this divergence of political and regionalist opinions continues until today. In addition, the early withdrawal of the colonial administration from the country opened up the political space for a fierce rivalry between political opponents and ethnic and regionalist groupings. Moreover, even today, the political landscape is made up of political parties with a communal connotation, where arguments have given way to ethnic and inflammatory discourse. We finally find ourselves in a situation where a crisis can erupt at any moment<sup>10</sup>.

Many families have experienced the loss of a parent in political unrest. Mourning is made all the more difficult by the fact that many of these abuses remain unexplained or unpunished. These different historical contexts, under the regime of Sékou Touré from 1958 to 1984, under that of Lansana Conté from 1984 until December 2008, and then under Moussa Dadis Camara until the end of 2009, have produced a bruised, fragmented memory that is still little shared by Guineans. A generation is growing up amidst partisan and truncated narratives. The memories are there, but the elders often keep them, out of caution, locked in the folds of memory, at the risk of letting other sources serve to write history<sup>11</sup>.

Popular discontent with the declining economic climate, brought on by rampant inflation, massive official corruption, decaying infrastructure, and poor governance, led to two massive strikes in 2006 (organized by a conglomerate of civil society groups, including the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea, Union for Progress in Guinea (UPG), the Guinean Social Movement, the New Democratic Forces (NDF), and student and religious groups), and a third nationwide strike in early 2007, in which protesters, concerned about President Conte's declining health, asked the National Assembly to declare the presidency vacant. Government attempts to suppress the third strike, which took place in two phases and included members of opposition political parties, exiled former politicians, human rights, and democracy activists, etc., led to the killing of 137 protesters and the injury of 1,700 others<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup>Mara, B. (2017). *Les crises constitutionnelles en Guinée : déroulement, résolution et approche prospectives*. France: Université d'Avignon, 27.

<sup>11</sup>(Op.cit).

<sup>12</sup>Okonofua. (2014). *Political Transformation and Security and Stability: The Case of West Africa's Guinea*. Researchgate, 12.

From the general strike of June 2006 to the unlimited general strike of January to February 2007 to these last elections, it should be remembered that Guinea has become the country where protests are held. Community political parties, workers, youth in the suburbs, students, etc. are trying everything to change the way the political system works.

Anyone can form a protest group at any time to protest against a public authority or private institution in order to influence its decision. Demonstration in Guinea is synonymous with violence, sometimes with revenge. This means that from the smallest citizen to the authorities, no one escapes this spiral of violence. Guinean civil servants hardly work during this period, institutions are weakened due to the lack of activities, schools and markets are closed to make way for anarchy on the roads and in the neighborhoods. In order to work, one must leave home early to be safe from clashes and thugs.

The strikes have become a habit so much so that some citizens call it in the popular language the "match between the government and the opposition". As in the days of the former putsch Dadis Camara, who marveled in his "Talk-show" that citizens were eager to watch behind their screens after the news.

The trivialization of political behavior in our country, which has become a completely different reality, tends to play down the situation. Crises persist, poverty affects almost every household, and those in power play deaf to the cries of the people.

In 2010, the polls that allowed a restoration of constitutional rights and democratic rule quickly turned into a conflict between the historical opponent Alpha Conde<sup>13</sup> and ex-Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo<sup>14</sup>. The result of the first round of the election announced Mr. Diallo as the favorite with 43.69% of the validly cast votes. The second round, however, allowed Alpha Conde to come to power with 52.52% of the vote, while in the first round the historic opponent had only obtained 18.25% of the vote. Did the independent national electoral commission (CENI) falsify the results? Was Alpha Conde politically better prepared than his opponent? How can this reversal of trends in the Guinean political arena be explained? One thing has been proven, however, and that it is

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<sup>13</sup>Alpha Condé is Guinea's former president and a long-time opposition politician heading the Rassemblement pour le peuple de Guinée (RPG).

<sup>14</sup> Cellou Dallein is a Guinean opposition politician of the Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG). He was a minister under Lansana Conté and is president Alpha Condé's main opponent until the coup d'Etat.

during these electoral periods that political crises are accentuated and alliances during the crisis open the way for inter-community confrontations, particularly between Malinké and Fulani who are affiliated, rightly, or wrongly, with the two political parties, the RPG and the UFDG, which are considered to be super parties.

The 2015 presidential election, the 2020 legislative elections in which the constitution was amended, and the 2020 presidential vote all took place in an atmosphere of extreme political tension that unfortunately caused many deaths and injuries. The proposed constitutional amendment, which would allow the president to run for a third term, gave rise to the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC), which paralyzed the country for weeks. In some parts of the country, including the opposition stronghold, polling station officials were unexpectedly visited by youths who attacked equipment and burned voter registration cards. The reason, according to them, was related to the non-association of their candidate with the consultation process initiated by the government.

Using Almond and Powell's classification, we can speak of the existence of a parochial political culture in Guinea, where voters want members of their ethnic group or nationals of their region to come to power in order to better defend the interests of their community. The Guinean state, populated by some thirty ethnic groups, has not yet managed to overcome ethnic divisions to form a nation<sup>15</sup>.

However, while this political reality tends to draw attention across borders, the economic crisis is pervasive in Guinea. Although the country is complimented as a geological scandal because of nature's gift of resources, Guinea remains a debt-ridden and underdeveloped country.

Guinean economy remains relatively undiversified and structurally vulnerable to exogenous shocks, particularly commodity shocks: the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP is relatively modest (23% on average) even though this sector employs nearly 52% of the active population; the secondary sector (35% of GDP) is mainly dominated by mining activities which, along with bauxite, gold, and diamonds, account for an average of 85% of the country's exports; energy is also a strategic sector, both for

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<sup>15</sup>Somparé, A. W. (2013). Une longue et laborieuse transition démocratique en Guinée. *Annuaire français des relations International*, 450. Found on [https://www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/449\\_Sompare.pdf](https://www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/449_Sompare.pdf)

the investments underway and for its knock-on effects on other activities. Guinea, which has a population of 13.1 million and a GDP of US\$15.4 billion in 2020, is at the bottom of the HDI ranking, occupying the 178th position out of 189 countries in 2019. According to the authorities, just under half of Guineans (44%) live under the poverty line, estimated at 13,717 GNF/person/day (1.1 euros) in 2019. In addition, the economy remains largely informal, accounting for an estimated 43 percent of GDP and 96 percent of employment in 2018<sup>16</sup>.

Beyond these indicators, the population is constantly seeking to satisfy elementary needs such as food, water, electricity, and the access to comfortable housing. These concerns expose citizens to all kinds of risks that have a direct or indirect impact on their mental health and physical well-being. Health security is only active in times of epidemics or pandemics such as (Ebola, Covid-19). Undernourishment and insalubrity are very often at the root of several diseases that hinder productivity. Life expectancy at birth for a Guinean is barely 60 years.

Chronic diseases, which are increasingly numerous in the population, are: diabetes, with a prevalence of 5% in subjects aged 15 to 64 years; chronic respiratory diseases, with 12.4% in schools; sickle cell disease, with a prevalence of 11.57% according to the Emmel test among routine applications; cardiovascular disease, with a prevalence of 28.1% of hypertension (high blood pressure); cervical cancer, with a prevalence of 0.5% in women; and liver cancer, with a prevalence of 31.5 per 100,000<sup>17</sup>.

The road infrastructure in a degrading state, especially in the interior of the country, causes fatal accidents during all seasons. The statistics of the Central Directorate of Road Police underline that only for the period of the year 2020 there were 3174 traffic accidents of which 228 deaths. The bad condition of these roads exposes users to looting and armed robbery by bandits commonly known as road cutters in Guinea. Guinea's death rate from traffic accidents per 100,000 inhabitants is 38.43 and it maintains the 29th place in the world according to a World Health Organization study in 2020. Cases of disability and

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<sup>16</sup>Direction Générale du Trésor. (2021, Août 24). Found on <https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Pays/GN/situation-economique-et-financiere>

<sup>17</sup> PNDS. (2015, mars). Plan National de Développement sanitaire. Conakry: Ministère de la Santé, 21. Found on <https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Plan-National-de-De%CC%81veloppement-Sanitaire-2015-2024.-Guine%CC%81e.pdf>

injury caused by motorized vehicles are reported almost daily. Young people are among the most affected by these accidents. Particularly reckless in the pursuit of their daily lives, especially during wedding celebrations, hosting artists, or gathering at political rallies many of them unfortunately lose their lives. The lucky ones are forced to live with a deformed limb, traces and after-effects during their lives.

As for corruption, like everywhere else in fragile countries, it is evident in Guinea. The trivialization of this scourge and the impunity that accompanies it, mean that the state records enormous losses every year. Guinean citizens have been unanimous on this issue for several decades.

According to research published in 2020 by Afrobaromètre on corruption indicators, 63 percent of Guineans believe that the level of this practice has increased significantly in the year prior to the survey. This trend increased by another 25 points in 2015. Magistrates and judges are among the most corrupt segments of public officials. 56% of the population considers them to be mostly involved in corruption. They are followed by tax agents (50%) and police officers (49%). Many citizens bribe public officials in order to avoid difficulties with the police, obtain their assistance, and obtain an administrative document.

Guineans trust religious and traditional chiefs more than public officials and institutions. Seven out of ten Guineans (70%) say that people risk retaliation if they report corruption to authorities. Fear of negative outcomes has increased by 7 percentage points since 2017. The government responds "somewhat unsatisfactorily" or "very inefficiently" to the issue of corruption in public administration, according to eight in 10 Guineans (82%).

For the year 2020 Guinea scored 28/100, down one point from the score achieved in 2019 (29/100), and below the average for the Sub-Saharan Africa region (32/100). The country is ranked 137/180 and drops 7 places from 2019 (130/180). In Africa, Guinea ranks 32nd out of 54 countries assessed, compared to 25th in 2019, demonstrating a significant decline in the promotion of good governance<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup>Diallo, O. K. (2021, février 10). Perception de la corruption: la Guinée en mauvaise position. Found on Guinée7.com: <https://www.guinee7.com/perception-de-la-corruption-la-guinee-en-mauvaise-position/>

Many Guineans believe that corruption has not decreased in the country. In this regard, 42.4% of Guineans think that petty corruption is stable and 25.7% say it is increasing. Regarding grand corruption (corruption at the top of the state), the following percentages are stable (36.8%) and increasing (29.6%).

Guinea has another problem that exposes the country to several other risks. While education is always a priority in the government's annual implementation plans, the majority of the Guinean population remains illiterate (65%), even though education is mandatory. This scourge affects women much more than men (74%) and tends to increase in rural areas where the learning environment and conditions are not very convenient.

On public financing of the education sector, an AFD note tells us that in 2013, the education budget represented 3.2 percent of GDP (compared to 4.7 percent globally) and 15.2 percent of the state budget (compared to an average of 17 percent for sub-Saharan Africa). The same note points out that the trade-off between subsectors has not been favorable to basic education and has not achieved the objectives set by the international community (the share of the budget allocated to primary education was relatively low, at 43.3 percent, while that allocated to higher education was 32.5 percent). The share of primary education in the public resources allocated to the sector decreased from 51% in 2002 to 47% in 2008 and then to 43% in 2013. Despite a certain growing effort to devote public resources to the education sector, this remains below the average for countries in the sub region<sup>19</sup>.

The subject of most concern is the deteriorating situation of teachers and contract staff. Poorly paid, poorly housed, meanwhile absent to do odd jobs to make up for shortfalls. Teachers in charge of education and training have demonstrated their discontent several times through strikes, the most memorable of which was that of the Free Teachers' and Researchers' Union of Guinea (SLECG) in 2017. The demonstration was to review teachers' salaries and regularize the situation of contract teachers across the country. In an already tense political context, this strike only added insult to injury.

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<sup>19</sup>Diallo, S. C. (2020, Décembre 05). Système éducatif guinéen: l'autre grand corps malade de la République. Found on Guinée Politique: <https://www.guineepolitique.com/systeme-educatif-guineen-lautre-grand-corps-malade-de-la-republique/>

The media, considered the fourth estate in Guinea, is assuming a role that is upsetting Guinean opinion about its capacity for transparency. Rather than being involved in their role as institutions for the dissemination of authentic information, some actors in this sector engage in deviant practices that deviate from media ethics. They reveal in their speeches and texts a hidden partisan ideology that leaves one wondering.

On the cultural level, Guinea has been throughout history the voice of abused and oppressed African states and at the same time the scapegoat who has taken responsibility on the part of France. Its access to independence in 1958 paved the way for several countries to obtain their own in the "60s" known as the year of independence in Africa. However, after the departure of the settlers, the teachings, the administrative system, and the language remained there.

The Guinean constitution in its essence contains several texts, which do not reflect the social and cultural reality of the Guinean population. Territorial carvings by Western imperialists have called into question the future of an African nation.

The dispersion of ethnic groups has broken the union of groups and peoples once linked by culture, languages, and customs. The established borders ended up making kingdoms and empires disappear. So instead of the nation-state in which an original indigenous language would have been spoken, countries with foreign languages.

From political demonstrations to socio-economic and cultural crises, change should be a priority for the state. However, there are many shortcomings, and the manifest will of the current heads of state in several African countries seems unsatisfactory and questionable. In institutional reports during stable periods, projections of growth and development are reported while on the ground deprivation and suffering are real.

This being said, in order to reach a better understanding of these continuous protests for more than a decade, we have made it our duty to explain this subject, the main question of which can be summarized as follows:

***Since the protests of 2006-2007, which were distinguished by their extremely rare nature, what explains the resurgence of social movements in the Republic of Guinea?***

- What relationship can be developed between social inequality and the emergence of protests?
- Do the post-election protests over the last ten years have any relationship to communitarianism and ethnicity?

- What explains the shift of actors from physical to virtual space?
- What roles do traditional and social media play during the periods of conflict?

The answers to these questions are in line with the objective of this research. They seek first and foremost to explain the causes of the resurgence of social movements in Guinea, but also its characteristics in the context of socio-political crises.

## **HYPOTHESIS**

The social movements in Guinea are first and foremost part of a philosophy of revolution. The actors of change invest themselves in this action to prioritize political, cultural, and social emancipation. Their way of achieving their objective requires strategies generally known by political science, but sometimes the environment and the framework being more cultural refers to it a little hybrid character. It actively participates in the reconfiguration of the political arena through activists and social actors who mobilize for a collective awareness.

In order to examine this issue, we will start from the hypothesis that:

***The resurgence of social movements in Guinea is explained by the political struggle of identity/interest groups for the highest office in the country.***

This hypothesis is considered to be the main one, and it undoubtedly refers us to a deep investment in the subject. However, previous observations on Guinean society mention that the economic factor and the situation of precariousness are grievances that increase the magnitude and the resistance in certain areas of tension.

Sometimes people who go out support violence when they have nothing to eat, when they have problems accessing a minimum service.

Based on this alternative idea, the second hypothesis can be constructed as follows:

*The politically precarious economic and social network created by successive powers, this fragmented and unequal system in which the survival of the poorest depends on their loyalty to the rich and privileged of the capitalist system, increases the disenchantment of the poor, which means expressing their anger and criticizing injustice through demonstrations.*

This look at a minority that makes resources their personal patrimony is a serious aspect that will be discussed in this work. In order to verify this hypothesis, it is obvious to know the problematic of social movements, the theories illustrating this phenomenon, and to carry out documentary research and statistical analysis to confirm or reject it. Far from being a weakness, this exercise will help to improve the work and place it in a scientific context.

## **CHAPITRE II: METHODOLOGY**

The social, economic, and political problems facing every society and the changes taking place in today's world are complex and require careful and thorough examination. To address them, it is essential to carry out in-depth work that depends on the appropriate methods and tools available for each field.

For researchers in the social sciences and humanities, scientific research is the means by which they generally achieve their objective. It is the process par excellence that allows to identify social phenomena, to study them, by accumulating both knowledge and experience.

In other words, it is an individual and/or collective effort to improve the understanding of problems by collecting information, analyzing, and interpreting these facts in order to draw useful lessons and give relevant explanations during a certain period of validity. It is these confrontations of knowledge, theories and experiences that allow scientific research to progress.

When the researcher decides to approach a given subject, it is necessarily because it interests him. These are phenomena about which we had previous knowledge and sometimes a lived experience. It is even obvious that we often proceed to research to validate or refute this information or simply to bring to light an idea that interests us and that deserves our full consideration<sup>20</sup>.

Research on social movements has so far been very concrete in its use of a range of techniques potentially available for data collection and processing. Consequently, the absence of methodological dogmatism is seen as an advantageous aspect of the field of social movement research. Many researchers have indeed applied a wide range of techniques and methods in the field to further their thinking on the issue (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002a; see also 2002b) (op.cit).

### **2.1. Methods**

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<sup>20</sup>Campenhoudt, L. V., Marquet, J., & Quivy, R. (2017). *Manuel de recherche en Sciences Sociales* (éd. 5e). Paris: Dunod.

When one begins scientific research, whatever the form or the nature it takes, the researcher always proceeds by the beginning which implies the choice of the subject, but also the availability of the documents necessary to its understanding. The exploration of the literature on social movements allowed us to get an idea of the research already conducted in the field, the angles of approach used, the methods and theories, etc. These available resources are a real contribution for each researcher. Through the literature review, we were able to identify the types of social movements in different geographical areas, the reasons why protests tend to be peaceful in some places and violent in others with completely different realities. The elements and strategies they use to achieve their goals.

Fleshing out the literature led to what we really wanted once we discovered the research question. It was essential to locate the angle of attack and narrow the area of study to avoid confusing everything in one basket.

In this study our preference is the mixed explanatory sequential method because we assume that the combination of quantitative and qualitative data will allow us to consider the strengths of both and to better understand the problem. However, before going into the detailed explanation of this method we will provide some definitions.

**Research methods** are the techniques you use to conduct research. They are the tools of the trade and provide you with ways to collect, sort and analyze information so that you can draw conclusions. If you use the right methods for your particular type of research, you should be able to convince others that your conclusions are valid and that the new knowledge you have created is sound<sup>21</sup>.

**Qualitative research** is a means of exploring and understanding the meaning that individuals or groups attribute to a social or human problem. The research process involves the development of questions and procedures, the collection of data in the context of the participant, the analysis of the data inductively from details to general themes, and the researcher's interpretation of the meaning of the data. The final written report has a flexible structure. Those who engage in this form of inquiry support a way of

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<sup>21</sup>Walliman, N. (2011). *Research Methods the Basics*. London: Routledge.

looking at research that honors an inductive style, a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of capturing the complexity of a situation<sup>22</sup>.

In this phase of the research, two categories of interviews were conducted. The procedure was based on collecting responses using a carefully developed guide containing unstructured interview questions. The unstructured interview recommends that the question be asked with some leeway for the informant to go into more detail in the conversation. This allows for the capture of important moments related to emotion, experiences, and the tendency of meaning, significance, and interpretation that the candidate gives to his or her thought, to the phenomenon under study. It is a natural conversation but guided by the interviewer.

In this research, the first category of respondent was people with experience in social movements, which were deliberately selected. They are usually political actors, journalists, columnists, and editors of the audiovisual press. The second category was the ordinary citizens available in places that were suitable for the collection of information in relation to their perception of the subject. Most of the data for this second tranche was conducted online to complete the number of informants.

In the collection of qualitative data, it was also a question of approaching subjects capable of providing us with answers on the theme. The illiteracy rate being more than 65%, despite the willingness to participate, some respondents unfortunately admitted not having the necessary information, which is why we automatically went to the informants who had knowledge about the protest.

**Quantitative research** is a means of testing objective theories by examining the relationship between variables. These variables can in turn be measured, usually with instruments, so that the numerical data can be analyzed using statistical procedures. The final written report has a fixed structure consisting of an introduction, literature and theory, methods, results, and discussion (Creswell, 2008). Like qualitative researchers, those who engage in this form of inquiry have assumptions about testing theories

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<sup>22</sup>Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (éd. 3e). California: SAGE Publications, Inc.

deductively, building in safeguards against bias, controlling for alternative explanations, and being able to generalize and replicate results<sup>23</sup>.

The questionnaire survey can be carried out in different places at different times, the most important thing is to be able to find as many informants as possible and turn their attention to the objective for a few minutes in order to obtain the precise answers according to the question asked.

**Mixed methods research** is an approach to inquiry involving the collection of quantitative and qualitative data, the integration of the two forms of data, and the use of distinct models that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks. The basic assumption of this form of inquiry is that the integration of qualitative and quantitative data provides additional information to that provided by quantitative or qualitative data alone<sup>24</sup>.

**The sequential explanatory mixed methods approach** is a model that involves a two-phase data collection project, in which the researcher collects quantitative data in the first phase, analyzes the results, and then uses the results to plan (or develop) the second, qualitative phase. The quantitative results typically inform the types of participants to be purposefully selected for the qualitative phase and the types of questions that will be asked of participants. The general intent of this design is that the qualitative data help to explain the initial quantitative results in more detail, so it is important to link or connect the quantitative results to the qualitative data collection. A typical procedure might involve collecting survey data in the first phase, analyzing the data, and then following up with qualitative interviews to help explain confusing, contradictory, or unusual responses.

### 2.3. Sampling

Non-probability sampling is a sampling procedure in which the chances of a participant being drawn from a sample cannot be calculated. This is a form of sample selection that uses non-random methods to determine a group of people to participate in a research

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<sup>23</sup>(ibid.).

<sup>24</sup>Creswell, J. W. (2018). *Research Design, Qualitative, Quantitative, aResearch Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*-John W. Creswell, J. David Creswell. (éd. 5e). California: SAGE Publications, Inc.

study. The non-probability sampling technique is based on the subjective judgment of the researcher. As such, this method can be used in cases where limited information is available on the population.

This technique is the opposite of probability sampling, in which selection probabilities can be calculated. In addition, probability sampling requires random selection, as opposed to non-probability sampling, which is based on a subjective criterion of the researcher.

To determine the sample size using non-probability sampling, only a few respondents are needed to allow for the necessary comparisons.

For both methods, we use the convenience sampling technique. For the quantitative method, we want to administer the survey to 350 informants.

Convenience sampling (also known as sampling on the fly, accidental sampling or opportunity sampling) is a type of non-probability sampling that involves drawing the sample from the part of the population that is within reach.

These people are chosen according to criteria defined by their profession, age, gender and ability to provide answers on the subject. Details of the presentation of these criteria will be available after the surveys, in the section where the results are presented.

Therefore, for this study, 350 questionnaires will be prepared and administered in the same way as for quantitative field research. After obtaining their consent, participants will be asked short, closed-ended, and semi-closed questions or sometimes scale questions to measure their perceptions of the conflict, the media, and social inequalities in Guinea.

Consequently, the data collected from the quantitative method will be subjected to an analysis to find complementary explanations in the other method. This strategy will result in a theory that will confirm or refute our initial hypothesis. The final result will be criticized and suggested and will be re-evaluated to arrive at a final conclusion.

In a qualitative study, several sampling techniques can be used to recruit participants. However, the two most common are purposive sampling and convenience sampling. They are best suited to almost all qualitative research designs. We prefer the second, convenience sampling, which we feel is more appropriate.

This is a sampling technique that qualitative researchers use to recruit participants who are easily accessible and suitable for them. Often, this means using a geographical location and resources that make it easy to recruit participants. Convenience because the researcher is collecting in a location that is convenient for him.

The reason for this choice is that it allows us to save time, material, and human resources. Unlike probability sampling, this type of sampling is very advantageous and faster.

We had estimated the number of interviews required for this study at 50. However, this number was not reached due to financial reasons and the health crisis. This number was reduced to 25 participants, with whom the qualitative study will be carried out.

Face-to-face interviews will be conducted with political players, young leaders and opinion leaders. These collections will also include photos, text messages or texts on social networks to capture facts. The data obtained will be constantly reviewed and updated. Quantitative and qualitative data will be coded and analyzed using MASQDA or SPSS.

What is noteworthy about the selection of participants is that several researchers have confessed to using methods that suit them when studying social protest. The goal depends on what each researcher is looking for. And many of them use mixed techniques to explain elements that were not foreseeable at the beginning. This means that starting with rigorous statistical methods sometimes doesn't suit students of the social sciences.

## **2.3. Risks and Ethics**

### **2.3.1 Risks**

The field research may be cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In this case, for the quantitative method, we will conduct an online survey to complete the survey through google form by submitting questionnaires that can be completed by clicking on the link of the questionnaires. For the qualitative method, we will conduct direct interviews via Zoom or Skype, where the data can be recorded and then converted into text for analysis.

It is necessary to understand in this situation that the number of participants in any given survey may decline. Because questions about ethnicity can be very sensitive in some societies such as ours, some participants may not be willing to provide answers to

these questions. It is also important to note that in case of financial difficulties, the quantitative analysis will be done in Excel, and we will try to interpret the qualitative data by linking it to the previous ones.

### **2.3.2. Ethics**

Ethical issues are of paramount importance in the decision to conduct scientific research. The primary ethical considerations in social research remain professional competence, integrity, procedural and scientific accountability, respect for the rights of research participants, dignity, diversity, and social responsibility of social researchers/scientists.

The Belmont Report endorsed the basic principles used in scientific research today. This statement and the general principles of Anadolu University will be followed during the research. Informed consent will be obtained from the participants before any form of survey is conducted. Data will also be used strictly within this framework.

## **CHAPTER III: DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **3.1. Definition of Concepts**

Concept definition is an exercise that allows researchers to specify and frame the contours of the concept to be defined. Several authors agree that this could also help to situate the reader according to the evolution of the concept and in which framework the concept can be useful in scientific work. In sciences such as sociology, the flexibility and changing nature of methods, as well as changing human characteristics, allows a concept to be adapted according to the space and cultural milieu in which it is used.

#### **3.1.1. The Concept of Social Movements**

Defining a social movement may not seem easy for the simple reason that the authors who take part in this exercise give their definitions according to their points of view and have different approaches. It is also linked to their disciplines, so that when a sociologist defines a fact, he considers above all what he sees, what the observable reality is. Whereas the historian would look in the rear-view mirror to formulate his point of view on the present.

Well before starting the definitions, it is important to know first of all the need to conduct a study on social movements. The first reason as a sociologist is to be aware of the reality around us. To be able to distinguish and differentiate between people, values, human and societal problems. It is also to understand why people revolt in the face of injustice, inequality, corrupt political authority. It is to understand the struggle of people who seek to preserve the existing lifestyle, their natural environment, in short, to preserve the natural order of things. On the other hand, it is to see the tendencies of other categories of people who deconstruct things, their preference for other forms of life, other identities, and cultures, including immersion in the other.

In African societies globally it is the understanding of the neo-imperialist, inter-ethnic conflicts, sometimes inter-confessional conflicts, the weight of the structure, and the traditional power. It is their acting together sometimes official or spontaneous to change their conditions of precariousness and to prevail their existences in a democracy of "dictat" in a wild capitalist system.

In an area as diverse as social movement studies some sort of thematic ordering device is essential to make sense of the richness that we are confronted by through the term social movement. The established terms 'old social movement' and 'new social movement' are valuable in terms of a sequential understanding. Old social movements originate in the social, economic, and political dynamics of the nineteenth century whilst new social movements originate within the dynamics of the latter part of the twentieth century. However, the terms are analytically problematic on a number of grounds. Many of the surrounding processes, methods of organization and intervention found in old and new movements are very similar. Many of the 'new' social movements had broadly equivalent counterparts in the nineteenth century or even earlier. [...]. Put another way, in each epoch key aspects of social, sexual, cultural, racial, political, and economic equality and equity are contested by social movements utilizing the range of resources available in a given place and at a given time<sup>25</sup>.

Social movements are involved in struggles over meaning as they attempt to influence public policy. An essential task in these struggles is to frame social problems and injustices in a way that convinces a wide and diverse audience of the necessity for and utility of collective attempts to redress them. Movement frames typically embody two essential components: the diagnostic element, or the definition of the problem and its source; and the prognostic element, the identification of an appropriate strategy for redressing the problem (Snow and Benford 1988). Movements usually lack the political and/or material resources necessary for routine access to political decision-makers and therefore must rely primarily on "outsider" strategies to draw the attention of publics and policymakers to the problems they wish to have resolved<sup>26</sup>.

A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity (Diani 1992: 13)<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup>Chesters, G., & Welsh, I. (2011). *Social Movements : The Keys Concepts* (éd. 1e). New York: Routledge, 1-2.

<sup>26</sup>McAdam, D., Smith, J., & Zald, M.N. (1996) Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings. New York: Cambridge university press, 291.

<sup>27</sup>Tilly, C. (1993). Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political Performances. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, p.5.

For definitional purposes, Charles Tilly calls a series of contentious events a social movement when they combine these three elements: (1). Social movement campaign: a sustained and organized public effort that presents collective demands to specific authorities, such as national governments; (2). Repertoire of social movements: combinations of culturally recognizable forms of popular protest, e.g., marches, rallies, demonstrations; and (3). WUNC demonstrations: the coordinated public representation of the value, unity, numbers, and commitment of movement members and supporters<sup>28</sup>.

A social movement is a set of informal networks of organizations and isolated actors, built on shared values and solidarity marked by "an intentional acting together, marked by the project of the protagonists to mobilize in concert according to a logic of claim and defense of an interest or a cause. A social movement is defined by the identification of an opponent. If collectives mobilize "for" a wage increase, the vote of law, this claim activity can only be deployed "against" a designated adversary: employer, administration, political power. This fact implies attributing a separate status to all forms of collective action which, while meeting the criteria set out above, aim to respond to a problem or a claim by mobilizing within the group, and only there, the means to respond. A social movement can be a response to the frustrations and disappointments of voting<sup>29</sup>.

Erik Neveu defines social movements around three dimensions of "collective action": "acting together as a voluntary and intentional project", belief in a cause and the notion of concertation. Social movements contain a "political component" in the relationship they have with the authorities and public policies<sup>30</sup>.

A social movement is the conflictual action by which cultural orientations, a field of historicity, are transformed into forms of social organization that are defined "both by general cultural norms and by relations of social domination<sup>31</sup>. It is the organized

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<sup>28</sup>(Op.cit)

<sup>29</sup>Neveu, E. (2005). *Sociologie des mouvements sociaux* (éd. 4e). Paris: La découverte, 10.

<sup>30</sup>Bazin, M. (2015). *Sociologie des mouvements sociaux. Communication langages*, 2.

<sup>31</sup>Touraine, Alain, (1984). Les mouvements sociaux: objet particulier ou problème central de l'analyse sociologique? *Revue française de sociologie*, 8

collective conduct of a class actor struggling against his class opponent for the social direction of historicity in a concrete community tendency<sup>32</sup>.

### 3.1.2. The Concept of Resistance

While there is no common definition of resistance to change, Piderit (2000) reviews research in social psychology that "clearly supports a multidimensional view of attitudes that can be used to integrate inconsistent definitions of resistance" (p. 787). A comprehensive attitude toward change includes behavior and cognition as two broad dimensions. The behavioral part focuses on what individuals and organizations do to indicate or enable resistance to change, such as communicating (in order to be informed of a change), inflecting a change process (as individuals tend to resist mandatory impositions), and taking actions that inhibit (or facilitate) a change process. Cognitive factors of resistance are related to deliberate or emotional attitudes of support (or criticism) of a change initiative and feelings of trust (or lack of trust) in those responsible for the change<sup>33</sup>.

It is when we turn to human action or the human sciences that the term resistance becomes more negatively colored. When it comes to influence, resistance to an order means refusal to obey, disobedience, opposition, rebellion. It means the action by which one tries to make an action directed against oneself ineffective<sup>34</sup>.

According to the APA Psychological Dictionary, it is a group opposition to the actions and economic or social policies of a government or society. Subgroup opposition to the values and restrictions of a dominant culture<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup>A, Touraine. (1978). *La voix et le réagard*. Paris: Les Éditions du Seuil, 108.

<sup>33</sup> Jones, S. L., & Ven, A. H. (2016). The Changing Nature of Change Resistance: An Examination of the Moderating Impact of Time. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 485.

<sup>34</sup>Bareil, C. (2004). *La Résistance au Changement : Synthèse et Critiques des écrits*. HEC Montréal, 3.

<sup>35</sup>APA. (2022, 01 27). *American Psychological Association*. Found on <https://dictionary.apa.org/social-resistance>

The Department of Defense defines resistance as an organized effort by a portion of the country's civilian population to resist the legally established government or an occupying power in order to disrupt civil order and stability<sup>36</sup>.

Some of these definitions converge with what we call resistance in social movements. That is to say, it is the fact that a group of people organizes to demand a change against a political or socio-economic entity. This resistance can be a question of justice or morality. It can also be related to issues of interest and power-sharing in certain contexts.

### **3.1.3. The Concept of Media Practices**

Media practice is a word composed of "practice" - which here refers to usage - and "media" - which identifies with the medium, i.e., the intermediary, or simply communication tools. It is the political and social use of new technologies, especially the 2.0 technology that involves artificial intelligence and applications such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, in short, social media. It is a concept that has spread recently and is frequently used by researchers in social movements and media. In this case, we are not only talking about the use of social media, but also about television, radio, and the way they are used by the population, politicians, reporters and activists who produce and consume information during social movements.

Couldry defines media practices as "the open set of practices related to, or oriented around, media" (2004:117), while further distinguishing "acts specifically aimed at media, acts performed through media, and acts whose preconditions are media" (2012:57). Practice theory therefore offers a holistic approach to understanding the social significance of media and allows us to capture the distinctive types of social processes that are enacted through media-related practices. The focus on media practices allows us to see media at work in a number of contexts and situations, and to understand how media practices organize, combine and, more usually, intersect with others social practices (Couldry 2004, 2012)<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup>Lee, D. (2017). Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory: Conditions, Mechanisms, and Effects. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 44.

<sup>37</sup>Stephansen, H. C., & Treré, E. (2021, October 22). *Media Practice in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Citizen Media*, New York: Routledge, 374.

It is in fact a radical reversal of perspective that the authors invite us to go beyond the classical vision of the consumer subjected to media manipulations to refocus the analysis on the subject-actor, on his media practice and on all that his action brings into play, in his relationship to himself, to others and to institutions. This reversal must be seen as a passage from the paradigm of information to that of communication: the relation and the interaction (subject-object/subject-subject) take precedence over the message as such<sup>38</sup>.

Media practice is often the place where a very wide range of interpersonal relationships and personal positions of involvement and distancing are discovered, much more open and varied than everyday reality and the family, social or professional environment allow - because it is work carried out in a virtual space constituted by the interface, with amplified interaction tasks, a logic of continuity of the flow of information, and because there is a passage from the concrete to the abstract, from physical effort to cognitive effort<sup>39</sup>.

The activity of setting in sense of the subject-receiver-user is an active experience, not only of selective perception of the information present in the message, but also of setting in relation of what is perceived with its own past experience of the same type. Moreover, this activity (of making sense) is articulated with the cultural aim of the subject inserted in a social, moral, historical context. The scientific approach has evolved towards new and complementary logics. We have moved from the notion of channel, support, medium, to the notion of working tool, means of action, and instrument (means and schemes of action), in an approach that observes them as catalysts, intelligent agents - amplifiers and transformers of the tasks and of the educational and social activity<sup>40</sup>.

#### **3.1.4. The Concept of Social Inequality**

A social inequality is a difference in access to rare and valued social resources, resources being understood in the broadest sense, including all possibilities of human action: political, economic, cultural, social, sexual, etc. Social inequalities are therefore

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<sup>38</sup>Bélisle, C., Bianchi, J., & Jourdon, R. (2000, Avril). *Science humaine*. p. 190. Found on [https://www.scienceshumaines.com/pratiques-mediatiques-50-mots-cles\\_fr\\_377.html](https://www.scienceshumaines.com/pratiques-mediatiques-50-mots-cles_fr_377.html)

<sup>39</sup>Ros, H. P. (2014). Approche dispositive et pratiques médiatiques. *Synergies Sud-Est européen*, 42.

<sup>40</sup>(Ibid.)

the result of an unequal distribution of resources within a society. Inequalities are the basis of the stratification of human societies<sup>41</sup>.

"Social inequality exists when some people frequently receive more "valuable goods" from a society than others because of their position in the social network of relationships." This definition implies that differences in eye color, height, physical disability, etc., cannot be called social differences or social inequality because they are not the result of a social process<sup>42</sup>.

Social inequalities are differences between individuals or social groups concerning advantages or disadvantages in access to socially valued resources. These socially valued resources depend of course on each society, on the values of each society. In today's societies, which put a great deal of value on economic activity, money, etc., social inequalities sometimes take the form of economic inequalities. But these social inequalities are not reduced to economic inequalities. Let us mention some examples of socially put resources. Primary, for example, is health, which is an essential capital for an individual. There are social inequalities in health between individuals, both between men and women and according to social background. A second example is access to professions: each profession has a particular prestige of different levels, and this access is obviously not egalitarian. A third and final example is access to a diploma that favors entry into a particular profession. This access is obviously differentiated between individuals, between men and women for example, or according to social background<sup>43</sup>.

Social inequality can be seen as the ability of an individual or group of people privileged by nature to access available resources and socially established privileges in certain societies according to the laws that react to them.

Sociologists have become more sensitive to inequalities between generations, inequalities between the sexes, and ethnic inequalities, which often overlap with social and spatial inequalities. Often represented in the form of segregation, discrimination, and

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<sup>41</sup>Bihr, A., & Pfefferkorn, R. (2008). *Le système des inégalités*. Paris: La Découverte.

<sup>42</sup>Hoffmann, R. (2008). Concepts of Social Inequality in Socioeconomic Differences in Old Age Mortality . *Springer*, 29.

<sup>43</sup>Webclass. (2022, janvier 01). *SES.WEBCLASS*. Found on <https://ses.webclass.fr/notions/inegalites-sociales/>

stigmatization, these multiple inequalities lead to the observation that social cohesion has been shaken and that the social contract between individuals and generations is therefore being called into question<sup>44</sup>.

### **3.1.5. The Concept of Conflict**

The word "conflict" has two generally acceptable interpretations. The first refers to open conflict - an argument, fight, or struggle. The second refers to subjective conflict - the perception by the party that the party and the other have opposing beliefs or an interest, or the other has deprived or antagonized the party in some way. The latter concept is richer for theorizing than the former, as there are several strategies the party can employ in response to the subjective conflict. The party may take a contentious approach and retaliate, or it may try to impose its will on the other through an argument, demand, or threat. This strategy is likely to result in open conflict. Instead of contesting, the party may remain inactive or give in to the other, or it may engage in problem-solving, with the goal of arriving at a solution to the conflict that is acceptable to both parties<sup>45</sup>.

Karl Marx explains conflict in relation to the economy and the exploitation of those who do not own the means of production. For him, conflict occurs when the poor (proletarians) become aware of their situation and form a united class - with a common identity and shared interests - to confront the bourgeois in order to win their case. For Marx, in industrial societies, technology discredits homogeneous workers who then become alienated workers. The reclamation of the wage by force, the battle for the assumption of their concerns, transforms the wage as a better reward for the exiles who could not henceforth regain their human dignity, the reward of their work. This stratification between bourgeois and proletarians is the basis of the conflict, and the conflict according to Marx is a means of recourse to change and transform the relations<sup>46</sup>.

Durkheim in his functionalism explains conflict as a dysfunction of the established norms that regulate and stabilize society. The society with organic solidarity, source of diversification of practices (professions), allows individuals to coexist without being subjected to the collective conscience. This dependence and this freedom sometimes

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<sup>44</sup>Goffmann, E. (1969). Etudes sur les conditions sociales des malades mentaux. *Révue Française de Sociologie*.

<sup>45</sup>Pruitt, D. G. (2007). Social Conflict: Some Basic Principles. *Journal of Dispute and Resolution*, 151.

<sup>46</sup>Marx, K. (1932) les manuscrits de 1944, 30-31

enclose individuals in an extreme solitude that favors deviance. He explains the forms of crime in two categories. Those which are transgressions in the inferior societies, and the crimes in the superior societies<sup>47</sup>.

During the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber tried to bring an answer to the question of conflict that Marx had raised. Weber considered that it was not only the economy as the only factor at the origin of the conflict, but also the State which, through its institutions of interventions like justice, the police also created the conditions of conflicts. For Weber, legitimation is therefore essential in the idea of conflict. He goes further by making it clear that the existence of social classes are not the only determinants of social inequality, status and party (or power) are included<sup>48</sup>.

For others like George Simmel, explains the conflict as a reconciling element between rival parties despite its harmful character. In order to achieve reconciliation, each party must recognize its limits and it is when there is a conflict that the disruptive elements are seen and discussed in order to finally reach an agreement.

According to Mills, social formations do not emerge by chance; instead, they are the product of struggles and negotiations between people with varying interests and resources. And these persons and their resources are in turn fashioned by broader structures and by the differential distribution of power and resources in societies<sup>49</sup>.

The other conception of conflict is global. It is the fact that a sociolinguistic or racial group wants to apply its own worldview of "cultural, ethnic or religious superiority" to others, imagining that the acceptance of this identity would be better and more beneficial to others than their own. This form of mono-culturalism, which pushes everyone to belong to the totality as imposed by the Western system for example, or Islamic radicalism, are some of the main reasons for the contemporary conflicts that oppose continents, nations, and peoples.

Societies are characterized by an inequality that generates social tension, instead of order and consensus. This conflict rooted in inequality can be overcome only by a

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<sup>47</sup>Durkheim, E (1893) *De la division du travail social*, Paris, 81-82

<sup>48</sup>Lewis Coser (1913–2003), *Conflict theory*, 212

<sup>49</sup>Mills, C. W. (2022, 01 29). *Theory Greats*. Found on <http://www94.homepage.villanova.edu/peter.knapp/THgreats.htm>

profound and radical transformation of the existing relationships in society and it is conducive to new social relationships. Underprivileged groups have a structural interest that runs against the status quo and that, once assumed, will lead to social change. Therefore, they are perceived as being agents of change rather than individuals to be sympathized with. The human potentials (e.g., the capacity for creativity) are removed by the conditions of exploitation and oppression, which are required in any society where the division of labor is unequal.

These qualities and others do not necessarily have to be restricted because of the demands of the so-called "civilization process" or "functional necessity": creativity is in fact a driving force of economic development and change. The goal of theory is to fulfill human potential and to transform society, rather than to keep the power structure in place. The opposite role of theory would be the objectivity and detachment associated with positivism, where theory is a neutral and explanatory tool. Consensus is a euphemism for ideology. No true consensus exists as real, although the most powerful in today's societies are able to impose their ideas on others and to persuade them to accept their discourse. The consensus does not maintain the social order, it establishes the stratification, who is the instrument of the present social order<sup>50</sup>.

The state is there to serve the particular interests of the most powerful while claiming to represent the interests of all. The representation of disadvantaged groups in state processes may cultivate the notion of full participation, but this is an illusion/ideology. A characteristic of global inequality is the deliberate underdevelopment of Third World countries, both during colonial rule and after national independence. The global system (i.e., development agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) is benefiting the most powerful countries and multinational corporations, rather than the subjects of development, through political, economic, and military actions<sup>51</sup>.

All these explanations have an influence on the way the notion of democracy is understood and studied by different societies nowadays. The notion itself imposes constraints, and draws limits that a part of the earth's inhabitants find difficult to cross in order to find consensus and harmony with other peoples. The new vision of the politics

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<sup>50</sup>Sears, A. (2021, Novembre 19). *Conflicts Theories*. Found on Wikipédia: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict\\_theories#cite\\_note-17](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_theories#cite_note-17)

<sup>51</sup>(ibid.)

of the Eastern countries, which continue to develop and to stand firm in the field of development, has become a solid argument that lets us think that the conflict does not have only dark areas as Simmel said, but allows us to understand several facets of the political-economic game and can in any case show the weakness of the adversary in order to facilitate the way to the consensus.

### **3.1.6. The Concept of Power**

The Oxford Lexico Dictionary describes power as an ability or aptitude to do something or to act in a specific manner. The aptitude or ability to lead or influence the behavior of other people or the direction of events. Social or political authority or control, particularly that exercised by the state or government. The authority which is given or delegated to a person or an organization. A State or nation, especially in regard to international influence and military power<sup>52</sup>.

Most theorists in sociology have given a narrower definition of power, as a particular form of relationship between objects, individuals, and communities. The most prominent definition is the one proposed by Max Weber: "power is the probability that an actor in a social relationship will be able to carry out his own will in spite of resistance, whatever the basis on which this probability rests". This is the beginning of most contemporary debates on the concept, whether explicitly referred to as such or not. Dahl, for example, states in his influential article "On the Concept of Power": "My intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. "Social psychologists from Michigan, French and Raven, employ an analogous meaning in their Lewinian power theory: power is the potential ability of one group or person to influence another in a given system<sup>53</sup>.

"The power is a kind of relationship and not an attribute thing use by the actors. It is linked to the relationship of exchange, of negotiation. It is a relation which aims at a goal, which is not transitive (it is direct, no intermediary), and which is reciprocal, but unbalanced. It is a power relationship from which one can get more than the other, but where one is never totally deprived in front of the other. It is therefore necessary to study

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<sup>52</sup>Dictionary, U. (2022, 01 29). *Oxford Lexico*. Found on Oxford English Dictionary: <https://www.lexico.com/definition/power>

<sup>53</sup>Martin, R. (1971). The Concept of Power: A Critical Defence. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 242.

the spatial, temporal, and social framework in order to measure the assets of each, or the constraints that weigh on them"<sup>54</sup>.

Michel Foucault, on the other hand, explains power in a different way to all these unidimensional assimilated notions of power. Foucault in his thinking, rather than seeing power as coercive and top-down as has been the vision of Hobbes, Weber and so many other philosophers and theorists, he refers to it as dispersed and pervasive not subject to agency or structure. His approach to power is not necessarily pejorative. Rather, he sees power as a source of discipline and a productive instrument that allows human beings to integrate into society and be a productive element through appropriate mechanisms of surveillance and control.

Power cannot be limited to the relations between individuals and the means that a state can deploy to deal with its own citizens. The power of a strong government can be exercised beyond its borders. It applies it in contexts of threats, to support other allied countries to protect its interests and its citizens, or to illegally take control of other territories through its external policy (diplomacy, economic and military influence, computer espionage) or even the occupation of supra-terrestrial spaces.

In this work it is important to understand in what sense I use the word "Power". When it comes to a chapter where the word opposition is preceded or succeeded by power, it should be noted that it is the government. In French speaking countries power is also synonymous with the State or the government. It is often used by policy analysts in this context.

The second framework means the ability to do something or act in a certain way, especially as a faculty or quality required of a person. The ability or capacity to direct or influence the behavior or decisions of others through one's will. It's in this sense that we use the word between countries that have reached a certain level of development and those that are still struggling to reach it.

### **3.1.7. The Concept of social media**

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<sup>54</sup>Crozier, M., & Friedberg, E. (1977). *L'acteur et le système*. Paris: Le Seuil, 65.

Global changes, especially information and communication technologies (ICT), have had an impact on the functioning of modern society. ICT developments have changed the perspectives of the users of modern society in different ways. The use of ICT is a tool to provide effective communication and information services to people. The World Wide Web (WWW) has, to a large extent, changed the way people access information and communicate with other people<sup>55</sup>.

From an evolutionary point of view, the passage from the static Web to Web 2.0, and lately the improvements registered like the creation of crypto-currencies and Facebook metavers fascinate the world of technology. These recent advances of physical representations in virtual space are incredible projects that facilitate meetings and communications in human life, making users more addicted to these elements that have multivariate ranges.

The unimaginable power that social networks give to citizens transforms political discourses and decisions into reality. The platforms allow each entity to have access to information, organize meetings and engage in debates that concern the public thing.

People working in the field of marketing, online business and related services use it regularly to increase their income through targeted advertisements. Different techniques are used for this purpose to sell their products and attract the attention of interested parties through the instant and repeated presence of notifications in the corners of the screen.

There is also the culture of influencers that takes a prominent place. Brands of clothing, shoes, jewelry, toys etc. collect a large amount of public data on social networks. Networks specialized in recruiting influencers can identify them through hashtags and make them their representatives and commercial partners. This practice promotes mass consumption and directly or indirectly orients people towards new cultural trends.

There are several emerging definitions of social media proposed, both within the communication discipline and in such related disciplines as public relations, information science, and mass media. Most definitions converge on the idea of social media, referring to digital technologies that emphasize user-generated contents or interaction (e.g., Kaplan

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<sup>55</sup>Kenchakkanavar, & Hiremath. (2016). An Alteration of the Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and Web 3.0: A Comparative Study. *Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR)*, 705(1).

& Haenlein, 2010; Terry, 2009). Often social media are designated by channel characteristics, either by identifying the destination of messages (e.g., Kent, 2010) or by utilizing some specific tools such as Facebook or Twitter to illustrate the modes of interaction (e.g., Howard & Parks, 2012)<sup>56</sup>.

The lack of a universal definition can lead to many interpretations of a term, making it difficult to establish a common understanding (Hempel, 1966) to guide theory and research. Indeed, current definitions of social media vary considerably in terms of complexity, focus, and relevance at the margins of their initial field<sup>57</sup>.

Other definitions of social media have been proposed outside of the communication sciences. In the field of public relations, Kent (2010) defined social media as "any interactive communication channel that allows for two-way interaction and feedback," stating that modern social media is characterized by its "potential for real-time interaction, reduced anonymity, a sense of proximity, short response times, and the ability to 'time-shift' or engage the social network at a time convenient to each member" (p. 645) [...]. In some field like medicine, social media has been "loosely defined as user-generated content using Internet-based publishing technologies, distinct from traditional print and broadcast media" (Terry, 2009, p. 507) and distinguished from traditional media by user-generated content. Interestingly, both of these definitions partially define social media by distinguishing between social media and traditional media (print or online), but they do not clearly exclude other "new media" such as email and text messaging, which are generally not included in typological lists of social media<sup>58</sup>.

### **3.1. Theoretical framework**

In the 1950s, Western countries experienced an explosion of social protest and demonstrations against their governments, public policies, and political uses of information. In the United States alone, there was the civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam war movement, the women's (and gender equality) movement, the "green" or environmental movement, etc. Europe has also seen feminist and environmental movements, as well as the movement against colonization (for example, the Algerian

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<sup>56</sup>Carr, C. T., & Hayes, R. A. (2015). Social Media: Defining, Developing, and Divining. *Atlantic Journal of Communication*, 47-48.

<sup>57</sup>(Ibid.)

<sup>58</sup>(Ibid.)

independence movement in France). These social movements have raised the question of why social movements appear and develop everywhere<sup>59</sup>.

In the mid-twentieth century, collective behavior and related theories were the dominant paradigm guiding research on social movements. These theories argued that social movements were a form of collective behavior that emerged when significant social and cultural disruptions occurred. As a form of collective behavior, social movements were seen as spontaneous, unorganized, and unstructured phenomena, at odds with institutional and organizational behavior (Morris 1999: 531). In this view, irrational emotions and ideologies were central as movements occurred in highly charged contexts characterized by mass enthusiasm, collective excitement, rumor, social contagion, and mass hysteria<sup>60</sup>.

They are therefore strongly associated with democratic societies. This does not mean that these social movements only concern democratic societies as a whole. In fact, they have also been associated with the democratization process in other societies and are also manifest in more authoritarian countries (Tilly, 2004). Social movements therefore take place in a wide variety of societies. They can have a local and purely limited objective, such as a movement against the construction of a toxic waste dump in a neighborhood, or an objective that is national or even international in scope. Social movements also have a wide range of goals. They may seek to change an existing political system; others may aim to prevent change in the hope of conserving their natural environment. On the other hand, some are not political at all and seek cultural or individual change. Still others seek revolutionary change at both the political and social/cultural levels<sup>61</sup>.

Despite the shortcomings and recurrent criticisms sometimes voiced by authors, several theories attempt to explain the dynamics of collective behavior in different ways. They range from psychological theories to those of the new social movements, which lately seem to be the most effective. Whether the social movement is old or new, the

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<sup>59</sup>Sen, A., & Avcı, Ö. (2016). Why Social Movements Occur : Theories of Social Movements. *Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi*, 125 (1).

<sup>60</sup>Morris, A. (2000). Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals. *American Sociological Association*, 445(1).

<sup>61</sup>Christiansen, J. (2011). *Narrative & Social Movements in Theories of Social Movements*, New Jersey: Salem Press, 4.

approaches remain complementary in most cases. There are similar objectives and elements in both. Therefore, we will present some theories that will help to clarify this topic.

### **3.2.1. The Psychological Theories**

Interest in crowds has long been recorded. Yet it was not until the late nineteenth century that a more or less systematic and widespread examination of crowd behavior emerged, along with the rise of the sociological discipline. The Italian Scipio Sighele and the French Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde are among the key figures in this flourishing study of crowds<sup>62</sup>.

For Le Bon, the existence of crowds goes through three stages: submersion, contagion, and suggestion. During submersion, the subjects in the crowd tend to lose their individual consciousness and their ability to assume personal responsibility. This process of submersion is largely induced by the anonymous nature of the crowd. As for contagion, it refers to the propensity of individuals in a crowd to rally unchallenged to the predominant ideas and emotions of the crowd. This action is capable, according to Le Bon, of spreading between "immersed" individuals, like a disease. The notion of suggestion refers to the phase in which the ideas and emotions of the members of the crowd are mainly drawn from a shared unconscious ideology. Its members thus become sensitive to any passing idea or emotion. This type of behavior is derived from an archaic shared unconscious and is therefore uncivilized in nature. It is restricted by the moral faculties and cognitive abilities of the less able members. For Le Bon, crowds can only be a very powerful force of destruction. Furthermore, Le Bon and some other authors have indicated that crowd members have a lower sense of legal culpability, due to the difficulty of prosecuting individual members of a crowd. To summarize, the individual who is immersed in the crowd loses control of himself, it is the self-annihilation, since the "collective mind" takes over and makes him capable of transgressing individual or collective norms<sup>63</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup>Borch, C. (2006). The Exclusion of the Crowd The Destiny of a Sociological Figure of the Irrational. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 85-86.

<sup>63</sup>Le Bon, G. (2007). Crowd Psychology. *Čáček: Alef*. Found on [https://wiki.dcldesign.co.uk/wiki/Crowd\\_psychology](https://wiki.dcldesign.co.uk/wiki/Crowd_psychology)

In *Why Men Rebel*, Ted Gurr develops the theory of relative deprivation, which in the author's terms refers to the gap between what people think they deserve and what they actually believe they can get. Although people tend to become accustomed to situations, when this gap becomes considerable during a period of transition, the potential for rebellion also becomes strong. These situations usually occur during periods in which crisis situations (economic conjunctures) are sources of political and social violence.

Relative deprivation is often seen as the primary variable in understanding social movements and is also used to explain the need for and role it plays in the quest for social change; indeed, social movements are born out of the collective sense of relative deprivation that gives rise to the desire to claim<sup>64</sup>.

In any case, although this theory is not able to satisfy our research because of its restricted vision of social movements, it should nevertheless be given some interest, especially in countries with a low level of development where opportunities are reduced. The social and cultural environment as well as the very similar lifestyles in some places increase the tension among certain professional categories that may feel marginalized at some point, especially when it comes to the majority.

In addition, psychological theory does not elucidate the real reasons why the masses take to the streets because of its overly simplistic logic that places the emotional state of the crowd at the center of the action.

### **3.2.2. Resource Mobilization Theory**

During the second period of the 20th century, the multiplication of social movements had become remarkable in many countries. Psychological theories did not seem able to provide convincing explanations. In disciplines such as sociology, researchers then began to turn away from this theory to seek the reasons for social change in societal factors, privileging resources, and rational actors as the basic components capable of explaining social movements.

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<sup>64</sup>Flynn, S. (2011). *Relative Deprivation theory in Social Movements Theories*. New Jersey: Salem Press, 100.

Social movements have traditionally been viewed as extensions of more basic forms of collective behavior and as encompassing both movements for personal change (e.g., religious sects, cults, and communes) and those focused on institutional change (e.g., legal reforms and political power changes). Resource mobilization theorists, on the other hand, have viewed social movements as extensions of institutionalized actions and have limited themselves to movements for institutional change that attempt to alter "elements of society's social structure and/or distribution of rewards" (McCarthy & Zald 1977:1218), to organize previously unorganized groups against institutional elites (Gamson 1975:16-18), or to represent the interests of groups excluded from politics (Jenkins & Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978, 1979)<sup>65</sup>.

Resource mobilization has been addressed by Olson as the underlying problem of social movements: to the extent that social movements provide collective goods, few people are willing to bear the costs of labor "alone" to obtain them. In order to understand collective behavior, some emphasis must be placed on the selection of incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or structures, and occupational benefits that lead to collective behavior (see especially Oberschall 1973). Several views are central to the perspective as it has developed<sup>66</sup>.

First, it is essential to conduct an analysis of the mobilization of available resources such as human and financial resources that seems necessary to understand the activity of social movements. When engaging in social conflict, resources must be pooled for collective purposes, which implies the existence of a minimal form of organization within the structure of the movement. Secondly, one must seek to examine organizations in its global and modern dimension in order to grasp the impact of the social movement's activity on society. Third, when analyzing the successes and failures of a social movement, there is a clear recognition of the need to involve people and organizations outside of the community that the social movement encompasses in order to strengthen its work. Fourth, there is sometimes the application of the supply and demand model to

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<sup>65</sup>Jenkins, J. C. (1983). Resource mobilization theory and the study of social. *Annual review of sociology*, 529(3).

<sup>66</sup>McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:A Partial Theory. *American journal of sociology*, 1216.

the flow of resources to and from specific social movements. Finally, there is a sensitivity to the importance of costs and rewards in explaining the involvement of individuals and organizations in social movement activity. Costs and rewards are centrally affected by the structure of society and the activities of authorities<sup>67</sup>.

This way of looking at the theory of resource mobilization aims to better explain the social mobility essentially articulated around the organizations in place, which function only on the economic basis.

In this view, social movements construct a market-like relationship, referring to the term supply and demand. They understand the organizational structures as institutions that react to the demand accumulated by the militants. They argue that social struggles arise in an entrepreneurial spirit when agitation in relation to a social issue is sufficiently accumulated. In most cases, the social movement does not structure itself as singular organizations. Organizations maintain a competitive relationship with other organizations facing the same or different social problems, as they fight for a limited number of resources in time and money from their membership base.

However, Olson's arguments are problematic in some respects. The question of rationality around which Olson evolves leads us to question why other individuals could not anticipate their rational behavior as free riders did. In principle, others could anticipate the harmful consequences and the blows that would be dealt to them.

Reducing collective action by purely economic mechanisms is a problematic reasoning because this choice is only one reason among others, as participation in social mobility also involves the social, psychological, and cultural dimension.

Cultural theories approach the problem by focusing on the fact that conscientious voters, who may or may not benefit from a beneficial outcome, often agree to put their individual resources at the service of a particular cause that determines their ethical or moral commitment.

### **3.2.3. Political Process Theory**

While classical approaches focused on actors' grievances, the political process model is consistent with the resource mobilization approach and assumes that the grievances of

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<sup>67</sup>(Ibid.)

a given population are relatively stable while its capacity to act varies over time and space. But unlike the resource mobilization approach, the political process model goes beyond organizational factors to consider, as its name suggests, political factors and processual dynamics<sup>68</sup>.

In *Political Process*, McAdam (1982:37) argued that society is dominated by elites, with subordinate groups holding power derived from their "position in various political-economic structures. This view of society assumes that domination is organized by and around a central source of power - the state. This view of society and power is basically a modified Marxist view. Economic and political subordination are seen as closely linked; economic disenfranchisement is achieved through political disenfranchisement. Governments are seen as the only important decision-makers and actors are defined in terms of their relationship to the state. Thus, the "members" and "challengers" of politics become the relevant actors in social movement struggles (Tilly 1978). The political and economic structures of society are seen as determining, while culture is treated as separate from structure and of secondary importance<sup>69</sup>.

Political opportunity theory encompasses elements essential to the constitution of social movements: Insurgent consciousness (1): Insurgent consciousness refers to explanations similar to deprivation theory. Individuals, minority groups with common characteristics form grievances when they feel deprived of collective goods that in principle should be used for the benefit of all. When the system contributes to this feeling of inequality and injustice towards them, it can motivate marginal groups to join a movement. In most cases, protesters make well-considered decisions before engaging in a movement. However, in a particular political context, activists may articulate specific grievances around which the movement is organized.

Organizational strength (2): This second element is similar to the main explanation of the resource mobilization theory. The main idea is that each organization should have a strong and effective leadership and sufficient resources to carry out its activities. These

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<sup>68</sup> Ancelovici, M. (2009). Esquisse d'une théorie de la contestation Bourdieu et le modèle du processus politique. *Sociologie et Société*, 40(2).

<sup>69</sup> Armstrong, E. A., & Bernstein, M. (2008). Culture, Power, and Institutions: A Multi-Institutional Politics Approach to Social Movements. *Sociological Theory*, 74-99.

two theories (political opportunity theory and resource mobilization theory) have several things in common when it comes to strategies for mobilizing resources outside the movement. Local forces and traditional leaders can also help recruit and motivate actors outside the movement to join and contribute to their activities. The rise of a movement often merges with other pre-existing, highly organized nuclei of individuals who assist the movement with resources and support. Community dynamics are stronger when individuals are embedded in disconnected but otherwise mobile communities, and these communities are likely to merge and support the causes in which their members are active.

Political opportunities (3): During a period of transition or instability, when the political system is vulnerable, it creates an opportunity for challengers to better seize the moment and benefit not only from the advantages but also from the social change that comes with it. Vulnerability can be the result of increased political pluralism, the decline of repression, division within the elites, especially when it develops to the point that some support organized opposition, and greater political empowerment<sup>70</sup>.

A disadvantage of the political process model is that it treats all aspects of social movements - their emergence and dynamics, participants' knowledge of and ability to join political protest, and their outcomes - as conditioned by macro-structural relationships. It also fails to consider the perspectives through which activists perceive potential opportunities for their movements, i.e., their subjective representations of reality and their interpretive frameworks. To address these shortcomings, political protest theorists have developed the political mediation model<sup>71</sup>.

The arguments raised by the theory of political opportunity are very much in line with the issues that are addressed in this work. However, it is a bit unfortunate to admit somewhere that the cultural dimension has not been integrated in order to correspond to what can be called the recognition of collective identity which is crucial and very present in non-western societies. These identities are not only limited to political networks. It is also support from groups with common interests and cultural practices that can shape the

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<sup>70</sup>Meyer, D. S., & Minkoff, D. (2022, Février 05). *Political opportunity* . Found on wikipédia: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political\\_opportunity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_opportunity)

<sup>71</sup>Gamson, W. (1990). *The Strategy of Social Protest*

perception of challengers. Like the unwavering support that some communities in Guinea give to their leaders.

Nevertheless, we will subscribe to this theory for the simple reason that the frameworks of relative deprivation (frustrations, dissatisfaction with the political system - the State) as well as the power of mobilization of internal and external resources that these movements hold allowing them to benefit during the period of crises, attributes to this work what we are looking for. That is to say, organizations with pressure powers and distributive motivations that are both political and economic.

#### **3.2.4. Cultural Theory: Collective Identity and Framing Process Analysis**

Long neglected by other social movement theories, the cultural dimension is more interested in the "why" that highlights the meaning that actors give to collective action and subjective interests. The question of "how", which concerns political conditions and existing resources, is not a priority in this framework of cultural reflection.

The principle is not to present actors only as people concerned with maximizing their personal interests like free riders. Actors in this context are imbued with the spirit of mutual solidarity, love, moral and traditional affection that motivates them to act in concrete ways on behalf of the consciously acquired collective identity<sup>72</sup>.

For Melucci, collective identity is a set of similar behaviors and interactions with specific meanings that associate individuals or groups with a social movement. Focusing on collective identity thus allows us to reduce the gap between the structural foundations of action and collective action itself.

The cultural version of new social movement theory is post-Marxist in that it transcends this tradition by proposing a more radical break between past and present societal types and movement forms than may be found in the political version. Accordingly, while the cultural version still has a model of the societal totality, it does not identify this totality in terms of capitalism but rather in culturalist or semiotic terms as an information society whose administrative codes conceal forms of domination. Its claims about the links between social structure and movement form emphasize the decentralized nature of both power and resistance, so it is not particularly macro-oriented

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<sup>72</sup>Carty, V. (2018). *Social Movements and new technology*. New York: Routledge, 24.

or state-centered but focuses on everyday life, civil society, and the creation of free spaces between state and civil society. The cultural version eschews strategic questions and instrumental action as pitfalls to be avoided, while emphasizing symbolic explorations and expressions of identity that precisely challenge the instrumental logic of systemic domination<sup>73</sup>.

In terms of the first debate reviewed above, the cultural version of new social movement theory not only recognizes new social constituencies but also argues that the old worker-based constituencies for social activism have been transcended along with industrial capitalism. In terms of the second debate, the cultural version tends to view activism as a defensive reaction to systemic domination that can potentially challenge systemic imperatives but it eschews the language of "progressive" movements as invoking an unwarranted metaphysics of history. In terms of the third debate, this version rejects the apolitical label often attached to culturalist movements by arguing that political movements are the most easily co-opted and that cultural movements fighting on symbolic terrain can do more to expose contemporary forms of power than the more conventionally political movements. In terms of the fourth debate, this version is more likely to identify the social base of new social movements in nonclass terms, by referring either to other statuses and identities or to values and ideologies that define movement constituencies, rather than by class locations (ibid).

The idea of framing should be understood in the situation of social movements as a problematic of the meanings that movement members associate with relevant activities, places, and events. It suggests a debate and a divergence of ideas that are sometimes contestable and negotiable and that produce different interpretations to better understand the situation.

In this view, mobilizers form their grievances not as emotions and sensations that automatically arise from particular material conditions, but as the result of a more or less meaningful interactive process of interpretation. The framing process conceives of this

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<sup>73</sup>Buechler, S. M. (1995). New Social Movement Theories. *The Sociological quarterly*, (19)458-459.

meaning-making as an ideal way in which political actors and leaders often engage through the media and social movements<sup>74</sup>.

Ryan and Gamson explain that cultural frameworks are linked to strategic activities. Quality frames do not do anything on their own, but must be associated with organizations, networks, and other forms of mobilization activities. Frameworks are not particularly useful for reaching unknown audiences through mass media; rather, they serve as a means to conduct conversations with allies and elements of one's own coalition. they create the conditions for dialogues between groups about how to proceed. Despite the importance of the media, there are people and organizations with whom activists need to dialogue<sup>75</sup>.

Like daily interpretive frames, collective action frames focus attention, define, and elaborate the elements of the frame, and often transform the meanings associated with the objects of attention. Nevertheless, collective action frames differ from everyday interaction frames in their primary mobilizing functions. These include mobilizing or inciting movement adherents from the balcony to the barricades (action mobilization); turning passersby into supporters, thereby broadening the base of the movement (consensus mobilization); and overpowering or demotivating opponents (counter-mobilization).

### **3.2.5. New Social Movements Theory**

The concept of "new social movements" has served as a double-edged sword. It has contributed to the knowledge of contemporary movements by bringing attention to the significance of morphological transformations in their structure and action, and by relating these changes to structural transformations in society in its entirety. These changes are at the origin of the "novelty" of such movements in relation to the model of collective action focused on class conflict that has been prevalent in Europe since the time

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<sup>74</sup>Snow, D., Vliegthart, R., & Ketelaars, P. (2018). The framing perspective on social movements: Its conceptual roots and architecture. *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, 393.

<sup>75</sup>Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. M. (2015). *The Social Movements Reader : Cases and Concepts* (éd. 3e). USA: Blackwell.

of the industrial revolution (Melucci 1989)<sup>76</sup>. Furthermore, there has been a tendency to "ontologize" the new social movements.

The term of new social movements is thus exploited in an extensive understanding by some, as if it encompassed the "essence" of all new forms of collective action. The exhaustion of the explanatory capacities of the concept is probably not without consequence on its valorization, especially since one tends to give it more explanatory power than it is empirically justified. The concept itself does not have enough criteria to be considered as a theory. It is simply an attempt to identify some of the more or less similar characteristics of these contemporary social movements, and to develop analytical tools to study them (Melucci 1989; Larana 1993b)<sup>77</sup>.

To put it in other words, unlike the industrial phase of capitalism, in the post-industrial society, the control of the state is not limited only to the productive sphere, but extends to consumption as well, to other services and to the societal relationships that drive people to interact. The protagonists of these new social movements are trying to regain control of their identities, their feelings as individuals and as a community<sup>78</sup>.

The expressive nature of participation is linked to the cultural aspects of movements because the purpose of expressive action is guided by a particular moral perspective regarding the appropriate normative order. The civic sphere, where culture resides, which was traditionally seen as dominated or determined by the economic sphere, is now seen as a site of social protest. This "liberation" of the civic sphere has highlighted the fact that the civic sphere is as much a domain of protest as the economic and political spheres<sup>79</sup>.

According to Giddens, individuals in "associations", "organizations" and "social movements" create history on the basis of different degrees of consciousness. This

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<sup>76</sup>Johnston.H, Laraiia E, Joseph R. Gusfield (1994). Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements, 6-7.

<sup>77</sup>Ibidem

<sup>78</sup>D'Anieri, P., Ernst, C., & Kier, E. (1990). New Social Movements in Historical Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 446(2).

<sup>79</sup>Pichardo, N. A. (1997). New Social Movements: A Critical Review. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 425.

consciousness depends on the context and the form of the available information, which in turn depends on the degree of social and systemic integration in space-time<sup>80</sup>.

For Giddens, the satisfaction of survival needs in the era of late modernity changed the thinking of many European societies. It was necessary to turn the page on an old form of struggle called class struggle in which workers aspired more to the improvement of their economic living conditions. It was now a question of looking at societal reforms that united the actors around common ideals and identities, allowing them to be better organized to reach a geographically and culturally shared goal.

Manuel Castells approaches the new social movements by contrasting the State and the heterogeneous social forces that seek to defend the popular interest. These urban protest movements demand the satisfaction of mass consumption, the enhancement of cultural group identity in opposition to a standard system of life, as well as the dispersion of political power at a more decentralized level to provide other entities with the capacity for decision-making and self-management of their communities.

According to Touraine, the overcoming of pre-modern societies that guaranteed social order has led humanity towards a society that becomes more and more the product of a reflexive social action. Individuals acquire a system of technique and knowledge that allows actors to produce and control their own functioning, what Touraine calls historicity, which opens the way to a new era, the programmed society. This control of historicity is subject to a constant struggle between classes defined by principles of domination. These classes take the form of social movements when they enter this struggle.

In the programmed society the popular class is assigned to a role of consumers or clients, the dominant class is defined by those who assume the management and technocracy. The dominant conflict between the two classes is that of understanding who will have control over culture and the capacity for self-management of society. However, given that the State is seen as the instance that holds the power to control historicity, it

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<sup>80</sup>Loyal, S. (2003). *The Sociology of Anthony Giddens*. London : Pluto Press, 103.

can be suggested that the central conflict of post-industrial society will be around this institution.

In a recent formulation, Touraine (1992) places the conflict of the new social movements in two distinct categories: a system that seeks to maximize production, money, power, and information, and people who seek to defend and expand their individuality.

For others, the new social movements are seen as a convergence of multi-class and multi-identity struggles initiated by the middle class in reaction to the colonizing intrusions of states and markets. They are based on the resistance of the professional middle class against the rationalizing forces of modernity, injustice, social fragmentation, and the politicization of daily life (Johnston 1994). The accent is more on resisting power in social or cultural spheres, democratizing new and existing public arenas, and politicizing issues previously considered private to escape new and traditional forms of domination<sup>81</sup>.

Nowadays, the media have become an indispensable tool, and have an increasing role to play in these NSM. Access to these media energizes these movements and allows to report, despite the existing digital divide, on the news of countries in various horizons. Networks of communication and friendship are created, attentive citizens share and consume information on these platforms which are managed by young people thirsty for justice and freedom throughout the world.

With the new ICTs, these networks can grow and evolve exponentially. For example, Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen (1993) argue that while the strength of social ties powerfully influences recruitment at the individual level, weak social ties forged in the virtual sphere can successfully spread the message of a social movement across diffuse networks. The virtual world now provides additional context to better determine the nature of individuals' interpersonal social ties (these may be friends, neighbors, co-workers, classmates, church members, or other acquaintances) to a particular social movement. The active participation of young people as activists on digital platforms can be understood by the fact that they receive information about mobilizations and contentious politics, such as those experienced in many countries during the election

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<sup>81</sup>(Op.cit)

period through digital media that constitute the channel for receiving information from third parties (trusted individuals) involved and sharing the same interests<sup>82</sup>.

This theory takes both several aspects into account, including the subject of the actor and the system. These details may lead me into a deep explanation in which I may get lost or think of linking all the parameters at once. It is really more a demonstration of fact than a theory. And in the logic itself, the authors do not seem to have yet a scientific consensus universally accepted by the parties.

### **3.2.6. Theory of Dependence and World System Theory**

Inter-state and inter-continental relations are becoming more and more unequal since the opening of the countries of the world to a capitalist market system. The diplomacy that implies cooperation through its imperialist policy continues to seriously affect the poor countries. The mechanism that has been put in place by the countries holding the power and the economic monopoly functions without constraints because towards the extreme periphery there are people in situations of extreme poverty who are like the proletarians of these central states. They are the populations of the third world, they provide raw materials, and they are transformed into permanent consumers of manufactured products and over-indebted.

The structural policy put in place by the institutions of these rich countries reinforces their powers and maintains the Third World countries in a state of dependence and continuous subordination. The conditions of precariousness favor the access to cheap labor for foreign multinationals and also allows them to build their countries. The brain drain are undoubtedly invaluable resources that compensate for weaknesses in several sectors and assume a role of intermediary in the relations of cooperation very often favorable to the central states.

Several practices are carefully used by the imperialist countries, and they have managed to modify even the initial role of the State in the dependent countries.

The evolution of the capitalist system, of the tools of technique and technology guarantees this relationship of inequality between the two worlds, so that the development

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<sup>82</sup>(Op.cit)

of the poor world is not linked to the economic impulse it initiates but linked to the control of the central states.

The change of this perpetual form of domination has only been possible in the countries that have made the revolution, where these systems have undergone a moment of important structural reform, starting with the change of the national currency, and the promotion of a radical development in an authoritarian form.

Wallerstein develops from 1970 onwards the improved version of this theory, drawing its explanation from an interdisciplinary process that has earned the world system theory its name. The author uses specific terms while questioning certain essential points of the theory of development.

The world-system according to Immanuel Wallerstein is characterized by an unequal and complex relationship, marked by both a vast economic policy regulated by global organizations, but also by relationships of interdependence that bring together peoples, states, tribes, cities, etc. Without going into detail about the mini systems, the author opposes the idea of a global economy and a global empire that crushes the non-industrialized and poor countries<sup>83</sup>.

Wallerstein categorizes the world into three geographical areas which he calls the "center" for capitalist countries with strong economic power, technology, and super modern armies. They control have a monopoly on institutions and are not practically dependent on others. Their needs in primary materials and labor are quickly satisfied by the fact that there are areas where other populations are in lack and live in precariousness.

The "semi-peripheries" are intermediate countries that have better economic situations than the peripheries. They have already embraced technology and have production industries in their midst that also give them power. They also compete with the peripheral countries for the resources and trust of the rulers of these countries through trade, diplomacy, and the establishment of profit extracting enterprises.

The "peripheries" are the spaces of poor category. These are the countries that are economically and scientifically poor. In spite of immense natural and human resources, the policy of these countries in the global system weighs very little. The lack of science

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<sup>83</sup>Alain, B. (2008). Immanuel Wallerstein, Comprendre le monde. Introduction à l'analyse des systèmes-monde. *revue ç Interrogations* ?, 2-3.

and technology, in a climate of instability and endemic corruption, turns their human resources into exclaves of the modern world. They and their resources are controlled by the other two mentioned above.

Global empires have within them a powerful system of integration and subordination of component units. They use the instruments of state power, the military, financial, and other heavy and powerful industries that are instruments of pressure and political and administrative control of the imperial structure. The essentially political character gives them a character of political unity which partly explains their success.

This political unification is sometimes coupled with a certain form of cultural standardization in certain countries under the effect of the diffusion of a major religion considered then as the state religion, and even of a language, which more or less standardizes morals, civil society, law, etc. A world economy is distinguished from a world empire by three closely related traits. First, it is not politically unified: on the contrary, it is politically fragmented into a multiplicity of autonomous and sovereign powers, often rivals and sometimes even enemies, which it nevertheless includes by encompassing them. Moreover, a world economy is politically fragmented, but also culturally fragmented: more than a world empire, it tolerates a great diversity of languages, customs, religions, etc.<sup>84</sup>.

The commercial relations that develop between different units, improve over time, and tend to take the form of cultural standardization. Wallerstein calls this tendency the geo-cultural strategy that aims at reproduction and conformity in other countries "world-economy".

Finally, and as a consequence of the two previous points, the unification of a world-economy takes place, as its name indicates, essentially in and through the economy. This presupposes not only the existence of regular and intense relations of commercial exchange between the different socio-political units that make it up, but also the development of a real division of labor between them, which makes them mutually dependent from the point of view of their material reproduction, which Wallerstein calls

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<sup>84</sup>(Ibid.)

"the axial division of labor" that is the backbone of the capitalist world-economy according to him<sup>85</sup>.

Although the theory of political opportunity is taken as a preference in this work, the theory of dependency and the world system will help us better understand the external factors related to the imposition of a unidimensional system that Westerners have imposed on the world. The reading of the last part is inspired by many of the realities that these authors evoke in the theme of underdevelopment.

### **3.3. Literature Review**

The literature review is in fact an overview of the explanations put forward by various authors for the work we are carrying out. It shows the limitations of previous work, and the deficiencies of certain arguments put forward by one author to assert the cause of a phenomenon. The review is the confrontation of all these ideas, which we examine in order to draw a true conclusion based on the angle of attack targeted in our work. The literature allows us to situate ourselves at the heart of the subject and to delimit our field of intervention.

Up until February 2006, Guinean politics was characterized by an asymmetrical seesaw mechanism between, on the one hand, a government that had granted itself immense executive power and, on the other, a weak, disorganized opposition. Mobilized for the first time in the 1993 presidential elections, the vast majority of these opposition parties failed to solidify a new policy capable of offering an alternative. Many Guineans therefore preferred to support Conté's Unity and Progress Party (PUP), albeit weakly, during the 1990s, following the adage "Better a known devil than an unknown one". When, at the turn of the 2000s, the PUP lost almost all legitimacy, many Guineans preferred to leave the system and abstain, as shown by the low turnout in the 2005 municipal elections. Breaking away from Sékou Touré's nationalist party-state, the PUP and opposition parties readily used ethnolinguistic groups as available political bases. At the same time, civil society organizations, trade unions, professional associations and

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<sup>85</sup>(Ibid.)

human rights organizations, as well as the coalitions that brought them together, came into competition with each other, weakened and divided<sup>86</sup>.

Politicians had no idea what this would lead to in the early days of the multi-party era, so the concentration of people from the same ethnic groups was slowly formed in urban areas, where the headquarters of the political parties with which they were affiliated as activists were located. This is where the rules took on a new form. The pacts sealed between communities are becoming weaker than they were during the colonial period. Competition for power, land, resources and markets has become the new constant in inter-community relations, leading to the development of new, predatory forms of relationship and alliance between Guineans.

Given that the youth of Conakry's ghetto are often described as either opportunistic (insofar as they support the politician who offers them money), simply violent for the fun of it (and for the economic benefits of looting), or ethnically affiliated (to politicians with close ties to their respective neighborhoods), this reaction is remarkable for its heterogeneity of political opinion and its lack of clarity. The heterogeneity of political opinions and its inconstancy<sup>87</sup>.

Protesters vary in size, age and influence. Five twelve-year-old boys may call themselves a "gang", but there are protesters with as many as 400 members in their twenties and thirties who exert enormous influence on their neighborhoods. When, for example, an influential gang calls for a certain action (be it a political campaign, a concert or vandalism), it has the means to ensure that its call will be followed by the vast majority of young people in its neighborhood. This is due to the respect and power they have acquired in these neighborhoods - either through intimidation, or by being an example to others: many leaders of these organizations are intellectually superior to their followers. They advise and direct them, and thus assume a position of authority over them. This phenomenon is closely linked to the devastating effects of economic hardship on Guinean families. If families don't have the time to look after their children, nor the financial means

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<sup>86</sup>Mike, M. (2007). Sékou Touré est Mort. Karthala, 128. Found on <https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2007-3-page-125.htm>

<sup>87</sup>Philipps, J. (2013). Politics of the Future – Riots of the Now. Temporal Horizons of Youth in Upheavals in England and Guinea. 137.

to ensure their well-being, it will be difficult for them to give them an example of "success" and the moral education needed to guide them<sup>88</sup>.

On the one hand, young people in Conakry (like the vast majority of the urban population) perceive poor governance as the cause of their main problems. However, they differ from the older generations in their conception of politics. They feel socially, economically and politically marginalized by a hostile state. It is above all in the above-mentioned neighborhoods that a radical ideology has developed, according to which absolute opposition, (and if necessary, violence) is the only way to achieve political change. This militancy manifested itself during the political movements against the Conté government in 2007, which were marked by violence and destruction. Buildings symbolizing the state were vandalized, and gas stations and stores looted. Protest and political opposition went hand in hand with destruction and personal enrichment<sup>89</sup>.

Guinea's early break with its former colonial power, France, forced the country to develop its own cadre of professionals early on. In recent years, however, the capacity of the administration has been undermined by corruption and a shortage of qualified mid-level civil servants. Public confidence in the government has been further weakened by the concentration of senior positions in the hands of members of President Conté's Soussou ethnic group<sup>90</sup>.

As always, when a Guinean president comes to power, favoritism towards his ethnic group has always been a curse of public administration. This practice has contributed to the appointment of corrupt and incompetent managers who have enjoyed the comfort of the wealth of the Guinean taxpayer.

Donations in the form of debt have always been poorly invested in projects due to corruption, which not only discouraged donors, but also meant that the development indicators invented here and there in the media did not really exist. The deepening of the economic and structural crisis in a country rich in poorly exploited resources finally gave

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<sup>88</sup>Philipps, J., & Grovogui, T. (2010). Urban Youth and Political Violence in Conakry . *Search for Common Ground Guinea*, 2.

<sup>89</sup>Ibidem

<sup>90</sup>Melly, P. (2003, August ). Guinea: Early Warning Analysis. *Writenet Paper*(No. 19), 7.

Guinea the image of a poor country suffering from the resource curse. Repeated crises eventually paved the way for political opportunism and recurrent instability, leaving theorists and analysts to express their views on the system of governance and to address various parameters related to the issue of political and social contestation.

Joschka Philipps' approach to the behavior of demonstrators, particularly the gangs in Conakry, is to see gang leaders as ruthless powers who maintain and exploit vast networks of patronage and extortion. Gangs are the driving force behind political demonstrations: they have instrumental value to politicians because they are strictly organized, remarkably stable, and have considerable influence in their neighborhoods.

From the gangs' point of view, these demonstrations generate revenue because politicians pay for the spectacle, and mass demonstrations provide opportunities for looting. Political loyalty is not a factor in these relationships, as gangs easily switch sides and often march for their political rivals. While gang youth may despise politicians, access to the networks of the "big men" can provide career opportunities. Self-proclaimed ghetto youth therefore defy authority and challenge the status quo as they aspire to join the world of the rich and powerful.

In several of his articles, Joschka prefers to speak of gangs to express the fact that even if the protests are heterogeneous and multidimensional, the presence of gangs negotiating with politicians is an important aspect that allows us to identify the constancy of these protests. He makes us understand that these entities can reign supreme until the expiry of any anonymous agreement or contract existing between the parties.

His understanding of riots is very much focused on calculating blows before cultural action, alluding to the support these young people can sometimes give to leaders with whom they share a similar ethnic identity or common interests. It ignores the anger of ordinary, thoughtful citizens who wanted to hold the government to account, and the egregious macro-economic aspect is not emphasized by the author.

Linda Ghirardello and Roland Benedikter approach the issue of protests from an electoral perspective. They argue that the outbreak of post-election violence stems from

the growing antagonism between the government and the opposition, which has developed over the past year and intensified in the run-up to the elections<sup>91</sup>.

While Condé has drawn the ire of opposition voters, many Guineans continue to see him as a figure of stability and a sign of hope for economic recovery, as evidenced by the 59.4% of the vote he officially received at the ballot box, compared to 33% for his opponent, Diallo. The social divide, however, seems to go beyond the electoral vote, creating a deep rift in the country's social and ethnic landscape. Indeed, much of the tension is linked to the rivalry between the Malinkés and Fulani, a divide that was exploited and manipulated during the election campaign. Given the resurgence of ethnic hate speech, the United Nations described the situation in Guinea as "extremely dangerous" a few days before the elections. Although the (partially divided) opposition has repeatedly called for inter-ethnic unity, it seems that Guinean politics and the current composition of the parties, Alpha being Malinké and Diallo Fulani, still too often revert to an ethnic base line, which generally reinforces the status quo<sup>92</sup>.

The costs of electoral violence are high. Even in situations where the number of deaths remains low, electoral violence can have a critical impact on the electoral process, the outcome of elections and their perceived legitimacy. In the long term, it can have a negative impact on the prospects for democratic consolidation and on people's perceptions of democracy as a political system. Electoral violence can also create a humanitarian crisis and halt or reverse socio-economic development programs. In extreme situations, it can increase the risk of armed conflict or civil war. Electoral violence can also spill over beyond the societies in which it occurs, affecting neighboring states by displacing large border populations, provoking a humanitarian crisis, and increasing the circulation of arms and armed violence, which can contribute to instability in already unstable regions<sup>93</sup>.

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<sup>91</sup>Linda, G., & Roland, B. (2020). Guinea at the Brink of Breakdown Contested elections, post-electoral violence, and a profound scission of society threaten the small West African State to succumb into chaos. *Research gate*, 2. Récupéré sur <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345338187>

<sup>92</sup>Ibidem

<sup>93</sup>Eldridge, V. A., Mimmi, S. K., Daniel, N., & Utas, M. (2012). Electoral Violence in Africa. *Nordiska Africa Institutet*, 2. Récupéré sur <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:556709/fulltext01.pdf>

Their contributions go some way toward the instrumentalist theory of ethnicity, which explains interethnic conflicts in terms of manipulation rather than linguistic or cultural differences. These explanations also fit the Guinean reality, but not to the full extent. The electoral period can be considered a favorable time for the outbreak of communal conflicts. However, this division is also historically linked to the first regime and even to the colonial period, when the colonizers used the divide-and-rule strategy. Opinions between the Malinké and the Peul have always remained opposed, and each continues to play the victimization game.

Unlike political ideologies, ethnic identities are often recognizable by physical appearance, language, name, or certain cultural knowledge such as religious verses. Chandra (2004) argues that citizens use ethnic markers to determine who to vote for. This logic is adapted to assert that politicians and their henchmen use the same markers to identify their voters in ethnically motivated countries in order to maximize the effectiveness of pre-election violence<sup>94</sup>.

Instead, Mohamed S. Camara focuses on the role of the media in providing unbiased commentary and intervention. In his article, he echoes social activist Boubacar Diop's argument that "Guinean web radios have the merit of reporting on important events that affect the Guinean community at home and abroad. However, he points out that most of them comment and analyze these important events from an essentially ethnic point of view. Too often," Diop continues, "broadcasters are influenced in their analysis by very biased questions and comments from the audience"<sup>95</sup>.

Facts are not only considered as simple comments to accuse a particular ethnic group of violent behavior, but attacks and insults become very violent, especially when it comes to live broadcasts. Many observers believe that in the digital sphere, the Fulani are making themselves too much of a victim by making it clear to international opinion that there is a Fulani genocide underway in Guinea.

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<sup>94</sup>Schweinitz, C. v. (2016). Ethno-political Competition and Pre-Election Violence in Africa. *International Conflict Research Group*, 3.

<sup>95</sup>Mohamed, S. C. (2012). New Media and Ethno-Politics in the Guinean Diaspora. *Humanities & Communications*, 14.

If we build the rule of change from one regime to another by handing over power to an ethnic group and not by elections, it will be very difficult to solve the electoral problem in Guinea. The frequency of political demonstrations in Ratoma community can be explained by the fact that the Fulani feel marginalized. The young people who take to the streets have internalized violent behavior, not only by participating in demonstrations, but also by learning over time that they are condemned to fight to bring one of their own to power.

Why, then, do political demonstrations occur disproportionately in some parts of the city and far less often in other neighborhoods that are just as poor and neglected? The answer to this question is explained throughout this book. There are political demonstrations and there are demonstrations related to economic crises.

In this work, we are embarking on a somewhat delicate exercise, due to the many factors we are trying to explain. The particularity of the subject is not only the politico-social manifestations, but also other factors such as the problems of the economic situation and the standard of living of Guineans. It's about really explaining the real problems of society through a holistic lens. Although this limits the details of the elements evoked, the advantage is that it sends us towards an open-mindedness while having a generalized knowledge of reality and the problems that arise from it.

## CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

The debates on the new world order revolve around two opposing visions. First, there are powerful states that support their policies through the promotion of a globalized world and the demands of growing capitalism that they implement in cooperation between countries and regions through bilateral and multilateral agreements. The multinationals and the politicians who promote them are constantly seeking access to cheap human and natural resources and to outlets for the goods they produce in their enterprises around the world. In contrast, workers and citizens say that the expansion of global markets creates a host of problems that harm human health and negatively impact the environment. In addition, it creates conflict, exacerbates social inequality, and threatens traditional cultures.

The objective of these actors is to establish a world order less focused on markets and more on people. Their concern is to have a stronger voice in global policy arenas that are largely isolated from public input and scrutiny<sup>96</sup>. Several struggles are engaged today throughout the world in various fields of action and seek above all to preserve a world of freedom and future.

The context of action often remains local or national. However, in order to analyze their action, the actors themselves are increasingly led to situate it in a general context and to think globally. Very often, they place themselves in a local or national context. However, in order to better understand their claims and their actions, the actors are led to place their analyses in a framework of current events and global thinking. The most relevant movements are generally those that give their approaches a universal scope that encompasses shared social values. A localized emancipation struggle that can in fact only mobilize well-defined actors in a restricted space. However, if these struggles are inscribed in a restricted political and social context, they appeal, in some of their meanings, to the universal values inherited from the Enlightenment; in this case, they

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<sup>96</sup>Smith, J. (2008). *Social Movements for Global Democracy*. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3.

demand an end to oppression, the recognition of human rights, and an end to corruption and to the misuse of the state by the authorities who distort its logic<sup>97</sup>.

The inability of the leaders of nation-states to respond effectively to persistent current problems, the disregard for the resolution of disasters such as ongoing climate change, the global ownership of wealth by a capitalist minority that widens the gap by reinforcing inequality, population growth and the loss of cultural heritage, are all evidence of this. As a result, many people live in precariousness and seek to deconstruct this system through the expression of their dissatisfaction with politicians and politics in general<sup>98</sup>.

The expression of this discontent can be summarized in revolts. However, this revolt is not simply defensive, but also prepares the future, because it breaks down the contradictions of the existing social order and destroys the restrictions imposed by the particular interest on the general and natural progress of society. In the last decades, the institutionalization of industrial conflicts in the big capitalist countries and the extreme importance of national struggles, revolutionary attempts and counter-revolutionary or repressive coups d'état in the dependent societies, have further accentuated this tendency...<sup>99</sup>.

After a period of recurring protests in several European and Arab countries in 2011, the intensity of these demonstrations has decreased significantly. However, in recent years, major protests seem to be on the rise again. The number of protests in North Africa and the Middle East has fluctuated more than elsewhere, with the most impressive peak of any other region. The Economist Intelligence Unit's acclaimed report identified 69 states that experienced new protests between 2009 and 2013 around the world<sup>100</sup>. By region, the largest number of protests occurred in high-income countries, followed by Latin America, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>101</sup>.

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<sup>97</sup>Michel, W. (2016). Social movements, a global perspective. *Hypotheses*. Found on <https://wieviorka.hypotheses.org/325>

<sup>98</sup>West, D. (2013). *social movements in global politics*. Policy Press.

<sup>99</sup>(Op.cit)

<sup>100</sup>Carothers, T., & Youngs, R. (2015). The complexities of global protests. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5.

<sup>101</sup>(Ibid.)

Not since the Great Depression have there been so many organized protests against banking institutions and political authorities. And since then, in every election, citizens have punished the incumbents and voted against the establishment. Revolutions that were once considered relics of the past have made a comeback on the world stage, as have coups and attempted coups everywhere.

A new study released that looked at demonstrations between 2006 and 2020 found that the number of protest movements around the world had more than tripled in less than 15 years. Every region saw an increase, the study found, with some of the largest protest movements ever recorded — including the farmers' protests that began in 2020 in India, the 2019 protests against President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and ongoing Black Lives Matter protests since 2013<sup>102</sup>.

In addition to issues related to democracy and political representation, the report identifies rising inequality as another major theme of protests around the world, contributing to nearly 53 percent of the protests studied. Individual issues raised by protesters include corruption, working conditions, and public service reform, followed by "real democracy" as the most frequently cited<sup>103</sup>.

The phenomena that have best marked this era of revolutions and political and economic crises are the movements of squares or occupations. These are the new forms of protest that have emerged in countries around the world to demonstrate against precariousness, inequality, democracy, corporations, and austerity policies.

In the 21st century, the media, and telephones in the hands of protesters, be it text, images, and videos, have become elements that have given another aspect to current protests, especially in developed countries. Activists have integrated them into their organization so that there is a transnational reach, and it can be said that these media have a populist character, as they cannot be easily controlled by the government.

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<sup>102</sup>Taylor, A. (2021, Novembre 04). *Why is the world protesting so much? A new study claims to have some answers*. Found on The Washinton Post: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/04/protests-global-study/>

<sup>103</sup>(Ibid)

It is understandable how effective and far-reaching the new platforms and the internet have been for social movements, much more than they have significantly affected the political system.

#### **4.1. Social Movements in Africa from the 1950s/60s to the Present**

The studies carried out on the evolution of the society and the socio-political changes from the prism of the social movements have shown that the idea is not new, however the modern nation states in particular Western ones have benefited from its application more frequently than the African continent. They often explain it by their rapid political, economic, and social evolutions and by the satisfaction of substantial needs<sup>104</sup>.

During the very first wave of demonstrations that flooded the continent, the demands were for independence. The second wave focused on the recognition of a multiparty system that favored the participation of all stakeholders in political life. Today, it is difficult to identify alternatives that are truly capable of replacing the dominant political order. The ability of political parties to offer new programs is limited, their repression by the authorities, their personal inclination to curry favor with Western donors, and the ambiguous nature of their activities are all factors that diminish popular support on the ground. Civil society, while focused on certain development issues, often identified with one of the influential parties, has little to offer.

Socialism as an alternative is not fashionable, and general criticism of neoliberalism is rarely heard. The only political language readily available is the liberal discourse of "good governance", supported by donors, which in practice often leaves no room for popular or even democratic politics. Thus, protests tend to focus on the easiest and most limited way to translate economic grievances into a critique of the state: anti-corruption and anti-incorporation<sup>105</sup>.

In the 1950s, many African countries were already determined in the anti-colonial struggle whose sole aim was the accession to independence. The strategy of this first wave

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<sup>104</sup>Dwyer, P., & Zeilig, L. (2012). *African struggles today social movements since independence*. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 18.

<sup>105</sup>Branch, A., & Mampilly, Z. (2015). *Africa uprising Popular protest and political change* London: Zed Books, 81-82.

of protests was to denounce the mistreatment of Africans working in the fields, on construction sites and in mining.

In Northern Rhodesia, for example, the new African miners' union provided strong support for the politics of national independence. Some of the most powerful leaders of the new unions - Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone, Sekou Touré in Guinea, Tom Mboya in Kenya, to name but three - became political leaders. This was further evidence of the growth of mass support for the new parties of nationalism and, at least indirectly, for the black independence that these parties sought<sup>106</sup>. After independence, these movements gradually disappeared, giving way to single parties and authoritarian regimes established by the former revolutionaries.

In the 1980s, the growing popularity of neoliberal ideology provoked a rethinking of the dominant paradigms then studying politics in Africa. The state, previously generally considered to be the main engine of development, was, in this period, increasingly seen as an obstacle to development<sup>107</sup>.

In the 1990s, the accelerating pace of structural reforms in African economies led to what has been described as the second wave of revolts against the IMF and the World Bank. The social movements in question were organized around a set of democratic demands, triggering the pro-democracy movements that spread throughout Africa from 1990 onwards.

Pro-democracy movements gained momentum in 1991. The African continent experienced major revolts in thirty different countries in which eighty-six movements were observed. Even without the attention of critics, this figure was an eloquent riposte to those who preached Afro-pessimism at the time. However, although the pro-democracy movements gained the ascendancy in places, as did the nationalist movements before them, in reality there was a deep division in their stated unity with respect to their expectations of the democratization process.

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<sup>106</sup>Davidson, B. (2013). *Modern Africa : A Social and Political history*. New York: Routledge, 91.

<sup>107</sup>McSween, N. (2010). Repenser l'analyse des mouvements Sociaux Africain. *Alliance de Recherche Université- Communauté Innovation Sociale et Développement des Communautés*, 2.

Coinciding with the fall of Soviet communism and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the American capitalist system, political liberalization coincided with the predominance of market-based economic liberalization as the only solution to the economic problems of the world in general and Africa in particular<sup>108</sup>.

#### **4.2. Third Wave: 21st Century Protest and Resistance**

The current protests are only logical consequences of the previous ones. People in many African countries continue to act in accordance with the problems that are and remain unsatisfied by leaders who take pleasure in feeding people false hopes. The economic figures hardly feed the citizens, the lack of reaction of the heads of state to the demands formulated by the civil society increases the grievances and frustrations whose only way to express them is through social movements. Despite the increasing number of damages and deaths, resistance by all means has become the weapon of these people and smartphones their media.

The last protests that appeared on the continent were in the 2000s. It is in 2010-2011 that they reached their peak. Some of these protests coincided with the wave of the "Arab Spring", that is to say that it could have a contamination effect at the regional level according to some reflections on the subject.

However, in 2005, protests had already begun to multiply well before the Arab Spring, which suggests that deeper mechanisms were at work at that time. Whether at the national or local level, the popular revolt varied from country to country, and the scale of the phenomenon increased according to the circumstances and events that occurred.

They include street demonstrations against rising food prices and the cost of living (Chad, Guinea, Niger), strike actions over arrears in wage payments and labor disputes (Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe), pro-tests over rigged elections or attempts by leaders to extend their constitutional term limits (Burkina Faso, Burundi, DRC, Gabon, Togo, Uganda), student protests (Uganda, South Africa), and out-breaks of unrest over police violence, extortion, corruption and impunity (Chad, Kenya, Senegal,

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<sup>108</sup>(Op.cit)

Uganda). What many of these popular protests have in common is that they are driven by deep-seated frustration with the economic and political status quo<sup>109</sup>.

Beyond grievances, political leaders not only lack development programs, but their reappearance sometimes coincides with electoral periods when the opportunity is favorable to the creation of ephemeral alliances and bastions of allies often mobilized on ethnic grounds that accelerate the predictability of future political crises.

Social movements in Africa comprise a variety of actors, including individuals and informal groups that come together through common social actions or causes. The two dimensions of social movements in the region are a collective identity, a vision, and a belief in a common social cause. In recent times, social movements are seen as an important factor in eliminating social exclusion and helping the poor gain their rights to access basic needs. They challenge state policies that lead to increased poverty and marginalization of groups of people. However, there is an evolving argument that social movements do not directly address poverty issues and that they generally address public policy processes that have implications for the quality of life of citizens<sup>110</sup>.

The strategies of civil disobedience and peaceful action employed by protesters in several countries and in public spheres have been particularly effective. Occupation of institutional headquarters and public space have been among the strategies used to challenge the ruling regime and their efforts to instrumentalize political structures, as has been the case in many other regions of the world. Research on past protests reveals that protesters were calling for political and civic engagement and a heightened sense of responsibility to influence policy decisions. This is particularly evident in the three cases analyzed, with all three movements making explicit calls to participate in the new political culture and appealing to a new kind of social consciousness<sup>111</sup>.

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<sup>109</sup>Arnould, V., Tor, A., & Vervaeke, A. (2016). Africa uprising? The protests, the drivers, the outcomes. *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, 2.

<sup>110</sup>Elongué, C., & Vandyck, C. K. (2016). Social Movements and Social Change in Africa. *wacseries Op-Ed*, 1.

<sup>111</sup>Mateos, O., & Erro, C. B. (2020). Protest, internet activism, and socio-political change in sub-Saharan Africa. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 660-661.

The novelty observed in the street protests is the creation of a hybrid network of interaction in various contexts around the world. This combination of street protest and social networking has been made possible by the presence and intensive use of digital platforms, and the increasing involvement of activists in website activities on the African continent (ibid.).

Some social movements in Africa are using the Internet beyond its mobilizing capacity. They are also using the Internet to connect, network, fundraise, and build global alliances. For example, Afro activists have used the Internet to network with social movements elsewhere in the world and support local cyber activists in their advocacy campaigns, as in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia, Senegal, among others.

According to Wieviorka, it is essential to recognize that today, whether in Africa or Asia, or in the geographical spaces where these movements were invented, the realities are almost similar. These movements can succeed when they overflow towards populism, just as they can suffer failures notably in the face of anti-movements, violence and certain strategies put in place by the opponent. In contexts of extreme violence, such as the removal of political regimes, the state can resort to ultimate methods such as military reinforcements when international standards of repression no longer work<sup>112</sup>.

It is therefore essential to rethink and thoroughly revise the new paradigms of the new social movements, especially on the African continent. Although the economic and cultural aspects prevail in their struggles, the elements and meanings are however situated in a post-industrial dimension.

### **4.3. National Context**

After the Second World War, in which Africans massively participated to liberate the Allies from the hand of the Nazi army, the eminent wish was that of accessing their own autonomy which should guarantee their legitimate right as a free society.

Since August 25, 1958, on the national level, the minds were prepared by one and only speech, that of the refusal to accept the constitution of the Vth French Republic. The reproach of the people in several countries of the sub-region was to note with

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<sup>112</sup>(Op.cit.)

astonishment the ingratitude of the former powers to recognize the effort of the African soldiers, the re-implantation organized by these countries in their former colonies and the fragmentation of the unitary structure which was the plan to maintain the peoples in inferiority again.

The strategy of President Ahmed Sékou Touré and his companions was to unite everyone around the same ideal through the single party, the one that would allow access to total independence, but also to be prepared against any hostility from the enemy.

#### **4.3.1. The Idea of Pan-Africanism and the Nationalism Rise**

In a broad coalition of movements initiated by African Americans for the recognition of the rights of colonized peoples and the equitable treatment of races, the African American intelligentsia and black intellectuals descended from slaves accelerated the process of decolonization in the world.

In the 1900s several anti-supremacist movements were born in America. The Afro-American labor movement, the Black Revolution movement, the Black Panthers etc. Newspapers such as the Universal Negro Improvement Association were distributed within the black community to raise awareness. In these newspapers, people were reminded of their painful past and informed about the situation their communities were exposed to.

In Africa, aided by the international socialist movement, the world communist movement, and humanist clerics and writers who found subjugation dehumanizing, the leaders of African Pan-Africanism quickly mobilized into unions and syndicates internationally, as well as around the party internally. The objective of these associations was the politicization of the movement to accelerate the unconditional liberation of the black colonies under imperialism.

The word "negro" once used to diminish the identity of blacks as inferior beings was used by French-speaking black African writers like Senghor to make Africans understand that they should be proud of their skin color, their culture, and their authenticity.

Sekou Touré quickly understood the wind of change of this liberation that was blowing on the continent and created the General Confederation of African Workers. He also

organized the internal structure through the PDG by asserting himself as the General Secretary.

He entrusted several responsibilities to women in the party, but also in their respective zones as intelligence agents. As a father of the nation, through the media he explained the importance and the interest of a sovereign state to his people in French and in the national languages. The message was understood and passed on from generation to generation thanks to the heroic act of Sekou whose nostalgia continues to echo in Guinea because of the unhealthy practices that no one dared to do in the time of the African man of his time.

#### **4.3.2. The Trade Union Movement of the Time and the First Era of a Guinean Revolution**

The emergence of trade unionism in French West Africa is linked to the specific nature of the forms of exploitation of labor power in the colonies. Between 1900 and 1946, in the space of less than half a century, the colonial system succeeded in creating a labor force in French West Africa that was partly freed from its domestic community of self-subsistence. This was the result of a progressive integration into the world capitalist system<sup>113</sup>.

Since the end of World War II, political and trade union freedoms have been gradually acquired through education: the 1946 Constitution, the 1952 Labor Code. Political parties became more Africanized: in 1946, African politicians began by associating themselves with metropolitan parties, but they gradually broke away from them and sought to group together on the basis of a clearly African policy. The Africans of this period have the mystique of equality. They want the same treatment, in theory and in practice, for the metropolis and for the overseas territories. In theory, the game was won with the promulgation of the Overseas Labor Code, but in practice, its application was not without difficulties. As early as 1953, the unions began to fight to eliminate abusive

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<sup>113</sup>Fall, B. (2006). Le mouvement syndical en Afrique occidentale francophone, De la tutelle des centrales métropolitaines à celle des partis nationaux uniques, ou la difficile quête d'une personnalité (1900-1968). *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*, 4.

interpretations by employers and the Administration, refusals to apply the law outright, and delays in its application (family benefits, for example)<sup>114</sup>.

The protest of the Guinea trade unionists was real, and remarkable throughout West Africa the sympathy they enjoyed during this strike has now become famous, the greatest Africa has ever known. The initiative, once again, came from Guinea. This strike began on September 21 and lasted until November 25, 1953, with private sector workers. It was the historic strike commonly called the "73 days" strike<sup>115</sup>.

Sékou Touré himself is the Secretary General of the U.G.T.A.N. (General Union of Black African Workers), an inter-African trade union, whose headquarters are in Guinea, and he is at the same time the head of the State of Guinea (Wallerstein, 1962). Thanks to his union struggle, he became convinced that colonization, which lives on oppression and exploitation, is an expression of violence and hears only the language of violence in return<sup>116</sup>.

From January 12 to 19, 1959, the General Union of Black African Workers held a Pan-African General Congress in Conakry, capital of the Republic of Guinea. This large gathering of African workers, the largest in African trade union history, brought together more than 318 trade union delegates representing all the African countries under French occupation: West Africa, Equatorial Africa, Togo, and Cameroon. Sign of the times and full of significance for the future, this Pan-African Congress was placed under the direct presidency of Mr. Sékou Touré, head of the Government of Guinea and trade union leader as well as politician. The debates were extremely lively and, once again, the unanimity of the African trade union leaders stigmatized the attempts of neo-imperialism in Africa to domesticate the workers' movements in their struggle for national and professional demands. The Congress of the U.G.T.A.N. solemnly reaffirmed that in Black Africa, as long as the people will not be cured of the colonial cancer, there will be absolutely no rational or even human frontier between the political struggle and the trade union struggle.

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<sup>114</sup>Bovy, L. (1965). *La nature du mouvement syndical ouest africain d'expression française*. Paris: Jean Hottot, 42.

<sup>115</sup>*Le syndicaliste*. (2022, Février 23). Found on Sékou le combatant : [http://sekoulecombattant2.free.fr/Le\\_syndicaliste.html](http://sekoulecombattant2.free.fr/Le_syndicaliste.html)

<sup>116</sup>(Op.cit)

In Black Africa, trade unionism and the struggle for national liberation are and remain, for the mass of workers and the people, the one and same historical duty<sup>117</sup>.

The effect of alienation, of depersonalization produced by domination and exploitation in this case foreign is constantly denounced by President Sékou Touré<sup>118</sup>. His determination for a united and strong Africa was the inspiration for the other countries that obtained their independence in the 1960s.

#### **4.3.3. "Freedom in Poverty than Wealth in Slavery" The Referendum of "September 28" and Its Consequences for Guinea**

In the narrow world of the French colonial empire, there was little to distinguish Guinea, its people, or its leaders from other territories in sub-Saharan Africa. Nothing in its history suggested, either to France or to Guinea itself, that it alone in French-speaking Africa would prove to have what its first president called a "vocation for independence. Yet a combination of internal and external circumstances led to a sudden and unique achievement, which in turn became the focal point around which its elite began to build a distinct Guinean nation. The fact that the power base of this elite was political, rather than economic, intellectual, ethnic, or religious, was both the cause and symptom of Guinea's successful challenge to colonial rule. It would also be Guinea's greatest strength and most tragic weakness as an independent state<sup>119</sup>.

Under the determined leadership of Sékou Touré, the Democratic Party of Guinea (P.D.G.) not only won widespread popular support; it also succeeded in undermining the influence of the French-appointed leaders. Even French control of the electoral machinery could not help Charles De Gaulle here. To his dismay and anger, 95 percent of the votes in Guinea went against his plan<sup>120</sup>.

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<sup>117</sup>Matip, B. (1959). Le syndicalisme en Afrique Noire: Aperçu des mouvements ouvriers dans les pays d'origine coloniale française. *Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente*, 67(4).

<sup>118</sup>Fischer, G. (1959). Civilization : some aspects of political doctrine in guinea. *Institut de Sociologie de l'Université de Bruxelles*, 459.

<sup>119</sup>MacDonald, M. S. (2009). *The Challenge Of Guinean Independence, 1958-1971*. p.21 Toronto: University of Toronto press.

<sup>120</sup>Davidson, B. (2013). *Modern Africa : A Social and Political history* New York: Routledge, 91.

*From now on, after the constitution of its structures, the State exists, but is it the same of the Nation? If the referendum of September 28, 1958, had envisaged that each ethnic region would constitute an entity with a government, would we not have had several states in Guinea and not a single state? The Nation that exists today is the result of the activities of the State and the Party. The State can therefore rationally promote the unitary character that gives force to its methods, to its objectives; but this is only a subterfuge, because the transformation of man can only be done radically and effectively within a political organization; it is the Party that can operate this revolution, in a satisfactory manner, by educating the people and by organizing their creative action.*

*As on September 28, 1958, the People's Party, the Freedom Party, the Dignity Party, says "No". No to the revival of racism on which some people base their foolish hopes of political revenge; No to corruption which has no other aim than to ruin, from within, the Party and the State; No to scandalous trafficking and enrichment based on the aggravation of the misery and suffering of the people; No to subversion; No to slander; No to betrayals; No to the bankruptcy of the economy; No to the defeat of the people!*

*It is this option that has led, in an irresistible way, many African peoples to the right path of history, that of responsibilities. It can never be said enough that if the Democratic Party of Guinea had not taken the right decision on September 28, 1958, we would not have spoken today of the Organization of African Unity nor recorded the existence of 37 African States<sup>121</sup>.*

General Charles de Gaulle will never recover. And to save his honor, Mr. Africa of the general, Jacques Foccart, made the bet to put Sékou Touré on his knees. This bet, he will lose it despite a thousand and one plots fomented against the young Republic of Guinea (Savané, 2008).

#### **4.3.4. The Consequences of Independence**

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<sup>121</sup>Touré, A. S. (1970). *Plan Septennal 1964-1971* Conakry: Harmathan Guinée, 379.

Guinea divorced France under courageous conditions considered outrageous by the latter. And we said above that the French government, in order to wash away Guinea's affront, decided to cut off everything from it in order to bring it to its knees. So not only was Guinea excluded from the 1957 convention of application, but also from the association conventions signed later (Yaoundé Conventions I and II). This exclusion deprived our country of important resources that had enabled the realization of important infrastructures in the other associated countries for more than 2,350 million ecus (French currency at the time) between 1963 and 1975<sup>122</sup>.

This first sanction was not always satisfactory for France, so it decided to include other destabilizing operations to accelerate Guinea's descent into an unprecedented crisis. It was now a question of nipping the chick in the bud.

In early 1960 the Republic of Guinea created its own central bank and opted for monetary sovereignty. The Guinean franc came into effect following Guinea's withdrawal from the community of countries using the French franc.

Jacques Foccart, senior advisor to French President Charles de Gaulle, decided to retaliate severely against the Guinean government, which had dared to take the risk of distancing itself from the West African French community. Known for his political interventions in Africa, Jacques Foccart decided to launch an operation to destabilize the Guinean economy through Operation Persil, the brand name of a detergent presented as a means of cleaning dirt. The operation had two components: to cause an economic disaster and to provoke armed uprisings against the Guinean regime of Sékou Touré.

The SDECE's mission was to secretly organize paramilitary missions and arm part of the Guinean opposition in order to provoke a civil war that would lead to the eventual overthrow of President Touré's government<sup>123</sup>.

President Sékou, backed by his external supporters, succeeded in forcing these operations, including the Portuguese aggression of 22 November 1970. Several Guineans considered traitors according to the president's term, were sentenced to death. The

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<sup>122</sup>(Ibid.)

<sup>123</sup>Wikipédia. (2021, Novembre 12). *Opération persil*. Found on wikipédia:  
[https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Op%C3%A9ration\\_Persil#:~:text=L'op%C3%A9ration%20Persil%20%C3%A9tait%20une,l'ind%C3%A9pendance%20de%20la%20Guin%C3%A9e](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Op%C3%A9ration_Persil#:~:text=L'op%C3%A9ration%20Persil%20%C3%A9tait%20une,l'ind%C3%A9pendance%20de%20la%20Guin%C3%A9e).

archives speak of more than 50,000 while the reality remains unknown for lack of tangible evidence.

Guinea's new international relations were not limited to the African context. The agreements that Conakry signed with the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia were also of primary importance. The communist countries wanted to take advantage of the departure of the French administration to win Guinea over to their cause and establish themselves in West Africa. To achieve their ends, they did not skimp on economic and military aid. Sékou Touré was cautious in the face of the maneuvers of the communist bloc. He accepted aid from the communist countries, but he took care to counterbalance it with approaches to the Western world. His trip to Moscow, for example, was preceded by a state visit to Washington and London and followed by a visit to Bonn. At the White House, during his meeting with Eisenhower, he asked that the United States develop economic and trade cooperation with his country<sup>124</sup>.

At the same time as relations with Paris were tightening, Sékou Touré strengthened cooperation with Nkrumah. On May 1, 1959, the two leaders announced the birth of the Union of Independent African States. Given the profound differences and the distance between the two countries, a complete union between Accra and Conakry was impossible, at least in the short term. The nature of the cooperation thus changed: it was no longer a question of unifying the two states, but of creating a more or less homogeneous bloc of African countries, which could impose itself internationally and, in the long term, influence the construction of the first pan-African political organization. In August 1960, the breakup of the Federation of Mali (composed of the territories of Senegal and French Sudan, the current Mali) allowed him to get closer to Modibo Keita, his former ally in the RDA. At the end of 1960, the Ghana-Guinea-Mali coalition was formed. On December 24, the three heads of state met in Conakry, where they proclaimed their intention to create a union between their countries ... In the context of an Africa now largely made up of independent states, the creation of a pan-African organization, establishing forms of collaboration more or less close, became a major issue<sup>125</sup>.

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<sup>124</sup>Migani, G. (2012). Sékou Touré et la contestation de l'ordre colonial en Afrique sub-saharienne, 1958-1963. *Le Monde*, 35.

<sup>125</sup>(Ibid.)

On March 20, 1984, after many trips to organize the 20th summit of the Organization of African Unity, he concluded the congress of the ECOWAS trade unions by declaring "I will remain a trade unionist until my death". A few hours later, he was taken by strong faintness. Moroccan doctors chartered by King Hassan II diagnosed serious heart problems. On March 24, American cardiologists diagnosed an aortic aneurysm. Saudi Arabia immediately dispatched a hospital plane to take him to Cleveland. Sékou Touré died on March 26, 1984, at 3:23 p.m. in Cleveland, Ohio, in the United States, during a heart surgery operation. His remains were repatriated on March 28 and displayed for two days at the presidential palace. He was buried on March 30 in the mausoleum of Camayenne (Wikipédia., 2022). "... The president of the Young Guinean Republic, Sékou Touré, was in this last period the decisive African man<sup>126</sup>.

*Why is Guinea the only territory in French-speaking Africa to have chosen independence? Mr. Sékou Touré explains this by the existence of a single party that identifies with the people. Also, in other French-speaking territories, most political leaders are intellectuals who have been under the "alienating and assimilating influence of the metropolis. But Touré, although a member of the French National Assembly, owes his influence to his work in trade unionism and to the fact that he preferred to stay on the ground, among the local people, rather than accept a position that was offered to him in the French government<sup>127</sup>.*

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<sup>126</sup>Césaire, A. ( 1959). Sékou Touré , L'Expérience guinéenne et l'unité africaine . *cité dans Mémoire collective*, 100.

<sup>127</sup>Fischer, G. (1959). Civilization : some aspects of political doctrine in guinea. *Institut de Sociologie de l'Université de Bruxelles*, 459.

**Picture 1.** Sekou Touré, President of Guinea-Conakry, speaking on August 25, 1958, in the presence of the French Prime Minister, Charles de Gaulle. Credit: Michel Clément / AFP



## CHAPTER V: THE GENERAL STRIKES OF 2006-2007

In a period marked by the economic and financial crisis that characterized the third phase of Lansana Conté's government, unions throughout the country launched a strike to protest not only the high cost of living but also the drift of military power in 2006-2007.

### 5.1. The People's response when things go wrong

Of Soussou origin, Lansana Conté was born around 1934 in Dubréka and was educated in an Islamic school before attending French military schools in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. He joined the French army in 1955 and was sent to Algeria to participate in the failed attempt by Paris to suppress the independence movement<sup>128</sup>.

March 26, 1984, marked the end of the reign of President Ahmed Sékou Touré. The administrative apparatus led by Louis Lansana Beavogui remained in place for only one month before Lansana Conté overthrew it in a military coup. The CMRD suspended the constitution and banned all political activity throughout the country. The military authorities founded a restructuring of the state authorities and proclaimed Lansana Conté president of the Republic.

Liberal and nationalist, he privatized public enterprises, reduced the number of civil servants, and gave Guinea a new constitution that allowed for a multiparty system. He became a general and was officially elected President of the Republic in 1993. He was re-elected in 1998 and 2003, thanks to a constitutional amendment (Wikipedia, 2021).

Better than Sekou Touré, Conté was able to sort out the real threats from those that were not really serious. Thus, as early as 1985, he consolidated his authority by eliminating his main rivals in the army and certain dignitaries of the previous regime. He also realized that he needed to allow a minimal degree of individual freedom and political pluralism and to go through the motions of elections in order to protect a power that had always remained military, personal and violent. The enthusiasm, however, did not last very long. Underneath his affable and straightforward exterior, President Conté soon

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<sup>128</sup>McGreal, C. (2008). Lansana Conté profile: Death of an African 'Big Man'. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/23/lansana-conte-profile>

demonstrated that he also knew how to appropriate power jealously while showing signs of openness and of breaking with the excesses of his predecessor, of whom he had been a collaborator for many years<sup>129</sup>.

In recent years, the country's increasing economic difficulties have been accompanied by a gradual hardening of the regime. On November 11, 2001, a constitutional referendum was held to abolish decentralization (by appointing district and neighborhood chiefs, who had previously been elected) and to establish a lifetime presidency (by amending Article 24 of the Basic Law, which limited the number of five-year presidential terms to two). But the opposition boycotted the 2001 referendum on the constitutional reform that allowed him a kind of "lifetime presidency", and then the 2003 presidential election: the head of state was re-elected with 95.63% of the vote against a single opponent<sup>130</sup>.

By amending the constitution, Conté quickly disenchanted Guineans by establishing a military authority to maintain power. The following years became unstable because of the demands of the army, but also because of the lifestyle and mismanagement that became more and more unbearable.

## **5.2. The beginning of Demonstrations**

The application of good governance and the rule of law require the proper functioning of institutions, respect for the separation of powers and the balance between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, a clear understanding of existing laws and regulations, as well as the intelligent, efficient, and rational management of human resources and the equitable distribution of the national wealth among the population. Failure to respect these principles can lead to internal and external conflicts, which have not spared Guinea over the past two decades<sup>131</sup>.

The warning signs of the crisis were identified even before the strike began. Guinean state power was showing a kind of political and economic fragility that had direct or

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<sup>129</sup>(op. cit.)

<sup>130</sup> <https://www.france24.com/fr/20081223-le-pr-sident-lansana-cont-est-mort-apr-s-24-ans-pouvoir-guinee>

<sup>131</sup>Sangaré, Alexander Sekou; Diallo, Yero; Camara, Sekou Oumar *État De La Gouvernance En Afrique De L'ouest: Guinée*

indirect repercussions on Guineans. The climate of insecurity and the trivialization of corrupt practices that resulted from it could lead to a popular uprising at any moment.

The year 2006 saw the beginning of protests in Guinea over the rising price of rice and gasoline throughout the country. When the protesters dispersed to nearby neighborhoods, police and gendarmes pursued them, ransacking homes, and causing material losses to nearby residents, striking not only the protesters but also other innocent people, including women, children, and the elderly<sup>132</sup>.

The paralysis of educational institutions and establishments in the run-up to the national exams prompted pupils, students, and teachers to join the protesters. The main arteries were barricaded, tires were burned, cars were damaged and 21 people were killed by the ball according to some sources.

With the population disgruntled, the number of demonstrators grew by the hour to a national strike, the third in less than a year. Initiated by two unions, the strike has reached such a scale that many unions, employer, and women's groups have joined in to form a state of paralysis throughout the country. The government tried to relieve the situation and called for calm, but the situation was not conducive to any negotiations. Every day there was a growing sense of frustration, and resistance to the mismanagement and squandering of assets by ministers and those close to the President. In Conakry alone, more than 30,000 people took to the streets, and tens of thousands more demonstrated in other provincial cities across the country<sup>133</sup>.

The Head of State's disregard for the rule of law and the constitutional principle of separation of executive and judicial powers, the instability of the government, and the nepotism that accompanies it, have worn down the patience of Guinean civil society actors. The unions, which had established themselves since the 2006 general strike as the only organized and credible force capable of carrying the popular discontent, filed a

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<sup>132</sup><https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2006/07/06/guinee-les-forces-de-securite-repondent-aux-manifestations-par-des-meurtres>

<sup>133</sup>Chaput, k. (2007, janvier 28). *Grève générale en Guinée: la présidence sous tension*. Found on Perspective Monde: <https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMAAnalyse?codeAnalyse=433>

notice of general and unlimited strike on January 2, 2007, starting January 10, 2007, "until the restoration of republican order"<sup>134</sup>.

The Guinean government has put forward its own figures indicating that the brutal crackdown has left at least 129 people dead and more than 1,700 injured, hundreds of them by gunshot. [...]. Indeed, for the first time since independence, tens of thousands of people - men and women, young and old, including members of all the country's major ethnic groups - took to the streets to demand better government, taking to the streets in rallies, marches, and sometimes clashes with security forces to openly demonstrate their discontent. The most common slogan chanted by the demonstrators was "change. During the strike, Guinean security forces routinely violated some of the most basic political and civil rights of their citizens, such as the right to life, security, and personal liberty, as well as the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly<sup>135</sup>.

The material damage was so significant that it is almost impossible to estimate the damage caused by this popular uprising. Looting and destruction of state property throughout the country was common. Resistance was effective, with dignitaries forced to deploy security to ensure their protection. However, despite the precautions taken, some saw their property go up in smoke, such as the house of Transitional Minister Eugène Camara, which was completely destroyed in N'zérékoré. The house of the former Minister of Higher Education, the mother of the second wife of the Head of State also lost her house in Conakry.

The President eventually declared a state of siege and martial law. On February 23, the National Assembly voted to lift the state of siege, and an independent Prime Minister, Lansana Kouyaté, a diplomat with the United Nations, was finally appointed. Just when it seemed that calm was returning to normal, unrest continued in some camps. In 2008, the exactions continued. Strongly destabilized and weakened, President Conté no longer controlled much in Guinea and relied on a few military and general officers. However, in May 2008, yet another mutiny broke out among soldiers over pay. Several soldiers and civilians were killed and injured during the unrest, which finally subsided with the dismissal of the Minister of Defense and the promise of a pay raise. But in June 2008, it

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<sup>134</sup>(Op.cit)

<sup>135</sup>HRW. (2008, Avril 30). *Guinée : Mourir pour le changement - Les forces de sécurité guinéennes répondent par la brutalité et la répression à une grève générale.*

was the police's turn to demonstrate over the non-payment of salary arrears. Bloody clashes broke out with the military, which Conté relied on to quell the police protest, resulting in several dozen deaths<sup>136</sup>.

The state media essentially broadcast only the views of the head of state and did not report the extent of popular support for the strike. In February, the military invaded the premises of two of the new independent radio stations. They destroyed equipment at one of the private radio stations and arrested employees at Radio Liberty. Then the National Council of Communication threatened to revoke the license of Radio Familia because it broadcast information about the unions' demands. Faced with further threats, the other two independent radio stations closed down. Radio France International's transmission was interrupted at least twice during the strikes and foreign journalists were harassed at the airport<sup>137</sup>.

On December 22, 2008, despite many years of illness. The death of Lansana Conté was not a surprise to anyone, and it is therefore without excessive surprise that the army intervened<sup>138</sup>.

Lansana Conte's political, economic, and social record from 1984 to 2008 is generally negative. Guinea's place in the poverty and corruption world remains unchanged at the top of the ranking, with drinking water and electricity deficit, even though it is considered by geographers to be the "water tower of West Africa," and is endowed with significant natural and mineral resources. The government has failed to reduce the illiteracy rate to nearly 70% of the adult population and to increase the school enrollment rate to barely 50% of young people<sup>139</sup>.

In the aftermath of the death of Lansana Conté, another military committee took power under the name of the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD). Directed by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, this coup d'état brought some relief

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<sup>136</sup>(Op.cit.)

<sup>137</sup>CNTG-USTG. (2007). *Pour Une Transition Pacifique Vers Le Développement Durable, La Démocratie Et Le Respect Des Droits Humains En Guinée*. Conakry.

<sup>138</sup>Hirribarren, V. (2011). Vers quelle démocratie se dirige la Guinée-Conakry (2008-2010) ? *Cahiers d'Histoire immédiate*, 139-154 (9).

<sup>139</sup>Dominique, B. (2015). Le coup d'État de décembre 2008 et la Transition controversée en Guinée. *Les Champs de Mars*, 18-33.

because it was carried out without bloodshed and was accompanied by reassuring promises of a genuine transition. But disillusionment soon set in after just a few months.

While the regime was initially popular because of high-profile public interrogations and trials of corrupt officials and drug traffickers, which seemed to indicate a real determination to fight public corruption, it soon became apparent that nepotism and mismanagement of public funds were dominant<sup>140</sup>.

During 2009, the captain's populism and authoritarianism grew: after blocking the creation of the National Transitional Council (CNT), the junta increased its intimidation of political actors and civil society leaders. So much so that when Dadis Camara announced his possible candidacy for the presidential election scheduled for 2010, political parties mobilized and called on Guineans to come and say "no" to this candidacy on September 28, 2009, in Conakry's stadium, echoing the 1958 vote that led to independence. But the repression of the demonstration was bloody, leaving at least 160 dead and more than 1,500 injured: women raped in the street, political leaders molested, civilians killed at point-blank range, bodies thrown into the sea to make them disappear.

The junta had gone too far, and faced with the UN international commission of inquiry, was soon divided over who was responsible for the massacre. Dadis Camara was shot and wounded by his aide-de-camp, "Toumba" Diakité, on December 3, 2009. Out of the picture, Dadis Camara gave way to the junta's number two, Sékouba Konaté, and Jean Marie Doré became Prime Minister during the Ouagadougou agreements, signed on January 15, 2010, under the mediation of Blaise Compaoré for ECOWAS<sup>141</sup>.

In conclusion, we must have the courage to admit that since the first regime, the Guinean government has been noted for its exactions against the population, which has a bad image of its governmental entities, namely the army and the police. The weakness of the institutions and the excessive corruption practices show a bad image of the country internationally.

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<sup>140</sup>Stremlau, J. (2010). Final report observing the 2010 *Presidential Elections in Guinea*. The Carter Center, 9.

<sup>141</sup>Pauthier, C. (2010). Guinée : achoppements sanglants de la transition. *Alternatives Sud*, 5.

The squandering of public funds that should be used to build infrastructure by white-collar criminals, the lack of transparency in public procurement and the unhealthy management of assets are all problems that cause the average citizen to continue to drag the devil by the tail. Successive military regimes have only aggravated the problem. Years go by and the Guinean people continue to suffer the consequences of the bad governance of political leaders.

### **5.3. A Second Category of Conflicts Not Necessarily Political: The Interest Conflicts**

In all modern or traditional societies there are always forms of conflict that are inherent to the functioning of the system. For example, tensions between ethnic groups, between genders, interfaith cleavages, or problems of stratification. These conflicts can manifest themselves in different ways depending on their nature. They can be violent, peaceful, latent unexpressed grievances, disobedience etc.

In Guinea, social conflict tends to be of little concern to the government, even though its existence in the regions and communes very often disrupts activities in these areas. The recurrent water and electricity cuts that plunge neighborhoods into darkness for hours. The transformers that do not support all these electrical loads and clandestine connections very often break down. These old buses in limited number which have difficulty to support the mobility of the people. The heaps of garbage in excess in some places due to misappropriation and uncivilized amplify the daily frustration of Guinean citizens.

The risk of confrontations and demands becomes frequent because the parties who are in conflict with the district authority or the pollution company that makes their lives unbearable are often protected by a high-ranking official who is muddying the waters somewhere. These protests are rarely organized. They arise spontaneously to denounce their deprivation of essential services or sometimes they are salary claims (especially subcontracting) of employees of a local bank, a private company or a school that refuses to pay its teachers.

These young unemployed graduates, always on the backs of their parents, often take center stage to speak for hundreds of people in their neighborhoods. They take the opportunity to show their dismay at the contempt of the authorities who, for them, are

elected by affinity and do not know how to direct their tasks. Around the tea and the famous games of chance during the day to pocket some money, the soccer match in the evening, the young people move away from their dreams because of the lack of jobs and socio-professional integration.

The demonstrators, having lost confidence in the unions and civil society whose existence divides them, prefer to go through these actions which are the only way to remind the state of its responsibility after the others have failed through ignorance or negligence. These protests and barricades erected on the roads and sidewalks quickly attract the media, who broadcast the information. However, if nothing is done, these protests may spill over onto the main roads and change opponents.

The other categories that are making themselves heard are teachers and subcontracted workers. They aim to protest through sit-ins and boycotts of classes in schools that can easily push students to join the strike. The latest was the strike by the Free Teachers and Researchers Union of Guinea (SLECG), which lasted for weeks. Many teachers just wanted the state to realize their precariousness and give them fair treatment like that given to senior officers, bankers, lawyers, deputies etc.

Underemployment affects virtually all segments of the population in Guinea. However, those who suffer the most are unskilled and uneducated people. Young people working for foreign companies have often questioned the Guinean authorities. Despite the existence of the labor code, these companies take advantage of the lack of enforcement of these texts and carry out their activities without having to worry about anything. The surrounding population is often sick, the water is polluted and stagnant, the vegetation layer is gradually disappearing, the marshes and rivers are drying up due to the effects of toxic drainage that kill animals but also impact human consumption.

It is also worth noting the profusion of union-based groups in the immense sphere of the informal economy on which the majority of the urban population depends - associations of market traders, itinerant vendors, motorcycle cabs, recyclers, cart pullers, etc. - and the fact that these associations are often involved in "transactional" negotiations with the authorities. If the "transactional" negotiation of their space of activity with the authorities is the usual practice of these associations, if the embryonic organizations of street vendors "struggle to coordinate their members", the practices of extortion or

eviction of which the small operators are regularly victims on the part of agents of the state or other economic actors are at the origin of protests which, depending on the context, can resonate and feed deep political currents hostile to the status quo<sup>142</sup>.

Protests that are purely social in nature are not very persistent in Guinea. Some disperse very quickly as soon as the current problem is resolved. They engage in a short-term struggle for immediate satisfaction. This is the case for many of the examples cited in relation to water, electricity, salaries, sanitation, or the situation in the markets that pits them against the collection agents.

However, others who are committed to the defense of women's rights against forms of violence, the protection of young girls against forms of aggression or the protection of vulnerable people such as the handicapped and albinos do not disappear completely. They despair from time to time due to lack of financial support and accompaniment (very small number of activists, lack of media coverage, personal demotivation etc.). The continuity of the struggle is not well planned because victims and non-victims alike do not value membership and active participation as activists in the common cause.

Throughout the day, attention is increasingly given to the political preoccupation that animates the minds. It is during the unfortunate events and days of commemoration that these social strata are often remembered. The political actors give priority to them only when it is the campaign period to win a higher percentage of their votes.

Protest movements of this kind should seek to be more organized, more resilient to put pressure on the authorities to put their concerns on the agenda. Wanting to resort to short-term solutions makes the claims weak. The appeals that are formulated will resurface each time the problem is touched. To be part of this tradition is to take responsibility for one's own failures and to accept one's situation as a victim.

#### **5.4. Interfaith Conflicts in Forest Guinea**


The Forest Region is the southeastern part of Guinea. It is the most multicultural of all the regions. There are several ethnic minority groups and two ethnic majority groups.

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<sup>142</sup>Polet, F. (2016). Afrique Subsaharienne : Entre Révoltes Populaires Et Restaurations Autoritaires. *Alternatives Sud*, 7-22.

The Guerzé, indigenous to the region, are generally Christian and animist, while the Konianké, non-indigenous and Muslim, have coexisted with the others for centuries.

**Figure 2.** Map of south-eastern Guinea, commonly known as Forest Guinea (area of inter-community conflict)



Because of the wars in the neighboring countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire) that surround Forest Guinea, this region, which also has nationals in these countries, has not been able to escape the consequences of these crises unscathed. In the 1991 elections, these two communities, known for their existing ideological differences, faced each other for the first time in communal elections.

"Indeed, it was during his election campaign tour in Forest Guinea that former head of state Lansana Conté, noting that the constituencies of the region were slipping away from him, reportedly instructed the Foresters to vote only for their "ethnic relatives" to the detriment of RPG candidates. Surfing on the allochthon of the Konianké in Nzérékoré, Lansana Conté is said to have told them that it is in Upper Guinea, at home, that they must be elected and not at their hosts in the Forest. He did not hesitate to describe as

"bastards" any Forestier who voted for Ibrahima Kalilou Kéita (Malinké), the RPG candidate, to the detriment of Michel Guely (Guerzé), the PUP candidate. In retaliation, the Malinké in the region publicly insulted the sacred symbols of the indigenous people, for example by making a monkey wear the prototype of a sacred mask. Unofficial figures indicate that approximately four hundred (400) people died.

Even though the Koniankés suffered from this stigmatization by the Guerzés long before, this confrontation of more than 30 years has installed a climate of mistrust between the two parties. The presence of the Koniankés, mainly in urban areas, and the rapid growth of their community are perceived by the Guerzé as a rapid occupation. The purchase of land and their economic influence show their pride in the Guerzé who are threatened on their own land.

Thus in 2004, as a Konianké Imam was leaving the mosque, a young Guerzé man hit him with his bicycle, resulting in two deaths in Nzérékoré.

In 2008, a similar conflict arose between the two groups after a young Guerzé girl wearing a non-conforming outfit passed in front of the Muslim (Konianké) faithful at prayer time during Ramadan.

2010: Altercations between a shopkeeper and a law enforcement volunteer during Friday prayer time resulted in the death of six people.

2011: Major community conflict-28 deaths and dozens injured-followed an animist (Guerzé) practice of identifying criminals by a witch in Galakpaye.

In 2013, the tensions of mistrust continued and once again, there was a real massacre following the death of a young Konianké apprentice accused of theft at a gas station. According to sources, the victims in both communities numbered 217 dead, 267 missing, 473 wounded, and 1,711 internally displaced. In 2020, during the legislative elections and the constitutional referendum, the youth of the two communities attacked each other, killing dozens.

The recurring conflict between the Konianké and Guerzé is primarily related to a social and cultural factor. The Konianké, who are considered outsiders in the region, seek to maintain their religious and social practices that influence their neighbors. In addition,

they consider the Muslim culture and way of life to be an essential part of their identity, which they tend to embody in a more constructive way.

The Guerzé, usually on the periphery where they can quietly perform their rituals, drink wine and enjoy life, or come to church on Sundays, are adamant about safeguarding their traditions which explains their positioning.

The knowledge of this reality by the politicians allows them to play on the sensitive thread as soon as the need is felt. And it is only from the elections as mentioned above, as well as rumors and misinformation that aggravate or trigger these conflicts.

## CHAPTER VI: ELECTORAL PROCESS

The electoral process is an important phase in the political life of a country. It constitutes the implementation of activities organized and executed within the framework of the rules of the electoral law of a nation. The Republic of Guinea has had experience with this since the 1st Republic. The competent authority carries out this work with the intention of renewing the mandates of the powers according to the electoral code.

### 6.1. Democracy and Electoral Contentious in Guinea

The election is inseparable from democracy. According to Philippe Ardan, it has become "a democratic ritual" and is internationally recognized because the right to take part in the government of one's country, either directly or through representatives chosen by unanimous consent, is enshrined in the Universal Charter of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<sup>143</sup>.

The transition from a regime of exception to a liberal democracy should be seen as a qualitative leap. But it depends on the men who lead this change to let the most positive aspects emerge and flourish<sup>144</sup>.

This is the first time after two years of junta transitions that Guinea will democratically choose its president. For the people, this is an important and historic political development. On June 27, 2010, Guineans went to the polls massively to elect a president from among 24 contenders for the supreme office. Article 32 of the Guinean constitution requires an absolute majority of votes cast for the election of a presidential candidate. Since none of the candidates achieved this majority in the first round, a second round was required to decide between the former Prime Minister, Cellou Dalein Diallo (UFDG), and the historical opponent, Alpha Condé (RPG). The two candidates received the highest number of votes in the first round, with 43.69% and 18.25% of the votes. Mr. Diallo was supported in the second round by the Cellou Dalein President Alliance while Mr. Alpha Conde was supported by the RPG arc-en-ciel Alliance<sup>145</sup>.

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<sup>143</sup>Kassabo, V. L. (2014). Le contentieux de l'élection présidentielle en Afrique. *Afrilex*, 1.

<sup>144</sup>Faye, O. T. (2007). *Guinée: chronique d'une démocratie annoncée*, Paris: l'Harmattan, 15.

<sup>145</sup>Souaré, I. K., & Diallo, A. (2010). Les défis du nouveau président élu. *Policy Brief*, 1.

This time factor is all the more important because neither candidate seems to have it completely under control. In turn, Diallo and Condé have complained about the postponement of the vote. Indeed, Diallo only needs to get 10% more votes, while his opponent Conde needs to court the losers of the first round to gather more than 30% more votes. According to Diallo, it would be in Conde's interest to buy time and foment ethnic violence between the two rounds. However, this ethnic violence should have been a valid reason for Diallo to postpone the vote. This shows that Conde would have needed a postponement of the vote just after the first round, whereas in November it was Diallo who wanted it. The use of ethnic rivalries would in this case be nothing more than an expedient to win the elections<sup>146</sup>.

On November 15, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) declared Alpha Conde the winner of the election with 52.52% of the votes, compared to 47.48% for his rival. The Supreme Court confirmed these results on December 2, making Mr. Alpha Conde President of the Republic of Guinea<sup>147</sup>.

In his article entitled Strategic Analysis of the 2010 Presidential Elections in Guinea, I.K. Souaré explains the reversal of this trend based on certain findings. The turnout in the first round, which was 77%, was the subject of complaints due to the cancellation of several ballots by the CENI in constituencies favorable to Conde. The second observation is that the cases of malfunctions and irregularities were noted by CENI, political parties and election observers were corrected by the ad hoc inter-ministerial committee. The third and most striking observation was ethno-regionalism. Although Diallo won the vote in his native Middle Guinea with similar percentages of between 80% and 90%, the corrected dysfunctions (for example, the disproportionate distribution of polling stations), the inclusion of ballots in regions favorable to Conde, his alliance with certain candidates in the first round, and the form of communication in the electoral campaign all had an impact on the results of the second round.

On the last aspect, it should be noted that it played a determining role in the victory of President Alpha Condé. The reunification of the main political leaders (Lansana Kouyaté, François Lonceny Fall, Papa Koly Kourouma) of the 3 other regions of the RPG arc en ciel alliance, and the 3 regional coordination's based on ethnicity, has indeed

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<sup>146</sup>(Op.cit.)

<sup>147</sup>(Ibidem)

allowed to isolate to the maximum his opponent who could only rely on the coordination of his region and the support that Sidya Touré brought him.

However, if in theory the event was understandable, in practice the victory of the RPG was a real disappointment for the militants and supporters of Mr. Cellou. They did not hesitate to express their frustrations. Their dissatisfaction with the CENI led to scuffles in some places. And tension has risen in the strongholds of the RPG where supporters have sought to savor their victory. The accusations and suspicions made more or less explicitly on both sides are serious, and the high level of confidence displayed by both sides has further confused the already segmented population.

The longer political actors allow this climate to persist through provocations, rumors, or biased information, and the more some media report on it uncritically, the greater the risks to the organization of the elections. The election and its preparation will inevitably give rise to a myriad of conflicts and accusations, some of which will be controlled by one side or the other, but some of which may also escape them. As the past presidential election demonstrated, if electoral institutions and adjudication arrangements are not sufficiently credible and the media are not sufficiently objective, some of these tensions can lead to tragic consequences<sup>148</sup>.

There is, above all, an institutional reason. The public authorities, i.e., the political staff and the public administration, are involved in electoral fraud; there are also failures due to insufficient or inadequate material resources. All this contributes to delaying or preventing the establishment of conditions for the regular renewal of the elites in power<sup>149</sup>.

## **6.2. The 2015 and 2020 Elections: Polls under High Tension**

The 2010 presidential and 2013 legislative elections had a lasting effect on relations between the presidential camp and opposition forces. Following the March 2015 announcement of CENI's decision to hold the presidential election in October 2015 and to postpone local elections until the first quarter of 2016, a series of demonstrations, marked by violent incidents, were organized in the capital and other localities by the

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<sup>148</sup>Group, I C Guinée : sortir du borbier électoral 2013

<sup>149</sup>Meledje, D. F. (2009). Le contentieux électoral en Afrique. *Cairn*, 139-155.

opposition in April and May to protest the failure to implement the July 2013 agreement, which called for communal elections to be held before the presidential election. On September 2, 2015, the Constitutional Court published the list of eight candidates allowed to run, including incumbent President Alpha Conde on behalf of the RPG Arc-en-ciel<sup>150</sup>.

But in 2019, one year before the end of the second presidential term, Alpha Conde launched a project to provide Guinea Conakry with a new constitution. This initiative, strongly contested by the Guinean Opposition, will however result in the adoption, on March 22, 2020, of a constitution increasing the length of the presidential term from 5 to 7 years. This change in the term of office of the President of the Republic, which offers the possibility for President Alpha CONDE to stand for re-election, will be the trigger for the socio-political and pre-electoral crisis in Guinea Conakry. Political postures are crystallizing and the protest demonstrations against this "3rd Mandate" are violent between the militants of the Guinea Rally party (RPG), presidential movement and those of the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC), coalition of the opposition parties and living forces of the Nation, led by the former Prime Minister (ELSA, 2020).

Despite the FNDC's demonstrations of strength, a large part of the population already supported President Alpha Conde's plan, especially in the interior of the country. Thus, although some candidates such as Lansana Kouyaté of the PEDN and Sidya Touré have renounced their participation in the presidential election, the election will indeed take place on October 18, 2020.

On the same day, Cellou Dalein Diallo claimed victory with 53% of the vote before the official results were announced. The provisional results compiled by the National Alliance for Transition and Democracy were collected from the messaging system and applications installed on the tablets. This process would have allowed this collective of support for Cellou Dalein to come into possession of 84% of the results of the presidential election (Barry, 2020).

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<sup>150</sup>UE, U. E. (2015). *République de Guinée Élection présidentielle 2015*. Conakry: Mission d'observation électorale. Found on <http://www.eueom.eu/guinea2015>

Despite everything, President Alpha Conde is still the winner, elected in the first round for a third term with 59.49%. After the publication of the results by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the main opposition figure, Mr. Cellou Dalein Diallo, accused the government of electoral hold-up and called on his supporters to resist and defend his victory throughout the country. This call was followed in his stronghold (generally in middle Guinea) and in Ratoma in the capital, where confrontations have resulted in dozens of deaths, including among the police.

Cellou Dalein Diallo had denounced on October 20 a "large-scale fraud" aimed at depriving him of victory in the presidential election. Cellou Dalein Diallo, who declared victory in the presidential election even before the results were made public, received 33.5 percent of the vote, according to the electoral commission. The prospect of Alpha Conde seeking a third term in office has sparked a year-long protest in Guinea, during which dozens of civilians have been killed, raising fears of an eruption around the vote in a country used to bloody political confrontations<sup>151</sup>.

Although the control of the regularity of elections occupies an important place, far from the reality, the control bodies pose problems in many African countries, including Guinea. The failures come not only from the authorities but also from political parties and their activists who do not respect democratic rules. This strategy of manipulation has long stifled the electoral sphere and prevented the evolution of democracy.

It is necessary to develop what Pierre Rosanvallon designates by the term of "counter-democracy": "What he calls counter-democracy is not the opposite of democracy, but rather the form of democracy that comes to oppose the other, the democracy of indirect powers spread throughout the social body, the democracy of organized distrust in front of the democracy of electoral legitimacy<sup>152</sup>.

### **6.3. The Identity of Protesters during Elections**

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<sup>151</sup>France 24. (2020, octobre 16). Found onPrésidentielle en Guinée : Alpha Condé réélu avec 59,5 % des voix: <https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20201024-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-en-guin%C3%A9-alpha-cond%C3%A9-r%C3%A9lu-avec-59-5-des-voix>

<sup>152</sup>Lewis, E., & Slitine, R. (2016). *Le coup d'État citoyen Ces initiatives qui réinventent la démocratie*. Paris: La découverte.

People engage in politics in a variety of ways, primarily by voting, signing petitions, forming political parties, joining unions, and participating in advocacy groups, social movements, and demonstrations<sup>153</sup>.

This participation does not always come down to questions of interest or opportunity, but its reputation for being in an ideology of defense, including cultural. In Guinea, as in many African countries, the multiculturalism that characterizes our society opens up gaps that are conducive to identity-based withdrawal. A situation well maintained by a chaotic political history through which ethnicity has most often been put to the test<sup>154</sup>.

Today, if there is one major concern that worries citizens beyond the socio-economic crises, it is the scourge of ethnocentrism that has spread to all areas. Ethnocentrism embodied in political discourse is actively participating in the deconstruction of the Guinean state. Ethnic violence is used as a means of gaining power, which makes it particularly difficult to accept the other in order to facilitate living together.

The colonizer conquered African territories by imposing his conception of territorial planning and his model of political power. This conception, analyzed in an anthropological and historical approach based on the observation of political practices in time and space, is based on a dual logic, which makes complex and plural local realities fit into the same mold. This dualist vision, a characteristic feature of the colonial legacy in Africa, brings everything to itself according to its own institutional and legal categories. Such a worldview, in reality, has materialized on the ground by opposing two complex realities, internal and external. The result, in Francophone areas in particular, has been a duality of systems of territories, powers, ethnic groups, but also and above all of political authorities, opposing or superimposing colonial power and local traditional authorities<sup>155</sup>.

Guinean political parties, playing more or less on the ground, run politics on an ethnic or regionalist basis. They unconsciously take up the colonial legacy of a structural

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<sup>153</sup>Fillieule, O., & Neveu, E. (2019). *Activists Forever? Long-Term Impacts of Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>154</sup>Touré, A. K. (2020, Décembre 12). *L'Ethnocentrisme ; incidences politiques et politique de l'emploi dans la culture Guinéenne*. Found on MaGuinée.Info: <https://maguineeinfos.com/l'ethnocentrisme-incidences-politiques-et-politique-de-l'emploi-dans-la-culture-guineenne/>

<sup>155</sup>Diop, M. (2015). La violence ethnique de l'État postcolonial. *Cairn*, 103-115.

dualism in which hidden alliances are forged between political parties and coordination councils<sup>156</sup>.

Each political leader, believing himself to be the legitimate representative of his ethnic group, thinks in terms of ethnic alternation. This is especially true for political leaders who have not yet held the office of president. In this context, four main ethnic groups dominate, corresponding to the four natural regions of Guinea: The Bagas-Soussou and affiliated groups; the Mande group; the Fulani group; and the groups of Forest Guinea. It should be recalled that when President Ahmed Sékou Touré (Malinké) died in 1984, after twenty-six years of personal rule, the constitution was systematically set aside. The challenge by some of Sékou Touré's relatives to the legitimacy of the constitutional successor and prime minister, embodied at the time by Dr. Louis Lansana Beavogui (Forest Guinea), created unrest and led to the seizure of power by the army, led at the time by General Lansana Conté (Soussou), and the establishment of a military committee for national recovery (CMRN). This regime, like the previous one, led to the seizure of power and lasted for more than twenty years. This situation did not inspire the Guinean political class and lessons were not learned, as the same scenario was repeated in December 2008, after the death of General Conté. The military, once again, ignored the constitution by disregarding the application of Article 34 of the Basic Law. However, each time the constitution was ignored, the country quickly descended into violence<sup>157</sup>.

The very decisive role played by community associations called "Coordination Councils of Natural Regions" also testifies to the gap between the constitution and the socio-cultural realities of the political terrain. Their importance is comparable to that of the CNT, although their role is not formalized in the legal texts. The last presidential election was marred by tensions and clashes between different ethnic groups, which put the country at risk of civil war<sup>158</sup>.

As many citizens are used to saying in the streets, "the ethnic problem already exists in Guinea, but since the death of President Lansana Conte, the Malinké and the Fulani are at the root of several instabilities in Guinea. Some are addicted to power and seek to

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<sup>156</sup>Charles, B. (1993). *«Le rôle de la violence dans la mise en place des pouvoirs en Guinée »*. Paris: CNRS.

<sup>157</sup>(Op.cit)

<sup>158</sup>(Op.cit)

preserve it through all possible alliances and strategies, especially in speeches. The others, nomads and rich traders who benefited from the Conté regime and were fascinated by the personality of their leader, believe that their turn has finally come to lead the country.

It must be said that this way of seeing things is accentuated by the discourse of politicians in the languages of the land, especially when they are in their strongholds or in their headquarters. The militants on both sides have only a small percentage of educated people in their ranks who are capable of understanding what is at stake, and the rest are easily manipulated.

These feelings of victimization at the grassroots level are also aggravated by the army and police in the performance of their duties during street protests. The aggression, abuse and killing of protesters on the one hand, the destruction of public property, the call to rebellion on social networks, the anarchy, and the transgression of rules on the other, prove that beyond politics, inter-community conflicts have integrated other spheres, even if they tend to take on a form of nepotism, sometimes depending on the context.

These behaviors lead other ethnic groups, rightly or wrongly, to take a position that contributes to the feeling of rejection and exclusion of the other.

If this issue remains a difficult and embarrassing subject to address today, there are many reasons for this, including the feeling of being trapped between endo-group and exo-group and the stereotypical image of the other that would follow.

#### **6.4. Political Marketing, Electoral Clientelism and Massive Fraud**

In countries where democracy struggles to exist, those in the crosshairs of the state or the opposition have a wider range of campaign tools and strategies at their disposal, as they face fewer institutional constraints than those in advanced democratic systems.

Politicians in these countries, having already some of the usual tools at their disposal, can also resort to the most common strategies during elections. These include influencing citizens' choices through ethno-regional positions, advertising, fraud, vote buying and even violence (Schedler, 2002; Southall, 2013)<sup>159</sup>.

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<sup>159</sup>Borzyskowski, I. v., & Kuhn, P. M. (2020). Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, 17.

These are often the issues commonly cited to get voters to focus on emotional and shocking issues. This technique requires optimal support from loyal voters and attracts other undecided candidates through more appropriate and emotionally charged means of communication. This is wedge politics, getting to the heart of the matter to touch people's sensitivities about their experiences and talk about the issues that matter to them.

Marketing is when the objective is primarily to target the public that is in doubt that is struggling to make a decision that is having difficulty joining a party for personal or ideological reasons. The case in the local African context combines both, not only making the activists more loyal and committed, the politicians also prepare them for the technique of the spiral of silence within the community by making the party look like a super party, dominant whose probability of bringing the next elections would be very high. The system of communication prepared in this regard in the languages of the land animates a feeling of insecurity or rejection that pushes the subject to ally himself with these causes to avoid this collective punishment.

Politicians can change their behaviors and better adapt them to the contexts and demands of the market. They can adjust the organizational structure of their parties, orient their members towards the set objective, use a new form of political marketing and improve their communications according to the target audience in order to increase their chances of winning the elections: this is the politics of Newspeak, since face-to-face debates are almost non-existent, everyone can use the words at his or her own pace, even if it is meaningless. The most important thing is to increase the euphoria and create a climate of trust and openness to the next step of the process.

They do this sometimes with internal resources, sometimes with external support that includes funding needs, opinion makers, political advisors, and even media partners who integrate their activities into their agendas. The campaign is launched by decree in Guinea after several preparatory meetings to set campaign dates. The big funds are first disbursed by groups of people who manage alliances and support movements in the neighborhoods and Kaloum clan<sup>160</sup>.

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<sup>160</sup>Kaloum is the name of the city center in the capital Conakry. Kaloum clan is a word used to describe the (establishment) officials and businessmen who have formed a very strong network of corruption and influence. They are at the same time propagandists of power. Their networks extend into the neighborhoods where they have small safeties ready to create instability sometimes just to show the head of state that they have the power to mobilize.

The same practices are automatically set in motion in the interior of the country, particularly in the major cities, to ensure that the candidate's local agents are well informed and ready to implement the campaign's instructions.

The dates are fixed and gradually the convoys of vehicles are prepared to enter the campaign. All techniques are good to get the majority of votes. Visits to traditional chiefs, selling dreams to young people, psychological camouflage, calls to join the party, bribery of activists and executives of other political parties etc.

Here and there, rallies are organized by political parties in the city's neighborhoods, either in the form of unannounced distribution of gadgets, or night meetings or more lavish, animated, and sounded meetings. Elsewhere, along the main roads, tea grills were financed by some of the city's shopkeepers to call on people to vote, to the background of the candidates' campaign music. Finally, in the neighborhoods, local political leaders are working to mobilize young people, working with them as well as with other social groups (in associations, places of worship, families, etc.)<sup>161</sup>.

This is the time when young unemployed people become more and more active to bring something home or to create small businesses to support post-election needs. For others, it is necessary to make friends in the political class in order to expand their social network (acquaintance with politicians, employment opportunities), something that can guarantee them a position in the public service or offer other opportunities in private companies.

Each in his own role, the activists are deployed sometimes hundreds and thousands of kilometers away in rural areas where on the day of the election they play the role of observers and supervisors on behalf of their respective political parties. This is the day to show what we are capable of. Fraud, falsification of ballots, manipulation of numbers, disappearance of voter cards, intimidation on both sides, late closures in some polling stations and many other things that are the basis of the first disputes between militants.

They are often equipped with phones and tablets to report to their superiors in order to get the information back as soon as possible. Party officials, on the other hand, are very

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<sup>161</sup>Kieffer, J. (2006). Les jeunes des « grins » de thé et la campagne électorale à Ouagadougou. *Politique Africaine*, 63-82.

active in the files. Sophisticated knowledge via a computer scientist is put in place, calculations are made, and anomalies are noted so that they have solid arguments in case a challenge is necessary.

Political figures use the ethnic factor to a large extent to mobilize votes. And this leads to some potentially very dangerous speeches. So, the Guinean context is banally violent<sup>162</sup>.

*"This election is not just an election, it's like being at war"* said Mr. Conde, whose remarks in Malinké by video conference to his supporters in Siguiri, his electoral stronghold in the east of the country, were broadcast on national television. "The other candidates have formed a bloc to fight me," he said, referring to the decision of his eleven opponents in the October 18 election to form a collective to speak with one voice on the electoral process. Conde usually speaks in French during his official national speeches. In his first campaign speech on September 19, also in Malinké, he warned voters in Kankan against giving their votes to another candidate from that community. *"If you vote for a Malinké candidate who is not from the RPG [People's Rally of Guinea party], it is like voting for Cellou Dalein Diallo, his main opponent, said Mr. Conde. " In the Fouta region, there is no other candidate than Cellou "* he said, referring to Fouta-Djalou (center), with its predominantly Fulani population and Diallo's electoral stronghold<sup>163</sup>.

The President of the Republic, who is more familiar with the sociology and daily life of Guineans, knows exactly how to orient public opinion in a population that is mostly illiterate and religious. From rumors to lies, during election periods all sorts of information is spread, referring to more or less well-founded accusations, poisoning, civil war, genocide, etc.

Some Guineans accuse Mr. Cellou Dalein Diallo of embezzlement of public funds during his time as head of several ministerial departments and as prime minister at the time, of possessing ill-gotten gains, of involvement in the sale of Air Guinea, of nepotism, etc. Cellou Dalein Diallo is said to have taken advantage of his appointments to invest in Senegal (Guinea's neighboring country). He is also considered to be the godfather of the

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<sup>162</sup>Mwanamilongo, S. (2020, Octobre 12). *Guinée : dernière ligne droite d'une campagne mouvementée*.

<sup>163</sup>LeMonde, & AFD. (2020, Septembre 24). *Présidentielle en Guinée : pour le président Alpha Condé, « c'est comme si nous étions en guerre »*.

modification of the constitution in 2001 by giving his invaluable support to General Lansana Conté for his project of a lifetime mandate.

In 2010, the UFDG mobilized the Fulani around the slogan "our turn," indicating that the country had never been presided over by a Fulani, even though the Fulani consider themselves to be a majority, even an absolute majority, and often see themselves as a prosperous and dynamic community, with the best educated elite and the most capable of moving Guinea forward. The UFDG tried to show its strength by organizing "dead town" days, emphasizing the strong presence of the Fulani in the commercial sector and feeding the concerns of other communities. The UFDG tried to show its strength at the time, emphasizing the strong Fulani presence in the commercial sector and fueling the concerns of other communities. They realize that ethnic claims present image risks, both nationally and internationally, and that victories are won "in the center," thanks to the votes of other communities, including those disappointed by the other side. In the face of the Fulani community, Diallo can still use martial language, evoking the martyrs of the UFDG: "We have created a square for the victims of Alpha Condé at the Bambéto cemetery," explicitly denouncing "discrimination based on ethnicity"<sup>164</sup>.

The leadership of political power is, of course, a major issue in the ethnic controversy. For many Guineans and foreigners, the prevailing principle is that "an ethnic group is in power when the supreme office is held by one of its members," as if the whole were the part. It is in this common belief that ethnic groups perceive power. After the death of Sékou Touré in 1984, the Malinkés claimed that power had escaped them, as did the Soussous after Lansana Conté, and the Foresters after the fall of Moussa Dadis Camara in 2009.

The Fulanis, on the other hand, may complain that they never exercised power. In each of these presentations of the country's history, certain events are highlighted as significant of the oppression experienced - the false Fulani plots of Sékou Touré, the purge of Malinkés officers under Lansana Conté, the ravages of the "border war" of the early 2000s across Guinea Foresters, and the killing of forestry activists in Cosa. Historical inequalities in access to education, public jobs or business opportunities are also interpreted as symptoms of ethnic exclusion. Ultimately, anyone can produce a story of

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<sup>164</sup>(Op.cit.)

marginalization and discrimination that justifies their claim, and anyone can denounce the ethnicism impulses of other groups, demand justice and attempt to mobilize an electorate<sup>165</sup>.

All of these perceptions and provocative discourses in the political arena aggravate the violence and are at the root of many conflicts in Guinea. Although these elements are seen as political strategies for some, the reality is that the consequences and aftermath remain in the memory and are likely to be reawakened during similar events.

### **6.5. The Alliance of Political Parties: Reconciliation or Strategies?**

Since the first republic, the Guinean political situation has been dominated by the parties of the heads of state and those of the main opponents, who are called and considered major parties or super parties. However, this glory is only ephemeral and remains valid during the presidential term. The traditional ideological construction that is created around the person of the president of the party, which gives rise to the cult of personality, often poses problems of succession, especially if the deputy does not have the charisma and the necessary means to lead the party in elections and state decision-making.

The cult of personality in the Guinean context is much more emphasized on flattery, wealth, and the fact that his or her ethnic group embodied the ideology that this person was the gift that God sent to them to redress the injustice they had suffered, but also to empower their community. This strength of personality is the result of the long-standing relationships of traditional religious leaders and newly mass media that make them immensely popular in the eyes of the public.

In his famous treatise, Duverger [1954] writes: "Alliances between parties have very variable forms and degrees. Obviously, the vast majority of African countries have a multiparty system that is sometimes anarchic, characterized in some cases by an ubiquitous plethora of political parties. Some are ephemeral and unorganized: simple provisional coalitions to benefit from electoral advantages, to overthrow a government or

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<sup>165</sup>(Op. cit.)

to support it occasionally. Others are durable and have a solid framework, sometimes resembling a super-party<sup>166</sup>.

In keeping with the spirit of the agreements, when one party in the coalition wins the election, there may be a strong chance that other members of the coalition will participate in forming the next government. Rather than ethnic cleavages, it is often emphasized that it is patron-client networks that provide an understanding of political parties in Africa: patron-client parties rely on the ability of a patron to exploit his or her intermediary position in a chain of relationships that link the center to elements on the periphery. In this context, a political party can serve to connect the different levels of a political system through a series of patron-client networks<sup>167</sup>.

Clientelism and ethnicity, conceptually, are phenomena that "rely on fundamentally different bonds of solidarity; clientelism involves a personalized relationship while ethnicity is inherently a group phenomenon. Thus, there is no good reason to expect concomitant variations between ethnic and patron-client solidarities..... And yet, the notions of ethnic parties and clientelist parties overlap in some ways in Africa. Electoral clientelism is most effective when it relies on the ethnic proximity between boss and client<sup>168</sup>.

On the one hand, ethnic parties generally do not develop sophisticated formal structures, but rather rely on existing clientelist networks, and therefore adopt an internal hierarchy that resembles that of clientelist parties, except those clients are more strictly associated with a given ethnic group. On the other hand, clientelist parties are often rooted in an ethno-regional base. Factors such as extreme poverty, illiteracy, rural-urban distance, and deep ethnic divisions foster political exchanges where "people, that is, families or the majority of the inhabitants of a village, chiefdom, district or even region, give their support to whoever can take care of them"<sup>169</sup>.

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<sup>166</sup>Breton, M. L., & Straeten, K. V. (2017). Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique. *Revue d'économie politique*, pp 637-736.

<sup>167</sup>Carbone, G. M. (2006). Comprendre les partis et les systèmes de partis africains: Entre modèles et recherches empiriques. *Politique africaine*, pp 18-37.

<sup>168</sup>Cogneau, D. (2007). *L'Afrique des inégalités : où conduit l'histoire*. Paris: Rue d'ULM.

<sup>169</sup>(Op.cit.)

Moreover, many of these parties do not appear to be capable of fulfilling the programmatic function traditionally attributed to political parties. Their ideological density is low, and it is difficult to distinguish their electoral programs. The driving forces behind electoral mobilization are therefore the personality of the leader and his or her networks, clientelism, and the assurance given to a group or region that it is now "our turn to eat"<sup>170</sup>.

The alliances of political parties in Guinea's opposition often take a hybrid and complex form because of their objectives. Some parties join with one of the major opposition parties for purely regionalist reasons while having internal agreements between the central party and subordinate parties. Others come together to form a coalition against the ruling party. The objective of this formation is to bring about an alternation of power, which could create political opportunities for new parties that do not have the capacity for strong internal and national mobilization. These young parties with a clientelistic character often rely on communication through the press and social networks for the visibility of the party, prestige, and fulfillment of their expectations. For example, it is very common for opposition political parties in African countries with a two-round majority electoral system to agree that each party will run its own candidate in the first round of presidential elections, and to agree to join forces in the second round behind whichever of them is best placed in the first round<sup>171</sup>.

Guinean political party alliances are based in most cases on clientelistic networks and personal interests. In this circle of greatness, rewards are provided according to the size of the electorate each candidate holds and its determination to accompany and contribute to the struggle of the coalition. This resource gives the candidate influence over others even though he or she is in search of other resources (money, lobbies). One of the rare opportunities he seeks is to be represented in the national assembly.

One of the paradoxes that causes incomprehension is the number of political parties that are widespread. There are hundreds of them among which some political parties

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<sup>170</sup>Cheeseman, N., & Gardner, L. (2010). *Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya Since 1950*. Berlin: LIT Verlag.

<sup>171</sup>Souaré, I. (2010). *Les Partis Politiques De L'opposition En Afrique De L'ouest Et Leur Quête Pour Le Pouvoir D'état: Les Cas Du Bénin, Du Ghana Et De La Guinée*.

struggle to make themselves known. One can speak of phantom or eventual parties that appear only when it comes to coalition and formation of political blocs against a bill in the context of elections and transitions in Guinea. Often acceptance within the coalition is obtained in exchange for an economic moderation to allow the parent party to retain all its resources and channel especially the propagandists who can change jacket easily.

So, we can summarize the exercise of the Guinean political parties by affirming above all that each person who aspires to the political life is often young, not necessarily rich, whose first vocation is to make themselves known and to create around their vision a network of friends able to support them in the first phase. They start in the neighborhoods with the mass movements through which they gain a certain influence. In the network of friends club, those who practice journalism go through the means to propel the leader by making him participate or interact through political programs in radios or television.

Thus, each feels that he or she has a mission to accomplish in order to maintain the existence of the movement. In the electoral context, political causes underlie ethnic rivalries. Many of these networks help the major party to maintain pressure on the opposing party. The more we strengthen these networks, the more likely we are to have others join our party to form the coalition. With electoral credibility at what can be considered a low level, voting behavior and outcomes seem to be known a priori.

In practice, this can be explained by the fact that the numerically represented ethnic groups, such as Malinké and Fulani, for example, have the strategic and financial means to win the election or to keep the incumbent in office for several years. It must be said that it is in this posture that the actors obtain their rewards. One can find people whose cultural capital is almost insignificant while their social capital and the communication around their personality grants them an assurance of eligibility.

This can be explained by the lack of real democracy within the party itself. Their representatives are playing politics with empty stomachs. We support them because we do not have the financial means to build a headquarters, the means are minimal to conduct campaigns in places like cities in the interior of the country. We want this alliance because it is the only opportunity in which we can take advantage of all the benefits and opportunities that political life can offer us.

Alliances and coalitions in Guinea have long failed to form as a real force capable of bringing victory to the main candidate around whom they are formed. The parties that have tried to do so on a solid basis have quickly been weakened either by lack of financial resources or by the existence of the system that the major parties have been building for several years.

It must be said that in order to put an end to this dialectic between power and opposition, the revision of the electoral law is indispensable. The reform will have to allow to conceive a system able to guarantee the electoral competitiveness and the restoration of the power of the institutions so that each apparatus of the State knows its limits and its prerogatives.

## CHAPTER VII: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES IN GUINEA

Questions of constitution-making are classic in modern democracies. A retrospective looks at the political life of modern states allows us to understand that this is a common exercise. [...]. In French-speaking Africa, they have often been the work of French constitutional experts who have been content to reproduce, in its essential elements, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, with some minor adjustments. Moreover, according to Yves-André Fauré's interpretation, these constitutions have mainly made it possible to establish the major functions of the state and to share power among the new elite. In addition, they had a confirmatory effect on the powers that be<sup>172</sup>.

The peculiarity of Guinean constitutional crises lies in the fact that the crises do not only oppose the traditional constitutional organs, but above all they oppose these organs to bodies that are somewhat foreign to this type of conflict. These bodies are not provided for as such in the separation of powers operated by the fundamental law, but rather as inescapable organs in the life of the state: they are the trade unions, the political parties, civil society, or the mass of citizens<sup>173</sup>.

The members of these bodies owe their mandate much more to the President of the Republic than to the people, especially when one knows the lack of transparency and democracy in the elections. It is this internal and culpable complicity of the constitutional organs that explains the invitation of other non-constitutional bodies to constitutional litigation<sup>174</sup>.

### 7.1. The Origins of the Constitutional Crisis

The constitutional history of Guinea shows that the country has known five (5) Constitutions. The Constitution of November 10, 1958, adopted following the referendum of September 28, 1958, which rejected colonial domination and allowed Guinea to obtain its independence on October 2, 1958. The constitution of May 14, 1982, is characterized by the constitutionalization of revolutionary power with a President of the Republic, who is supremely responsible for the revolution and who has considerable powers (art. 49). The Fundamental Law of 23 December 1990, adopted by referendum and promulgated

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<sup>172</sup>Alou, M. T. (2014). *Les modalités de la transition démocratique et les processus d'élaboration des constitutions*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 83-84.

<sup>173</sup>(Op.cit)

<sup>174</sup>(ibid.)

on 23 December 1991. This constitution created a break with the past: political parties were authorized, multipartyism was constitutionalized and replaced the single party.

The first presidential election was held on December 23, 1993. The 2010 Constitution adopted by the National Transitional Council to get out of the military regime. The constitution of April 7, 2020, voted by 89.76%, was adopted to overcome some of the shortcomings of the 2010 constitution and allowed the president to run for his first term in the Fourth Republic. We must add the Charter of the Transition of 2021 considered as the provisional constitution applied on September 26, 2021, due to the Coup d'état of September 5, 2021. It remains valid until the drafting of a new constitution or the restoration of the 2010 constitution, the annulment of which was the subject of the recent crisis.

The origin of constitutional crises is varied of the fact that the reasons for them are both historical and political. However, these crises would strictly speaking come from the modification or violation of the texts by the holders of power in order to keep it. This violation is materialized by the deletion of articles, sometimes the introduction of laws that are seen as revision rather than violation. To go back a little, we can go back to the crisis in the 2000s during which General Lansana Conté had succeeded in this exercise in complicity with his close friends from the coast and some of his ministers.

For Bah Oury, the end of the 1990s marked a real "crossing of the desert" for the opposition political parties. "The militants were completely anesthetized by years of repression and the government, certain of having succeeded in quelling the protest," he recalls. The period was also marked by internal divisions within the opposition and the failure of attempts to form a common front against Lansana Conté, who won the 1998 presidential election hands down. On the strength of this victory, the general ushered in the new millennium by passing a constitutional reform that extended the presidential term of office and allowed him to stand for his own succession. This was done in 2003, and he won the election with more than 95% of the votes, without even getting out of his car, in front of which the ballot box was brought to him. It is an open secret that the president's state of health had deteriorated considerably<sup>175</sup>.

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<sup>175</sup>(Op.cit)

At the time of his death in 2008, the socio-political crisis under the military regime of President Dadis was enormous. It is urgent to put in place laws to organize the upcoming elections. Thus, under the presidency of General Sékouba Konaté, the constitution of May 7, 2010, will be drafted by the CNT and the political actors.

The context of the time allows us to understand the reasons for this. The end of 2009 had been particularly trying for Guineans. The massacres and mass rapes committed on the morning of September 28, 2009, by the forces of the regime of Moussa Dadis Camara and the attempted assassination of the head of state by the commander of the presidential guard on December 3, 2009, had set off alarm bells. Both the governed and the principal ruler were affected. The violence had reached a climax. The dysfunction of the defense and security forces was at its peak<sup>176</sup>.

## **7.2. How to explain the Behavior of Presidents in the face of Constitutional term limits?**

In the African context, constitutional change to the article on term limits depends on the balance of power between two political groups (the governing coalition and the opposition). The group whose power has grown over time demands a constitutional renegotiation. Constitutional change produces an outcome that results from the negotiation of interests in which a varying number of groups of people participate. However, only the most powerful groups are involved in the negotiation process. The potential of a group is measured by its ability and willingness to inflict costs on others by significantly reducing their bargaining gains<sup>177</sup>.

The Guinean president has already won the two previous presidential elections. To get re-elected again, Alpha Conde has sought to circumvent all constitutional obstacles to a third term. In 2020, he is proceeding to change the constitution by manipulating political institutions, limiting press freedom, and delaying local and parliamentary elections to gain an advantage over the opposition and better control the political situation<sup>178</sup>.

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<sup>176</sup> Bangoura, D. i. (2015). *La transition vers une Gouvernance*. London: Ubiquity Press, 46.

<sup>177</sup> Keneck-Massil, J. (2019). Changement constitutionnel et durée au pouvoir en Afrique : une approche économique. *Revue d'économie politique*, 105-135.

<sup>178</sup> Boucher, A. (2019, Août 15). *La Guinée à la croisée des chemins*. Found on Centre d'étude stratégique de l'Afrique: <https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/guineea-a-la-croisee-des-chemins/>

It is this rapid adoption of the constitution that has created tensions. Depending on whether one is on the side of the opposition or the presidency, perceptions of the 2010 constitution differ. If Alpha Conde wants to give his country a new constitution, it is because he considers that the one that governs the functioning of institutions in the country has allowed the crisis to end and that it has become obsolete and full of inconsistencies. The opposite view asserts that it was consultations involving all components of Guinean society and international actors (ECOWAS/UN) that led to the adoption of the 2010 text and established peace and social cohesion. It should not be detached from it, or at least not under this presidency. During a visit to France in 2017, the current tenant of the Sekhoutoureyah Palace said that each country was free to choose the number and length of terms of its presidents<sup>179</sup>.

In 2019, the arguments put forward by supporters and allies in favor of changing the constitution, notably the Democratic Coalition for a New Constitution, assert that reforms are essential to allow the outgoing president to continue with the projects he has begun, to strengthen the institutions and to give independent candidates the opportunity to participate in the elections. To achieve these reform proposals, a new, more legitimate constitution, submitted to a referendum, will consider certain realities rather than the 2010 constitution promulgated by the military council of the transition<sup>180</sup>.

Guinean civil society and opposition political parties grouped in another coalition (FNDC) with the aim of preventing a constitutional change, preserving democratic gains, and promoting an alternation constitute the government's counterweight in its approach. Between October 14, 2019, and March 30, 2020, the FNDC recorded 47 deaths as a result of police and military violence during demonstrations against the president's misrule, according to its report published on April 9, 2020, three days before the publication of the new constitution<sup>181</sup>.

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<sup>179</sup>Boutaleb, O. (2020). Guinée : le projet de réforme de la Constitution suscite la controverse. *Policy Center for the New South*.

<sup>180</sup> Niang, I. A. (2019, Aout 2019). A new Guinean Constitution at All Costs? Africa's Latest Third-Term Quagmire. Found on ConstitutionNet: <https://constitutionnet.org/news/new-guinean-constitution-all-costs-africas-latest-third-term-quagmire>

<sup>181</sup>Balde, S. O. (2021). Les conséquences d'un changement constitutionnel sur le cadre électoral et l'alternance démocratique en Guinée. érudit.

A few months after the financing of this election from own funds, things are getting worse. Foodstuffs are becoming expensive, especially the increase in the price of bread. In order to supply the state's coffers, the government increased the price of a liter of gasoline from 9,000 to 11,000 francs.

The biometric identification project was launched, and the price of the card rose to 100,000 Guinean francs (about \$12). A 5% deduction from the salaries of civil servants for the contribution of government employees increased the frustration of workers who usually complain about insufficient pay. The embezzlement of funds by some ministers has already given the impression that the president has lost control.

On Sunday, September 5, 2021, around 8:00 a.m., heavy gunfire was heard in the vicinity of the presidential palace, where the Head of State was then staying. A few hours later, members of the Special Forces Group (GFS) led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya had everything under control.

Since 1990, with the waves of democracy in Africa, several countries have sought to improve the constitution through reforms such as limiting the number of terms of office in dictatorships and opening up to a new type of governance based on the management of institutions by the state, considering the separation of power in the decision-making bodies in order to successfully combat mismanagement and corruption and guarantee the rule of law.

If any country has made it out of this, it should be mentioned that several countries in Africa are still limping along, such as Guinea, Mali, Chad, Cameroon, Egypt, Rwanda etc. Although this does not help, miraculously some of them have managed to adapt their management to the culture and democratic laws. It's a bit of a hybrid mix of texts that works in everyone's interest. If we still care about democracy in a continent where ethno cultural groups are so important, then minorities should totally abstain from power.

It is important to mention that African countries in general were regulated by the traditional power of tribal chiefs and clans. The rules that governed the conduct of the society were based on the strict observance of social values, and each individual found himself and was established in his rights.

The power did not belong only to the most educated and the strongest. It is after the years of independence that Africa embraced this democracy that brought us to where we

are today. The laws written in the constitutions are much more favorable to the social and political practices of the politicians that the majority has found itself completely excluded. The question that is being asked by Africans today is to know if the time had not arrived to implement an African charter better adapted to our social and cultural realities.

The repeated constitutional changes, the limitation of the number of mandates to 4 or 5 years, or the restriction of the power of the left or the right are things that must be revised according to the realities of each country, otherwise it is chaos that reigns in the end. Wasn't Libya under the dictatorship of Muhammad Gaddafi better than many African countries under democracy nowadays? Are the countries that today impose a partnership obliging Africans to respect the rules of democracy and human rights also countries that do the same?

Germany, Belgium, England are not developed today? yet the forms of power are sometimes limited to one person, sometimes open-ended democracies, sometimes parliamentary monarchy etc. How to understand the adaptation of the laws of those countries to their socio-cultural and legal conformities and the imposition of Western values to countries with different realities?

### **7.3. New Constitution, 1<sup>st</sup> Mandate of the 4<sup>th</sup> Republic: What Does the Population Know?**

Most of the countries in the world proceed to the revision of their constitution when it is necessary to modify some parts of the law which turns out to be incomplete or which poses imperfections to their applications on the legal level. Given the socio-political and cultural reality of a country, in a true democracy the consultation of the parties according to the prevailing regime is essential to maintain political legitimacy.

In a country where the majority of people cannot read or write, changing the constitution does not necessarily seem to be a concern. The reason would be simple, the captivating discourse of the promoters would be fully sufficient as long as they have their representatives in the political sphere. If there is one thing that raises their concerns, it is the voting instructions.

It is important to concentrate on not forgetting the photo or rank of your candidate on the ballot. Otherwise know whether to vote "Yes" or "No" depending on the type of ballot. And after the vote, the prices must be lowered to promote purchasing power.

These voting instructions and counter-instructions reflect the predominantly patronage-based relationship that exists between election stakeholders and the electorate. [..]. Political developments (alliances between political parties, electoral games, redistribution of political and administrative posts) and economic developments (unequal distribution of state resources, provincial disparities in the provision of development infrastructure: schools, roads, dispensaries, rural electrification and telephony, etc.), such an image, already very perceptible in the 1980s, had obliged informed observers of the African political scene to talk of "politics of the belly"<sup>182</sup>.

Apart from promises of infrastructure and development, food and clothing, gadgets and all kinds of trifles are offered to the population during election periods. These are, essentially, money, loincloths, tee-shirts with the party's logo, caps, scarves, etc.

Opposition political parties use their own rallies to denounce the practice of donations, their airtime on television and radio for those who have access to it, the door-to-door method, or the columns of local newspapers. Caught between donations that fall like manna from heaven on populations facing immediate survival problems, and the inability to offer donations as the ruling party does, the main opposition parties have adopted the following attitudes in turn: instructions to refuse donations, instructions to accept donations, instructions to use them.

The procrastination of the population and the opposition political parties can be summarized as follows:

- "They want to buy your consciences. Don't accept donations."
- "Take the gifts, but do not use them; throw them away."

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<sup>182</sup>Socpa, A. (2000). Les dons dans le jeu électoral au Cameroun. *Cahiers d'Etude Africaine*, (2) 91-108.

- "Take and eat, for these donations are your tax dollars...which they stole. But don't vote. Alone in the voting booth, think about your suffering and vote for change" (Ibid.).

These instructions are very difficult for citizens to accept, especially when they are in need during the lean season. In rural areas, the means are very limited and since activities are concentrated in the cities, the population of these areas has a constant problem of income. At the end of each month, they rely on their parents to send them a little money, which they do not need to do without. Even if they refuse to wear tee-shirts and caps to avoid identifying themselves in public as militants of other political parties, the money is more than welcome. As some say, "It's better to have money in hand and talk about it than to refuse it".

Mobilizing clientelism as a key to understanding electoral behavior is a defensible perspective, but by overestimating its mobilizing force, we often fall into a determinism that condemns voters to dependence on their bosses. This reading of electoral clientelism, turning away from the reaction capacity of "peripheral" actors in the face of what appears to be a systemic constraint, deserves to be explored further. The legitimist vote undergoes readjustments dictated by the national situation and complex local logics that cannot be reduced to a culture of corruption<sup>183</sup>.

Because the Republic of Guinea is a patriarchal society, the instructions of the head of the family are very important in electoral processes. Explanations often focus on male dominance, and women tend to believe that they are the ones who know the political situation best and how to vote. This behavior is very much observed in rural areas.

The information is of the transcendent type, i.e., if the meeting between the candidate for election and the patriarchs or religious leaders of a locality is satisfactory, the patriarchs in turn call meetings and explain the stakes of the situation to the representants of the family, who are the secondary informers. Of course, this happens after discussing the benefits that this choice could bring them if the elections are won. These behaviors

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<sup>183</sup>Beye, A., & Hamme, G. V. (2019). La dynamique électorale au Sénégal entre 2000 et 2019 : contribution à l'analyse contextuelle des comportements électoraux. *Politique Africaine*, 183-205.

make it difficult to meet rational voters who are less constrained by partisan and ideological weight.

Here, the reference point is the party or candidate. Emotional attachment, for reasons that are sometimes not well understood, leads the voter to choose one of the main parties that could become the country's leader. Some voters follow conservative policies, but not in the strict sense of the term. The majority of them know well in advance of the election who they are voting for. These are the party loyal voters, they give their votes in accordance with their family, social and cultural values<sup>184</sup>.

What is also certain to be known is the tension that persists. Accusations and suspicions made more or less explicitly on both sides in relation to the voting arrangements made by one community push the others to take an equivalent or superior position in response.

Even before the Election Day, the first demonstrations to show the candidate that his or her support is effective take place in the countryside. In these areas it is easier to impose one's vision through financial power and the fact that the rate of belief and illiteracy is high.

Ethnicity, even if attenuated, still plays an important role in the positions taken. Finally, violence is part of the mental framework of the actors, even if each one considers the adversary to be responsible and claims that they only want to defend themselves. The more political actors allow this climate to persist (and even feed it) through provocation, rumors or biased information, and the more certain media echo it uncritically, the more the organization of the elections will involve risks. The election and its preparation will inevitably give rise to a myriad of conflicts and accusations, some of which will be controlled by one side or the other, but some of which may also escape them. As the past presidential election demonstrated, if electoral institutions and adjudication arrangements are not sufficiently credible and the media are not sufficiently objective, some of these tensions can lead to tragic consequences<sup>185</sup>.

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<sup>184</sup>Mayer, N., & Boy, D. (1997). Les « variables lourdes » en sociologie électorale. *Débats et controverses*, 109-122.

<sup>185</sup>(Op. cit.)

With the establishment of political parties according to the regions where his ethnic group is in the majority, this has cultivated in each group the vote for his relative without conditions and this has finally created radicals who have advocated the cult of personality.

Analyses of all types of events, especially political events in country like Guinea, have always involved the massive participation of the Fulani. It is not known exactly how many victims this community has recorded since the first Republic. They have been involved in the opposition to all political regimes that Guinea has known, including transitions.

Lansana Conté, who had given many opportunities to this community, also experienced a struggle with Fulani traders who controlled the price of foodstuffs towards the end of his reign.

Dadis Camara's transition came to an end shortly after the September 28 stadium massacre, which claimed many Fulani victims, including the leader of the opposition, who was narrowly saved during the killings.

During the reign of Alpha Condé, the Prince Road, inhabited mainly by this community, was nicknamed the axis of evil because of the endless demonstrations and violence of all kinds perpetrated on both sides. This political violence turned into ethnic clashes between Fulani and Malinké in some places.

After the recent coup d'état, Cellou Dallein Diallo believes that the street demonstrations will soon resume if the CNRD attempts any form of exclusion based on any criteria regarding their absence from decision-making and the race for the next presidential elections.

It is in view of all these events that others somewhere say that it is not a struggle for democracy, but their only goal is that by intimidation or by victimization the imperative would be the accession to power of Cellou or a Fulani. This is the only thing that matters to them, and the use of their resources is mobilized in this sense.

However, the one-dimensional vision does not sum up this struggle. The solidarity of the Fulani to support each other emanates from the fact that the other ethnic groups are setting in motion the mechanisms of discrimination that are operated during election periods. Hence, during the 2010 elections, there was, according to them, an election of one against all.

If we conceptualize the negative effects, the spatial manifestation of this type of conflict creates a division and a limited sense of patriotism that can push some people to go too far or even support extremist factions, as we see in the countries of the sub region.

## CHAPTER VIII: GUINEA BETWEEN DEMOCRATIZATION AND COUPS

The pervasiveness of violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years has led to the killing of millions of people and increasing political instability in the countries concerned. The persistence of these conflicts in some areas results in poverty, poor services, economic slowdown, famine, and other developmental challenges that prevent improved humanitarian security. A successful and sustainable solution to these conflicts represents an enormous challenge to the future prosperity of the region. Moreover, post-conflict rehabilitation of these countries, and those around them, is arguably the greatest challenge in sub-Saharan Africa<sup>186</sup>.

In West African countries, with the exception of Senegal, which has not experienced a military coup, the army has played a major role in the management of political affairs. The interference of the military in political affairs since independence has had a more or less successful impact depending on the circumstances<sup>187</sup>.

Guinea was long spared military rule. The first coups d'état that established military authoritarianism occurred in 1963, while Guinea's coup d'état occurred in 1984, a gap of nearly twenty years<sup>188</sup>.

Guinea entered a new period of political uncertainty in 2008, which marks the date of the second successful coup d'état by Captain Moussa Dadis. Thirteen (13) years ago, due to the constitutional slippage by the only democratically elected President since independence, the country experienced its third coup d'état.

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<sup>186</sup>Bowd, D. R., & Chikwanha, D. A. (2010). *Understanding Africa's contemporary conflicts Origins, challenges and peacebuilding*. Addis Ababa: Africa Human Security Initiative.

<sup>187</sup>Gadin, J. (2010). *The evolving role of the military in the peace and security architecture of West Africa*. Addis Ababa: Africa Review, 151.

<sup>188</sup>(Op.cit)

**Picture 2.** Soldiers received a rapturous welcome after the September 5, 2021 coup in Guinea (source: bbc.com)



### **8.1. Why do Coups Occur?**

Far from being an isolated element, there are often specific reasons for military intervention in political affairs today. Before mentioning some of these reasons it is better to understand first what the word *coup d'état* means.

A *putsch* is a sudden and rapid intervention by a group of military, gendarmerie, or other armed forces regiments with the mission to illegally overthrow the current government. The duration of the operation depends on the effectiveness and strategy of the coup plotters, their ability to adapt to the circumstances and the changing situation, and the strength of their opponents. When the coup succeeds, the following hours will see a communication on television and radio according to the dissolution of the government and all state bodies including the constitution. The economic and social policies can be changed radically, and the country passes at this moment from a normal regime to a transitional regime.

If the *coup d'état* operation is unsuccessful (an intervention that usually lasts no more than a week), it is then qualified as an attempted *coup d'état* where the culprits are arrested or sometimes neutralized by government forces.

Other less common forms of infiltration are "conspiracy", i.e., an extra-legal form of military or paramilitary infiltration into political affairs. In such a case, the public learns of it after it has been discovered and prevented by the legitimate government making an official announcement<sup>189</sup>.

Most African coups occur in what Tilly (1978:189-199) might call revolutionary situations. As with coups elsewhere in the world, however, there is usually no revolutionary outcome that follows, but rather an increased likelihood of further coups. McGowan and Johnson (1984) documented the occurrence of coup activity using both the New York Times and other sources [...]. Their findings on the relationship between coups, time, and colonial legacy are consistent with Wells' (1974) findings for the early years of independence. Although their goal is not to directly explain coups, they do conduct analyses of coups in relation to certain economic variables. They find that lack of industrialization is a pervasive factor in the region<sup>190</sup>.

McBride highlights the economic reason as the primary reason for military intervention in political affairs. The perpetrators are motivated by the rent, privilege, material objects, and money they hope to receive once they have taken the state under their control.

According to Collier and Hoeffler, there is a correlation between the risk of coup d'état, conspiracy, and the state of military spending at the time of attempted or successful military intervention. They conclude that when the government responds by limiting military expenditures and improving their situation, the risk of a coup becomes low. However, in countries where the government tends to increase military spending, the probability of a coup becomes higher<sup>191</sup>.

The model of the military profession makes it possible to interpret the question of political interference by the military in a different way, since it seeks the causes of insubordination in the professional characteristics of the troops. In so doing, it highlights a part of the social and cultural rationality of the men-at-arms. From then on, political

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<sup>189</sup>Barka, H. B., & Ncube, M. (2012). Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d'Etat a Never-Ending Phenomenon? *AfDB Chief Economist Complex*, 2.

<sup>190</sup>Wells, A., & Pollnac, R. (1988). The Coup D'etat In Sub-Saharan Africa: Changing Patterns From 1956–1984. *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, 43-56.

<sup>191</sup>(Op.cit)

interference was understood as the result of an unattainable social integration linked to a devalued socio-professional condition: incomes were low; the state of the barracks was deplorable; the equipment was obsolete; the profession was poorly recognized socially, and the soldiers were rejected by civilians. This approach is interesting because of its emphasis on the social desperation of the military south of the Sahara. The military therefore intervenes when the political decision-making process risks influencing their commitments and their living conditions [...]. Far beyond the objective control advocated by Samuel Huntington, the military intervenes in the political domain with the aim of protecting the interests of their profession, considering themselves legitimate to influence political decision-making processes that may affect their missions, their image, and their social condition. The political intrusion of the military in Guinea on December 23, 2008 around Captain Moussa Dadis Camara was presented from the first hours of the putsch as a protest against the governance of the country, before the new military junta in power locked itself into an authoritarian practice of political power that would discredit it in the eyes of Guinean civil society<sup>192</sup>.

There are new avenues of reflection on coups that remain little known or less exploited until now. This research highlights the potential of democratic institutions and the level of economic development of a state. Based on observations made on recent coups in some African countries, coup plotters have alluded to institutional weaknesses and certain disloyal practices that have constituted evidence of a lack of respect for their respective peoples.

In addition, factors related to nationalism, even if the tendency has diminished after the acquisition of independence, are gradually resurfacing. The mimicry of African heads of state in the face of their counterparts in developed countries, their weakness in decision-making in the face of the multinationals that plunder the continent and the contempt they show towards the majority abandoned in precariousness while enriching themselves are all elements evoked by the putschists.

Far from being sidelined, the interests of regional and ethnic groups must be examined as one of the causes of coups in Africa. The coup attempts in Guinea, such as the case of

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<sup>192</sup>Augé, A., & Gnanguénon, A. (2015). Introduction au thème : de l'institutionnalisation de l'armée dans l'appareil d'État. *Les Champs de Mars*, 7-17.

Diarra Traoré from the Malinké ethnic group, can be seen in this light. After the death of Sékou Touré, the Malinké were dispossessed of their property and the monopoly of trade that they held at the time, which is one of the reasons that led some officers, most of whom were Malinké, to attempt to take back power.

What is evident during the 24 years of reign of president Lansana Conté, as well as during the recent coup d'état that toppled Alpha Conde, is that the military have generally become involved in political affairs when their economic and detention conditions have deteriorated at some point. The proof is that under the regime of General Lansana Conté several mutinies took place, some of which date back to 1996.

As a second example, the newspaper Jeune Afrique reported that the intelligence services heard Colonel Doumbouya talk about the poor quality of foreign wine bottles in a supermarket. In addition, he reportedly made comments in an establishment in the capital city of Conakry about the poor operational capacity of the ordinary army in the midst of the Guinean contingent of the Minusma. The comments revealed the lack of interest of the head of the Special Group in the operational effectiveness of his fellow soldiers.

Although this evidence is put forward as the main reason for coups, some coups, which are rare situations, are intended to fight against political corruption and clannism that civil regimes tend to establish in Africa. The wave of patriotism that has emerged in recent years in the country help support the military to put an end to these networks of mafias very powerful that reign supreme in some countries whose destruction would be almost impossible with a civilian president. The citizens accompany these political projects not because they want to remain under a military regime, but it is to reorganize the political structure and include all the social forces to the participation and to a decision making.

## **8.2 How can we explain their Reappearance?**

The 2000s brought a new era of multiparty politics to Africa in more than 30 countries. Free elections were held in a climate of confidence and optimism. The Mckinsey report indicated a 4.9% increase in Africa's annual GDP between 2000 and 2008. This is twice the growth rate observed during the 1980s and 1990s. Almost 60 years after their independence, some of the continent's countries have managed to radically transform

themselves into democratic countries and the dynamism of their economies ranks them among the fastest growing in the world. Yet, the situation in other countries has shifted to political instability, military coups, and economic and humanitarian crisis<sup>193</sup>.

Results of an Afrobaromètre survey conducted as part of the fight against corruption revealed that in 19 African countries 6 out of 10 people mentioned that corruption was increasing in their country (63% in Guinea). And two-thirds of respondents thought the government was not doing enough to fight corruption. The same survey found that 72% of informants said that ordinary citizens risk reprisals if they cooperate with authorities. This is a sign that Africans believe their public institutions are not only involved in corruption but also tolerate it.

The abuse of corruption and bad governance has aggravated poverty in African countries. Since the end of 2019, the Coronavirus pandemic has also dealt a heavy blow to an already fragile economy. Today, Nigeria, considered the largest economy in West Africa, has one in three unemployed people. The same applies to South Africa, which is considered the most industrialized country on the continent. More than 500 million people live in deplorable conditions in Black Africa, which is half of the population that cannot satisfy some basic needs.

The author of the recent coup in Guinea, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, echoed these arguments, citing "poverty and endemic corruption" as reasons for the overthrow of former President Alpha Conde who had lost control of the country.

The soldiers who led the recent coup in Mali, led by Assimi Goita, said "theft" and "bad governance" motivated their actions. These coup plotters often refer to Jerry Rawlings' famous statement: "If the people are crushed by their elites, it is up to the army to give them their freedom.

The desire for African countries to progress animates more than ever the youth who want to enjoy the happiness and resources of their countries. The disappointing behavior of some civil heads of state push the population to welcome these coups as liberating events. However, the men in arms who do not have the necessary intellectual training to lead a country end up making the mistakes of the past.

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<sup>193</sup>(Op.cit)

Said Joseph Sany, vice president of the U.S. African Center of Peace. "The initial reaction of what you'll see in the streets will be joy, but very soon people will be demanding action...and I'm not sure the military will be able to meet the expectations, the delivery of basic services, more freedoms," he said. It is clear that these coups pose a considerable threat to the democratic advancements made by some African countries in recent years<sup>194</sup>.

However, despite the fact that coups are considered a threat, the current transition period in Guinea has left people divided for this moment. The government composed mainly of civilians and young executives is a strong commitment on the part of the CNRD that is welcomed by many Guineans. Other acts such as the recovery of state property and the fight against economic and financial crimes through the Court of Repression of Economic and Financial Offenses (CRIEF), the submission of a transitional timetable, the revision of mining company contracts and the cleaning up of public administration files are all points that are part of the acts that envisage Guinea's return to the right track.

However, the analysis and political forecasting of certain actors see these reforms as a seduction operation by the author of the coup d'état, whose character is leading people into a kind of conspiracy theory with the former head of state, with whom he is of the same ethnicity. The alliances of the political opposition, such as ANAD, headed by Cellou Dalein Diallo, who welcomed the coup as an act of liberation, now demand an electoral timetable and do not rule out street demonstrations. Will we once again make the mistakes of the past? The current changes do not allow us to make an absolute forecast. Only future actions and the fulfillment of the government's commitments could lead us to a more thorough assessment of the reforms underway.

### **8.3. Ecowas Sanctions against Anti-Constitutional Changes**

Known since its creation in 1975 as a regional organization in charge of promoting the economic development of member countries, ECOWAS has for some time now become an institution that has become involved under the pressure of political events in

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<sup>194</sup>Adekoya, R. (2021, Septembre 13). *CNN*. Found on Why are coups making a comeback in Africa?: <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/12/africa/africa-coups-resurgence-intl-cmd/index.html>

the sub-region in organizing the resolution of political crises. It also seeks to strengthen peace and improve security in the community space<sup>195</sup>.

Despite the organization's impressive legal structure to prevent, manage and resolve crises, its actions and initiatives face serious obstacles. Here and there, political actors, especially those in power and executive members of the organization, have difficulty complying with the aspirations of local populations and the initial decisions<sup>196</sup>.

With regard to the recent post-election crises, ECOWAS has announced sanctions against the perpetrators of the September 5, 2021, putsch. The organization decided to freeze the assets of the leaders, impose travel bans and the immediate release of the former president of the Republic<sup>197</sup>.

Like Guinea, Mali also experienced more serious sanctions, such as the closure of the borders of other neighboring countries, the freezing of the country's funds abroad and in banks such as the BCEAO, reducing the financial capacity of the Malian state to overcome the transition crisis. But despite these sanctions, the patriotic spirit of the population has become a powerful lever of support for the coup plotters. Guinea, in the same situation, issued a communiqué stating that it would not participate in the decision, and that Guinea's borders would remain open to the Malian people, who are considered to be brothers and sisters because of their historical ties.

#### **8.4. What explains the Weaknesses of the Organization?**

ECOWAS decisions and sanctions are either poorly implemented or rejected by a number of countries within the community. One of the weaknesses of the African architecture for condemning unconstitutional changes is the particular attention given to the modalities of access to power, in other words elections. This is a significant but limited step forward, at the expense of what we believe should be a consideration of the modalities related to the exercise of power. Practice shows that governments that have

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<sup>195</sup>Olakounlé, Y. G. (2010). *Le Rôle de la CEDEAO dans la Gestion des Crises Politiques et des Conflits : Cas de la Guinée et de la Guinée Bissau*. Nigéria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 6.

<sup>196</sup>Roger, D. T., & Binantob, N. (2014). Les Causes De L'inefficacité Des Organisations Régionales Dans La Résolution Des Crises Électorales En Afrique: Le Cas De La Cedeao. *Rev. Ivoir. Anthropol. Sociol. Kasa Bya Kasa*.

<sup>197</sup>Figaro, & AFP. (2021). Guinée: la Cédéao annonce des sanctions contre les auteurs du putsch. *Le Figaro*.

been established through the ballot box, even in a transparent manner, have not been immune to totalitarian abuses using various subterfuges to modify certain constitutional provisions in their favor, either through the "unilateral" revision of certain provisions considered intangible, or by creating an institutional imbalance in favor of the executive. The normativity of constitutions is put to the test in many African states in crisis situations. The resolution of the latter sometimes involves ignoring or overcoming the established constitutional order in favor of political arrangements of various kinds. These arrangements produce a new "circumstantial" constitutional order that overrides the previous constitutional order, which it integrates or modifies<sup>198</sup>.

The poor economic health of West African states remains a major obstacle to the integration efforts undertaken since the early 1980s. The economic crisis has forced member states to abandon all their long-term economic development plans, including development through regional integration, in search of short-term stability. This economic crisis has also drained the coffers of states (Bundu, 1996). No provision was made in the ECOWAS treaty for regional cooperation in the areas of politics and defense. The need to create a climate of trust across the region as a prerequisite for regional integration was nevertheless felt from the inception of the community. As for the renewal of African leadership, it has been said that the political instability, economic decline, and social discontent that currently prevail in Africa are attributable to a crisis of leadership<sup>199</sup>.

To this can be added the loss of political credibility in the face of an organization that does not embody the spirit of community. The skepticism surrounding this organization feeds the feeling of being driven by Western powers. The latest case in point was the imminent call by France for ECOWAS to increase democratic pressure on the Malian junta, whose relations between the two countries have been deteriorating of late. France's policy of interference in the political affairs of French-speaking African countries is often supported by those heads of state who are known in the French-speaking world as the "house negroes" and who are now the decision-makers of ECOWAS.

The sanctions against Mali are now penalizing countries such as Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire which have recorded economic losses in terms of imports and exports. Thus, on

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<sup>198</sup>Joseph, K. M. (2012). L'Union africaine face à la gestion des changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement. *Revue Québécoise de droit international*, 101-141.

<sup>199</sup>(*ibid.*)

this plan ECOWAS is taking a lot because of the dysfunctions of these sanctions which do not solve any problem, and which go moreover against the West African public opinion which asks to safeguard the interests and to prioritize the policy of their regions as the others do.

As Sogoyou Keguewe says in an excerpt from Alain Foka's documentary on ECOWAS sanctions, "It is the blacks who punish the blacks to please the whites, no white punishes a white to please a black. This is a way of explaining the disappointment of the population in the face of the political decisions of these leaders who, wanting to please the West or sometimes to maintain their relations with these powers in order to keep their seats, apply ineffective and counter-productive sanctions against their own citizens.

Since independence, ECOWAS has had difficulty creating a common currency in the sub region, which, according to their report, is due to the lack of first-order convergence criteria. Indeed, several countries still use the franc of the French colonies as their national currency under the influence of the French government, which affects the economy of WAEMU countries. The sustainability of the project to introduce a new currency remains a very complex issue, as the other WAMZ countries would not want France to play any role whatsoever, so as not to have their credibility and monetary sovereignty influenced by other currencies.

Another challenge is related to the issue of security in the sub-region. Political and social conflicts, Islamist radicalism in member countries, drug trafficking and organized crime are all obstacles that member states must overcome. For the time being, the establishment of an effective army is still dragging its feet. The lack of funding and the establishment of a real policy to fight organized crime are the main obstacles to achieving this goal.

One of the most recent realizations that some observers and geo-political scientists have pointed out is the feeling that small, independent countries are being dominated by large ones in West Africa.

Take Gambia, for example, which is completely overwhelmed by Senegal, and where cross-border conflict breaks out almost every time between people who share a similar ethnic and cultural background. In many ways, this country is heavily influenced by Senegal in terms of cooperation, and power relations remain unequal.

The Republic of Guinea, too, despite historical quarrels linked to the Portuguese attacks of 1970, Guinea Bissau has not been a good friend to its larger neighbor. During the epidemic in Guinea, with the exception of Mali, all bordering countries closed their borders, including Guinea Bissau. President Alpha Condé took the decision to punish these neighbors for their habit of buying agricultural produce from Guinea. This decision required the intervention of delegations from these countries to defuse the crisis.

Nigeria also wields considerable influence within the sub-region and within the organization itself. Thanks to its economy and its army, Nigeria is considered a power in West Africa.

## CHAPTER IX: MEDIA PRACTICES

In recent years, the use of media has emerged as an inseparable element of social movements. The reaction of online activists against an oppressive power or the demand of rights for the recognition of a cause goes through media that facilitates the networking and the process of setting a new strategy in motion. Human rights activists, those defending against global warming or protesting against violence against women use it as a means to increase the visibility of their actions in the world.

### 9.1. The Role of Media in the Socio-Political Contestations

The era of the revolution we are currently living in, is that of the new information and communication technologies that allow the creation of a network of interaction on the one hand between people, but also a communication with machines and other objects endowed with artificial intelligence. These innovations are at the heart of the evolutionary process of information and communication technologies. This revolution, therefore, also brings a profound change in our habits, our social, political, and economic relationships. Thanks to the software and applications incorporated in these communication tools, our results are exceptional and drive our ability to surpass ourselves<sup>200</sup>.

Modern political media are communication productions of a political nature that allow the dissemination and exchange of information and political content on digital platforms such as the internet, social networks, etc. Their rapid development in recent years has had a determining and sometimes unexpected effect on current political practices and democratic governance. The repercussions on the way leaders and public institutions communicate have been profoundly altered. The communication tricks of journalism have been transformed in the political-media system. Citizen intervention in the political process and electoral practices have been redefined in a consequent way thanks to the new media<sup>201</sup>.

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<sup>200</sup>Branco, M. (2005). *Free Software and Social and Economic Development in The Network Society*. Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 289.

<sup>201</sup>Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 31-36.

Lately, social movements have adopted this tool as their preferred means of communication. Political actors, activists, and even ordinary citizens beyond their basic functions, make political use nowadays. These are radios, internet, websites, newspapers, smartphones, social networks etc. These media have contributed to a change in collective behavior and have brought citizens on the same wavelength in terms of communication.

On these platforms everyone is free to express themselves and interact from the other side of the world, since the horizontality and ease of expressing oneself without constraint seems to have given political power to citizens, allowing them to mobilize and constrain certain actions of the central power.

Social media shares content that attracts users' attention, information of public interest that pushes people to share more to draw more attention to the news while getting more people to join a cause that would likely have been declined if given a second thought. The increased dissemination of certain political information on these sites can make it easier for the public to implement elements of the hidden agenda by opinion makers.

In sub-Saharan Africa, new civil society actors such as online activists, citizen journalists, and mobile monitors have engaged in political action by circumventing the media barriers long monopolized by mass media journalists. This controversy in the field of communication has sparked an interest in media researchers. Although attention has increased to develop research in this discipline, there is a significant deficit of literary data to situate the role of each actor and the impact of their communications in the political sphere<sup>202</sup>.

Conscious activists are those who seek above all to denounce, they publish malpractices and provoke collective awareness by sharing ideas on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and others. Others use it mainly to plan and organize demonstrations, which is what many activists do in Sub Saharan Africa.

## **9.2 . Digital Activism and their Rise**

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<sup>202</sup>Mutsvairo, B. (2016). *Digital Activism in the Social Media Era :Critical Reflections on Emerging Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa*. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 9.

First of all, online activism, net-activism, or cyber-activism "is defined as the action of using the Internet to advance a political cause". Web 2.0 is then characterized by the emergence of new social media such as the well-known Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, followed more recently by Snapchat, Instagram or Tok-tok. The new information and communication technologies (NICT) and the Internet have in a way freed us from distance by bringing proximity through the rapid circulation of information. Numerous actors have then progressively seized these digital spaces, notably militant organizations<sup>203</sup>.

The use of digital technologies and social networks in political conflicts in Africa began with the revolutionary movements in Arab countries. Even if the slow penetration of smartphones was already noted in some countries, however, it is only from the years 2010-2011 that several papers written by researchers such as Castells, Gerbaudo on social movements have noted the real use of these platforms as a means of mobilization and organization of demonstrations. The objective was to bypass the state media and criticize authoritarian regimes through images, tweets, and videos on Facebook, as well as show the world the crimes committed by these regimes against their citizens.

Years later in many African countries, youth have become the defenders of freedom and justice. With the flow of smartphones sent to the continent and the improvement of connectivity in some countries, media activism is now manifesting itself in several advocacy activities, violent or non-violent revolution, and these actors are direct competitors of traditional media in the field of communication.

The Arab Spring protest movements are an example of this. Young people managed to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Libya and recently in Algeria with the Hirak movement. The public places are identified, the demonstrators have their phones that allow them to share the event.

Former president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was overthrown in a military coup in Mali in 2020. A civilian government was installed to ensure the transition before the organization of general elections. At the same time, Nigeria entered a spiral of youth protests against police brutality. Protest campaigns organized on digital platforms were

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<sup>203</sup>Gillard, F., & Carrié, F. (2020). De l'activisme à la propagande extrémiste numérique-Des dynamiques de mobilisation. Paris, France. Found on <http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/thesis:27103>

accompanied by the slogan #EndSARS aimed at the Special Anti-Robbery Squad division of the police, renowned for its unfounded arrests, charges, and other abuses against citizens. Also in Senegal, the arrest of young opponent Ousmane Sonko led to a protest that prompted Macky Sall to call for the release of the young leader supported by Senegalese activists. Ousmane Sonko is the main protagonist who organizes demonstrations to denounce violations of laws and call on the population to commit to rights and patriotism<sup>204</sup>.

Guinean activists formed around the FNDC, civil society and political parties have repeatedly demonstrated against the change of the constitution in Guinea. And during the electoral conflicts, the disrespect of citizens' rights by the authorities and the atrocities suffered by the population have gone viral on social networks.

Several Guinean activists and blogging journalists have been convicted of disseminating false information in the media. Their arrest and detention by security forces was deemed unacceptable by the political class, which accused the government of interfering in judicial decisions. These arrests eventually allowed other young activists to spread the news after audio leaked from a prosecutor who was trying to bribe a judge to convict activist Oumar Sylla. During demonstrations against constitutional change, opposition activists and journalists were also attacked by the police, who accused them of supporting the opposition and calling for public disorder. Today many activists have been forced into exile because of repeated accusations and unjustified political convictions and call for public support on Twitter @FNDC\_Gn.

### **9.3 . Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations: from Public Space to Digital Public Space**

Of course, the notion of public space itself has always had a very political aspect, it is a place where citizens meet to discuss and debate together issues related to the city, to collective interests, to reflections on public policies whose recent protests are only the logical continuation of conflicts between authorities and citizens.

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<sup>204</sup> Ayeni, T. (2021, Avril 05). *Africa's growing activism: Taking down the autocrats, one at a time* . Found on The Africa Report: <https://www.theafricareport.com/76348/africas-growing-activism-taking-down-the-autocrats-one-at-a-time/>

Challengers use this space to engage others in their work, but more importantly, for the sustainability of their activities through the media. They can access it easily and express their contradictions through different forms of protest to reformulate public issues and practices. Although the internet and social networks are considered as privatized public spaces by the oligarchic power, they do not push the challengers today to erect a barrier by considering these tools as a handicap to achieve their goals.

Recent years have seen an upsurge in socio-political protests related to digital activism in Guinea. Clashes between police and activists in the streets of neighborhoods are efforts that need visibility to draw the attention of other citizens to the facts. The current generation has understood this logic and has embraced the new form of protest with less risk and more visibility. Although this has its disadvantages, however, they see it as a strategic change to limit the oppression of the system.

A true actor of modernity, at the crossroads of homo mobilis and homo numericus, the cyber-migrant also represents one of the key players in the social changes brought about by two driving forces of today's social world: mobility and technology. Capable of intervening at a distance, he is led to redraw another geography of the social and the political, to dominate transnational social fields and to participate actively in the reconfiguration of power relations between local and global actors<sup>205</sup>.

You don't need a computer, let alone an email address, to open a Facebook account and use the main services offered by the American giant. All you need is a phone number. With its Facebook Zero mobile site, the social network also offers free access to its main services. From their phone, users can update their statuses, check their feeds, comment on publications, or send and read messages. This easy access is at the origin of Facebook's phenomenal rise to power in the space of a few years<sup>206</sup>.

Demonstrations between the FNDC, the main force of resistance supported by the Guinean opposition to defend the constitution, and the RPG's genuine movements for the

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<sup>205</sup>Nedelcu, M. (2010). "Cybercitoyenneté" et mobilisation en ligne des migrants Nouvelles formes de participation transnationale et d'action collective à l'ère du numérique. *Dans Migration Société*, 139-154.

<sup>206</sup>Kasongo, A., Abderahmane, M., & Rigaux, M. (2016, Novembre 22). Citoyenneté numérique : ce que l'Afrique prépare. *CFI Développement Media*. Found on <https://cfi.fr/fr/actualites/citoyennete-numerique-ce-que-lafrique-prepare>

continuity of the president, confrontations in the streets and neighborhoods now seem to give way to confrontations between police officers and UFDG militants. During periods of crisis and socio-political contestation, debates are transposed into the virtual space, contributing to the accentuation of socio-political and ethnic cleavages.

In the current context, the protagonists have invested social networks such as Facebook, Twitter mainly, where activists and militants have put themselves in marching order to pass their messages live with thousands of views per day. It is fair to say that despite their modest means and the lack of broadband connectivity in the country, people are trying to get their messages online, mostly through group, family, corporate or cell phone company subscriptions such as Orange, MTN or Cellcom.

Facebook has become the most courted platform by these activists who sometimes speak out on behalf of such and such a community or group of people by divulging information of revolt where the excess of freedom of expression and the appropriation of public speech escape even the Facebook team drowned in an infinity of data. These messages, sometimes broadcast in dialects, remain unknown to the Google universe. Cyberspace for activists is a place where they come not only to gain popularity but also to influence thousands of subscribers who are the unconditional listeners of these influencers who maintain their subscribers through Lives.

The plethora of applications easily downloadable on smart phones make it easy for them to manipulate the content of images, videos, and audios to sometimes question the information coming from authentic sources. This practice blurs the professional journalistic approach that struggles to compete with, or reframe, so many streams that circulate on communication networks.

Very dynamic in the hotbeds of tension with their smartphones, activists in Guinea are ready to do anything to put the authority and some Guinean ministers accused of misusing their powers. It is also an opportunity for others to sully the reputation of politicians during failed press appearances to question their competence or sometimes their unwillingness to advance development. Cases of corruption and misappropriation of public funds are all acts aimed at diverting undecided voters in favor of their candidate.

Whether in Guinea or anywhere else in the world, the reality today forces politicians to give interest to social media platforms. In Guinea, post-election periods remain the most

turbulent and difficult times for the HAC, the body responsible for controlling and regulating communication. Videos with violent content, photoshopped images, and stereotyped messages, especially those with ethnic connotations, are completely beyond the control of this entity.

Aware of the role of social networks, political personalities intervene on current events to defend themselves or contradict certain accusations insinuated by political opponents against them. This space allows them to rebuild with their militants and sympathizers who need information to reassure themselves.

As a perfect illustration, we can take as an example the results of the 2020 elections that were published by the Republican opposition, in particular the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea party, on Facebook by the Vice President and the party's communication officer. The institutions and the electoral commission (CENI) not being credible in the eyes of some opponents, the use of these technological means have allowed them to have some figures that for them were largely favorable to their party that even pushed the president of the UFDG to proclaim himself president without waiting for the official result.

These websites and other applications also allowed the movement to connect with those who, for whatever reason, were unable or unwilling to attend the protests. While the actions of these activists were barely visible in the public space, they helped create the way they have used social media in recent times to build their identities and fuel the hotbeds of tension has made a deep impression.

Often afraid of reprisals and arrest by the police, those who are educated associate themselves in meetings with the diaspora or sometimes students on training trips to other countries, notably France, Belgium, Germany, the United States, and certain countries on the African continent where the Guinean community is very representative.

To plan their activities and be more active on social networks, they are often in constant communication with other members of their networks who provide information (videos, images, or audios) as well as the topics to be attacked in order to attract more public attention. As Baumann points out, cell phones and websites offer a "virtual

proximity" that "no longer requires physical proximity" a proximity that is so difficult to find in contemporary social space<sup>207</sup>.

#### **9.4. How do they produce Fake News?**

A lie makes it to the other side of the world  
before the truth has a chance to get its pants on (Winston Churchill<sup>208</sup>)

Artificial intelligence algorithms incorporated into computer technology are a major advance over the existing possibilities of creating false information and manipulating images and videos<sup>209</sup>.

The credibility of news has always been questioned (McGrath 1986). Long before the Internet came along, some weekly appearances were known for their tendency to distort content (McGrath 1986). The Internet offers the chance for people to access a wide variety of information rather than being limited only by traditional channels. This possibility increases the risk of exposure to biased and distorted information. Similarly, news consumption on social networks is different from news consumption elsewhere<sup>210</sup>.

When people started using the Web, they slowly realized that they were free to do whatever they wanted. Since the creation of the new media, the role of issuing information is now exercised in a random way. The traditional consumers of mass media, who had long been the recipients of one-way communication, have become senders.

In the dynamics of news production in Guinea, these users take advantage of moments of instability when citizens are often at home looking for news on the evolution of election results, the places where clashes are taking place between demonstrators and the forces of law and order, or even recently the events of the September 5 coup. These are their prolific periods during which not only are they very well followed but also the number of subscribers rises very quickly.

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<sup>207</sup>Bauman, Z. (2003). *Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds*. Cambridge: Polity press.

<sup>208</sup>QIInvestigator says April 13, 2015 found on <https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/07/13/truth/>

<sup>209</sup>Botha, J., & Pieterse, H. (2020, Mars). Fake News and Deepfakes: A Dangerous Threat for 21<sup>st</sup>, 3.

<sup>210</sup>Alan R. Dennis 2018 Fake News on social media: People Believe What They Want to Believe When it makes No Sense at all.

This heterogeneous category of subscribers is not impressed by the detailed content of everything that is seen and shared on Facebook. These people already have a political side, so everyone wants to know what they can hear. The question is not about the authenticity of the information, but rather about the person sharing the information and their political party. In the comments, it is easy to identify people who are for a particular party or for a particular socio-political cause.

It is in this climate that these web activists take advantage to introduce unverified information that they have received from a third party whom they trust. Sometimes they put in scenes that they comment on with their faces covered and even using the voice of computers on scenes of violence that did not take place for some of the cases in Guinea.

These intoxications have often been unmasked by observers on France 24 using effective techniques. Several images of intoxication have been shared on both sides by activists in the middle of the campaign during the presidential election of October 18, 2021.

For example, images of UFDG supporters destroying roads built by President Alpha Conde, when in fact this image came from South Africa. A video also showed a fight between a Guinean minister and his chief of staff when in reality it was a fight between a university rector from Equatorial Guinea and his chief of staff. Other images of ministers being caught with their lovers in hotels in Conakry have also gone viral on Facebook.

The false information during the first wave of Covid-19, or the elections in some countries like Guinea are among many examples that can be cited. Fake news is present in the daily life of people, to the point where "the President of the Republic said that Guinea was ranked 4th in terms of dissemination of fake news. This was false," said Sally Bilaly Sow of Guinea Check. President Alpha Conde was reacting on the French media to the warnings of several organizations about "ethnic speech" during the election campaign. "I have never made this ethnic speech for the simple reason that I am a pan-Africanist," said Alpha Condé<sup>211</sup>.

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<sup>211</sup>Koubakin, R. (2020, Novembre 25). *Afrique : comment le continent fait face aux fake news*. Found on Made for Mind: <https://www.dw.com/fr/afrique-comment-le-continent-fait-face-aux-fake-news/av-55723324>

Without prior verification, many people react with comments on these images and videos that are just a shot showing parts that can give some credibility to their publications. The attention of subscribers and people connected at that moment is attracted by phrases like "Urgent" followed by the rest of the phrases where they push consumers to "Liked" or put "Hearts" before starting to elaborate on the topic of the day. Some prefer deep fakes with video montages where you can see leaders calling for ethnic group to prepare for a civil war.

Guineans in the diaspora who are often very connected to current events sometimes like to play hero in the digital public space. They call on others to take to the streets to attack members of other ethnic groups and destroy public property. This form of activism is not this time oriented towards the dissemination of fake news, but it increases the sources of tension in the capital Conakry where cohabitation is becoming increasingly difficult between communities.

### **9.5. Media Behavior and Journalistic Slippages: When Political Opinion affects the Ethics of the Profession**

Due to the political upheavals on the African continent, the last two decades have seen the emergence of the media as a key player in the socio-political landscape in several countries. Their involvement as one of the main tools of counter-power, control and democratization, their role in electoral processes, their mission of animating and advancing public debates on subjects that are sometimes little discussed, their power of persuading public opinion has made them essential actors in advanced democracies. Moreover, because of their power of destabilization, their solicitation in conflicts and peace processes, or their mobilization by donors and NGOs to accompany social change<sup>212</sup>.

The media use foreign and local African languages to communicate with the public. Their audiences reach both urban and rural listeners. They are managed by the government authority for the public media, but the patents of the private ones are held by companies, religious organizations, businessmen, associations etc.

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<sup>212</sup>Capitant, S., & Frère, M.-S. (2011). Les Afriques médiatiques Introduction thématique. *Afrique contemporaine*, 25-41.

The intellectual class gives a preponderant place to the written press, which is a predominantly urban audience. As for the audiovisuals, the strategy is different, they embrace a wider and much more heterogeneous public. They are capable of tightening the dynamics of their activities voluntarily because of the difficulties they encounter in an authoritarian regime or according to the social and political context. Usually, like everywhere else, the media in Africa are experiencing a rapid progression in the field of the new information and communication technology. They consider the concerns of journalists and the issues related to the evolution of society and the adaptation of traditional media<sup>213</sup>.

As soon as they appeared in the 1990s, the new private African media (whether commercial, associative, or religious), as well as the journalists who ran them, were faced with political, economic, and identity-related challenges. First, the freeing of speech, in a poorly regulated context (lack of journalists trained in the principles of the profession, absence of codes of ethics or self-regulatory bodies, inaction of public regulatory bodies), led to the emergence of offensive, even insulting, and often partisan discourse, which in some contexts (Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire) even went as far as hate speech targeting certain communities. In many countries, press trials have multiplied, with journalists from private media being accused of defamation, insults, slander, and dissemination of false news or invasion of privacy. Abuses in the use of freedom of expression have quickly served as a pretext for leaders (former or from the alternation linked to democratic transitions) to restrict freedom or slow down the opening up of the audiovisual field, which is considered more strategic than the written press in countries with high illiteracy rates<sup>214</sup>.

Second, the socio-economic context was not conducive to the development of private media enterprises: a narrow and unstructured advertising market despite the gradual liberalization of the economy; low purchasing power of citizen-consumers; and high costs of media production in countries that have to import all inputs. Very quickly, the entrepreneurial and financial consolidation of the private media, in the hands of inspired men of letters but without management skills, was hampered, leading to practices that threatened the quality of journalistic work and its independence. On the one hand, the

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<sup>213</sup>(Op.cit)

<sup>214</sup>Frère, M.-S. (2019). Défis Politiques, Economiques Et Identitaires Des Journalistes En Afrique Francophone. *Annuaire français de relations internationales*, 940-941.

very low or non-existent salaries of professionals have led to a whole series of abuses: journalism paid by the sources of information, the combination of the functions of journalist with those of communicator, the use of media spaces as instruments of financial transactions, and even as tools of blackmail. On the other hand, economic fragility has led to the rapprochement of companies with political parties or personalities likely to support them financially, transforming journalists into transmission belts for the points of view of political actors or even propagandists<sup>215</sup>.

Finally, political obstacles and economic difficulties have had serious consequences for the consolidation of the professional group of journalists in this new context: the model of the "independent" journalist, "counter-power" and "voice of the voiceless" has found itself in increasing contradiction with practices linked to concerns of economic survival, militant priorities, or career strategies, also hindering professional solidarity. Professional organizations have struggled to attract the support of all journalists. Divisions soon appeared between public and private media workers, between journalists who were sympathetic to different political parties, between hierarchical leaders defending their positional interests and young freelancers with precarious status, and between journalists from the capital's media and those from small community radio stations or provincial associations<sup>216</sup>.

### **What do listeners blame on Guinean journalists?**

Guinea is one of many countries where, unfortunately, the lack of professionalism of some journalists is often blamed. Beyond issues related to the exercise of the profession, journalists are treated as supporters of political parties that are often involved in corruption-business. Very courteous towards the leaders of political parties and businessmen with whom their business dealings work wonderfully, the journalist then all the time ready to turn his coat is obliged to take a position to defend or criticize with more delicacy to avoid finding himself financially broke. A behavior that discredits some private radio stations in Guinea.

The public broadcasting media had fewer problems beyond the decrees on staff succession and equipment problems. RTG, the state radio, is a target of criticism for its

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<sup>215</sup>(ibid.)

<sup>216</sup>(ibid.)

privilege and its pacifist character. Press releases, decrees and, better still, almost all the important events of the republic are reported by it.

However, this has nothing to do with the personal practice of the profession. Whether they are in the public or private sector, they are forced to follow the setting agenda of their bosses who work behind the scenes with wealthy merchants in order to keep their advertising contracts which keep their radio stations running and ensure the payment of workers in the private sector. Sometimes they are under pressure to praise public figures to maintain their lucrative relationships. It is sometimes enough to follow political broadcasts during election periods to realize the partisan behavior of some playing devil's advocate.

The ones that are easily detectable are news sites that do not respect the requirements of the media operation. Caught up in the competition, they sometimes publish unauthentic information that can be damaging to a physical or moral authority. Just the title of the magazine can suggest their ambitions to create buzz just to be read by the public. Phantom information, false testimonies, gratuitous accusations that expose some and infringe on the privacy of other citizens.

However, those who seek to do their work properly are faced with direct threats, intimidation, and violence against political columnists. Arrests, threats of closure and imprisonment are not excluded. The reason for the closure of some radio stations, according to the authorities, is due to non-compliance with the content of the specifications and the incitement of people to violence, through very passionate and revolting interactive programs.

Others are accused of spying for a political party. Their techniques include asking trick questions that can often lead the interviewee into error. They may also extract strategically classified information and make it available to other politicians in return for money or promotion. This method is not a one-way street.

The political corruption that has become frequent in the media discredits some journalists who react in interactive programs that are widely watched by the public. It is precisely this distrust of partisan journalists that has led most young bloggers to flood the field of the virtual world to report their own stories without necessarily getting anyone's permission before posting content on social networks. Despite the risks of manipulation

and fake news that this can induce, subscribers are very active and appreciate especially the information that reaches them from inaccessible areas.

### **9.6. Techno Optimist and Techno Pessimist: What Real Change does Media Activism bring to the Struggle for Democracy in Guinea?**

In French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, the Web, in its interactive and participatory components, is progressing rapidly, even if its penetration rate is still very disparate<sup>217</sup>. By accessing online political discussion, participants would be freed from both the constraints of ordinary sociability and the many limitations to speaking that are caused by the operation of political spaces. Individuals would express themselves more freely, free from the constraints associated with ordinary sociability and the politeness requirements of face-to-face relationships, which would improve democracy through less restricted discussions<sup>218</sup>.

For many users, the information and communication age has brought more changes with it including political change. Intervention in the state decision-making structures through simple messages and videos is more than a revolution for the youth of the 21st century. Communication is power, the content of the speeches brings so much change and awakening for those who aspire today to fight against all forms of oppression around the world. The proponents of this vision with faith in ICT are techno optimists.

Believing in the impact of technology to find effective answers to our problems is to show confidence in the potential of technology to solve the challenges posed by society. In other words, it is techno-optimism. These challenges are extremely varied in scope, and they can range from global problems such as the threat to peace, global warming, to more modest ones such as family management, the promotion of citizen engagement in the process of fighting violence and illiteracy. Techno-optimists are not in absolute belief in technology and media. They recognize the need for improvement

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<sup>217</sup>Champion, R. I. (2012). *Journalisme 2.0 : nouvelles formes journalistiques, nouvelles compétences*. Paris: Les Etudes de la Documentation Française.

<sup>218</sup>Parasie, S., & Cointet, J.-P. (2012). La presse en ligne au service de la démocratie locale: Une analyse morphologique de forums politiques. *Revue française de science politique*, 45-70.

and the inadequacy of these tools in some areas. However, they find in this innovative system ways to deal with social changes and problems<sup>219</sup>.

However, in authoritarian regimes, and even in Western democracy, the potential of these tools to challenge political decisions and call for resistance pushes governments to apply restrictions in order to limit and bring certain initiators to justice.

In most African countries that are in a semi-democratic system, social media such as Facebook are monitored by governments that use ordinary means to control the actions of users, even interrupting communication in situations of serious political crisis<sup>220</sup>.

It is for this reason that cyber-pessimist (Gladwell 2010; Morozov 2011) believe that the revolutionary potential of social media should be re-evaluated. They mention that these virtual platforms rather serve authoritarian regimes to better track down protesters and find ways to stifle the movement. They also point out that online activism, instead of helping activists, diverts them from engaging in real physical protests and allows authoritarian regimes to conduct Orwellian state surveillance on the behavior and identity of individuals and groups<sup>221</sup>.

The participation on the web of young influencers is far from the context that we can imagine in Western countries. It is not something well organized that can be compared to other structures that have the technical means and resources necessary. It is rather promotion in the name of the party, denunciations in most cases and calls and challenges launched by the activists as support to the party.

As a result of the broadcasting and the call to violence, the Guinean government had proceeded to cut off the internet in order to ease the situation and stop the flow of fake news and images circulating on social networks. Despite this, the use of VPN (Virtual Private Network) software, which allows certain information whose authenticity is not proven, served as a relay for the militants.

They consider themselves representatives of the silent majority who have difficulty expressing their precariousness. The lack of drinking water, social housing, roads that

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<sup>219</sup>Kidd, D., & McIntosh, K. (2016). Social Media and Social Movements. *Sociology Compass*, 785-786 .

<sup>220</sup>Mutsvairo, B. (2016). *Digital Activism in the Social Media Era :Critical Reflections on Emerging Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa*. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 171.

<sup>221</sup>(Lim 2012)

are in a dilapidated and impassable state, a youth trained to be unemployed, corruption are all topics that are discussed and commented on the platforms.

However, the problem with online protests is their fragility. These movements can burn out and disappear as easily as they appear. The lack of resilience and their virtual character that is summarized by comments, likes and dislikes. The lack of interaction of a community attenuates the feeling of belonging to a collective identity that influences the motivation and considerably decreases the civic engagement of the actors.

Under these conditions, one cannot speak of effective demonstrations if the authorities are not confronted with putting the protagonists of any claim in order in the physical space. In African countries where the accessibility and use of digital tools is already a challenge, without wanting to protest physically in front of a national assembly or the court of justice for example is to give up these rights. This is why techno-pessimists are wary of the imaginary, fragile and harmless world.

The struggle for democracy or for rights issues directly involving citizens must be field work, not simple emoticon postings that change nothing in reality. Repeated calls on social networks in Guinea to fight against social injustice and the abusive use of force by the police have never borne fruit.

The violence and aggressions committed by certain supporters and extremist militants of the super state parties have been kept silent despite the circulation of illustrative images and videos on social media. The very way of proceeding to the demonstration does not correspond in reality to a demand for change, very often badly organized, these protests are instructed by hooligans and armed bandits who have no sense of civic spirit and democracy which they claim to guarantee the respect.

We can deduce that social networks have enormous advantages and help solve many of the major problems of today's world, including communication, reducing physical distance, learning, participating in debates in virtual space etc...

Online activism, although criticized, should not be considered a practice to be abandoned for personal or security reasons. The mechanism that is used in the digital space supports the protests in the physical space, it is necessary to know how to take advantage of both to achieve the objective and to divulge the information to a wider

public to raise awareness on the subject. Like it or not, the potential of social networks in democratic countries has had a positive impact on citizens' awareness and on the electoral process.

However, in authoritarian countries, simply commenting or making videos without concrete citizen actions leads most of them to fail to achieve their goals. Just like social movements, good organization, and strategies to achieve the goal should be a priority to give strength to the actions taken for the social welfare of the people.

This should challenge political party leaders and opponents of the current regime to learn more about how to mobilize activists, especially their organizations in underdeveloped countries.

## CHAPTER X: SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

From one country to another and within each country, social and economic inequalities are enormous. While economic inequality is striking and important, social inequality encompasses much more"<sup>222</sup>. If global wealth has sometimes increased, as the Bretton Woods institutions estimate, it has not had the same impact on the actors, who have rarely had the opportunity to appropriate it and have had the feeling of becoming poorer rather than richer<sup>223</sup>.

When we proceed to a global evaluation of wealth in the world, we notice that between 1980 and 2016, 1% of the rich have benefited from a growth twice as high as that of 50% of the poor. This gap between a rich minority and a very poor majority has caused a significant loss of growth, especially in southern countries. The current inequality constitutes a threat to development and public policy, it is the basis of political conflict in some places and drastically hinders development. Between 1985 and 2005, OECD countries lost 5% of their growth rates due to inequality<sup>224</sup>.

In Africa, south of the Sahara, the distribution of wealth and access of people to goods according to socio-professional categories or social status is a real challenge. Access to these social rights involves several criteria related to power, science, age, gender, kinship, living environment and association, status etc. In African countries, depending on the environment, some resources are easily accessible while others are not. Purchasing power and income are attributed to urban dwellers.

Recent data produced by some specialists show that one of the most unequal economies in the world is in Africa. Statistics show that the average coefficient in relation to the Gini index in these countries is 0.43, which is 1.1 times the coefficient of the rest of the world. The other problem reported is that the highest paid people in Africa have an income more than 10 times higher than the 20% of the lowest paid workers<sup>225</sup>.

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<sup>222</sup>Blackburn, K. i. (2008). What is social inequality? *International Journal of Sociology*, 250-259

<sup>223</sup>Courade, G., & Suremain, C.-É. d. (2001). Inégalités, vulnérabilités et résilience : les voies étroites d'un nouveau contrat social en Afrique subsaharienne . *Pluralité des normes et jeux d'acteurs*, 119-133.

<sup>224</sup>Rioux, R. (2018). *Lutte contre les inégalités: Etat d'urgence*. AFD.

<sup>225</sup>UNDP (2016), Growth, Poverty and Inequality Interactions In Africa: An Overview of Key Issues. Vol. 1, No. 1, 7 May 2016 p.3

Those who live in African capitals, executives, foreign sportsmen, businessmen and entrepreneurs have easy access to economic goods such as money and salary income. They have a logic of merit in relation to their professions which require more training and therefore more money. These acquired characteristics privilege these intellectuals and create a remarkable gap between them and those in rural areas who have not had or have not been able to take advantage of this opportunity that improves the standard of living of others.

Social inequalities in very traditional and religious African societies imply a stratification linked to gender, and especially to status, which contains the privilege granted to certain groups (ethnic groups, tribes) according to their acquired historical roles, which can be explained by legends of the time, and whose professions are destined only for this specific group. Although these variables are demystified nowadays by the fact that some members are oriented towards other more diversified professions, however, it is not uncommon to find other constraints that are imposed such as prejudice and discrimination based on cultural ideals.

The other privilege is the administrative tasks that are assigned to other people who are better known as leaders or resource persons who have easier access to material or financial aid directed to these places. This leads to the reproduction of the cycle of poverty and limited access to health care, transportation, and other public goods.

### **10.1. Reproducing Inequalities in Guinea**

The most common forms of inequality that exist between men and women, urban and rural populations, rich and poor, migrants and indigenous citizens, as well as other stratifications in society related to ethnicity, caste, religion, physical or mental disability, and sexuality are all barriers to the effective realization of citizenship rights and the promotion of a secure future for all<sup>226</sup>.

The profound transformation of rural societies over the last few decades, under the pressure of socio-demographic, economic and environmental changes, has not been without effect on the dynamics of these inequalities, which sometimes decrease, but often

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<sup>226</sup>Hujo, K. (2021). Social protection and inequality in the global South: Politics, actors and institutions. *Critical Social Policy*, 341.

worsen. When examining inequality in developing countries, including Guinea, it is normal to approach the issue from several angles. At first glance, however, income inequality remains one of the inequalities that affects more than half of the Guinean population.

There are millions of Guineans who live in precariousness. Faced with daily difficulties and responsibility, many of them do not have access to care and treatment worthy of the name. Due to the lack of social and health security, they are caught in circumstances of premature death or disabilities that could be avoided.

When people do not have economic security and cannot rely on their government, they often have children so that they will owe them in the near future. In this context, children are seen as sources of wealth rather than problems. In a patriarchal society with a lineage tradition and a gerontocracy culture characterized by the power of the old and the elders over the young and the power of the man over the woman, sometimes things are left in the natural order as they are established. This factor shows how much the weight of culture still exists in our society.

One of the important elements that can be highlighted in relation to this practice is the work environment. In some organizations, while it is felt that a person's individual ability to solve problems is what keeps them in their position, other organizations form or rely on strong bonds between workers. In the Guinean context, if the company is owned by the family, the aim is to gradually integrate the members of the family, including the less competent ones. The family maintains this policy in order to maintain their power and name in the community where they live.

This practice is unfortunately repeated in state institutions. The directors or the civil servants with decisional positions easily manage to integrate a family member who in turn becomes automatically indebted to the family. This implies that he should find a way to help another person to free himself from the task he has been entrusted with. It is a reflex, and sometimes it is like a burden that is deposited there somewhere in the brain where the only alternative involves the success of the subject.

Another recent practice is recruitment on the basis of cultural similarity. This mechanism has also gained momentum. The recruiter uses non-verbal behaviors to eliminate people who are not similar to him or herself. It is a practice that maintains the

ideology that this community is rich, that community is smart or that community is naturally lazy or weak. This selective behavior amplifies the conflicts between the different ethnic groups in Guinea.

People with little financial means or potential pass on their trades to their children or younger family members informally, as a family heirloom that may allow the latter to work in subcontracting companies or in the workshops, they set up not far from their homes.

In this situation, where workers set up these workshops in order to supplement their wages, workspace and family space are diluted - to use Dominique Jacques-Jouvenot's terms. This facilitated the transmission of the trade, sometimes to the detriment of the school careers of the children of employees, who were constantly moving between school and the workshop. Reproduction is also explained by the fact that workshops and trades are considered family assets to which families are much attached<sup>227</sup>.

In the school environment, these children sometimes show contempt for assimilating courses, contributing directly to their failures. The fact of having parents without cultural capital also contributes to the return to inherited practices. Those who strive to succeed are condemned to face several difficulties such as financial and material inequalities and other resources such as didactic support.

## **10.2. The Situation of some Inequalities in Guinea and the Challenges of the State**

As in most African societies, there is a separation of tasks within the household and more broadly in the community between men and women. This barrier of activities between genders goes back to ancient practices and is much accentuated in rural areas. The roles assigned to women and girls are different from those of men. Beyond the cultural weight and religious teachings, women, although respected according to the same customs, are increasingly subjected to pressures and differences in treatment that prevent them from identifying with men or hinder their ability to do so.

These restrictions, maintained by patriarchy, can limit women's income level, their consumption (Locoh et al., 2007) and make them unable to satisfy some of their basic

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<sup>227</sup>(Op.cit)

needs (food, clothing, housing, health, etc.) or to flourish within their society (Garnier and Capul, 2002). [...]. The operating principles of this system require that women obtain the consensus or approval of men, especially their husbands, who are the key to their paradise for undertaking any non-household activities (Barry, 2006). In societies where this social formation is dominant, women are often engaged in precarious agro-processing and retail activities, which often generate only "micro-profits", despite the multiple income-generating activities they engage in at the same time (Barry, 2006). The income generated by these activities is rarely intended to satisfy the needs of the women themselves, but rather to satisfy the imminent needs of their household, their children, or their extended family (father, mother, uncle, aunt, etc.)<sup>228</sup>.

Women remain underrepresented in public and political life and in decision-making positions. As a result, they have little ability to influence the transition and peacebuilding process. Only 26 percent of government officials are women, most with limited responsibilities. Of the 155 members of the National Transitional Council (CNT) chaired by a woman, only 20.6 percent are women. Women make up 17.6% of the Supreme Court judges, 11% of the police and 15% of the gendarmerie (ECOWAS Assessment, 2012). The rate is much lower in the military at 5.9% (Biometric Census Report, 2012).

These treatments reserved for the female layer make certain professions gender specific. This vertical segregation hinders the evolution of certain sectors in which women are deemed to be more productive than men. The measures should allow everyone to have access to a prestigious job in order to break the barriers and give the chance to fulfillment and social welfare to women in order to reduce sexism.

Youth unemployment is also a problem because it deprives them of the possibility of acquiring independently the housing, they need to start a family and participate in society. It also creates a multitude of social ills, and young people in particular suffer from its detrimental effects: lack of vocational training, devaluation of oneself, marginalization, impoverishment, and waste of enormous human resources<sup>229</sup>.

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<sup>228</sup>Cissé, A. (2015). Genre et sexualité Quelques enjeux contemporains: Inégalités de genre et pauvreté des femmes en Afrique subsaharienne. *Aspects sociologiques*, 22.

<sup>229</sup>Niang, D. B. (2019). *Analyse sociologique des trajectoires d'insertion socio-économique des jeunes au Mali*. Paris: Université de Lorraine.

Young Guineans face this category of people who accuse them of lacking experience, and often maintain this barrier as a handicap to their integration into professional life. This stigmatization not only leads to a loss of self-confidence, but also leaves this resource available to clans and politicians who use them as they wish.

*As Somparé describes in his article, "Others feel threatened, fearing that they will be surpassed or supplanted by the young colleague to whom they have passed on their know-how, so that hierarchical leaders often tend to have members of their families or ethnic groups surround them by appointing them to various positions of responsibility. In this case, the presence of "relatives" around them is not a threat, but rather a guarantee of protection<sup>230</sup>.*

Sometimes those who succeed in joining the civil service are condemned to show courage. They have to do everything possible until their matriculation and the payment of the first salary, at the risk of having their efforts given to others. They must also remain respectful of the seniors to avoid all kinds of traps from their peers. It is difficult to flourish as a young person because of the constraints and social rules that interfere in the administration system.

The standard of living of managers or civil servants, who are not well paid, is generally dependent on their ability to access state resources through corruption. For example, civil servants in the economic sector under the Ministry of Finance and Economy tend to have a higher standard of living than others. An ordinary customs officer may have a higher standard of living than a high school or university teacher because he or she has the opportunity to embezzle customs revenues<sup>231</sup>.

At the level of society as a whole, it is easy to notice a certain homogeneity in the lifestyles of individuals who are respectively at the two ends of the social hierarchy. At the top, senior civil servants and big businessmen share certain practices that stem from their economic affluence. This is particularly visible in their educational practices. Their

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<sup>230</sup>(Op.cit)

<sup>231</sup>(Op.cit)

children, who are often born in hospitals in western countries, where their wives are sent to give birth, benefit from special care. Enrolled in reputable private schools, they are taught at home, where they acquire from early childhood a familiarity with the French language that will be improved by stays in Europe during the vacations, while waiting to continue their studies in a Western university. However, the affluence of this bourgeoisie depended largely on the possibility of accessing state resources for civil servants, or of negotiating with the state the monopoly of certain markets for large merchants. It is therefore a precarious economic condition, closely dependent on political balances and ministerial appointments that are constantly changing. This consumer bourgeoisie, which does not engage in productive investments, does not always succeed in reproducing itself by transmitting its economic and social capital to the new generations<sup>232</sup>.

In 2018, slightly more than one in three Guineans (35 percent) live in urban areas, and the country has seven cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. About half of Guinea's urban population lives in Conakry, whose population is growing rapidly (6.1 percent on average per year) due to rural-urban migration. Guinea has a housing and urbanization policy, but it suffers from lack of implementation. False documents are granted to certain citizens who build in an anarchic manner, which explains the disorderly urbanization and the existence of a relatively large number of slums.

Living in slums often means occupying precarious housing and having relatively limited access to certain essential social infrastructures and services (drinking water, electricity, hospitals, schools) and very often it is synonymous with living in promiscuity. This is an expression of poverty and precariousness that makes people vulnerable to epidemics and disasters (e.g., floods).

The percentage of individuals benefiting from housing with permanent walls increased by almost 9 points in rural areas between 2007 (22.6%) and 2012 (31.5%). On the other hand, in urban areas, there was a near-stagnation between 2007 (82.7%) and 2012 (83.3%). Depending on the area of residence, Nzérékoré, Faranah, Kankan and Boké are not well off. There are also problems in terms of access to property. Of the 77.4 percent of households that own their homes, about 32 percent own their homes in urban areas. The rate of renting households remains high, both in Conakry (around 54 percent) and in the other cities of the country (around 55 percent).

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<sup>232</sup>(Ibidem)

Life in the slums is encouraged by a number of facts. First, there is a housing and urbanization policy, but it is not implemented. The second reason is that bank loan conditions are largely out of reach for the average Guinean. The third reason is related to the relatively small number of plots of land that have been serviced and put up for sale by SOLOPRIMO, the company in charge of servicing and selling the plots. The fourth and final reason is that the conditions for the sale of serviced and available plots of land are inaccessible to the overwhelming majority of Guineans, given the low level of income<sup>233</sup>.

Those who have access to comfortable housing in Guinea are senior executives who work for the state, or who have served for the state, large merchants, and the diaspora who also actively participate in the construction of the country to shelter their families from this type of need.

The majority of the others live in medium-sized concessions where sometimes the houses are in a dilapidated state. They are often in the working-class neighborhoods, they are the workers, drivers, hairdressers, small traders, sellers of second-hand clothes and those who exercise the professions etc. Others, such as small civil servants and young people who are looking to build a new life, are found in this setting.

In the transport sector, Guineans face enormous mobility difficulties. Urban and interurban transport in Guinea remains an area where the disparity between rich and poor is still apparent. To improve the mobility of the population, although it remains largely insufficient, a suburban train "Conakry Express" was put into service in 2010 as well as a transport company operating about 100 buses. Motorcycles are the most accessible means of transportation in Conakry.

Private vehicles generally belong to those who are in business, who are seen by the majority as those with purchasing power. When they return from work, some of them often transport people to the roadside to bring them closer to their homes, while others take advantage of the opportunity to find pocket money and fuel for the next day, hoping to make a profit.

At the other end of the social scale, the condition of the peasantry has elements common to all regions of Guinea. This condition is marked by the difficulty of achieving food self-sufficiency. The cyclical indebtedness during the lean periods (between two

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<sup>233</sup>(Op.cit)

harvests), the strong economic dependence on better-off family members living in urban areas. The farmers could well form a social class because of the similarity of their working and living conditions, if they were aware of belonging to the same social group<sup>234</sup>.

However, the pre-eminence of political society over civil society is marked by the fact that the ruling class peacefully decapitates the elites of the subordinate classes by absorbing them into its political class through the parallelism and communication between the hierarchies of the state apparatus and the Party organization, the former being the instrument of the latter. The spirit of the Party and the proof of allegiance to the ruling faction condition all recruitment. Thus, the intellectuals accepted are those who endorse. Through the school apparatus, the agents of the system are reproduced, or more precisely, their qualification-subjection is reproduced<sup>235</sup>.

### **10.3. Inequalities in the Digital Divide**

The digital divide is the disparity in access to computer technologies, particularly the Internet. It concerns inequalities in the use of and access to ICTs such as cell phones, computers, and the Internet<sup>236</sup>.

Digitization introduces a much more protean issue, because, initially focused on the question of differences in the rate of computer equipment, the debate has extended to inequalities in access to the Internet, and even more recently, to inequalities in broadband networks. Moreover, if the discourse on the digital divide was originally limited to OECD countries, it now concerns all countries, adding a new dimension to international inequalities in economic development<sup>237</sup>.

According to Van Dijk, the physical accessibility of information and communication tools such as the Internet and computers is significantly reduced in developed countries, while the digital divide continues to grow in developing countries.

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<sup>234</sup>(Op.cit)

<sup>235</sup>Rivière, C. (1975). Classe et Stratification Sociale en Afrique Noire. *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, 285-314.

<sup>236</sup> Emmanueldabo. (2014, octobre 16). *Les inégalités dans les communications sociales*. Found on Blog action day: <https://emmanueldabo.com/les-inegalites-dans-les-communications-sociales/>

<sup>237</sup>Rallet, A., & Rochelandet, F. (2004). La fracture numérique : une faille sans fondement ? *Réseaux*, 19-54.

In terms of access to skills and access to use, the digital divide is widening. He argues that information skills (the skills needed to search for, select, and process information in computer sources and networks) and strategic skills (the abilities to use these sources as a means to achieve specific goals and the overall goal of improving one's position in society), as aspects of access to skills, are "extremely and unevenly distributed between populations in developing and developed societies." In terms of access to uses, Van Dijk found that people with high levels of education and income tend to use database, spreadsheet, accounting, and presentation applications much more than people with low levels of education and income who favor simple consultations, games, and other entertainment<sup>238</sup>.

Castells further identifies an educational divide, an ethnic divide, an age divide, a family/alone divide, and an ability/disability divide (Castells, 2002). For Wilson (2006), the digital divide has eight aspects: physical access (access to ICT devices), financial access (cost of ICT services relative to annual income), cognitive access (ICT skills), design access (ease of use), content access (availability of relevant online applications and information), production access (ability to produce one's own content), institutional access (availability of institutions enabling access), and political access (access to governing institutions where the rules of the game are written). Wilson links these eight aspects to six demographic dimensions of the digital divide: gender, geography, income, education, occupation, and ethnicity<sup>239</sup>.

According to Van Dijk, structural inequality means that the disconnected class has fewer opportunities in the labor market, fewer educational opportunities, and fewer chances to participate in politics and society [...]. In global network capitalism, the accumulation of economic, political, and cultural capital (in Bourdieu's sense) is shaped by knowledge and computerized information and communication technologies. This results in flexible, networked, and transnational regimes of accumulation that allow for increased profits and minimization of capital turnover. The disconnected and excluded class identified by Van Dijk is poor and deprived of economic, political, and cultural capital, and lacks the benefits, material access, and capabilities to use technological

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<sup>238</sup>Fuchs, C., & Horak, E. (2006). Africa and the digital divide. *Science Direct*, 100-101.

<sup>239</sup>(Ibid.)

capital that shape accumulation processes in global network capitalism (Fuchs 2006b). Most Africans are part of this new class<sup>240</sup>.

It is clear that Africa's much-vaunted entry into the information society is based solely on cell phone penetration figures, which are themselves marked by major disparities between countries. As for other technologies, in particular fixed-line telephones, computers and the Internet, the figures remain particularly low. It is especially with the Internet that the contrast between countries and within countries between social strata and groups is most apparent, notably because of the costs and training problems that make access to computers and the Internet more difficult<sup>241</sup>.

The notion of a gap within developing countries is extremely significant. In the capital city of Conakry and in some provinces of Guinea, the gradual integration of digital technology is being seen mainly by the literate population. However, the lack of access to these materials is a problem. Guinean students often conduct their research using low-capacity telephones and the lack of high-speed Internet is pushing others to invade the Internet. Those who benefit the most are workers and teacher-researchers who purchase high-speed connections and are equipped with their own modems.

However, given that the companies that provide these services nationally, such as Orange, Cellcom and MTN, are foreign companies, it must be concluded that this is a huge loss for the state and the Guinean population. The accessibility to the equipment is posed in a first on the whole territory. In 2013, according to a study conducted by the ITU, Guinea was among the third category of countries in Africa whose percentage of Internet users per hundred inhabitants was barely 1%.

It is not uncommon to find that the concentration of quality Internet connections, access to equipment, and information is in downtown Kaloum, Taouyah, and towards the Corniches where embassies, national and foreign institutions, ministries, etc. are located. The people working there are considered as active users who know how to take advantage of the equipment and software to create content and transform it into a source of income.

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<sup>240</sup>(Ibid.)

<sup>241</sup>Alzouma, G. (2008). Téléphone mobile, Internet et développement : l'Afrique dans la société de l'information ? *Tic&Société*, 30.

In the countryside, rather than computers, smartphones or the internet, the radio is the main source of information. Teachers and some old people prefer national radio to follow the programs in French or in local languages. As for the rural youth, they prefer cheap Chinese cell phones to play music and spend a few minutes on Facebook to see the pictures of their friends and exchange some rare moment according to their means.

Many other citizens do not have any more, even if they were offered as gifts by a family member, the use would be lacking. The information of these people is limited to their environment, i.e., their living environment. Their participation in community life and meetings is limited to physical contact. And we talk about all these inequalities without mentioning the people who suffer from a physical or mental handicap. Beyond the discrimination and social stigma, they face every day, not only does this category have all the difficulties of access to NICTs but they are sometimes victims and reached in their private lives by third party users.

The linguistic and educational barrier is at the origin of two types of communities born from the differential use of ICTs: those who are able to read are able to integrate into virtual networks, to become members of cyber-communities, while this possibility is excluded for illiterates for whom the use of mobile telephony tends rather to recreate or reinforce the already existing traditional sociability networks and community links: families, groups of friends, professional groups and business networks. This is so because those with a certain level of education tend to use e-mails, online discussion forums, in addition to the cell phone (smartphones), while illiterates mainly use the cellphone (op.cit).

It's not uncommon to see the skills of young people in demand, especially in rural areas where owning a smartphone is not just a means of communication, but a real luxury. Observing the behavior of these people from afar, it's easy to deduce that the anxiety felt by those who master this virtual space regarding the disclosure of their information, the theft of their data for example, as well as online blackmail, is bluntly incomparable to the reading that farmers have of these technologies.

In short, in developing countries, it would be salutary for the state to introduce digital technology into their development plans. Initiating teachers to the use of ICT and restoring it as a program in classes and elementary teaching units will prepare future

generations for integration into the digital economy. This integration policy is bound to have a significant impact and will undoubtedly reduce the digital divide between less countries.

## CHAPTER XI: POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND PROFIT EXTRACTION

The politics of interference and profit extraction are themes that are addressed with the idea of examining the operation and strategy that rich countries use to maximize their interests on the continent. Some focus rather on interference to claim the former paternity by guaranteeing the security and decisions of the countries they had colonized such is the case of the Westerners. Others have chosen the race to the wealth of the subsoil and the control of the international trade in the profits are not only enormous, but the flight of the capitals through a process very often illegal where the share of the market of the countries suppliers of these materials is a curve inflected.

### 11.1. Imperialist Policy in Africa

Africa is often described as the continent of the future. Its large size, sparse population, and impressive array of untapped natural and mineral resources - especially uranium, platinum, gas, oil, gold, diamonds, copper, phosphates, bauxites, aluminum, and zinc - have attracted the attention of the world's major powers - not to mention the seabed resources of Africa's coastal regions. Consequently, some strategically important places such as the Cape Route, the Horn of Africa and the Suez Canal are also mentioned in scholarly writings. In the process of launching aggressive searches for control of Africa's resources, African peoples, their cultures, and their glorious struggles to achieve dignity and self-respect in human history are often overlooked<sup>242</sup>.

Africa's relations with the world economy bear the imprint of a growing inequality that the end of the cold war accentuated by adding geopolitics to the register of economic and financial devaluation. States, now dispossessed of whole sections of their sovereignty, have been confronted with forms of external dependence that were thought to have been rendered obsolete by decolonization. The international tutelage of African economies and the tightening of conditionalities in bilateral policies have become a source of growing constraints on the management of public affairs. There are few African states where the exercise of sovereign powers is not seriously undermined on a daily basis<sup>243</sup>.

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<sup>242</sup>Harshé, R. (2019). *Africa In World Affairs: Politics of Imperialism, the Cold War and Globalisation*. London: Routledge.

<sup>243</sup>Bach, D. C. (1998). *Régionalisation, mondialisation et fragmentation en Afrique subsaharienne*. Paris: Karthala.

Globalization, in theory, encompasses multi-level social processes that stimulate the free flow of goods, services, capital, technology, knowledge, information, terror and disease. It has not only compressed space and time but has expanded the areas of cooperation and conflict. The globalization phase has seen several powerful transnational regimes such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and networks of multinational corporations and banks<sup>244</sup>.

Like all other regions of the world, African states are also affected by globalization processes. While facing the challenges of globalization, they are trying to consolidate continental organization such as the African Union (AU) as well as multiple regional organizations to promote inter-state cooperation in Africa. They are also compelled to seek cooperation from traditional neo-colonial powers such as France, imperial powers such as the United States, and emerging powers such as China and India while organizing sustainable development, containing ethno-nationalist movements, and combating the activities of terrorist groups. As a result, virtually all of these powers with their public and private capital are operating in the extractive sectors in Africa. The socio-economic and politico-strategic relations of the continent with these great powers are thus conditioned and constantly shaped by globalization<sup>245</sup>.

From this point of view, the Third World has a hard time deciding on its cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions. These institutions (IMF and the World Bank) are under the control of the conservative American elite and from this angle the Third World is simply excluded from the important decisions within these structures.

The successful capitalist policy of the United State has allowed it to expand its supremacy in the world through an international policy set in the image of its system. As a result, the IMF and the World Bank have limited resources and decision-making power. This subjugates them into global representatives or watchdogs of Washington's interests and actions.

The idea of international monetary regulation has created a structural problem: when the dominant currency in financial relations is the currency of a hegemon, the temptation exists for that hegemon to use its dominant currency to satisfy its own domestic economic

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<sup>244</sup>(Ibid)

<sup>245</sup>(ibid.)

and political needs. Such a hegemon may use its dominant power to flout the rules. In this case, other states have no power to discipline the violating hegemon<sup>246</sup>.

### **11.2. From Discourse to Practice in Foreign Policy: The Imbalance of Power in Relations**

After independence in several African colonies, the looting and exploitation of wealth by imperialist forces left African states fragile, vulnerable to all sorts of manipulation and interference by highly industrialized nations, and multinationals. These aspects left behind a precarious and distorted economy. The economic system of the underdeveloped countries was focused on a narrow export of local products; this less efficient mechanical production gave a less profitable result with an anemic growth rate. The infrastructures left behind were in a defective state because the goal of the colonists was to force African countries to return to them to continue on the path of dependence.

In essence, writes Frederick Cooper, “the development effort of the late colonial regimes never provided the basis for a strong national economy; the economies remained externally oriented, and the economic power of the state remained concentrated on the border between the interior and the exterior<sup>247</sup>.”

These conditions have strained the prospects for building self-sustaining economies that are sufficiently diversified to protect infant industries from the turbulence of global markets. As British socialist Chris Harman has pointed out, "Commercial success in the modern world is only possible if you already have a high level of investment in modern technology. Countries that do not have this are doomed, even if there are no barriers to selling their products in advanced countries<sup>248</sup>.”

The reforms included free trade, removal of non-tariff barriers, free markets, better governance, and political freedom. African countries hated these preconditions, but

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<sup>246</sup>Igwe, I. O. (2018). History of the International Economy: The Bretton Woods System. *Athens Journal of Law*, 105-126.

<sup>247</sup>Cooper, F. (2002). *Africa Since 1940*. New York: Columbia University Press

<sup>248</sup>Harman, C. (2005). The End of Poverty. *Socialist Review*, 297.

changes in the global power structure meant that the only loan sharks they could borrow from set the rules, and there was no real viable alternative<sup>249</sup>.

According to neoclassical realism, industrialized states holding a monopoly on economic policy in the international system are motivated above all by what they see and perceive as their state's interests thanks to the opportunities offered by globalized markets (Olsen, 2017).

The interest of their states above all, which is called good politics in their jargons. The hustle and bustle of the 21st century on the African continent is indeed going in that direction. The current powers, be it the United States, Russia, France, or China, have submerged the economy of African countries through the establishment of multinationals and industries of all kinds, transforming the continent into a veritable profit extraction ground.

The setting in motion of the diplomatic machine through speeches of seduction (soft power) for certain countries like Turkey and China and for others, the speech of former colonists who consider African countries as still being under their protectorate. Communications in the discourse of Western leaders and ambassadors such as France concerning their interests are often imposed through power relations and agreements that exist between African countries having difficulty cutting this chain of linkage that has lasted for decades.

Fearful of destabilization or a possible coup d'état, African heads of state do their utmost to safeguard the interests of these neo-imperialists in their respective countries. On the political level, France has succeeded in establishing a number of economic and military cooperation agreements with the countries of French-speaking Africa to keep them under its control. Sometimes it is the raw materials annexed by certain agreements, on the other hand the maintenance of the countries which need their monetary sovereignty in the CFA zone (Franc of the French colonies of Africa) and worse the agreements of defense which allowed France to install the military bases in several strategic zone on the African continent.

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<sup>249</sup>Magu, S. M. (2021). *Explaining Foreign Policy in Post-Colonial Africa*. Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan.

Since it has several, but these elements quote have been the subject of several criticisms in recent years and see popular uprisings in the recent case of Mali. Although the responsibility is shared from now on, however the servants of these countries who are our heads of states, always at work to protect these French industrial groups, become from now on in the eyes of their population accomplices of all the evil which rages on the continent.

### **11.3. The Strategies of Indebtedness, the Plundering of Resources and their Consequences**

The 21st century is shaping up to be a very difficult one for African countries in terms of economic policy. As if the centuries of colonial exploitation were not enough, the pressure exerted by these powers on African heads of state is making the situation worse. The exorbitant number of poor people are only increasing, the policy of interference that blurs the tracks of development, the armed presence in some countries, the violation of human rights, misery and terrorism, the massive migration of young people are so many aspects that our leaders so far have difficulty to overcome. Why are we having trouble catching up?

First of all, the attainment of political independence of nations was not enough for African states that hoped to find their own way to effective self-sufficiency. The trap set was to make them understand that their aspirations were wrong and that they had to be part of the global system set up to maintain the world order. It must also be said that the subsoil and the human resources do not benefit our countries. The raw materials, whether agricultural products, mining resources or other resources such as fauna and flora, are exported massively at low prices.

That all these gigantic deposits and wealth can be found in one country without its population being happy seems to be a miracle to some, and to others a pure amazement. The abundance of these resources is a gift of nature, yet this wealth is seen as a curse for some.

In practice, as has been seen since the establishment of imperialist countries, extractivism first materialized through investments in missionaries and oil and mining companies. This phenomenon, which has continued for several years, has been aggravated by violent conflicts in developing countries.

The peoples of these Northern countries, already demanding of their governments since the end of World War II, pushed the latter to stratify the countries of the world according to the selection process based on their contributions. The poor countries were condemned to provide the materials to feed the factories that built the economy of the Northern countries, completely devastated after the world wars. This way of managing and moving things forward was a form of governance that is difficult to detect, it is the politics in diplomacy.

They needed gas, oil, minerals such as aluminum, iron, cobalt, etc. Multinationals were quickly installed to facilitate extraction and at the same time to make governments understand that it was in this cooperation that they could pay back their debts but also build infrastructures such as roads, bridges, school sites. The expertise of the representatives called economic advisors has never raised any suspicion. The mentioned recommendations including the economic recovery policy (structural adjustment) have been applied in several countries.

They needed gas, oil, minerals such as aluminum, iron, cobalt etc. The multinationals were quickly installed to facilitate the extraction and at the same time to make the government understand that it is in this cooperation that they would be able to repay their debts but also to build infrastructures such as roads, bridges, school building sites. The expertise of the representatives called economic advisors has never raised any suspicion. The mentioned recommendations including the policy of economic recovery are used by the governments to starve and lime thousands of people.

The first oil production site on the continent was established in 1889. Great Britain obtained the first concession rights to the Nigerian oil site. Companies such as Exxon have been active in Africa for over a century extracting petroleum products. The second half of the 20th century saw reversals in the extractive industries in Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria. More than 50% of Western foreign direct investment to facilitate the exploitation of these resources. The United States had to rush into this race for access to these resources in the regions of Angola, after their European counterparts had already involved Shell, Total, Statoil etc.<sup>250</sup>.

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<sup>250</sup>Lee Wengraf 2018 *Extracting Profit Imperialism, Neoliberalism, and the New Scramble for Africa* p 149-150

Niger, for example, no longer benefits from its uranium deposits exploited by the French multinational Areva, which, beyond the export profits, benefits from 20% of their global interests that escape customs control. However, in France, information reveals that most of the energy sites would be supplied by uranium from this country, which is one of the poorest on the planet.

The other phase of the extractivist process that has been observed in recent years is the export of wealth flows that continue to elude governments and the impact that these companies have had on the environment and on humans. In some areas of Africa where silver and gold deposits are important, trafficking and abuse have resurfaced between rival groups that sometimes seek to control these sites. These groups put forward an ideology of defending their environment, but in reality, they use it as a label to better establish themselves and barter with foreign wealth hunters in the region.

This behavior aggravates the conflicts between the communities which can result in armed conflicts and even the interventionism of foreign armies in these areas to protect the interest of their respective countries. This is the phase of predatory extractivism, as is the case in the Congo for example. The youth of the locality is condemned to poverty, trafficking and even abuse of women and children. With precarious jobs, the labor force is cheap and so the graduates from these countries play the role of facilitators of the process, it is the reflection of utilitarianism, "After us, it's you". The level of study is not valued in most cases, it is the French, Russian, Chinese, or American citizen first.

As for China, it is the country that has established itself more in Africa since 2010. There are more than 10,000 Chinese companies according to a 2018 Forbes article. China not only exploits resources in priceless quantities, privatizes companies unable to repay debts, also uses local labor to relocate its resources. In the DRC Congo the mega contract signed by Sicomines for the extraction of copper and cobalt have not been well tied up according to the Congolese government.

Guinea, despite being the world's second largest bauxite producer, is not able to take advantage of its market share and leverage its sectors to transform its economy. Foreign multinationals often undermine the transparency process by favoring political corruption and subcontracting in the Guinean mining sector. If the conventions signed with multinationals are not published to know what the country gains or losses in the

cooperation, it means that there is a problem of corruption or complexity of our leaders in front of these foreign partners. You don't need to be an economist to know this. The repatriation of profits and the absence of reparations on the population and the environment, in the long term will make our countries more fragile than they are nowadays.

China and Russia, which are active in the Guinean mining sector, undervalue the local workforce. Those who do work often complain of poor treatment and inadequate pay. China in particular has become involved in the trade sector in Guinea. The massive import of Chinese products and the counterfeiting of our cultural products such as traditional Guinean textiles contribute to a double loss. Even though the Chinese are less present, their influence is becoming more and more noticeable through debt-for-equity swaps.

Liberalization, privatization, and the granting of huge debts at low interest rates are the seductive operations that have opened up opportunities for China in African countries and China is not ready to deteriorate this relationship on the continent.

China is said to have confiscated Uganda's airport due to non-payment of its debts. Although the information is refuted by authorities on both sides, it is not an option to be ignored. Guinea's structural adjustment policy should serve as a lesson. The inability to pay employees, to invest and to meet the needs of the population pushes the government into debt, but once you are unable to pay the debt you are forced to give up resources or privatize enterprises. These debt-for-equity swaps hinder development and cause crises and resource transfers.

The analysis report published by Global Justice Now, states that the resources of the African continent benefit the rest of the world more than Africans themselves. In 2015 alone, more than \$203 billion was diverted from the continent and reinjected in the form of grants amounting to \$162 billion in the same period, posing as key players in African development. The amounts diverted are either directly or through multinational companies that fraudulently transfer profits to offshore accounts.

The Honest Account report indicates that Africa loses \$41.3 billion through this type of trafficking in 47 African countries. The illicit figures amount to \$68 billion a year, three times more than the \$19 billion in aid the continent receives.

Factors that contribute to maintain this trend are the unfair payment of debts and the lack of transparency of multinationals that hide their wealth and profits through tax evasion and political corruption. African governments received \$32 billion in loans in 2015 but paid more than half of that - \$18 billion - in interest on the debt, with debt levels rising rapidly.

The argument that rich country leaders say they want to provide aid to Africa is just "distraction and deception." Until proven otherwise, what African's need is a solid technical transfer and an end to systematic political and economic looting.

The denial of the exporting companies to recognize their damage and the non-defense of the countries supplying the raw materials support conflicts at all levels. It is a degraded and abandoned environment in the middle of nowhere, it is sick animals, it is poverty and generalized conflicts, misery.

It should also be noted that the enormous profits from this extraction are only beneficial to a minority of people who fraudulently register their own support companies with these multinationals, which bring them millions of francs that are not taxed by the State. They consolidate their relationships with government officials and become their protected. They are called the untouchables, their influence is also great in the companies not only in the eyes of foreigners, but also in the eyes of nationals who take them for exceptional people. They invest more often in other countries of the sub-region and their business remains anonymous to protect their wealth in case of a change of regime which can happen in any circumstances. These practices persist and are gradually degrading the image of the state among citizens. The lack of liquidity and the absence of financing in sensitive and essential sectors such as energy, hydrocarbons, water and food accentuate the violence and give greater scope to social movements, which are the population's main means of expressing its grievances and distress.

Predatory extractivism also contributes to the inequality of wealth distribution. This is often the case in rural areas where the rate of ignorance and illiteracy is truly extreme. People who join together to defend their environment in the form of associations or non-governmental organizations are quickly challenged or intimidated. They are accused of inciting violence by politicians who do not care about their living conditions.

Nowadays, with the change of regimes and the return of migratory flows to their countries of origin, there is a change of mentality on the national level. A majority of people are beginning to curb some of these practices and to impose on companies the respect of certain regulations in order to not only protect certain resources, but also to insist that collateral damage be repaired.

This is the case in Guinea, where the military government is insisting on the construction of refineries to facilitate the transformation of materials into finished products, but the country has been able to impose its own price on these extractive companies. There are changes at all levels, but much remains to be done to repair this delay of more than a half century.

How can we explain the failure of this cooperation?

African countries maintain cooperative relations with several countries in the world, these partnerships should actually contribute to a better integration of these countries in the globalization. Unfortunately, the international political system adopted by these countries seeks to maintain African countries in these two blocks since the cold war.

In this ambiguous system of relations with these industrialized and better integrated countries, they take better advantage of the machinery and have the means to implement their policies. The flow of capital out and the accumulated profits favor their investment and transform the poor countries into creditors, so that the wheel turns. The pressure exerted by the debtor to adopt its development policy does not conform to the socio-cultural reality of Africans.

Democracy has been imposed for more than half a century and has brought nothing but crisis and instability to the continent. The African leaders who sought to solve the problem were assassinated at some point to make way for a corrupt generation that seeks its share of the cake in its development loans. Except Botswana, which has been able to combine democracy with traditional laws. And the country has recorded exceptional growth on the continent by making good use of their resources.

The intellectuals who are supposed to take over, sometimes flee the repression of crooked politicians or are often in entrepreneurship, the private sector, and personal projects to prepare for a better retirement and a gracious future in north countries.

While things should not continue to be seen as threats every time, knowing how to examine the state of affairs and improve the shortcomings could be a good start. We live in an era of hegemony in which countries with the means of their policies use the right tools to maintain their influence, either through soft power or intimidation. Through donations, media, NGOs, and multinationals accredited in poor countries, they seek to legitimize this influence by letting us believe that all these relationships are good cooperative business.

The need for income and the opportunities offered in these countries should not prevent intellectuals from finding solutions for the progress of their countries. Integration into political life and participation in decision making - the application of the required knowledge and the establishment of the necessary technical capacities to boost growth sectors will undoubtedly improve the economy. Consensus diplomacy to cancel the debts of African countries as compensation for collateral damage can bring about positive change.

## **CHAPTER XII: PRESENTATION OF RESULTS**

The results are presented in two phases depending on the method chosen. In the first phase, the quantitative data are explained and tabulated through Spss, and the data are interpreted in the second phase followed by the conclusion.

### **Phase 1: Quantitative Data**

In this phase, as planned, 350 questionnaires were submitted to the respondents through surveys conducted in the field in the different communes of the capital. The particularity is that we felt that this is the place where we can find available informants who will be able to provide us with rich answers about the protests. The population of Conakry, in our opinion, is suitable for this study for the simple reason that the results provided after the study can be generalized to the population. The actors are frequent in the communes and numerous movements in support of political ideologies as mentioned in the theoretical part of this thesis as well as the concentration of institutions of power makes the area an appropriate place for the investigation. That is, the fact that the demonstrations are concentrated in the capital and that the actors who seek to renegotiate power relations are numerous there as well, can allow us to take advantage of this research through what we consider to be a reasonable sample.

### **12.1. PRESENTATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS**

#### **a. Socio-Demographic profile of informants**

The profile of the respondents is the set of socio-demographic characteristics of the people in our sample. In this study, the following elements were considered: Gender, Age, Educational level, marital status, religious affiliation, Economic activity, Socio-professional category, and social status. These selection criteria excluded other categories because of operational constraints (risks) and the high cost of collection. These are disabled people, people with mental imbalance problems and young people in the suburbs (the outskirts of the city).

**Table 1.** Gender participation in the survey

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid percentage	Cumulative percentage
Valid	Male	202	57,7	57,7	57,7
	Female	148	42,3	42,3	100,0
	Total	350	100,0	100,0	

In the first series of questions related to the socio-demographic situation of our respondents, the first table of our sample shows that the majority of informants are male (202) individuals, i.e., 57.7%. While women are slightly more than half, i.e., 148 people, 42.3% of our population.

**Table 2.** The age of participants according to the African Youth Charter. There may be slight differences from country to country.

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid percentage	Cumulative percentage
Valid	Under 18 years old	17	4,9	4,9	4,9
	18-35 years old	276	78,9	78,9	83,7
	35-55 years old	48	13,7	13,7	97,4
	Over 55 years old	9	2,6	2,6	100,0
	Total	350	100,0	100,0	

The question about age explains that people under the age of 18 were included in the survey, with a representation rate of 4.9%, or 17 people. However, young people are overrepresented according to the figures, which is not surprising when we see the overall percentage compared to the extreme youth of the Guinean population. So, they make up more than 83% of our cumulative percentage, or 276 people in this age group. The third category is more modest in number, in the African charter it is the cycle that directly follows extreme old age. There are 48 people in total, or 13.7% of the total sample. Finally, 9 respondents are over 55 years old, which corresponds to just 2.6% of our target population.

**Table 3.** Comparison of informants' gender and level of education

			Education level of participants					Total
			Without level	Primary school	Secondary school	Vocational school	University	
Gender of participants	Male	Number	31	10	59	20	82	202
		%	15,3%	5,0%	29,2%	9,9%	40,6%	100,0%
	Female	Effectif	54	15	38	13	28	148
		%	36,5%	10,1%	25,7%	8,8%	18,9%	100,0%
Total	Number	85	25	97	33	110	350	
		%	24,3%	7,1%	27,7%	9,4%	31,4%	100,0%

The analysis of the question in relation to the level of education according to the gender of the respondents shows that many of the people who answered this question have a university level (31.4%), i.e., 110 people, including 28 girls. They are followed by a significant number of people who have only secondary education. The percentage is 27.7% for a total of 97 individuals including 38 girls. The third group are people who can neither read nor write and they are moderately represented (24.3%), i.e., 85 people in total, 54 of whom are women. They are followed by the tradesmen who accumulate 33 people including 13 girls. Finally, only 25 respondents among our informants have the primary level, whose valid percentage is 7.1%, including 15 girls.

In this table the P-value = 0.000 < 0.05. Thus, we can conclude the existence of a strong significance between gender and education level. Although there is a strong significance between these two variables, their associations are however medium because the V- Cramer = 0.303.

**Table 4.** Comparison of informants' gender and marital status

		Civil status of respondents						Total	
		Single	Free Union	Monogamy	Polygamy	Divorced	Widower		
Gender of participants	Male	Number	138	12	34	17	1	0	202
		%	68,3%	5,9%	16,8%	8,4%	0,5%	0,0%	100,0%
	Female	Number	72	9	33	31	2	1	148
		%	48,6%	6,1%	22,3%	20,9%	1,4%	0,7%	100,0%
Total	Number	210	21	67	48	3	1	350	
	%	60,0%	6,0%	19,1%	13,7%	0,9%	0,3%	100,0%	

The next question related to the civil status of the respondents was cross tabulated with gender to determine the situation between the sexes. The table shows that 138 men and 72 women are single, i.e., 60% of the respondents. They are followed by monogamous brides, 34 men and 33 women, or 19.1% of the sample. The number of polygamous marriages among women is 31, compared to 17 among men, i.e., 13.7% of our surveyed population.

The logic behind this is that polygamy is accepted in our societies. Normally the opposite would be frowned upon, since polyandry does not reflect our societal values and we can only speak of co-wives among women. The rest of the figure is broken down into 12 men and 9 women living in common-law relationships, i.e., 6% of the respondents. Common-law unions are a form of marriage sometimes due to a lack of means. The people who accept this form of life do so hoping to make their union legal in the future.

1 man and 2 women who are divorced are among the informants and only one widow, that is 1% of the sample. So, we can conclude that there is an association between these two variables  $P\text{-value} = 0.002$ .

**Table 5.** The table shows the religions practiced by the informants and their percentages.

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	Muslim	259	74,0	74,0	74,0
	Christian	87	24,9	24,9	98,9
	Animist	1	,3	,3	99,1
	Atheist	3	,9	,9	100,0
	Total	350	100,0	100,0	

The table concerning the religious confession highlights the existence of a Muslim majority among the respondents. There are a total of 259 individuals or 74%. They are followed by Christians (24%), who are numerically represented compared to the others, of whom only 3 people affirm their disbelief and only 1 animist who closes the table.

The next question asked the respondents to provide information on their economic situation in relation to their socio-professional categories. In order to better understand the answers on this aspect, we have put in relations with the help of a cross table these different elements whose only constancy was their professions.

**Table 6.** Indication of types of activity and salaries by sector

Salary in \$ <sup>251</sup>			Type of Trade					Total	
			Liberal Profession	Trade	Private Sector	Public Sector	House work		Other
No income	Job	NO						45	45
	Total							45	45
Less than 50\$	Job	YES	33	34	13		3	8	91
		NO	0	0	0		0	7	7
	Total		33	34	13		3	15	98
50\$-100\$	Job	YES	20	24	19	4	2	2	71
		NO	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	Total		20	24	19	4	2	3	72
100\$ - 250\$	Job	YES	4	9	9	18			40
	Total		4	9	9	18			40
250\$ - 500\$	Job	YES	3	2	2	2			9
	Total		3	2	2	2			9
More than 500\$	Job	YES	1		2				3
	Total		1		2				3
No response	Job	YES	1	2				0	3
		NO	0	0				80	80
	Total		1	2				80	83
Total	Job	YES	62	71	45	24	5	10	217
		NO	0	0	0	0	0	133	133
	Total		62	71	45	24	5	143	350

The variables that are crossed here are employment, salary, and occupation. To make a small remark, we must start with the number of people who have no income (45), that is to say a rate of 12.9%. 17.7% of the people surveyed have various activities, i.e., they do

<sup>251</sup> 50\$=500.000Gnf is an estimate of the dollar exchange cost which may vary depending on the market and the inflation rate.

not have a stable job, this is the category of liberal profession. Of the 62 people surveyed, 33 have a salary of less than \$50; 20 have a salary of between \$50 and \$100, 4 have a salary of between \$100 and \$250, 3 of them are better paid with salaries of between \$250 and \$500, only one person claims to receive more than \$500, while 1 other did not answer the question.

20.3% or 71 people are in the commercial sector. In this sector 34 people earn less than \$50 per month, 24 people earn between \$50 and \$100, 9 people are in the 3rd category, i.e., \$100 to \$250, 2 respondents are between \$250 and \$500 and 2 others working in this sector did not provide answers on their salaries.

The respondents working in the private sector include 13 employees with less than \$50 per month, 19 people with an amount between \$50 and \$100, 9 people with an amount between \$100 and \$250, and 2 people in the 4th category with a salary of \$250 to \$500, i.e., 12.9% of the target population. In the public sector there are 24 informants or 6.9% of which 4 people have a salary between \$50 and \$100, 18 are between \$100 and \$250 and 2 have a salary of \$250 to \$500 per month.

The respondents practicing the domestic work trade are 5 people in total, 3 of whom have a salary of less than \$50 and 2 are in the 2nd salary category.

In the last column "Other" 45 respondents have neither job nor income. 8 people whose monthly income is less than \$50 did not specify their job. Two others also earn between \$50 and \$100, and their occupation is also unknown. 7 informants earn less than \$50 but do not have a job. The same is true for 2 individuals who earn between \$50-\$100 per month without a job. 80 people who did not respond have neither income nor a job, so the number of people who do not have a job is 133 in all, or 38% of the informants.

**Table 7.** Zone frequentation in relation to informant activity

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid percentage	Cumulative percentage
Valid	No response	133	38,0	38,0	38,0
	Rural area	57	16,3	16,3	54,3
	Urban	134	38,3	38,3	92,6
	Mixed	26	7,4	7,4	100,0
	Total	350	100,0	100,0	

With regard to the work environment, 134 of our informants carry out their activities in urban areas, 38.3% of them, compared to 16.3% in rural areas. The people who wander between urban and rural areas are few, 26 in all or 7.4%. Others did not answer the question. Most of them are unemployed, with a total score of 38%.

**Table 8.** Social status of respondents

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid percentage	Cumulative percentage
Valid	Imam / Priest	1	,3	,3	,3
	Elder / Notable	2	,6	,6	,9
	Local elected official	1	,3	,3	1,1
	Leader	12	3,4	3,4	4,6
	Ordinary citizen	334	95,4	95,4	100,0
	Total	350	100,0	100,0	

What emerges from the table concerning the social status of the informants proves sufficiently that the quantitative data were largely collected from ordinary citizens, who represent 95.4% or 334 respondents in all. The leaders are 12 respondents (3.4%), the wise men (2), and then only 1 local elected official and 1 man of faith participated according to the table.

**b. Knowledge about the causes of the Emergence of Protests**

**Table 9.** Minority membership \* Participation in protests

			Participation in protests		
			YES	NO	Total
Minority Membership	YES	Number	16	78	94
		%	17,0%	83,0%	100,0%
	NO	Number	76	180	256
		%	29,7%	70,3%	100,0%
Total	Number	92	258	350	
	%	26,3%	73,7%	100,0%	

The cross-tabulation of ethnic minority membership and participation in demonstrations shows a weak relationship between the two variables. 94 people answered that they felt they belonged to a minority while 256 individuals, or 73.1%, said they belonged to a community majority. However, there is a tendency for the numbers to decrease rapidly when asked about their participation in protests. Out of 100% of the informants, only 26.3% or 92 people said they had participated in social movements, while the majority 258 said they had never demonstrated (73.7%). The P-value = 0.017 > 0.05 so we can conclude that the significance is low because belonging to the majority did not necessarily mean participation in the protest.

**Table 10.** Number of participations in protests \* Number of years in the protests

Number of Participation	Number of participation in Social Movement						Total
	Never	Less than 1 ans	1-3 years	3-6 years	More than 6 years	No response	
0	85	0	0	0	0	1	86
1-5 times	0	21	35	14	6	0	76
5-10 times	0	2	4	4	2	0	12
More than 10	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
No response	1	0	0	0	5	168	174
Total	86	23	39	18	15	169	350

The measure on the number of participation and involvement of the respondents in the event was respectively answered as follows: the people who participated in the events 1-5 times are 76 or 21.7%. 21 of these people have been involved for less than 1 year, 35 claim to have an experience ranging from 1 to 3 years, 14 also are between 3 to 6 years, and only 6 have an involvement duration of more than 6 years.

In the same order, they are followed by the second category that have participated 5 to 10 times, with a total of 12 individuals or 3.4%. Those who participated more than 10 times in the events are only 2 informants and their experience goes beyond 6 years. In the last part it was necessary to skip the question if you had never participated in a demonstration, but others preferred to write never, and they are 86 people or 24.6%. If we add to this number the number of non-respondents, i.e., 169 informants, it gives 255 people or 72% of our informants. 1 person answered this question even though he did not report his participation in the event in Table 9. The P-value = 0.000 < 0.05.

**Table 11.** Activist of a political party \* Active in which commune as Activists

		Active in which commune as activists							
		No response	Matoto	Ratoma	Dixinn	Matam	Kaloum	Total	
Activism	No response	Number	3	41	32	29	15	23	143
			2,1%	28,7%	22,4%	20,3%	10,5%	16,1%	100,0%
	Ruling party	Number	0	23	11	6	9	13	62
			0,0%	37,1%	17,7%	9,7%	14,5%	21,0%	100,0%
	Opposition	Number	0	22	34	4	5	6	71
			0,0%	31,0%	47,9%	5,6%	7,0%	8,5%	100,0%
	Civil Society	Number	0	21	18	8	12	15	74
			0,0%	28,4%	24,3%	10,8%	16,2%	20,3%	100,0%
	Total	Number	3	107	95	47	41	57	350
			0,9%	30,6%	27,1%	13,4%	11,7%	16,3%	100,0%

On questions related to activism and the communes in which they were most active in events consistent with their political choices, more reticence was observed in the responses. In the commune of Matoto, out of 107 activists, 41 did not answer this question, 23 respondents said they were from the political party, 22 from the opposition and 21 people chose civil society as their answer. In Ratoma, out of 95 informants, 32 abstained from answering the question, 11 informants were from the political party, 34 from the opposition and 18 from civil society. In the other communes, they represent

respectively 45.2% of activists for the movement, 21.1% for the opposition and 47.3% for civil society.

**Table 12.** Use of Media

	Frequency	Percentage	Valid percentage	Cumulative Percentage
No answer	236	67,4	67,4	67,4
Traditional media (Radio, newspapers, TV)	1	,3	,3	67,7
Social networks (Facebook, WhatsApp etc.)	113	32,3	32,3	100,0
Total	350	100,0	100,0	

A simple univariate presentation was used to find out how many informants were using the media as a tool for political mobilization and communication. Of our 350 informants, less than half (32.3%) reported using social media to express their political views. However, only 1 person claimed to use traditional media for the same purpose.

**Table 13.** Meaning of Participation in a Protest

	Observations					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
Means Nothing	43	12,3%	307	87,7%	350	100,0%
Politics	190	54,3%	160	45,7%	350	100,0%
Patriotism	127	36,3%	223	63,7%	350	100,0%
Regionalism	13	3,7%	337	96,3%	350	100,0%
Ethnocentrism	40	11,4%	310	88,6%	350	100,0%
Other reason	23	6,6%	327	93,4%	350	100,0%

We submitted multiple-choice questions to informants to find out whether participation in a social movement was meaningful to them. Among the answers provided, 190 informants felt that taking part in a demonstration had above all a political meaning.

Political because demonstrations are recurrent when opposition and ruling parties are at odds. The opposition, made up of republican parties, uses street demonstrations as a means of exerting pressure. However, the ethnic facet of the issue transforms the face of the movement. From the majority left, we end up in a politico-ethnic demonstration and a media shuffle where everyone tries to make clear the non-legitimacy of the existence of the opposing group.

127 informants from the same sample felt that it was the feeling of patriotism that animated the demonstrators. This feeling of patriotism must be treated with caution. The reason is that the manifestation of patriotism in Guinea appears only when the population feels it is facing a situation of interference or, in rare cases, facing the State in circumstances of extreme crisis. The demonstrations on Route le Prince are hardly considered a patriotic movement, for the simple reason that every time we talk about demonstrations, it's Route le Prince, it's Ratoma, it's the Fulani. During the last 15 years of demonstrations, almost all the victims have been people with Fulani names in Guinea.

So, the report published and the fact that the victims bear the names of the Fulani ethnic group, which is the majority ethnic group in Ratoma, also considered to be the main opponent's stronghold, deduces ethnic violence. But these moments of instability are in fact seen as a political opportunity to balance the balance of power, which is not an obvious expression, since no one has the right to brandish the victims as the flag of victory at the risk of being abandoned.

Regionalism and ethnocentrism were signified by 3.7% and 11.4% respectively. A sense of regionalism in demonstrations in Conakry, which is the hotbed of tensions, cannot really be explained for the simple reason that politics and ethnicity take precedence over regionalist considerations. It's true that each region is inhabited by a majority group, but there are no conflicts of authority at regional level. State civil servants and administrative staff are generally transferred to other regions from which they do not

originate. However, as part of their administrative functions, they contribute to the development of the locality and are accountable in the event of unrest or poor governance.

Ethnic struggles may have the development of their region as a secondary objective. They can only succeed when the person to whom they have entrusted their political destiny comes to power. The fulfillment of promises made by this person is also a dependent factor.

The rest of the respondents who didn't attach any meaning to the demonstrations are informants who think that those who go out to demonstrate do so to assuage their grievances. They may also be young people looking for material opportunities (stolen phones, laptops, money, food supplies). They are often homeless, and considering that they have no clear situation, the only time they can really find themselves with considerable sums of money is during unstable times.

**Table 14.** Reasons of the protests

	Observations					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
Justice-Democracy	238	68,0%	112	32,0%	350	100,0%
Water-Electricity	158	45,1%	192	54,9%	350	100,0%
Employment-Nepotism	200	57,1%	150	42,9%	350	100,0%
Economy-Inequality	112	32,0%	238	68,0%	350	100,0%
Foodstuff	111	31,7%	239	68,3%	350	100,0%
Others	0	0,0%	350	100,0%	350	100,0%

According to the data, 68% of respondents believe that the lack of justice and democracy is the cause of protests in Guinea. 45.1% of the same population identified the problems of water and electricity, and 57.1% were also interested in employment and nepotism. With respect to the economy and inequality, the frequency of responses was 112, and finally, informants did not exclude food as one of the main reasons for the social movements. The frequency of response is 31.7%.

As explained throughout this work, this category of responses alludes to the presence of economic and political crisis. Economically, when the State is incapable of setting up a strong institution capable of meeting the indispensable needs of its citizens, and politically, when the image of members of the government is poorly perceived in relation to their track record in managing public affairs. Demonstrations that arise for these reasons involve the entire population. It's like the strikes of 2007.

Strikes over water and electricity are not very common. What's special about them is that they seem effeminate. The rule is simple: when the problem is solved, everyone goes home; when it's not, citizens set up small barricades to cut off secondary roads. These strikes take place within neighborhoods and, on rare occasions, in inland regions.

The same applies to employment, which is directly linked to the favoritism from which some people benefit to others. The particularity is that educated people who are victims of long-term unemployment are often opinion-makers who join opposition parties or small groups, transforming their status from unemployed to politician or activist.

Guineans don't protest about cultural inequality, such as unequal access to education and training. Income inequality is the most striking because of its directly visible impact on the household. For this reason, it is most keenly felt in times of economic crisis.

Other inequalities, such as the stigmatization of people with reduced mobility and albinos, and gender equity, do not enjoy much support from civil society, even if their lines are taken into account. Perhaps we need to reach the next phase of the democracy process to be able to integrate all these other categories so that they can benefit from the positive spin-offs of government policy.

The food issue is a preoccupation in Guinea, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock has the support of the government and its partners to reinforce food security throughout the country. It is not mentioned separately as a situation in its own right, but

is confused by citizens with income inequality and the economic crisis. It's not as if we're diagnosing how to grow a particular crop variety and import less rice from Asian countries.

In short, a good Guinean needs to eat rice, even three times a day. The absence of a bag of rice at home is one of the warning signs that the country's economy is not strong enough to meet demand.

The bag of rice isn't just food, just like bread in many countries, it's a symbol, it reassures citizens and sometimes, even when they're short of money for other items on the menu, women can go out into the gardens to pick or borrow condiments. That's how poor households should be perceived.

**Table 15.** Level of mobilization \* Results of the protests

			Results of protests					Total
			No rating	Very satisfied	Satisfied	More or less satisfied	Not satisfied	
Level of mobilization	No rating	Effectif	1	0	0	0	0	1
		%	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	100,0%
	Very satisfied	Effectif	0	0	7	6	8	21
		%	0,0%	0,0%	33,3%	28,6%	38,1%	100,0%
	Satisfied	Effectif	0	2	30	37	127	196
		%	0,0%	1,0%	15,3%	18,9%	64,8%	100,0%
	More or less satisfied	Effectif	2	0	6	9	84	101
		%	2,0%	0,0%	5,9%	8,9%	83,2%	100,0%
	Not satisfied	Effectif	0	0	2	1	28	31
		%	0,0%	0,0%	6,5%	3,2%	90,3%	100,0%
	Total	Effectif	3	2	45	53	247	350
		%	0,9%	0,6%	12,9%	15,1%	70,6%	100,0%

The level of mobilization and expected outcomes after the events are cross tabulated in this table. In the first row on the x-axis, 1 person did not give an assessment. 21 informants said they were very satisfied with the level of mobilization, 196 were satisfied, 101 people were more or less satisfied, 31 were not satisfied. On the ordinate axis, 3 people did not give an assessment of the results, however 2 people were very satisfied, 45 informants were satisfied, 53 were more or less satisfied and the majority of respondents, i.e., 247 people, were not satisfied.

**c. Information on the fear and mistrust of citizens during demonstrations**

**Table 16.** Stay at home \* Attacked during the protests

			Attacked during the protests			
			No response	YES	NO	Total
Stayed at home during the protests	YES	Number	1	22	191	214
		%	0,5%	10,3%	89,3%	100,0%
	NO	Number	0	34	102	136
		%	0,0%	25,0%	75,0%	100,0%
Total	Number	1	56	293	350	
	%	0,3%	16,0%	83,7%	100,0%	

The presentation of the results on the last part shows that during social movements, a significant number of our informants stay at home. They are 214 individuals or 61.1%. On the other hand, others prefer to continue their activities despite the risks, representing 38.9% of the total sample. The vertical reading shows that 293 informants were not attacked during the demonstrations, but 56 others from the parent population said they had been attacked. One person did not answer either question. It can be concluded that staying home decreased the risk of being attacked.  $P\text{-value} = 0.001 < 0.005$ .

**Table 17.** The place of attack

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid e	No rating	296	84,6	84,6	84,6
	House	13	3,7	3,7	88,3
	Work	2	,6	,6	88,9
	School	7	2,0	2,0	90,9
	In the street	32	9,1	9,1	100,0
	Total	350	100,0	100,0	

The assessment of this question shows that out of the 56 people who stated that they were attacked in the previous table, 32 informants were attacked on the street, 13 at home, 7 of them were attacked at school and only 2 ticked their place of work. It is important to note that 2 people did not specify the places where they were attacked. They were then added to the people who did not answer the question.

**Table 18.** Summary of the observation on the reasons of attack

	Observations					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ethnic	183	52,3%	167	47,7%	350	100,0%
Political	230	65,7%	120	34,3%	350	100,0%
Theft	102	29,1%	248	70,9%	350	100,0%
Revenge	109	31,1%	241	68,9%	350	100,0%
Murder	36	10,3%	314	89,7%	350	100,0%
Other	35	10,0%	315	90,0%	350	100,0%

The table above measures the opinion of informants on the reasons why some people attacked other citizens during unstable periods. The frequency of responses shows that 65%.7% of the respondents put political reasons on the first place, followed gradually by

ethnic reason mentioned by 52.3% of the informants, then 109 people also emphasized revenge, 29.1% mentioned theft. As for murder, 10.3%, or 36 people in the same sample, said that the intention to harm another person's life was one of the reasons for the attack. Those who attack are also motivated by other reasons, according to 10% of respondents.

Most of them were trained as bureaucrats or technocrats, and the absence of any real program or project has led many of them to play on the ethnic fiber to increase their chances of election. There is a shortage of political resources in Guinea. The post-election period is transformed into violence between rival ethnic groups. The attacks can be explained not only by the hatred that people develop over years of confrontation, but also by political communication, which is not conducive to calming the situation on either side.

The way people look at and judge their fellow human beings stems from the messages their leaders transmit through communication channels. It's when everyone cares about development that the construction of a true state makes sense. However, if the aim is to compete for power and resources, conflicts will never cease.

Many shopkeepers lose their belongings during the violence. These losses are caused by security forces, soldiers or people they sometimes know. They are filmed by telephones and kept or published. It's all about opportunity. Victims can also prepare themselves accordingly to avenge these losses, which are not limited to material goods.

Conditions were created for tensions to boil over into targeted assassinations. The Fulani feel frustrated by their losses. And on social networks, some are calling for civil war or jihad. Guinea is one of the countries at risk of high-level conflict. So far, some are wondering how the country has managed to avoid the predilection for genocide. Some analysts point to mixed marriages, culture and the strong presence of Islam, which preaches peace and tolerance through its preachers. In the south, too, there are non-aggression pacts, which are the reasons that prevent these conflicts from turning into inter-ethnic wars.

**Table 19.** Frequent acts during protests

	Observations					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Murder	77	22,0%	273	78,0%	350	100,0%
Theft	208	59,4%	142	40,6%	350	100,0%
Rape	30	8,6%	320	91,4%	350	100,0%
Barricade	210	60,0%	140	40,0%	350	100,0%
Violence	184	52,6%	166	47,4%	350	100,0%
Destruction of public property	196	56,0%	154	44,0%	350	100,0%
Other	14	4,0%	336	96,0%	350	100,0%

The question asked to the informants regarding the frequent acts during the protests places the barricades as the first thing that is noticed. Sixty percent of the respondents admitted this. In terms of frequency of responses, this act is directly followed by theft, 59.4%, then comes the destruction of public property, 56%, or 196 respondents. The act of violence also makes a little more than half of the opinion (52.6%), followed by murders 22% and the cases of rape are mentioned by 8.6%. 14 informants think that there would probably be other acts not mentioned in the multiple choice.

**Table 20.** Neighborhood during the protests

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	Good	283	80,9	80,9	80,9
	Neutral	14	4,0	4,0	84,9
	Bad	53	15,1	15,1	100,0
	Total	350	100,0	100,0	

Among the people who answered the question 283 say that they have a good relationship with their neighbors or 80.9%. For others the relationship is less good during this period, they are just 4% of the respondents and at the bottom of the table 53 people representing 15.1% say that their neighborhood is not good at all.

**Table 21.** The Fear of Social Movements

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	YES	263	75,1	75,1	75,1
	NO	86	24,6	24,6	99,7
	No response	1	,3	,3	100,0
	Total	350	100,0	100,0	

In the last table that examines fear of social protests, the vast majority of informants say they fear social movements, 75.1% versus 24.6% of respondents who do not fear protests. Only one individual did not answer the question.

## **12.2. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

### **Phase II. Analysis of Quantitative Data**

#### **12.3. Education and the social perception of gender**

The surveys that are carried out in countries with high illiteracy rates know the active participation of men in most cases. There are many reasons for this, but the social reality in some societies and the social barriers coming from these cultures often put a kind of pressure on the female layer. Their representations are less noticed in the field of science even if the global sex-ratio is favorable to them in some countries such as Guinea. The inferiority complex, school dropout, marriage and other factors make their intellectual and academic contributions modest.

Research on education in Guinea shows that both sexes are enrolled at the outset. That is, in elementary school, the number of boys and girls is roughly balanced. However, as they grow older, social and cultural factors weigh heavily on the female gender. Inequality in relationships still persists, and these data remain unchanged despite some small statistical improvements that set some women apart. They are as present and distinguished by their intelligence and work in different fields where men still hold the monopoly and the chance to succeed.

The stereotype in the functions or in the professional orientation already accumulate some selective criteria that make women believe, for example, that mathematics would not be their field. The ease of communication and their ability to be flexible send many to the faculty of journalism, medicine or otherwise in the reception and reservation services.

In a normal situation, no profession or occupation should be seen as such, because it's a means of self-fulfillment, an activity linked to the individual skills of each person according to their devolution and the ease with which they apply them. However, the consideration of identity linked to function has included the variable of gender. As a result, social and cultural representations have ended up giving a mentally constructed image that privileges or assigns one or the other to a profession that best suits them.

This representation has a major influence on people's choices and behavior. A woman who has lived in a village for years can only be an essential element in passing on this heritage. In other words, in African societies where traditional structures are solid, roles

are not just simple executions. They're full of meaning, symbolism and the importance that the subject himself gives to the role on which he's aware of his dependence.

These analyses can reflect all its values in restricted communities. In post-modern societies, the reflection on identity becomes more complex because of the diversity of choices that individuals themselves tend to take control of. Today, there are men who have a strong preference for women's professions, and women who are invested in men's professions. Even beyond the trades themselves, there are gender preference tendencies that lead some people to perform breast and genital implants.

#### **12.4. Employability and outsourcing of the workforce**

In table six (6), the wage and the number of unemployed persons is the main focus of attention. An inspection of the data highlights the issue of employability above all. Out of a total of 350 people, 133 are unemployed. Given the number of informants who work in the professions and trade, we can deduce that the number of people who work for the state (24) is low.

One of the symbols of poor governance, the other particularity of Guinea is the high rate of unemployment. The educated population with a minimum level of education is mostly unemployed. A symbol of poor governance, the other particularity of Guinea is the high rate of unemployment. The educated population with a minimum level of education is mostly unemployed. Investment in human capital is relatively low. Many young Guineans lack the courage to continue their studies, although some parents make an effort with their meager financial means to invest in their education. The overall weak macroeconomic context does not provide opportunities for young people, while the number of employed people is declining.

Due to the lack of jobs, others take up manufacturing and small income-generating activities over the years. The informal sector, where the underemployment rate is estimated at 76%, is not exactly an environment that facilitates short-term success. Wages are very low and people lack adequate facilities to grow their businesses. Although there are places to train people who want to become entrepreneurs, they are sometimes faced with financial problems that are considered an obstacle to the success of their projects. The financing agencies set up by the State define their own selection criteria which already eliminate a large part of these people.

This can be explained too by the lack of post-school training (internship, private training) and the lack of financial means that should allow them to have their autonomy by making their own choices without being subjected to the criteria of a third party.

The fact that these activities were not the initial project of some young people also influences their motivations in the professional sector. The initial project of most of these people was to become an executive, a professional worker, a master in his or her field in order to honor parents, family and to be proud of oneself. However, life has its own rules and sometimes our dreams do not necessarily lead to what we imagine. This is why some people often accept jobs as subcontractors in private companies, such as security guards, or as commercial agents to promote foreign consumer products (energy juices, Canal + and Startime channels, cell phone companies like Orange, MTN, Cellcom, etc.).

The less fortunate are those who have failed in school and are often engaged in activities where physical strength is the only option. For example, workers on construction sites, dockworkers, street vendors, etc. Unfortunately, women and children are not spared from this exploitation. Just like men, women and children suffer enough harm from their employees and are equally exposed to risks and diseases.

To live normally in Guinea, one needs at least \$500 per month, but the people who receive this amount according to the table are only 3 in total. This shows that purchasing power is very low and that many people live below the poverty line. When we look at the number of people who receive less than \$100 of monthly income, they are just over half of the informants with an income of 170 people according to the wage progression.

The number of people working in the city is justified by the rural exodus and the opportunities to engage in small activities that are not profitable in the countryside. The city is the place where everyone comes with their project, it is a complex mix, a sphere of activity that allows one to earn opportunities and money without necessarily being employed. It is also the place where one finds the most unemployed, beggars, a little bit of everything, that is to say a complex set that enriches and reorganizes the social and political structure.

In the Guinean capital there are categories that earn significant amounts of money with little effort, such as canvassers and online sales. The knowledge of technology has given rise to many other professions that help many people earn a living through the production

of small videos, music, etc. These are the influencers, they record incredible sales figures in this field.

### **12.5. Identity and social movement's participation**

The difference in event participation shown in Table 9 can be explained first and foremost by the type of accidental informant collection we chose for this study. The idea was to go to places where there was a high probability of meeting informants who had taken part in demonstrations. The intention was to obtain data to measure the perceptions of those who had or had not taken part in the demonstrations. Cross-referencing this variable with the "ethnic minority" variable shows that the two variables are independent.

The feeling of belonging to a large ethnic group does not necessarily justify participation in a demonstration. The first reason is quite simple. The two majority groups are already in politically contradictory blocs, constantly seeking a balance of power. It's also important to note that the mistrust of saying you've taken part in a demonstration is linked to self-protection. Letting it be known publicly that you took part in a demonstration can trigger a feeling of insecurity in certain informants who know the system and the type of regime that prevails. They may also feel guilty about destroying property and supporting violence, because demonstrations in Guinea are synonymous with a lot of hardship and trouble. Many heads of households in neighborhoods known as opposition resource persons have been arrested and imprisoned for supporting demonstrators. They may also be thinking of a police investigation that could turn them into prime targets during unstable times.

The analysis shows that beyond the majority who did not respond, the number of people participating in social movements decreases over time. In other words, informants can participate in demonstrations for three years, which corresponds to the maximum year of mass participation. After that, there is a gradual downward trend, which can be explained by the shock and risks that these protests can generate, such as murder, injury, imprisonment, loss of property, etc.

The police and gendarmerie apply other more or less conventional methods. The best known is the use of tear gas to disperse demonstrators. These gases are also thrown into the courtyards of concessions in neighborhoods known for retaliating against repression

units. Tear gas has toxic elements which, when inhaled, can cause asthma attacks in some young people.

The other conventional method is the use of hot-water trucks. These trucks are sent out to spray hot water on demonstrators, causing burns. This is also an effective deterrent from the outset of demonstrations.

Hand-to-hand combat is the most frequent and most difficult. A confrontation in which each side uses the means at its disposal. For the demonstrators, it's stone-throwing, stone-throwing, machetes and, on rare occasions, weapons in neighborhoods where civilian possession of weapons is constantly observed.

With a wide range of information on the demonstrators, the police generally use truncheons and clubs in clashes, as well as stones to respond on camera. However, in very embarrassing circumstances, they resort to other, much more dangerous methods.

This is the method used by the anti-demonstrators, who are supported by the police and gendarmes in their offensive against the demonstrators. Worst of all, some officers use firearms and are then quickly exfiltrated to protect their identity.

In short, recorded killings on both sides make the incidents more violent. But the overall unsatisfactory results, and the failure to take care of many of those injured by ball living with the after-effects, serve as a lesson for other young people who find refuge in the digital space to expose their remorse and at the same time point out things that are difficult for journalists to report or see.

Radio and TV broadcasts and skits by cultural actors calling for ethnic unity and the promotion of peace in the country also affect some people, who become aware of the danger that these acts produce, including the loss of credibility of the state and the deterioration of services at all levels.

Some of them are calculating the costs, for example, the young people who are damaged, and the people who live in the slums and who seek to improve their conditions. Others aim for the goal, such as those who want their leaders elected by any means necessary. If neither is achieved, then the demonstration is considered useless and unproductive.

What emerges from Table 11 is once again that people refrain from openly clarifying their position on certain issues, such as displaying their political affiliation. Whether they are from the opposition or another political party, given that in elections people do not vote for civil society, it can be said that they choose this category out of caution, fear of exposure, or simply to keep their identity secret.

## **12.6. Means and strategies used by rival camps**

The political reality is constructed in such a way that the question of ethnicity is almost inescapable. For many, to be for the party in power is also to be for those who plunder the country, who kill others when they try to claim their rights, who support corruption and crony capitalism.

From a cultural point of view, some people go so far as to interpret citizens who give credibility to government leaders as weak. A way of showing that these people do not combine their strength with their own to prevent repeated mandates of leaders of other ethnic groups who are at the center of the alternation.

The same interpretation is made by supporters of the ruling party, who describe the Guinean opposition as destructive, always ready to endorse violence. It is seen primarily as a community, not a political party. It is the cause of the destruction of public property and the recurrent instability in the country. They are stateless people who are opposed to the development and stability of the country for some. The leaders of this alliance play politics of the belly. Their objective is to put pressure on the current government so that it takes into account their interests.

Those among them who are dissatisfied seek to join the movement again. This behavior discredits their persons and shows that they are people who do not have a project really built and capable of changing the country. Those of them who are dissatisfied seek to rejoin the majority in power. This behavior discredits their persons and shows their inability to benefit from the preference of the voters. Instead of a real political debate, they very often use protest as the only way to limit the exactions of the government.

These connotations affiliated with one camp or the other lead a category of citizen to take a neutral position in civil society, which means putting the interests of the people first. This also explains the high number of abstentions, which represent almost half of the population surveyed. However, it must be recognized that this is far from being the

only factor, because the logistical crisis of the electoral commission does not encourage voters in a context where the means of mobility are already limited.

If we look beyond our sample, the Guinean reality shows that the Guinean population as a whole does not have confidence in the institutions. The civil society in question is considered a political entity whose representatives are very often suspected of playing the political game of the opposition or the party in power. It is difficult to consider them as a counter power or an entity capable of strong mobilization. Moreover, the illiteracy of more than 60% of the population makes the organization even more fragile because their role is still unknown to many people.

If we look at the Guinean political sphere, there is no need to prove that hundreds of organized demonstrations are the work of political parties. 54.3% of the respondents mentioned this on the frequency of the answers provided.

The right to demonstrate is recognized in Guinea in the event of a violation of democratic rules or a failure to comply with the legal texts and laws that define the functioning of state institutions.

The majority of participants and non-participants in the protest know this. This is why people think to grant themselves or their supporters a political status when they join this political process. It is in the same sense that others see themselves as patriots because they defend the interest of the country.

However, opinion differs on this point, as others understand it as the means used by people who share the same cultural and geographical values seeking to gain access to power. These are the ones who checked off ethnocentrism and regionalism.

One thing remains certain; however, the protests are taking place in a very violent context in Guinea. The barricades that constitute the first obstacle to prevent all forms of circulation (60% of opinions) are erected by concrete blocks, tables and sometimes the electric poles are torn off to cause power cuts in places. To create an atmosphere of chaos, the demonstrators set fire to the whole axis giving the impression of being in a state at war. It is in this climate that clashes occur, often resulting in targeted deaths or lost balls.

Guinea's political history is full of unfortunate events. Since independence, many families have suffered bereavement as a result of prejudice between citizens and the excessive use of force and abuse of authority by leaders over the governed. The democratic and judicial challenges are enormous.

The various conspiracies during the first regime, the misappropriations and slippages unconstitutional excesses of the second regime, the January-February strikes, the killings at the September 28 stadium, the inter-community or inter-denominational confrontations between the Guerzé and the Koniankés or between the Malinké and the Fulani since 2010, and the various coups d'état have not been free of hatred and grievances.

The perception of Guineans towards politicians is globally negative. The plan is to help themselves at the expense of the people. It is during the exercise of their functions that the atmosphere becomes favorable to nepotism and corruption. How else can one imagine a country with immense resources and even the water tower of West Africa unable to provide water and electricity to its people who have been living in misery for more than half a century? The figures in this table explain the real social problems that Guinean citizens face in their daily lives. The gap is remarkable, and the responsibilities remain shared.

Some social movements in Guinea are well organized. They manage to mobilize all the necessary resources and even the media to their causes. The demonstrations between the FNDC and the Coalitions of Support for the New Constitution, or the strikes of 2006-2007 against the Conté regime and of September 28 against the CNDD have seen the participation of thousands of Guineans. However, none of these strikes resulted in real satisfaction.

When you protest against a regime, the regime remodels and changes some ministers but the system remains in place despite the human and material losses. If you protest against the change of the constitution, you will be told that certain texts suffer from shortcomings and therefore a new constitution is necessary; and if it is to improve living conditions, you will be told that the crisis is everywhere, while those who are monopolizing property illegally live better with their families. These are the reasons why Guineans are dissatisfied with the results of social movements.

The organization of elections in Guinea is always invested with circumstances of community clashes. In the township of Ratoma, along the route le prince, Guineans call it the "axis of evil. During strikes, the chance of being attacked by groups of young people is very high, and it is even higher if you are not Fulani. In other towns and neighborhoods

with a Malinké majority, for example, the rule is the same: Fulani are also subject to attacks, especially theft and destruction of market goods.

The risk of violence, robbery and revenge makes many people prefer to stay at home, or even move to another town or neighborhood to be safe with their family. The reasons for the attacks are primarily political and later turn into ethnic confrontations. The intention to elect a leader from one's own community, and the leader's strategy of relying on his or her ethnicity to have weight in the political arena, summarizes the conflicts in Guinea in recent years. It is in this contradiction that other elements such as violence, murder, rape, revenge, etc., are invited.

The administrative division of Guinean territory is composed of four natural regions, each inhabited by a majority ethnic group. The occupation of these regions is inherent to historical facts related to the types of places that are favorable to this type of exchange, to culture, to animal husbandry, and to the fact that these groups come from different empires. It is true that it is human nature to have a more direct empathy for one's fellow man than for others. However, any form of abuse of this relationship can cause disharmony and puts us at odds with other groups, hence the conflict.

When we look at the 5 communes of the Guinean capital, we see a distribution similar to our natural regions. The people are housed in such a way that the majority are Fulani, for example, in Ratoma, and they spill over to Dixinn. The Soussous in Kaloum, Matam and Dixinn, the Malinkés in Matam and Matoto and the foresters between Matoto and the outskirts of Ratoma. This projection is very often reflected in the electoral votes. Sidya Touré must win in Kaloum, Cellou Dalein in Ratoma, Alpha Condé in Matoto, etc. This is normal for Guinean politicians, otherwise we will talk about cheating or misappropriation.

In summary, the analysis of the results provided by the quantitative data is done with caution due to the selection of non-probability. Some interpretations are provided based on the experience of the informants. In most cases, the citizens of the capital share the same space with their peers, who have certain cultural and political characteristics in common that favor their living together. This makes them less vulnerable in certain contexts. However, in spite of all these devices and attempts to understand the social movements in Guinea, the majority of Guinean citizens fear this phenomenon.

So the real reasons for the recurrence of demonstrations in guinea, according to our quantitative sampling, prove that the causes should not be captured only in the political space that results in the demonstrations. Grievances such as persistent inequality, the issue of employment that concerns a whole generation of graduates, access to drinking water and electricity, and the problem of food security are all factors that give Guineans the impression of being in a state of unhappiness abandoned by their own children.

This feeling of being in a position of weakness and of not having the power to act to change something is above all this frustration that eats away the morale of many executives whose social networks seem limited.

The way the country is governed is at the root of many executives' decision to live abroad, changing their plans from one day to the next. After studying at the world's leading universities, the question of returning to their country of origin becomes the first suspense on which even their family members ponder deeply, analyzing above all the economic framework.

Above all, the family will act as the central element that will make you understand the accountability that the subject must obligatorily fulfill towards his family but also towards his social and cultural environment. This same behavior has affected the management of many executives who have tried to enrich their families with taxpayers' money.

The cost of unethical practices has increased not only frustration but also a lack of confidence in public institutions. Accountability would normally have a positive meaning if everyone sought to do their duty first and foremost. However, the power granted to the various ministerial departments suffers from the politics of the executive, whose orders every manager is expected to obey.

In this climate, political clientelism flourishes, giving weight to corruption, as well as to the selection of personnel on the basis of knowledge rather than qualifications.

Reform in public administration is too slow. The training of civil servants to master tasks and be capable of design is lacking in most departments. Executives who sign up to serve their country find it hard to stay honest for long, due to unattractive conditions and salaries.

In Guinea, as in many other African countries, wage earners are transformed into beggars. Expenses far exceed the income of these people, who find themselves obliged to cumulate functions as teachers in private schools for those who wish to remain in the profession, or by doing business.

These factors have been at the root of a major flight of executives who have not hesitated to choose other, more beneficial, more personal options.

## **12.7. Phase III: Integration of Qualitative and Quantitative Data (Analysis and Interpretations)**

### **12.7.1. The origin of social movements: an analysis that goes back in history**

When we began this study, the main question we were thinking about was "How to explain the reemergence of social movements in Guinean?" From the city to the countryside, whether individuals are civilized or not, when they suffer injustice at the hands of some oligarchy, the feeling of being wronged in their rights somehow stimulates the spirit of association, reunion and belonging, which pushes people to transform their grievances into complaints and then express them peacefully or through violence.

From resistance to the colonists to political independence, we are often made to understand through the history of Guinea that Samory Touré led a fierce resistance against French and British penetration that lasted more than 18 years. During these battles, the enemy discovered over time within the regions that within the empires, groups of indigenous people existed and maintained strong societal relationships.

There were laws more or less based on their respective customs. As an African adage says, "it is through the cracks in the wall that the enemy finds the cracks", it is necessary to divide and conquer. Thus, for lack of support, Samory was weakened and captured according to legend. Sékou Touré would have been animated by the spirit of patriotism through the experiences of his ancestors, which he always judged inadmissible and considered an affront to the black people and Guineans in particular.

Far from telling a story, what interests us here is the word "division" or the verb to divide. Then, in order to understand certain conflicts, one must know their sources. During the field interview, one informant stated that in order to understand political and social conflicts, although the reasons are diverse, it is necessary to go back in time in order to better understand certain facts, particularly the ethnic dimension.

*“At the time, to have a hold on a country, you needed a strategy, instruments of imposition and one of the strategies of the colonists was ethnocentrism. For proof, in the 4 regions of Guinea there were associations and groups of an ethnic nature that exacerbated the*

*division. So, before independence there was a real violence in the Republic of Guinea between the ethnic groups, something that suited the colonists to assert their influence” (Informant 9. Male, Mandingo, forester, 2019).*

The September 28, 1958, referendum allowed Guinea to break away from France and gain independence. The results of the vote reveal that 56,981 people, or 4.78% of the validly cast ballots, voted to keep Guinea in the French colonies. Did these people have Cartesian arguments given the context of the time to make this choice? Or did they suffer from Stockholm syndrome, which causes the victim to develop unconscious dispositions to empathize with and understand his victimized state by his aggressor.

In the case of Guinea, however, something is certain: the identification of certain persons or groups of persons by the regime as enemies of the people. The history of the Portuguese aggression of 1970 is a perfect illustration of this passage, the memories of which continue to haunt certain minds.

Studies of social movements in Africa confirm that there are intractable conflicts such as ethnic conflicts that become politicized over time. During the various successive regimes in Guinea, each president has been confronted with this problem, even if it tends to be hidden in politics and sometimes behind political parties. While the Fulani felt somewhat secure when the late General Lansana Conté, a Soussou president, came to power, the Malinké felt threatened and victimized by the regime.

*“The real problem is not victimization as such, but rather the action that each citizen consciously takes to give others the opportunity to imitate and persist in this practice, which does not honor the values of Guinean culture” (Informant 25. Male, Mandingo. Publicist lawyer, 2021).*

The loss of their property, the dismissal of Malinké civil servants from positions of responsibility in the public administration, and the loss of the monopoly in the

commercial sector were the grievances expressed by the Malinké community at the time. As proof, after the (real or fake) failed coup d'état of Colonel Diarra Traoré in 1985, they strongly mobilized behind Professor Alpha Condé who created the People's Rally of Guinea (RPG) in 1992 after the establishment of a multi-party system in September 1991. Professor Alpha Conde is now considered the white knight of the Malinké ethnic group, which mainly makes up the party. The votes in the region of Upper Guinea have always been largely won by the party especially in cities like Kankan, Siguiri, and Kouroussa.

The Fulani, for their part, are not enamored of the name Sékou Touré. If the praise that accompanies the father of independence is acclaimed by Guineans nationally and internationally, for those who lost their loved ones the hero is seen as a gunman who has bereaved families, one of whose victims was Diallo Telli- in 1977, who was of Fulani origin and former secretary general of the Organization of Unity (O.U.A). It is with the regime of Lansana Conté that the community will fully integrate the public and private administrative apparatus while monopolizing the trade sector considered as one of the strategic sectors in Guinea.

In 2007, the former leader of the opposition Cellou Dalein Diallo was elected to head the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), a political party whose founding members were Fulani. These ethnic opposition parties will henceforth have more weight on the political chessboard through votes that will force third party politicians (client parties) to join one or the other respectively to form alliances that will change according to the political climate.

*“In Maslow's pyramid there is the need for security, when someone finds himself in lack of the need for security from the State which is supposed to guarantee an equal treatment to its citizens would be obliged to go and look for it elsewhere, that is to say in the entities which are natural to him for example his ethnic group, his clan”*  
**(Informant 4. Male, Kissi, forester, 2019).**

However, we must ask ourselves the question: did Cellou Dalein, accused of mismanagement of the last few public funds, come to seek protection from his community or was it the Fulani community that was looking for a charismatic leader to better prepare for their political adversity against the Malinkés? Was Alpha Conde, who had been exiled for years in France, really looking for protection from the Malinké or did he want to use the Malinké community to gain power?

When the theory of relative deprivation is brought into play, the context shows that Guinean communities seek above all access for their own to the scarce resources of which they were deprived during the rule of the other community. Thus, the seeds of ethnocentrism have permeated the vision of generations who are politically educated in this sense.

In many Guinean families, people vote according to the instructions of the head of the family, which is very important to family members. Questioning the decision of the head of the family is frowned upon and considered a form of deviance, especially for housewives who take these decisions very seriously.

*In traditional Africa as a whole, there is what is known as the curse of the elders and the birthright. This tradition has been practiced since the dawn of time. These people are believed to be more honest, and are seen as the benchmarks to follow in maintaining the traditional heritage. That's why in most African families, and Guinean families in particular, this special place is reserved for them. (Informant 22. Female, Sociologist, 2021)*

It's not uncommon for parents to encourage their children to continue to follow this or that political leader, telling them that it's thanks to this leader that the family has benefited in this way. And if he wins, how good it could be for the community. Many supporters of this trend pass on the idea as the guideline to follow in their circles.

In Guinea, power and economic resources are the object of covetousness and sometimes abusive adversity. Those in power privilege their fellow human beings to

access these resources through sometimes hasty appointments based on the loyalty of the person to the leader and not necessarily on his or her skills. The attribution of power to individuals who do not know its benefits abuse it, which disempowers those who are in a weak position. Comparisons between individuals or groups of individuals become frequent topics of discussion in the public space. The passion in the debate creates the feeling of stigmatization and rejection of the other.

*“For example, President Alpha Condé categorizes positions according to ethnicity. For example, the national assembly is for the Forest Guinea as long as he is in power, the primacy is for the Soussous, and he is already in the executive branch, so the Fulanis are excluded. So, everyone is looking for power so that their ethnic group can benefit from the honey”.* (Informant 3. Male, Soussou, 2019)

With the exception of the Sékou Touré era, when in principle everyone was a member of the single party, the ethno-strategy has been used in different ways by politicians throughout Guinea's political history. It is in order to give a different image and to escape the scourge of ethnicization of parties that some political parties try to reflect in the composition of their executive bodies a kind of more or less heterogeneous reconfiguration of their leaders and local representatives within the country.

Far from the idea of instrumentalization, the ethnic question is exposed in these paragraphs as a problem that really exists and that people are more or less reluctant to talk about because it would be very sensitive, especially for people from a cultural mix. However, deconstructing it allows us to understand the phenomenon and correct the subjective perceptions that remain dominant.

There's one factor that generally escapes the collective Guinean consciousness. It's the fact that we don't even know when ethnic identity, which has always been known in its once stable latent phase, has been activated to meet the preoccupations of certain politicians.

The idea of power is crucial to the advancement of the argument. Throughout Guinea, there are large ethnic groups endowed with political or economic power that facilitates their imposition on others. Ethnic parties have been aware of this for a very long time. They activate this element when it comes to taking advantage of the weaknesses of other groups to benefit from adjustments while the control of political authority is at stake.

The demographic rise of an ethnic group can stimulate the idea of conflict to curb this phenomenon, which can be seen as a factor in upsetting the established order in the future. This situation is not just an ordeal in underdeveloped countries, where rival ethnic groups are pitted against each other. It has even become an essential element of conflict on a global scale between races or ideologies (blacks and whites, immigrants and natives, capitalism & communism, colonialism and anti-colonialism).

*"The confrontation in Forest Guinea cannot be summed up as a purely ethnic struggle between Konianké and Guerzé. There is of course the economic factor, with the purchasing power of the Konianké increasing as a result of the different activities they engage in. The demographic factor (they are Muslims and marry several women, including women from other ethnic groups, which means many children)". (Informant 18. Male, journalist, 2021)*

It has to be said, then, that the onset of this conflict does not lend itself to an analysis based on the premise that conflict can be an isolated element. People think conflict, politicians use it to protect or safeguard their interests. The race for all the resources that can facilitate the achievement of the objective is de facto applied by the parties in disagreement.

The case of political parties such as the UFDG and the RPG in recent years serves as a perfect example to understand the hatred that divides these predominantly large groups. The same dilemma is played out between the Koniankés and Guerzés in the forest regions. As the Koniankés were originally Malinkés, these two groups seek

mutual support during post-electoral and religious conflicts in the interior of the country to counteract the threatening force.

Far from being indifferent, the Fulanis take advantage of these periods to make new allies among the minorities in Forest Guinea and Lower Guinea. This does not necessarily mean that ethnicity is the only recourse that parties use, but among the resources available to them, it is the most important because of the rapid response it brings in terms of political and economic support.

*"As for the use of ethnicity, it's the politicians who have brought us into this climate. We wouldn't say that all protests are communal, but some communities demonstrate to claim their rights. However, there are others among the demonstrators who take part to satisfy their personal interests". (Informant 7, Female, Fulani, 2019)*

Demonstrations are also the result of structural crises in low-income countries. Since 2010, the economic crisis has persisted despite political changes and coups d'état in Guinea. The question should also focus on the predominantly poor working class, which this time brings together a heterogeneous mix of people struggling to make 2 meals a day.

This parameter is important in terms of reflection, in that it is a majority that not only suffers human losses, but also constitutes a considerable percentage that casts doubt on whether it is only ethnicity that is at the root of the conflicts in Guinea.

If we delve into a historical analysis that emphasizes the favorable economic conditions of the Fulanis compared to their counterparts from other groups due to the Conté regime, this may slightly render the debate moot, as the material evidence remains almost non-existent.

Beyond that, the Fulani are known for their mastery and courage in the commercial sector. They invest heavily in their children's education, in which priority is given to learning Islam. This is a group much more involved in business than any other ethnic

group in Guinea. Even if, in popular perception, the origin of their fortune is sometimes linked to the sale of illicit products, it can be said that livestock breeding and trade are at the heart of their concerns.

This particularity of staying in touch with their cultures and the marriage between families of the same ethnies constitutes the basis of their wealth and the mutual aid they give each other in terms of financing and solidarity in a general context.

It should also be noted that in Guinea, without wishing to stigmatize others, the advantages and particularities of each of these groups are genuinely known and accepted as such by public opinion. Or let's say it's a sort of collective construct that is not justified by research but based on simple observations by citizens.

The Malinkés (Mandingo) are known for their pride, their great size and their obsession with power. In Manding history, they are written of as true healers and conquerors. Of course, the Malinkés have the art of the spoken word, and this is considered a profession for the griot family, which is an essential component of this group. Expanded trade and the search for farmland led to the splitting up of this group into sub-groups, which created their own culture by staying with other ethnic groups for centuries, as in the case of the Koniankés.

The Soussou, on the other hand, respect their chiefs and are very friendly, even if the men tend to be described as a little lazy. Soussou women are renowned for their courage in facing obstacles and taking care of the family. It's a group that advocates peace and facilitates social cohabitation. Being indigenous to the coastal region, the source of their wealth lies in land and real estate, which is also considered a highly contentious sector.

In the south-east, foresters are groups who depend on the land to meet their financial needs. Very courageous and hard-working, they are renowned for their rigor and seriousness, especially when it comes to teaching. However, most of them have had difficulty gaining access to resources from an early age, and the lack of infrastructure and support makes themselves felt. Their hatred can also be explained by the deterioration of their situation in relation to other groups with a greater presence and, at the same time, considerable cultural influence.

Without wishing to go into the details of this situation, which has been built up by public opinion through generalized perception, we have to deduce that, despite the fact that poverty trends differ slightly from one ethnic group to another, the majority of Guineans live in dire straits.

It's when the crisis reaches its peak that everyone seeks to confront the authorities. In other cases, it's generally the citizens of the predominantly Fulani axis, commonly known as the axis of evil, who organize demonstrations in support of the opposition or the FNDC. The manifest reason expressed on the media or chanted on the international stage alludes to the restoration of the values of the Republic.

However, in the other communes, the recurrence of demonstrations harming certain citizens shows that the intention is rather a strategy to bring one's own to power and maintain it. This rumor is likely to fuel a pattern of reciprocal rejection that escapes few people.

To overcome all these conflicts, several analysts have thought of creating a single national identity that would allow everyone to leave this divisive aspect behind and concentrate much more on the essentials. The sharing of a common local language, for example. The dream was not to use French as the official language, since it was imposed and taught. This language is used by many people to facilitate communication, which is different from the satisfaction of using it.

The reality of the Guinean situation doesn't help matters either, as the two major rival groups each seek to impose their own language and culture. This ongoing rivalry only serves to heighten tension, both socially and politically.

For some years now, the state has been initiating political dialogues and funding certain institutes to improve the social climate and ease the tensions that materialize in community violence. For the time being, however, the results are barely making an impact, with only the well-educated able to measure and identify the benefits this could bring. The uneducated majority also know the importance of living together, only their responsibilities remain ephemeral and fragile due to political and economic crises.

### **12.7.2. The reasons of the resurgence of social movements in Guinea and their accentuation during electoral periods**

Political process theory teaches us that political opportunity must be present to enable challengers to achieve their objectives. Can we deduce from this that the electoral period is the time of greatest political opportunity? The Guinean experience proves the contrary. Even if coups d'état are part of the equation, elections nevertheless bring together all the elements needed to analyze the issues at stake.

When General Lansana Conté came to power, his military position made him an illegitimate candidate in the 1993 elections, which were the very first multi-party elections in the country's history. Lansana Conté's new impression was one of disrespect for the law and of treating public office as a privilege. Supported by his military friends, the law in Guinea was flouted, giving way to a kind of anarchy.

Everywhere in the administration, executives were directly or indirectly involved in corruption and the squandering of state assets. While the population is suffering, some ministers are enjoying every possible comfort abroad and at home.

*“In 1993 the main reason for the very first demonstrations were that the military should not be candidates. Unfortunately, the people next to the president (his relatives) found ways for the president to run for office by becoming a civilian”.* (Informant 5. Male, Fulani, 2019)

This first violation will continue with the modification of the number of presidential mandates, which are the fragrant acts of the violation of the constitution. The ministers who are supposed to protect the administrative apparatus for its proper functioning will specialize in the modification of documents and even imitate the signature of a sick president still clinging to power.

The truce in the demonstrations ended in 2006 when living conditions became increasingly unbearable. With the indefinite strike in 2007, the price of freedom and change that Guineans paid was obviously hundreds of deaths. This particularly difficult period can be explained by an economic crisis that had affected all households in Guinea and the excessive abuse of power by dignitaries who were in a kind of financial drift and were building a kind of debauchery life in the image of the president himself with a

number of beautiful cars, villa (very expensive chic home), and young girls very frequent in the offices and arteries of the administration.

While the children of the poor were looking for electricity to prepare for the national exams, those of the rich were quietly in the business of drugs, pimping and in the nightclubs to enjoy alcoholic drinks. The most serious ones were abroad, especially in France, continuing their higher education.

Dependence on the bosses of Kaloum has become a habit. During the course of the year, it's a common practice for these professional beggars who, instead of work, always have appointments with this or that minister or director. They may look well-dressed, but their presence brings more problems than solutions. The most notorious cases are those of subtracting information from somewhere, swindling citizens seeking employment, using forged and counter-signed papers, falsifying official documents and so on. These practices cost the State money, and generate conflicts within the administration and between families. The most recurrent of these are land disputes, which have claimed several victims in and around the capital.

A number of foreign companies took advantage of this situation to increase their turnover through third parties who awarded contracts to these companies on behalf of the Guinean state. Corruption had reached its peak, so that either the population had to stay there and die in misery, or resort to demonstrations to have their rights restored. These were the grievances that led to the violent protests of 2006-2007, which unfortunately resulted in several deaths.

Past practices dominated by bad governance and disregard for citizens' demands will enable the unions to unite all social forces to force the government to be more responsible and diligent.

This particularly exceptional period ended with the death of President Lansana Conté who, according to some sources, was in an unconscious state long before his death. Rumors were already circulating that the president of the assembly could not replace him as he was also in an illegal mandate. It was in this context that Captain Dadis came to power in a bloodless coup.

However, the man who was acclaimed on the day of the coup did not keep his promises and was led into the same errors by his relatives from the Guinean forest who let him


understand that the time had come for them to take advantage of the fruit of the fatherland. In September 2009, a large demonstration organized by the opposition was violently repressed, leaving dozens of dead. It was the September 28 massacre, which Dadis denies having orchestrated.

So, when we look back over this period of political violence, lack of justice, lack of jobs and serious violations of the law, we see that the climate of peace has been altered and that the country has found itself in a situation where the index of corruption is not pleasant, and consequently widespread poverty.

*“Since independence the fundamental problem is the weakness of the State, the State has become more and more personalized and at the head, it is represented by an individual who is an institution”. We need a real change of mentality, or we're not going to get out of this situation.*

**(Informant 6. Male, Fulani, 2021)**

In the various demonstrations it is enough to pay attention to the signs to see the strike words that are often chanted by the protesters. "Down with dictatorship"; "justice for the victims"; "change or death" etc. There are many people today who think that there are issues of justice and breaches of democratic principles. In the answers collected from our informants we can see in the graph how much people consider on the frequency of the answers provided.



Source: Survey conducted by the author (350 informants)

For decades, this issue of justice and violation of democracy is very often discussed. During the recent electoral periods, the same causes produced the same effects which led us to the coup d'état of September 05, 2021.

In all communities' children are taught from an early age to be honest and just. However, this much sought-after justice comes up against the realities of life, where sometimes even the institutions of justice make mistakes. This is the debate that has animated Guinean society since the first Republic, namely whether it is really possible to render justice to all victims in Guinea. When the Portuguese aggression took place in 1970, the members of the opposition who joined the Portuguese militia to try to overthrow President Ahmed Sekou Touré were all executed after the failure of this operation.

In one of his videos, the president claims to have relatives among the traitors who rallied to the Portuguese enemies in his words. However, without supporting or blaming any party, when we take the context of those years and the particular socio-political realities in which Guinea found itself after the threats of France, it would be difficult to distinguish between lead and gold. It is in this reality that the accusations, rightly or wrongly, have cost the lives of some people. However, can this constitute palpable

evidence to deny the abuses committed during September 28 and the other demonstrations?

First, let's return to the election protests. The year 2010, as previously mentioned, was characterized by the completion of the first ever democratic election in Guinea. The main challengers on the list were the parties recognized as major parties, including the UFDG, the RPG, the UFR and the PEDN. Human resources were largely mobilized around these parties. As usual, the apparent thing remained the ethnically based mobilization of militants who were very determined to vote. The community felt that the Fulani had arrived to take their turn at the supreme magistracy. The final result, unfavorable to the UFDG, triggered a political protest against the decision of the CENI.

*“Demonstrations in Guinea are usually political and electoral. Political when it affects a decision of governance, electoral when it affects a decision of organization. Political actors call for demonstrations for these reasons”.* (Informant 11. Male, Kissi, forester, 2019)

The organization of elections by CENI has always been marked by irregularities reported by both the opposition and the opposition. Unregistered activists, loss of voter's cards, reduction of the number of polling stations in some places on the national territory, falsification of results are recurrent practices that are reported as dysfunctions that continue to characterize the elections in Guinea.

Opposition members file appeals with the Guinean judiciary not because they have confidence in the institution, but because it allows them to find sufficient elements and evidence to address national and international opinion that their recourse to demonstrations is legal and the restoration of their rights should be non-negotiable. In the interview with the president of the UFDG, he told us that:


*“My party has hardly accepted the result because it was not easy after we obtained 44% and the support of Sidya 14% and Abé Sylla 4% in the first round and to be stolen by the CENI in complicity with the high military officials who did not want me to accede to power for indecent reasons which I do not want to return on” (Informant 8. Male, Fulani, 2019).*

The repeated violation of agreements and laws by the ruling party in complicity with the institutions in charge of organizing and registering voters has made demonstrations a common practice in Guinea. It is customary for organized elections to be won by the ruling party.

The particularity of the 2010 election is that all the protagonists were from the opposition, beyond the ethnic aspect it was a real competition between political parties. However, the transition period was led by a senior Malinké officer, Sékouba Konaté, who was the second in command of the CNDD. Had he prepared the ground for Alpha Conde to win the second round of elections, as the interview suggests? To remain objective, the irregularities of the CENI have been reported by several actors of supervision since the first round. The massive enrolment of minors on both sides not yet of voting age, the increase in the number of polling stations and the irregularities mentioned above.

The accumulation of frustration over all these repeated irregularities during the elections has pushed the president of the UFDG to proclaim himself president of the Republic in the last election of 2020. The leader of the opposition will publish on his twitter account I quote:

**Picture 3.** Statement by the main opponent after the 2020 elections



(Source: twitter.com@ Cellou\_ UFDG)

Translation “*My dear compatriots, in spite of the serious anomalies that marred the proper conduct of the October 18 election and in view of the results that came out of the ballot box, I am the winner of this election in the first round*”. October 19.2020

*“I thank the member parties of ANAD, the numerous movements and associations that have supported my candidacy and all the people of Guinea for this mark of confidence”.*

October 19.2020

Demonstrations related to governance involve the mismanagement of actors who monopolize management not only in the public sector, but also in the private sector. The economic crises, the demonstrations related to unemployment and the improvement of living and working conditions. Mismanagement and corruption are obstacles to the economic take-off of the Guinean state. The fight against embezzlement is not yet an effective practice. The establishment of bodies to fight corruption and misappropriation

of public funds has not been successful. The normalization of these practices in the administration has contributed to the weakening of institutions. Clannism has contributed to a restriction of economic power that continues to be controlled by the minority.

In the Third Republic, two major acts of misgovernment shocked Guineans with respect to the former head of state and the Minister of Technical Education. In December 2006, President Lansana Conté released Mamadou Sylla and Fodé Soumah, both accused of corruption and embezzlement.

In November 2020, the Minister of Technical Education and Vocational Training in the government of Alpha Conde was implicated in a case of embezzlement of 200 billion Guinean francs.

The first case is a flagrant abuse of power where Conté made it known that he was the law and was not supposed to let his relatives of the same ethnic group rot in prison. The second is a kind of complicity between ministers who abused the trust of the head of state, who did not have control over the files during the last year of his governance.

In recent years, Guineans have become very demanding of their leaders who have become accustomed to bad governance. The protests by young people in the neighborhoods to demand electricity, water or sanitation are part of this trend. On construction sites or in manufacturing plants, Guinean workers are also victims of deception sometimes by the subcontracting company or their representatives who are Guineans looking for their percentages on the employees' effort.

The payment of taxes has become so difficult for Guineans because this money (taxes) that should go into the state coffers is often misappropriated by collection agents who continue to make small arrangements in the markets and in front of stores with customers. The police, local representatives, and collection agents are cited in these cases and denounced by the population who, after having paid their taxes, still find themselves faced with filth, the deplorable state of the roads, and shortages of basic necessities. Corruption and nepotism have taken hold in the administration and in all the streets since the people who should serve as an example to the people have been sponsors of bad governance in the country.

*“During these years, opponents will return to the country, electoral promises will be published everywhere, people will get used to money and corruption will increase in the administration, the Guinean who used to work will now sit and wait to be given. Factories and public property will begin to disappear and be replaced by talk and lies. Some assets are privatized, and others sold by people who are known to the general public for the most part” (Informant 3. Male, Soussou, 2019)*

Thus, the socio-economic conditions have become very precarious over the years and the gap of inequalities has become even deeper. As it is sometimes said in our language "everything that happens to man is mostly man's fault". People cry for help when they are the source of their own misfortunes.


Everyone talks about change but those who are committed to putting the country on the path to prosperity are very few. People only blame when it doesn't suit them. The real problem lies in the ignorance of the majority who can neither read nor write. This collective consciousness that consists in not seeing the reality of things, in being unable to ask for accountability in a logical way, in demanding justice in a responsible way when one is oppressed are handicaps that show the weakness of the civic and intellectual culture of many Guineans. It is when the situation becomes worse and there is a lack of everything that it is necessary to go out to demonstrate. As was the case with the great protests of 2006-2007.

Derek Curtis Bok said, "If you think education is expensive, try ignorance. It is necessary to observe the electoral periods to realize how much the population is a victim of manipulation. No political debate or real social program is presented by the candidates to prove their leadership and their moral probity to better manage resources. The promotion of mediocrity and ethnocentrism seriously compromises the stability and future of intellectuals.

When asked during unstable periods which practices are frequent the destruction of public property and violence also scored in the frequency of responses provided by our informants.

*“Unfortunately, we are used to violence in demonstrations, so if we don't make efforts there will be victims, which we don't want”*

**(Informant 15. Female, Student, 2021)**



Source: Survey conducted by the author (350 informants)

### **12.7.3. The media involvement, usefulness and limits**

In developed countries, where human rights are taken into account across the board, and where the stages of democracy have reached their peak, the media are a fourth pillar of power after the executive, legislative and judicial branches. From local and international news events to government decision-making, relations between countries and their positions on the international stage are debriefed in good time by the media to help citizens take a stand on public policy. The media are an essential part of democracy, and their role is to keep citizens informed in good time.

Social media offers many opportunities these days. Immediate responses, views and likes of content, identity camouflage, political opinions etc.

Reading the table about social media can lead us to the observation that the people who did not respond, it is obvious that they do not have access to these phones or they do not have the ability to use them. There is another very interesting point that should not be ignored (journalistic practices) that are perceived as a practice that goes beyond the work ethic of partisan journalists, but also the respect of the agenda imposed by the owner of the shares.

In the exercise of this profession, impartial behavior is the practice that every good journalist must consider as the first reference. Impartiality, by definition, requires a person in charge of any responsibility to refrain from all emotion and to say or behave without taking sides, without favoring or demoting the facts. His or her vocation is then to report the situation as it is perceived, and to explain the characteristics as they have presented themselves to the subject. Unbiased journalism means that the facts must be free from manipulation, i.e., the truth is the element that deserves to be told.

This rule should not only be demanded of the traditional media; imposing it on all media houses and regulating it in the digital space should be a requirement of the regulatory body to reduce the consumption of false information.

What we consume as news is based on the public understanding of reality, which is simplified and does not exactly reflect the politically correct consciousness. The basic ideas are generally widespread and often even the subject of debate by those who don't even care about the ethics of the profession. News has become a subject of debate within everyone's reach. Public opinion is shaped not only by professionals in the field, but also by bloggers, who are very frequent on social networks.

In the audiovisual sector, the traditional media are highly coveted by older people and politicians who participate very actively in interactive programs such as the Grande Gueules (GG) of Espace Fm, we're remaking the world of Djoma média, The Mirador of Fim Fm etc. And visits to online sites such as [guinée.news.com](http://guinée.news.com), [mediaguinée.com](http://mediaguinée.com), [guinée.matin.com](http://guinée.matin.com) and more and more other sites are created every day and are also accessible worldwide.

News enthusiasts are always on these sites to learn about current events and seek to participate in radio shows that give listeners a voice to give their opinions and interact with journalists. The top programs followed by the public are those interested in politics.

When there are demonstrations, elections, or slippage of public figures in cases of corruption, misappropriations, leakage of audios or videos containing information of public interest such as the subjects of national examinations or even the sextape involving ministers, businessmen or journalists makes the subject even more exciting and overmediatized.

At a time when everyone seems to be getting involved in the issues, this is where information consumers are often victims of fake news. Trust in the media arises in relation to the manipulation of content and the safety of information every day. Media literacy is very low because of the ignorance of consumers and the lack of knowledge even about the strategy that the media use to manipulate and direct public opinion through information.

News websites are the most concerned in this interpretation of the news. The articles that are published by young journalists who work all month for almost insignificant wages suffer from manipulated content. The directors of politically partisan sites control these publications to see if their will is done.

What is difficult to understand are the professionals who are in complicity with the press bosses who tarnish the image of their channels by imposing a certain obedience to the respect of the agenda that does not reflect the image of the sector. However, they are forced to obey this game of dependence to the political and financial lobby that allows the company to function.

These slippages are sometimes observed during interactive programs. The divergence of opinion of the columnists in their positions has gradually installed a crisis of confidence between listeners and media. The phenomenon has become more widespread since journalists have started to reflect their militant position in their analyses. The deontology of deliberately zapping has not only created a bipolarity of listeners but also accentuated the misinformation on social networks.

It is this pessimism towards the media that has contributed to the birth of several Guinean bloggers who have started to talk about politics, to advertise political parties and to pass themselves off as the holders of rare information from reliable sources. The overmediatization of political topics on these social networks will attract many young people

who will now consider this virtual space as the ideal place to divulge misleading and defamatory information.

*“In relation to the media, it's like the political actors when your name is close to someone in power or in the opposition, we can determine your side, especially the bosses of the press. Otherwise, the media plays a role of impartiality, it is thanks to the media that we are informed today. It is thanks to the media that we are known everywhere. However, on the networks, some people take images from other countries to stick to Guinea, and a can be inversely also, this is the negative side of the media” (Informant 6. Male, Fulani, 2021)*

The social networks are kidnapped by these event journalists who at the slightest moment take out their smartphones to start talking about subjects while completely ignoring the notion of privacy. These practices are not considered as offences by the public, but as more or less credible information that contribute to feed social networks with revenues that encourage to produce more and more content on these platforms.

The paper newspapers that were so coveted have experienced a dramatic drop in sales. The editorial environment is full of digital media, which has completely dominated the media battle because of the ease of access, the opportunities, and the immediacy of information dissemination. That's why the data on the use of social media is still growing, given all the ranges they present, but also the practices of journalists who have themselves discredited and continue to make the sector miserable.

Among the traditional media only television manages to maintain itself in almost all countries. Many radio stations and newspaper publishing houses are closed. Since the rise of new technology, some journalists have become simple editors who strive to produce content that is already known to listeners through social networks.

This is far from considering that it escapes propaganda and censorship. Television supports politics through commercials and the construction of opinions. As a family medium, everything we see on television gradually becomes part of our daily lives.

During election periods in Guinea, television far exceeds other forms of media. It brings us so close to reality that it is impossible to remain calm in front of a sensitive subject.

Television not only plays a political role; it has also influenced the behavior of women and young people watching Nigerian and Indian series. Women also love the Mexican series on Novelas tv. These channels portray the weaknesses of the male gender, sometimes seen as heroes. At the same time, they influence changes in behavior, leading to conflict.

One of the biggest difficulties facing traditional media in Guinea today is the contestation of the information they seek to transmit on social media in order to maintain their presence in the digital space. The presence of several sources of information from other media and individuals who have been given editorial powers through social networks saturates news sites with a system of inform that enables them to recount or discredit more credible information.

These alternative media play a role that their users believe predominates over traditional media. However, even if in the digital sphere they have a monopoly on the speed of information, when it comes to marketing, the choice remains diverse. Many companies use both categories to reach their targets.

In some communities, traditional media are more widely followed than new media. The diversity of the language they use to convey information, codes and symbols is more easily understood by the community. This form of information transmission differs from that of social media in its simplicity. Uneducated people find themselves at the same level of understanding, for example, when transmitting information in traditional languages.


*“Traditional media are also widely followed. There are generations who prefer these media to the social networks that are the products of new technology. When you pick up a newspaper, it's not just news, but also features, job offers, games, and a whole host of other things that help to build a general culture”.* (Informant 24. Male, Student, 2021).

This closer level of understanding helps these people to start discussions and enter into political debates amongst themselves. It's not uncommon to find fathers talking politics over tea. Sometimes discussions focus on the previous day's newspaper, giving everyone a solid argument.

Television and radio, which had hitherto been the main channels for disseminating news and cultural information, are now essential. Access to these media in villages where new technology is slow to make an impression on farmers provides traditional media with loyal viewers who are always on the lookout for information from a single source.

Even if the survey shows that social media are preferable in terms of political expression, television remains the preferred medium for all categories in a country like Guinea. The combination of audiovisual content and the feeling of being close to reality with the attention it demands gives television an exceptional rank.

This is why so many did not answer because of the type of question asked. If we would have rephrased the question by asking it in the following way: What is your preferred source of political information? Probably many would have mentioned television, which broadcasts not only in the official language but also in the local languages such as Malinké, Soussou, Poular, Konianké Kissi, etc. which are the languages of the ethnic components.



Source: Survey conducted by the author (350 informants)

In the eyes of many, however, it would be very difficult for traditional media to hold out much longer. Many companies and advertisers prefer digital advertising. Information is at your fingertips, and broadcasting it doesn't necessarily require a third-party calendar. Communities in financial difficulty can only make do with television, which is why it remains their preferred medium.

#### **12.7.4. Interference and neo-imperialism**

Interference as a subject of international interest has drawn our attention to the strategy of foreign partners and the West in particular in the face of the challenges of underdevelopment that our country is experiencing. This deserved reflection to see in the other direction what the world system wanted us to be and how through tools such as financial aid, democracy, media, and diplomacy, they always manage to maintain us in a position of dependence in perpetuity. Starting from this reflection, which goes beyond internal realities, can also allow us to better understand the failure of certain African heads of state who wanted to change the destiny of Africa or their own country at one time.

For more than 60 years, the proposals of the governments of these countries were immediately implemented in the countries of French-speaking Africa in such a way that many people, especially the generations of the independence years, could already imagine a positive change and the emergence of a development comparable to that of their counterparts in the North.

*“During the years of independence, in many African countries, those who came to power could not understand everything that was going on, especially the politics of countries like France. In the first place, not only did they not have the means, but some were military men with little or no intellectual knowledge.” (Informant 21. Male, journalist, 2021)*

However, as this conditional cooperation evolved, development and democracy aid became more of a problem for African countries than an effective way out of poverty. Countries experienced a staggering increase in their debts as the United States adjusted

their economies and decided to accumulate capital. Privatization of state assets through structural adjustment programs has led to unemployment, protests and regime change in some places.

The imposition of the structural adjustment program was a form of interventionism in the political bodies of African states. The adoption of this policy imposed since the 1980s has resulted in an abysmal failure that has not only involved the responsibility of some African heads of state but continues to receive much criticism to this day. The fact that many foreign countries have completely deviated from the idea of win-win cooperation to give priority to good politics or good business always favorable to the oligarchs of multinationals has quickly deconstructed the trust in cooperation but also in the institutions that accompany them in their policies.

The observation remains bitter on the African continent. For more than 60 years, France has continued its policy of double standards. Supporting dictatorship in countries that safeguard their interests and imposing regime change in those that value their sovereignty. In the second case, several policies are implemented through threats, economic sanctions, and the manipulation of certain neighboring heads of state through media coverage to push the population to revolt, etc.

It is appalling that in the 21st century the international financial institutions continue to support these forms of neo-imperialism. Since the Washington Consensus, the same policies produce the same effects that is a servitude. As a result, billions of people in Africa today live in poverty. Market control, unequal free trade, and the imposition of the dollar as the currency of reference have greatly increased debts.

Inclusive and equitable globalization has only been inclusive for the industrialized countries, supported by the World Trade Organization that regulates the international market. The unilineal proposal of the values of capitalism to the whole world as an inflexible and indispensable solution to enrich the pharmaceutical, arms, fashion, and food industries. Thus, towards the peripheries, the massive and progressive extinctions of human, animal and vegetable species thanks to chemical, political and economic sciences.

Nowadays, many people talk about technology transfer, but in reality, they have not asked themselves what kind of technology Africans really need to take off in the field of industry. These transfers are for the most part transfers of consumption while these

countries need transfers of establishment and production on the spot. The training of workers with the capacity to design and boost development in the sectors that show the need would allow for rapid change.

*“To develop, we need to lay the foundations for development, such as roads, electricity and the construction of refineries to transform raw materials into refined products. We need to use more innovative means and prepare our managers by equipping them with these resources to better integrate the international system. ”. (Informant 19. Male, teacher 2021)*

Instead of transferring technical and practical knowledge, political NGOs are established throughout the African continent. Although their humanitarian role is appreciated in the foreground, their wealth and aid fuel conflicts in some countries. In their commitments to citizen awareness and minority rights, they may support protests and publish data that aggravate conflicts. Instead of promoting education and the agricultural sector, for example, some of them promote homosexuality in societies where beliefs are strong. Their strong presence in conflict areas already explains the hidden agenda of these organizations.

The establishment of military bases on the geostrategic points of the continent will finance and feed the capitalism of war. More and more countries are now calling for some kind of military cooperation as they consider their own defense systems to be inadequate in the face of rising terrorism on the continent. However, this dependence is evolving in parallel with the economic competition between foreign powers. The security challenges will become recurrent over time because it is a way to control certain areas of concentration of scarce resources to facilitate their transfer, but it is also to have control over African armies whose intervention strategies are known in advance by foreign officers who are trainers.

In addition to the risks associated with the intensification of conflicts, a new strategy of neo-occupation will emerge, similar to the antagonistic blocs between the United States

and Russia on the one hand (armed warfare) and between China and the United States on the other (economic warfare).

We are not excluding France in this game. Many French companies are established in West Africa and in its foreign policy as a former colonizer of many countries in West Africa it still has its eye on this old map. It is enough to take information on the situation of Mali and the countries of the G5 of the Sahel to realize you of a new jostling of the foreign powers.

*“Well, one cannot exclude neo-imperialism in certain contexts. Because to tell the truth, the former colonists never want to abandon Africa in general and Guinea specifically, simply because of the very important natural resources that this continent abounds” (Informant 12. Female, political activist, 2021).*

Someone said that *"a State that is unable to defend the interests of its people has no reason to exist"*. If through cooperation between states, from year to year, a party feels very disadvantaged at a given moment because the agreement has been badly revised or misunderstood, it must be able to free itself from this burden either through a new revision that will allow its people to benefit from it, or by ending this agreement as soon as possible. Under the constraint of the strongest which offered the advantage to the powers after independence, the disproportion was understandable at the time more than in our days when the margins of discussions became more and more open. The new order observed on the international chessboard puts an end to the verbal intimidations that the States knew until then complexed in front of their business partners.

Since 1945, some countries have found it difficult to cut the cord that binds them to France. The very identifier of this currency sends us back to the spirit of colonialism. The currency is not only the control of the economy, but also a symbol of a people, it must remain free, the monetary servitude has never arranged the economy of a country. A win-win partnership built on an equal basis and on competitive criteria should be the sole objective of all African countries.

*“Since independence, France has shown that it can no longer do without us, politically they are present in our affairs, fortunately thanks to Sékou Touré we had our own currency, but when we see the other countries that use the CFA, we wonder when it will stop” (Informant 24. Male, Student, 2021).*

Although the goal of owning the resources underneath is a reality, the political and imperialist vision has become more than ever a concern. Before the Arab world became unstable, the oil war was carefully crafted by the Americans, who used conspiracy theories and military intervention. The words of the war supported by a media hype against the leaders were dictatorship, Islamism, terrorism, oppression etc.

The form that Africa's takes is really very flexible, it is really the operation that consists in gouging the eye of the adversary and accusing him of blindness. Africans have always been accused of being bad managers, corrupt and many other labels. But political corruption in partnership is one of the tricks of the multinationals established and supported by their respective governments contribute to excessive capital flight.

Political corruption is a practice in which the Guinean state is very deep. The files that have been poorly handled since the presidency of Conté have left no Guinean indifferent to the restoration of ill-gotten gains by the former caciques of power. Guinean leaders have become accustomed to dealing with the affairs of state in a private context, where personal gain becomes enormous once the contract is signed. Many executives in the administration are in forms of high-level networking. Representatives of multinationals and sometimes business leaders brought in by foreign statesmen respectively have become accustomed to cronyism. Contracts are awarded without any real examination of the contracts binding the parties.

It is only recently that the current president of the transition, Mamady Doumbouya, has ordered a review of all mining contracts and a change in the positions of several executives who have illicitly enriched themselves on the backs of the Guinean population. Political corruption is a strategy that is effective in times of instability. States often use it when the state holding the resources is facing huge economic crises or when it is in a very

violent political conflict. It is a method that undermines the rules of democracy. African presidents, often very attached to their chairs, often choose this method to please and benefit from the protection of the treating state.

In West African countries, Western media antennas are installed everywhere. Many Guineans today cannot do without RFI, BBC, France 24, and dozens of other media. It is an information system that has a huge impact on public opinion. Election periods and coups d'état illustrate these facts. If the French media condemns a coup d'état, it means that it is getting serious, if not, you still have to stay tuned, such is the unfortunate reality that has overwhelmed the Guinean population. The media hype has never touched on these problems of transferring funds from criminal enterprises, let alone on the operation of the lobbying networks that have taken over the arteries of development.

With the loss of credibility in the sub-region, French media are now suffering from sabotage all over the French-speaking world. The suspension of French TV and radio in Mali, the dismissal of the French ambassador and the burning of the French flag in Central Africa have left France's opponents to announce clearly on the channels that French policy should review its strategy from now on.

Many African countries are supported financially and militarily by China and Russia. Other rising powers such as Turkey, Japan and India are also investing in Africa to benefit from the continent's resources.

However, the most difficult aspect of this cooperation remains the illegal means used and the series of commitments of political, economic or military influence in diplomatic relations. Countries that refuse to give in to these shenanigans often fall victim to the unofficial support of armed terrorist groups and economic sanctions to revolt the population against the regime in power.

With the new international order taking shape, Russia and China have proved to the world that when a country has the means to carry out its policy, it can develop and even defend its own interests, while earning the respect of other countries. With the war in Ukraine, African countries have understood the stakes and are now seeking to strengthen their South-South cooperation to facilitate economic transactions on the continent.

We can't say today that this is the only option for development. Nor are we saying that we have to make a clean break with the old powers countries, who hold the cards in

their hands despite their exposed weaknesses. The solution is to harmonize with the rest of the world in terms of human, economic and technological development.

## CONCLUSION

Most of the facts that characterize today's world result from the practices and behaviors of the world of previous centuries. The history of the slave trade and racial slavery, the industrial revolution, the improved scientific progress in its phase of discovery of the Internet to compensate for the use of man-made forces and energies. The armed and economic wars that have been waged between those who have benefited from these changes and who, through their imperialist policies, have managed to install and print their ideologies in other cultures. The use of the media as an instrument of disinformation, power and threat in the real wars, which are both cultural and economic, are all events that will accelerate the upheaval and transformation of social relations.

It can also be argued that the world order established by the West shows an unequal distribution of resources on a planetary scale. The countries of the South have been among the most unfortunate in the so-called economic integration of globalization. These inequalities have not only increased poverty, but they have also favored a whole mechanism, including political and economic dependency, which is perpetuated in relationships whose rules are dictated by the strongest.

The post-colonial period, marked by revolutionary change in some countries, was short-lived. In countries like Congo, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, where there were leaders who opposed any form of imposition of capitalism and democracy, these leaders were either assassinated, poisoned or sometimes weakened by factional groups supported by the former colonial power.

In some countries, soldiers with little knowledge of administration and management of public affairs, in others, automatons who act in the interest of the powerful to preserve their power, the succession of difficulties has finally become a legacy for Africans who are struggling to recover from this nightmare.

Corruption continues to affect all sectors of production, and the financial flows of foreign multinationals established in these countries are increasing dramatically. The use of foreign currencies in some areas of West and Central Africa has deprived these countries of their monetary sovereignty, as they have difficulty creating their own

currencies. Solving environmental and demographic problems is also a challenge, as is the youthful population that seeks a better life against all odds.

Over the course of several decades, the developing countries, which have learned to be patient, have proposed solutions and ways out of crises that are more adapted to their realities and more respectful of their socio-political environment, which unfortunately have not been taken into account, either out of contempt or simply because their opinions run counter to the interests of the rich countries.

The beginning of the 21st century, which brought the era of consumerism to an end, opened the way to protests characterized by denunciation and popular violence against public power. Populism took over the institutional apparatus, which seemed too weak to meet the needs of the population.

Guinea, which had its moment of glory at independence, has a history of disillusionment with both military and civilian governments and has yet to distinguish itself in the field of development. The experience of both types of regimes has led many to take stock as observers.

Although, as in many African countries, the Internet and social media such as Facebook have contributed to an understanding of the realities of the Western world, the awareness that is being created in Guinea still has a long way to go.

The political aspects of governance and the political education system largely elude politicians and their activists in the general sense. The protests that are organized against the current government lack strategy and struggle to continue because many have never experienced the institutions of higher education, which are essential places where we can afford to rebuild ourselves and influence certain political decisions through our analyses.

One cannot claim to be a true activist without knowing one's field of intervention. The mass political culture of ethnic character established by the parties serves as a way for them to gain power and not to find the solution to the political and economic problems that are still without solutions.

The problem that needs to be addressed is not only the crises that everyone seems to know about, such as the water crisis, the electricity crisis, the road crisis, the unsanitary conditions in the capital, etc. The real problem is institutional. The real problem is

institutional. The process of legitimizing the policies of dominant cultures by those in power in societies whose realities are at a different stage of development can only be a mistake. The custodians of this new dominant culture seek to normalize and perpetuate their hegemony in all political, cultural and social relations.

However, the winds of change blowing across the African continent are engaging the continent's young intellectuals in opposition to their own governments for control of destiny and public space. This radical change is at the root of the support for the recent military regime in Guinea.

The peripheries are now trying to deconstruct the reality presented by the countries of the North. The citizens of the big cities demand to participate in public debates and to balance the discourse of the representatives of the political entities that are now forced to adapt or leave the territories. Participation in decision-making must now include all parties. The era of repressive diktat is collapsing to make way for diplomacy. The recent abstention or non-participation of African countries in the vote on Russia's non-annexation of Ukraine is an example.

Sub-regional organizations are beginning to get the message and are changing their approach to their populations. Sanctions are being transformed into dialogue, and the old-fashioned palaver-tree tool is being used. Solidarity among states is inspiring and beginning to materialize, paving the way for more equitable and balanced South-South cooperation.

Since the CNRD came to power in Guinea under Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, many changes have taken place. The Guinean judiciary and the Court for the Suppression of Economic and Financial Crimes are working to rebuild the institution and leave a country with a future for the new generation.

Today, despite President Mamady Doumbouya's ability to adapt to the situation and mitigate the crisis, the fear of a return to military rule is an integral part of people's thinking about the country's future. Persistent inequalities in access to income and living conditions for all categories of people need to be addressed.

Although the FNDC is suspected of being linked to the UFDG, which is gradually disappearing, there is no guarantee that all will be well after this transitional government. It should be remembered that Guineans are not necessarily thinking of a civilian or

military government, but rather of a strong institution capable of turning the page on the bad practices that continue to make life miserable for the majority.

The best-known means of overcoming subordination is work. The transformation of the marginalized classes into an active population, the reconstruction of public services through a safe and accompanied replacement, the valorization of vocational schools, the establishment of a quality education system, the promotion of equality to give space to the female class as well as the promotion of the Guinean intellectual are, among others, the mechanisms that it is necessary to materialize.

Education must be responsive to the demands and needs of society. Once these conditions are met, a number of innovative practices could be introduced to make government action more effective.

The control of our human resources, land and subsoil, the revision of badly tied contracts with foreign partners, the investment of profits in productive sectors through the construction of factories and local production will constitute the basis of development on which we can build a strong nation.

The materialization of all these actions in terms of the practice of good governance and the adjustment of public policies will drastically improve the conditions of all social strata. The impact on ethnic considerations and socio-political conflicts will be automatic. Equal opportunities and consideration for people of all ages and categories, without stigmatization, will create a sense of inclusion and also stimulate the desire to participate in the rebuilding of a modern state.

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# **APPENDIX**

## ACRONYMS

AFD	: French Development Agency
AI	: Artificial Intelligence
ANAD	: National Alliance for Democratic Change
AOF	: French West Africa
AU	: African Union
BCEAO	: Central Bank of West African States
BCRG	: Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea
BL	: Liberal Bloc
CARLE	: Administrative Commission for the Revision of Electoral Lists
CENI	: Independent National Electoral Commission
CFA	: French Colonies of Africa
CMRD	: Military Committee for National Recovery
CNDD	: National Council for Democracy and Development
CNRD	: National Committee of the Rally for Development
CNT	: National Council for Transition
CNTG	: The National Confederation of Guinean Workers
CODENOC	: Democratic Coalition for a New Constitution
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of West African States
EU	: European Union
FNDC	: National Front for the Defense of the Constitution
PIB (GDP)	: Gross Domestic Product
PUP	: Party of Unity and Progress
GFS	: Group of Special Forces
HAC	: High Authority for Communication
HDI	: Human Development Index
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
MINUSMA Mission in Mali	: The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MTN	: Mobile Telephone Networks
NICT	: New Information and Communication Technology
NMS	: New Social Movements
OCDE	: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEDN	: Party of Hope for National Development
PEG	: Party of Ecologists of Guinea
PNDS	: National Plan for Health Development
PDG-RDA	: Guinea Democratic Party-African Democratic Rally
RGPH	: General Census of Population and Housing
RPG	: People's Rally of Guinea
PUP	: Unity and Progress Party
RTG	: Guinean Radio and Television
SAC	: Civic Action Services
SDECE	: External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service
SLECG	: Free Union of Teachers and Researchers of Guinea
UFDG	: Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea
UFR	: Union of Republican Forces
UGDD	: Guinean Union for Democracy and Development
UGTAN	: General Union of Black African Workers
UIT	: International Telecommunication Union
UN	: United Nations Organizations
USTG	: Union Syndicale des Travailleurs de Guinée
VPN	: Virtual Private Network
WTO	: World Trade Organization
WUNC	: Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment
WWW	: World Wide Web

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## Socio-demographic characteristics of the interviewees

Informants who subjected to depth interview (Table 1)

Name and Surname	Gender	Position	Date/Place
<b><i>Ahmed Sékou Traoré</i></b> <b><i>(informant 9)</i></b>	Male	Actor of the Guinean Civil Society	Kaloum 20/09/2019 From his service...
<b><i>Mamadou Cellou Dalein Diallo</i></b> <b><i>(Informant 8)</i></b>	Male	President of the UFDG party	Dixinn 23/09/2019 at the party headquarters...
<b><i>Alpha Oumar Taran Diallo (Informant 6)</i></b>	Male	President of the ADR party	Sonfonia 03/06/2021 at Gandhi University....
<b><i>Aliou Bah</i></b> <b><i>(Informant 2)</i></b>	Male	President of the MoDeL party	Ratoma 21/09/2019 at the party headquarters....
<b><i>Diabaty Doré</i></b> <b><i>(Informant 10 )</i></b>	Male	President of the RPR party	Matoto 01/06/2021 at home.....
<b><i>Dr Faya Milimono</i></b> <b><i>(Informant 4)</i></b>	Male	President of the BL party	Lambadji 19/09/2019 at the headquarters.....
<b><i>Marie Louise Diallo</i></b> <b><i>(informant 7)</i></b>	Female	Journalist at RTG	Koloma 18/09/2019 at the Guinea Radiotelevision ...
<b><i>Tamba Zakari Milimono</i></b> <b><i>(informant 11)</i></b>	Male	Journalist and columnist at Espace FM	Matoto 18/09/2019 at Espace TV.....
<b><i>Dr Dansa Kourouma</i></b> <b><i>(Informant 1)</i></b>	Male	President of CNOSC/Civil Society/ CNT President	Matam 13/09/2019 At the civil society office .....
<b><i>Amara Camara</i></b> <b><i>(Informant 3)</i></b>	Male	Editor in chief at RTG	Matoto 19/09/2019 At home.....
<b><i>Boubacar Sanso Barry</i></b> <b><i>(Informant 5)</i></b>	Male	Editor-in-Chief of the online press le Djely/ columnis at Djoma Fm	Lambadji 21/09/2019 at the Press station.....

**Online open-ended interview (Table 2).**

These informants are often young people who have completed their studies and who have agreed to provide a minimum of information regarding their perceptions of the social movement phenomenon.

<b>Informants</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Age category</b>
<i>Informant 12</i>	Guinea	15/01/2022	Female	Political activist	40-65 years
<i>Informant 13</i>	Guinea	15/01/2022	Male	Teacher	25-40 years
<i>Informant 14</i>	Guinea	16/01/2022	Male	Journalist	25-40 years
<i>Informant 15</i>	Guinea	17/01/2022	Female	Student	25-40 years
<i>Informant 16</i>	Guinea	18/01/2022	Male	Cambist	25-40 years
<i>Informant 17</i>	Guinea	25/01/2022	Female	Economist	25-40 years
<i>Informant 18</i>	Guinea	06/02/2022	Male	Journalist	25-40 years
<i>Informant 19</i>	Guinea	10/02/2022	Male	Teacher	25-40 years
<i>Informant 20</i>	Guinea	11/02/2022	Male	Accountant	18-25 years
<i>Informant 21</i>	Guinea	12/02/2022	Male	Journalist	25-40 years
<i>Informant 22</i>	Guinea	19/02/2022	Female	Sociologist	25-40 years
<i>Informant 23</i>	Guinea	22/02/2022	Male	Educator	18-25 years
<i>Informant 24</i>	Guinea	23/02/2022	Male	Student	18-25 years
<i>Informant 25</i>	Guinea	25/02/2022	Male	Publicist lawyer	18-25 years

**SURVEY**

Date...../...../ 2019

The objective of this study is to understand and explain the emergence of social and political manifestations, their consequences, and the distrust of the populations in Guinea.

This study concerns individuals belonging to the following specific groups: leaders of social movements, community leaders, politicians, local elected officials, religious leaders, young people and ordinary citizens (men and women).

**IDENTITY AND GENERAL INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS**

- 1. Administrative Region:.....
- 2. Common/: \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_/
- 3. Neighbourhood/District: \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_/
- 4. Village/ Sector: \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_/
- 5. Date of interview..... / \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_0\_/ Sept\_/2019
- 6. Name of Investigator: \_\_\_\_\_
- 7. Controller Name: \_\_\_\_\_
- 8. Control date..... / \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_0\_/ Sept \_/2019
- 9. Name of input Agent: \_\_\_\_\_
- 10. Date of entry..... / \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_0\_/ Sept \_/2019
- 11. Interview start time ..... / \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_/
- 12. Interview results: completed (1); partially completed (2); refused (3) /\_\_\_/

**STATISTICAL SECRECY**

*“The information collected during this investigation, including information relating to the privacy of the individuals being investigated, is **CONFIDENTIAL**. They may in no case be disclosed or used for political purposes, fiscal control, economic repression or legal proceedings», in accordance with article 7 of Law L/95/047/CTRN of 29 August 1995.*

**SECTION I: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT**

N°	Questions, instructions and filters	Answers	Codes	Referrals
Q1	Investigator to record the sex of the respondent	Masculine Feminine	1 2	
Q2	How old are you?	Age (in full years)	/____/____/	
Q3	What is your level of education?	Without level of education Primary Secondary Professional Superior Other (to be specified)	1 2 3 4 5 6	
Q4	What is your marital status	Single Common-law union Married Monogamous Married Polygamist Divorced/Separated Widower	1 2 3 4 5 6	
Q5	If married polygamist what is the number of wives/co-wives?	/____/		
Q6	What is your religious denomination?	Muslim Christian Animist Without religion Other (to be specified) _____	1 2 3 4 8	
Q7	Do you have an activity that provides you with money?	Yes Non	1 0	
Q8	What is your main source of income?	Liberal profession Trade Private sector employee Public sector employee Domestic work Other (to be specified)	1 2 3 4 5 6	
Q9	Can you please tell us your monthly salary income?	Less than 500,000 GNF From 500.000 - 1.000.000 GNF From 1.000.000 - 2.500.000 GNF From 2.500.000 - 5.000.000 GNF MORE than 5.000.000 GNF	1 2 3 4 5	
Q10	Do you work primarily in rural or urban areas?	Rural Urbain	1 2	
Q11	Statutes in the community	Imam Priest Communicator/C Notable Local elected Youth leader Woman leader Ordinary citizen Other (to be specified)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	

**SECTION II: KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSES OF THE EXPANSION OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENTS**

N°	Questions, instructions and filters	Answers	Codes	Referrals
Q11	Do you feel you belong to a community minority (ethnic, religious, etc.)?	YES NON	1 2	
Q12	Have you ever participated in a protest program? -Peaceful or violent march	YES NON	1 2	<b>If yes go to next question</b>
Q13	How many times have you participated in protest movements?	Never One to five times Five to 10 times 10 times or more	1 2 3 4	
Q14	How long have you been involved in a social movement?	Less than one (1) year 1 to 3 years 3 to 6 years More than 6 years	1 2 3 4	
Q15	Are you an activist of a political party or an organization? If yes, which	Mobility Opposition Civil society Other to specify	1 2 3 4	
Q16	In which Commune or district are you mainly active as an activist?	Matoto Ratoma Kalum Dixinn Matam	1 2 3 4 5	
Q17	What does participating in a social movement mean to you?	Political Patriot Regionalist ethnocentrism Nothing at all Other	1 2 3 4 5 6	
Q18	Have you ever used a social network or communication channel to mobilize people or get a message across for your party or organization? If yes (several choices are possible)	Traditional media (television, radio) Social media (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram, etc.) Never	1 2 3	
Q19	In your opinion, what is the basis of social and political mobilizations in Guinea?	Lack of justice and democracy Lack of water and electricity Lack of jobs and nepotism Economy and social inequalities Nutritional insufficiency Other	1 2 3 4 5 6	
Q20	How do you perceive the level of citizen mobilization during the demonstrations?	Very good Good Bad Very bad	1 2 3 4	
Q21	How do you like the results?	Very satisfactory Satisfying Unsatisfactory Bad	1 2 3 4	

**SECTION III: CITIZENS' FEAR AND CONFIDENCE AT EVENTS**

N°	Questions, instructions and filters	Answers	Codes	Referrals
Q22	Do you stay at home during demonstrations?	YES NON	1 2	
Q23	Were you attacked during the demonstrations?	YES NON	1 2	<b>If yes go to next question</b>
Q24	Where exactly were you attacked?	At home At work At school In the street Other.....	1 2 3 4 5	
Q25	What do you think are the reasons for the attacks?	Ethnic Policies Robberies and murders Revenge Other.....	1 2 3 4 5	
Q26	During the demonstrations, what is the most common act in your municipality?	Murder Vol Rape Barricade Violence Destruction of property Other.....	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
Q27	Are you afraid of demonstrations?	YES NON	1 2	
Q28	How do you describe your relations with your neighbors during elections or demonstrations in your municipality?	Good Very good Excellent Bad Very bad	1 2 3 4 5	

Do you have anything to add?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Thank you Mr. / Mrs. for participating in our survey.

<b>INTERVIEW GUIDE</b>
------------------------

**I-IDENTIFICATION**

1. **Commune**

.....

2. **Neighborhood**

.....

3. **Number and type of respondents**

.....

**II- KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORIGIN AND EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

1. What do you think is behind the social and political demonstrations in Guinea?
2. According to some, their origins can be traced back to the propensity of certain groups to develop collective initiatives to defend their interests and find representation for them in the political system? What's your take on this?
3. Are these collective movements related to systemic crises?
4. Since 2007, social movements have taken a new turn. What do you think is the socio-political background to these events?
5. Are the intermediary bodies failing? Trade unions / civil society ?
6. Do unions and civil society still have the capacity to initiate the resolution of these conflicts?
7. In your opinion, do the response and methods used by the executive conform to international standards?
8. Is there a radicalization of social movements in Guinea today?
9. What can we expect in the event of a constitutional change in Guinea?
10. What impact might these protests have on the process, or the actions underway, initiated by the government?
11. What are the responsibilities of the executive and the opposition in triggering it?
12. What role does the media play in these conflicts? And how can we explain the domination of new media over traditional media?
13. What impact might this have on citizens?