

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
THE FUTURE: POSSIBILITY,CONTENT
AND CONSEQUENCES**

Doctoral Thesis

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DOCTORAL THESIS

Department of Sociology

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FINAL APPROVAL FOR THESIS

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ÖZET

SOSYAL BİLİMLER VE GELECEK İLİŞKİSİ: OLANAKLILIK, İÇERİK VE SONUÇLAR

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Bu çalışma sosyal bilim ve gelecek ilişkisi üzerine bir tartışma yürütmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Geleceğin sosyal süreçlerin ve insan eyleminin önemli bir unsuru olmasına karşın sosyal bilime dahil edilmesi noktasında ikircikli bir tutum söz konusudur. Bu ikircikli tutumun kaynağı ve yansıması olarak sosyal bilimde genellikle uzakta ve henüz olmayan biçiminde kavramsallaştırılan gelecek, düşüncedeki bu konumu nedeniyle ancak belirli yaygın eğilimler üzerinden ve dolaylı olarak sosyalin analizine dahil edilebilmektedir. Bu durumun yarattığı en önemli sorun, gelecek sosyolojisi alanının olgunlaşmamasından ziyade sosyal bilimin sosyalle, çağıyla ve kendisiyle ilişkisi üzerindeki etkilerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu nedenle, çalışmada sosyal bilim ve gelecek ilişkisine yönelik tartışmanın temel odaklarından biri geleceğin sosyal düşüncedeki yaygın konumunun sorgulanması üzerine kurulmaktadır. Bu odak, geleceğe kıyasla daha yaygın ve yerleşik bir ilgi gören zamana ilişkin kuramsal yaklaşımların sosyal ve zaman arasında kurdukları ilişkinin değerlendirilmesi yoluyla açılmaktadır. Kuramsal tartışmaların sosyal bilim ve gelecek ilişkisi açısından yarattığı açmazlar, daha ziyade zamana ilişkin deneyimlere ve bu deneyimler arasındaki eşitsizliklere odaklanan ve çalışmada zaman politikası olarak adlandırılan literatürdeki bir başka eğilim tarafından yeniden üretilmektedir. Bu noktada, manifesto türünden seçilen örneklerin zamansal yapılarının analizi sosyal bilim ve gelecek ilişkisi üzerine düşünme girişimi için önemli bir alan açmaktadır. Ayrıca, söz konusu ilişki sosyalin tanımsal sınırlarını ve içeriğini de biçimlendiren bilim ile gelecek ilişkisi açısından da değerlendirilmektedir. Bu

tartışmalardan hareketle, gelecek spesifik bir çalışma konusu olmaktan ziyade, çalışmada futural olarak adlandırılan bir duruş ve perspektif olarak konumlandırılmaktadır. Futural duruş ve perspektifin içeriği ise, çalışmada futural sosyal bilimin önkoşulu olarak tanımlanan zamansallığın niteliklerinin tartışılması ve geleceğin düşüncedeki konumunun sorgulanması yoluyla açıklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gelecek, Zaman, Zamansal, Sosyal bilim, Manifesto

ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE FUTURE: POSSIBILITY, CONTENT AND CONSEQUENCES

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This study aims to discuss the relationship between the social science and the future. Although the future is an important element of social processes and human actions, there is an ambivalent attitude to its inclusion in social science. As the both source and reflection of this ambivalent attitude, the future, which is generally conceptualized as distant and not-yet in social science, has been indirectly included in the analysis of the social through certain common tendencies due to its position in thought. The most significant problem created by this situation arises from its effects on the relationship of social science with the social, the age and itself, rather than the immaturity of the sociology of the future. Thus, in the study, one of the main focuses of the discussion on the relationship between social science and the future is based on the questioning the prevailing position of the future in social thought. This focus is opened through the evaluations of the relationship between the social and time established by the theoretical approaches to time, which have received more extensive and settled attention than the future. The predicaments created by the theoretical debates in terms of the relationship between social science and the future have been reproduced by another tendency in the literature which focuses on time-related experiences and the inequalities between these experiences, and is called as the politics of time in the study. At this juncture, the analysis of the temporal structures of the examples selected from the manifesto genre opens up an important room for the attempt to contemplate on the relationship between social science and the future. In addition, the relationship in question is also evaluated with regard to the relationship between the future and science, which also shapes the definitional boundaries and content of the social. Based on these discussions, the future is positioned

as a stance and perspective called as futural in the study, rather than a specific subject of study. The content of the futural stance and perspective is explained by discussing the features of temporality defined as the precondition of futural social science in the study, and questioning the position of the future in thought.

Keywords: Future, Time, Temporal, Social science, Manifesto

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29/06//2022

STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND RULES

I hereby truthfully declare that this thesis is an original work prepared by me; that I have behaved in accordance with the scientific ethical principles and rules throughout the stages of preparation, data collection, analysis and presentation of my work; that I have cited the sources of all the data and information that could be obtained within the scope of this study, and included these sources in the references section; and that this study has been scanned for plagiarism with “scientific plagiarism detection program” used by Anadolu University, and that “it does not have any plagiarism” whatsoever. I also declare that, if a case contrary to my declaration is detected in my work at any time, I hereby express my consent to all the ethical and legal consequences that are involved.

Aslı AĞCAOĞLU

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1. INTRODUCTION

The future embedded in all practices and actions, and linked through various ways from dreaming to planning is an integral part of the social. Social science, as a field of theory and practice on the social, is not exempt from the concern for the future. However, the future has occupied an ambivalent position on the grounds that it does not meet the criteria of science due to its immeasurability and unobservability, has been lost between the emphases on the past and the present in the process of the demarcation of social science, has been accepted as the violation of the principle of neutrality, and does not fit into the definition of factuality. Therefore, the future, which simultaneously contains two contradictory features as the inseparable part of the social, and as the violator of the principles of science, has been an awkward subject for the science of the social.

Despite this ambivalent relationship, concern for and interest in the future has continued to exist in various forms. Since the future is considered in relation with change, new, and difference, it can find a place for itself, albeit implicit and imperfect in most cases, in the theories of social change and of modernization, predictions about the various structures and processes, evaluations carried on the technological and scientific developments, and the notion of progress. In addition, social scientists have also been able to relate to the future through the analysis of future-related genres, and of the expectations and perceptions of people, societies, or ages. In spite of this inclusion, it is pointed out that the interest in the future that had existed in the initial phase of social sciences disappeared, on the one hand, with the emergence of state-perspectives such as structuralism and functionalism (Adam, 2005; 2008a; 2011; Bainbridge, 2003), and with the gradual loss of confidence in the future on the other (Adam and Groves, 2007; Heilbroner, 1968; Urry, 2016). For that reason, significant focus in the future which shone for a short time in the second half of the twentieth century as the sociology of the future, unfortunately, did not last long, and eventually, future-enthusiastic social scientists had to take refuge in a different field of study (Bell, 1999).

Aside from the problem of the future's inability to develop as a sub-discipline, the scope and the content of the interest in the future points to the important consequences not only for the perspective of social science on the future, but also, perhaps even more, on the social, the current age, and itself. The fact that approaches on the future, despite their differences, are in cooperation on the distant and not-yet future indicates that the relation between the future and social science deserves to be considered more. When the

future is conceived in this way, it does not seem possible to expect it to be genuinely included in social science apart from the aforementioned tendencies. Since the future is located far from the age and the distance is ambiguous, this conception of the future which should always remain as the future also causes the social and the age to be considered within certain limits and with certain questions.

From this base, the study aims to conduct a discussion on the relationship established between social science and the future without relying on the prevailing tendencies and conceptualizations. Since the establishment of any relation firstly entails to understand the position of the being related, the discussion on the relation established with the future requires to question the position of the future in social thought. In the study, this questioning is majorly constructed on the approaches to the subject of time which has found broader and fertile theoretical ground as compared to the future. The evaluation of time literature is made on the basis of the relationship they established between social and time in conformity with the main problem of the study. In this scope, the most prominent and strong line is founded on the notion of social time which is differentiated from other forms of time with its qualitative aspects and its function as common framework. This first line based on Durkheim's (1995) ideas on the categories including time assumes a regulative relation between time and social. Even though the future is not genuinely included in this line, it gets attention by means of the comparisons between the visions of the future of people, societies, and historical periods, which is fed by the basic assumptions of the first line. Whereas the second line comprises broad theoretical distribution, these different theoretical stances converge on the constitutive relation between social and time as well as distinction between the immediate and distant pasts and futures on the base of experience, consciousness, practice, structuration, and system. Although the future is relatively included in this second line as compared to the first one, this relationship is almost semi-automatically established in the context of the immediate present. Time and social enter into connection on the third line in company with the various historical and social processes. In the third line, the content of time and future changes according to the differences in perspective on the more or less similar processes. However, it should also be remarked that the boundaries between the lines are not always very sharp.

Theoretical evaluations of time indicate two important predicaments in terms of the relationship in question. The first of these is the tendency to proliferate the adjectives

of time that began with the notion of social time, consolidated with the tendency to compare, deepened with the questioning of temporal inequalities and different time experiences, and got out of the control with the reduction of time to the isolated experiences. While the invention of adjectives is meaningful to some extent, and even necessary to understand the relation between social and time as well as the unequal and conflictual aspects of the social, the problem is that, on the one hand, there is no common ground of discussion on the adjectives, and on the other hand, they are endlessly proliferated according to the peculiarities of each experience. The second problem stems from the fact that time and temporal are generally interchangeably employed, and when a distinction is made, temporal is used in the sense that is relatively similar to the constitutive understanding. This conceptualization causes to divide social into two spheres, one is more rigid, homogeneous and even atemporal, and the other is more fluid, heterogeneous, and temporal. The most striking result of this division is that the regulative side of time, and, more importantly, society, structures, social institutions and similar components of the social are excluded from temporality. Another important result brought by the discussions about time is that the vast majority of approaches meet on the imputed position of the future despite all their differences. The future is generally considered as distant and not-yet which can begin when the present ends, but the present never ends, the future never begins. This position also explains the existence and prevalence of certain trends by which the future infiltrates social science.

Another significant tendency that time finds ground for itself in social science is the questioning of time experiences and temporal inequalities that become evident by the trio of standard time, clock time and linear time settled in parallel with historical and social processes such as industrialization, modernization and capitalism. The most prominent veins of this tendency called as the politics of time in the study, are the pairs of working time and leisure time, and cyclical and linear time. This tendency has been enriched by means of questioning of the prevalent assumptions and frameworks through women's time experiences and changing content and forms of labour. However, meaningful attempts to scrutinize and challenge the inequalities that emerge over the control and regulation of time have been gradually transformed into the focus on the specific experiences of time without relating to broader context. Therefore, by gradual disconnection of time-related experiences and inequalities, these approaches, which have

the power to be closer to the practice, led to the reduction of visibility of inequalities and the fading away of the future which is confined into expectations and intentions.

The future is ambivalent not only in its relation to the social, but also to the second part of social science, namely science. Since the future does not conform to the given definitions of the principles of factuality, causality, and objectivity on the one hand, and it is indirectly involved in social engineering practices by which science is used to plan and control on the other, the future has been hesitantly approached. In other words, it is simultaneously being inadequate to the principles of science, and the contributor of strict practice of science. Under these circumstances, besides the efforts to make room for the future in the field of science by emphasizing the processuality, latency and immateriality of the future, relatively immune fields from the principles of science such as absolute new and images have also been created.

In line with the purpose of the study, manifestos, which present an interesting temporal framework, are also evaluated. This genre opens a fertile ground in order to think about the relation in question since it is constructed on the relatively concrete ground unlike other future-related genres as well as it focuses on the similar fields with social science, albeit from different angle and with different purposes. Manifestos, which are frequently invited to social science to discuss on the formation of the political subject, understand social movements, and propound new ideas in the face of prevailing and ossified assumptions, have not attracted as much attention as the other future-related genres in order to think about the future and time. Therefore, the temporal structure of this genre gives an opportunity to reflect on the relationship between social science and the future.

Since the future as an integral part of the social occupies unsettled position in social thought, this unbalanced subject entails to be deeply pondered. On this basis, the study contemplates on the relationship established between social science and the future without relying on any of the common tendencies and prevailing assumptions. In this respect, the relationship in question is discussed on the line that stretches between the future which follows the present and never begins, and the future which is closely connected to the present. The study moves on this line by employing the term futural to indicate the future as quality that social science can hold, rather than future as specific subject as in the sociology of the future. The characteristics of futural social science is attempted to be clarified by a distinction between time and temporal, and stipulating

temporality as the precondition of futurity. This study mainly based on the relationship between the future and social science, consists of four chapters.

In the second chapter of the study, the reasons behind the exclusion of the future, the features of a field of study dedicated to the future, theoretical approaches to time through relation between social and time, two predicaments arising from the conceptualizations of time, temporality as the precondition of futurity, and the prevailing position of the future in social thought will be elaborated.

In the third chapter, the tendencies and studies called as the politics of time, which are closer to the field of practice, and question the time-related inequalities, will be addressed. In this framework, the reasons making time political, the history of emergence and prevalence of clock, standard, and linear times, the distinction between work and leisure, inquiries into the dominant time-related understandings and frameworks, and the portrait of the future drawn by the evaluated studies will be discussed.

The fourth chapter of the study will be constructed on the temporal structure of the manifesto genre. In this respect, literary features of the manifestos, the temporal features released from the ten selected examples of the genre, the social scientific texts appealing to manifestos as content or title, and the opportunities offered by the genre in terms of the relationship in question will be analysed.

In the last chapter, the relation between the future and science via the fundamental principles of science and the social engineering, the fields created to connect with the future without disturbing scientific field, three important points on whether the future is considered as process or outcome, on the questions asked for subjects under consideration and on the attitude and act maintained in futural stance, and finally, basic characteristics of the futural social science will be detailed.

2. THE FUTURE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

The relationship between the future and social science¹, or science in general, can be briefly described as arduous to establish and somewhat ambivalent. The most basic cause of this brief definition is that the prevalent conception of the future violates the basis of science that accustomed to talk about the measurable and observable. Therefore, wandering in the garden of the past and the present that offers measurable and observable data has always been more appropriate to scientific attitude. The future, on the other hand, as for all subjects that are difficult to properly and scientifically dealt with, has been either handed over to the different fields and manner of speaking, or transformed into the forms accepted as more suitable for science. When it comes to the latter option, the convenient act of science has often been prediction. Yet, since verification of what is predicted becomes possible after future gives up being future, what science talks about is not the future, but the reliability of the past and present data by the help of the future. As for social science, this ambivalent relationship based on prediction gets more outlandish, since, on the one hand, it becomes difficult to maintain externality established with what is spoken about, and social is considered as more contingent, and full of surprises on the other. Thereupon, as the measurement and experiment do not work well in the field of social sciences, it becomes difficult to fit the future into the act of prediction. In addition, emphasis on the future, in most cases, can be evaluated as infringement of the principles of neutrality and objectivity. Thus, the future resisting to be predicted, becomes a very challenging subject for social sciences to deal with, and to remain neutral and objective.

Yet, throughout history, people have continued to talk about and connect with the future in various ways. Social sciences are also not exempt from this concern. As Urry (2016) indicated that the effort to imagine and forecast future as well as the “specialists of the future” from prophets to futurologists common in almost all societies. However, since the future is difficult to talk about in the field of science, it is converted into proper forms that are assumed as more talkable and more legitimate for science, as in the case of all subjects disturbing conventional forms of thought. Thus, when parts of this title, the future and social science, come together, some pervasive and familiar trends have been emerged. First of all, the future has implicitly or explicitly infiltrated social sciences to a

¹Although the texts evaluated in the study are predominantly from the discipline of sociology, the phrase “social science” will be overwhelmingly employed due to the fact that conceptualizations of time and the future exhibit relatively similar tendencies in the fields looking into the social from different sides and angles.

certain extent through theories of social change and its accompanied distinction between “social static” and “social dynamic” (Comte, 2015). The analysis of future-related genres assumed to convert future into concrete data is another prevailing tendency. Though the connection of the future in these genres, i.e., utopia, dystopia, and science-fiction, with the present is contestable, this fictional future lived in the fictitious space and/or time is assumed to become present and legitimate base for interest in the future because social scientists hold the texts. In addition, as the reflection of the familiar bond established between technique, science and progress from the very beginning of social sciences, the future can permeate into social science via emphasis on changes brought by technology, techniques and science with the additional help of grandiose developments in various fields such as information technologies and genetic science. For certain, though the invitation to the future through such changes and developments can be accompanied by enthusiasm or lament according to the point of view, the future has become technical progress social scientists can talk about on a legitimate base. Toffler (1970) made such an identification by declaring that “in the three short decades between now and the twenty-first century...the future will have arrived too soon”, especially for citizens of “advanced” countries. The future has also found a place for itself in social sciences by some notions presented as model such as modernization, progress, industrialization that are also the *raison d’être* of social sciences, and accompanying applications such as social engineering. Besides, the future has been invited to social sciences through inventories and analysis of the expectations, intentions and visions of people, societies, societal positions or ages. Accordingly, based on expectations and visions, various comparisons have been made over the relationship established with the future as well as inferences about whether the age is dark or radiant. Moreover, the future has been included in the social sciences through predictions on the future of specific subjects such as capitalism, technology, environment, and industry. Addedly, combination of the future and social science also brings to mind the future of social sciences or the role of social sciences in shaping the future, albeit very rare in today in comparison with the other tendencies.

Since the amalgam of future and social science evokes these prevalent tendencies, it may be more illustrative to start with the negative definition of the study. Primarily, the study aims neither to analyse the future through future-related genres as very common tendency today, nor to discuss the future as a field scudding across technology. In addition, there is no search for an answer to “what kind of future awaits us?”, i.e., the

study does not aim to discuss the future of environmental disasters, the capitalist mode of production, technological developments, and population movements. This study not only leaves behind the concern for “future of”, but also the question of “how soon”, that is, there is no inference in the study about whether the future implies a century later, next year or one hour later. This question also alludes to a boundary between a beginning and an end. On this boundary (or at least at the small-dot like area) future begins, and present ends, while the past, in this fiction, becomes ceaselessly expanding piece of time swallowing the present and the future. This study does not rely on such a time conceptualization. Also, in this study, the future will not be discussed with normative attitudes such as presenting a model or solutions to social problems. Similarly, the study does not aim to make an inventory on the future expectations, hopes or disappointments of people, social groups or different epochs.

After briefly mentioning what the study does not aim in its attempt to think about the future, the main focus of the study can be clarified. This study aims to reflect on the possibility, content and consequences of establishing a relationship with the future within the framework of social sciences, without relying on any of the common tendencies each of which has important outcomes for social sciences. In this attempt, since the future is somehow related to all subject social sciences deal with, i.e., every part of the social, the aim here is to think about a relationship that can be established with the future beyond the common trends and conceptualizations in social science rather than to focus on the future as a specific subject. To put it in different way, the discussion conducted on the relationship between social science and the future can be considered as a question on the possibility of encounter with the future without even using the word “future”, rather than the “sociology of the future” which refers to a specific subject matter. More to the point, the character of the relationship established with the future also means to think about the relationship of social science with its current age, the past, social in general, and itself. Unfortunately, the abovementioned prevalent tendencies in social sciences reproduce the future as disconnected field from the present in varying degrees and contents. It means that these attempts turn their backs to the present and the past in order to turn their gaze to the future. Therefore, although the main issue in this study is not the sociology of the future, contemplation on how the future is commonly positioned and understood in the current debates is one of the bases this study constructed on, because, to establish a relationship entails to take a stance and stand at an angle, then it deserves to be considered

on how the target is positioned. Even though it is possible to discuss and scrutinize the future through different themes and in very different ways, attempt in this study firstly entails to look into the ossified position of the future in social thought. For this reason, first of all, position of the future in social sciences, and then the characteristics of a field devoted to the future will be discussed. Afterwards, inferences about the future will be captured by evaluating the theoretical approaches to time that have found a relatively legitimate base for itself compared to the future as specific subject. Based on these approaches, a discussion will be conducted on two problems created by the evaluations of time that require to be considered in order to establish a genuine relationship with the future. Finally, based on all these discussions, general perception and conceptualization of the future in social sciences will be evaluated.

2.1. The Future, a Disregarded Subject?

Although the future has infiltrated the social sciences through certain above-mentioned tendencies, it has still been difficult to find a legitimate theoretical ground for itself. The ambivalent position of the future stems from the assumed contents and necessities of two words, i.e., social and science. In this framework, the science of the social has either focused on the observable and measurable aspects of the social, or tried to convert resistive parts into the more suitable forms to be scientifically spoken. Thus, the past and the present has become more proper data for social science instead of the not-yet future. This illegitimacy of the future has been secured by such demarcations that the subject of sociology must be past and present like positive sciences (Durkheim, 1895/1982; 1912/1995) and by such definitions that “the type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical science of concrete reality” (Weber, 1903-1917/2012). Hence, the future has been able to enter into the field shaped by emphases on empirical and positive only through hesitant predictions and inferences. Accordingly, the current ambivalent position of the future has been evaluated with an emphasis on bereavement that the activist and future-oriented attitudes appeared in parallel with the great social changes experienced by the founders of social sciences such as “Saint-Simon, Comte, and Condorcet” have been replaced by the evidence-based objectivist and interpretative approaches that have detracted social sciences from normative attitudes, and directed to the “static and conservative view of the future” (Adam, 2005; 2008a; 2011; Bainbridge, 2003). With regard to the loss of future-oriented attitude, besides static and evidence-

based approaches, the general state of insecurity and uncertainty brought by the catastrophic historical experiences has also been pointed out. In this manner, it is asserted that uncertainty created by historical experiences such as wars, revolutions, and the abuse of technology and science hampers to construct meaningful connection between the past, the future, and the present as well as led to the reduction of the future to the present (Adam and Groves, 2007; Heilbroner, 1968). In a similar vein, Urry (2016) connected the loss of confidence with the changes in the “structures of feeling” resultant especially of some historical events such as 9/11 and invasion of Iraq in 2003 unveiling dystopic dimensions of globalization. The validity of such claims on the relation between future and social science, however, is partially open to be contested. Primarily, contrary to what the first comment pointed out, the future has been introduced to social sciences, albeit indirectly, through discussions on time run mostly by scholars having functionalist, interpretivist, and even system-based tendencies. Regarding this issue, Martins (1975) argued that although functionalism has always been criticized inasmuch as being static, atemporal, and ahistorical, sociological theory is still suffered from the lack of temporal and historical interest in comparison with the classical functionalism. Regarding the second comment, insecurity and the loss of confidence about the future, contrary to the claims, is one of the most prominent trends that open up a space for the future in the field of social science through various themes negated the future such as “risk” (Beck, 2011), “unanticipated consequences of purposive social action” (Merton, 1936), “unintended consequences” (Giddens, 1996), “acceleration of reality” (Virilio, 2003), and pastless and futureless “hyperreality” (Baudrillard, 2011). Undoubtedly, this pessimistic gaze is the one of the prominent problems of our age, because historical processes, accompanied social sciences in the nineteenth century, also carried a similar, perhaps even greater degree, uncertainty. Therefore, regarding the relation between social science and the future, it can be propounded that major issue is not the uncertainty but perspective and attitude towards perceived uncertainty. The difference between attitude of the nineteenth century thinkers who attempted to give direction of perceived uncertainty, and of current age that negated and avoid from the future implies very significant break in stance. For sure, this differentiation is closely related to the disastrous experiences that is partly contributed by the fundamental notions of the nineteenth century such as progress and unconditional confidence in science. Yet, despite all devastating historical experiences, social science could have preferred putting the claim on the future instead of gradually

moving away, but did not. Related to this point, Jameson (2003; Stephanson and Jameson, 1989) meaningfully asked, “after the end of history, what?” To Jameson, postmodern culture is specified by the confinement of all connections within the present, impotency of inventing alternatives, and consequently the substitution of “spatialization” for “temporalization.” This announcement of the “end of history” was also construed by Virilio (2003), as a token of the “end of space, and... of geography” by means of the victory of simultaneity over succession. Similarly, Harvey (1997) asserted that social theory focusing on social changes, modernization and progress led to the “annihilation of space by time.” With regard the same point, but from relatively different angle, defining the age he lives in as “the epoch of simultaneity”, Foucault (1984) indicated that history as the focal point of the nineteenth century abandoned its place to the space. However, just like the notion of the end of history, the claims on the replacement of history with space, as well as announcements of the end of space can be evaluated as the reflections of the distortion in perspective. It is extremely true that experiences and processes related to time and space have undergone some historical changes to the extent that time and space are not absolute categories, but when these transformations are interpreted as process of disappearance or displacement, the meaning of these changes cannot be genuinely captured. In other words, time and history (and also space) do not leave their place or completely disappear, thus the main problem is where we turn our gaze and how we define time, history, space and the future. Relatedly, Bloch (1954/1996) connected the problem of perspective with capitalist society and bourgeoisie characterized by static thinking and hostility towards future. Therefore, assertion of the loss can convey significant meaning to social thought to the extent that it is defined as either a loss of interest as Jameson did, or as connection between stance and historical conditions as Bloch propounded, rather than as the loss of time, space or history.

Though an interest in the future existed in the emergence of social sciences shone again for a short time in the second half of the twentieth century, unfortunately, the future, later on, was surrendered to the separate field of study shaped by policy-making, business, and war management that entails prediction, forecasting, modelling, and planning (Adam, 2008a; Tutton; 2017). Therefore, future-oriented social scientists had to fulfil desire of future outside of their fields of profession. Two articles written by Wendell Bell, a prominent futurist but also a sociologist, can sufficiently reveal the exclusion of the future from the social science. In an article dated 1971, the “Sociology and the Emergent Study

of the Future” (Huber and Bell, 1971), Bell hopefully expected that the sociology of the future could develop in the 1970s. In this mood of optimism, Bell, together with James Mau, a sociologist too, edited a book titled as *The Sociology of the Future* (Bell and Mau, 1973) first published in 1971. However, after 28 years, Bell (1999) expressed his disappointment with such sentences, “...in 1971, we believed that futures studies would -and ought to- become an important part of the field of sociology. We now know that did not happen. Nor did futures studies become an established university discipline in its own right.” One of the most underlying reasons of the transformation of expectation shone in the 1960s and the 1970s to disappointment at the end of 1990s is the ossified position of the future in social sciences and general opinion. Yet, before delving into this position, a brief glance at the field of study dedicated to the subject of future may guide the inferences about the ways to establish a genuine relationship between social science and the future.

2.1.1 A field devoted to the future

The future, which draws relatively less interest than other subjects in the social sciences, has had a chance to be the focus of another field of study dedicated to the future. However, it is also possible to assert that being handled in the different field instead of social sciences has important consequences. Though future-enthusiastic social scientists, like aforementioned Bell, had the opportunity to fulfil their desires, the field has been predominated by various disciplines and fields in compliance with the needs and demands of governments and business sector that has had a significant impact on the conceptualization of the future. For example, Bell (1999) pointed out that when he first attended to the futurist conferences, most futurists in the field were not social scientists, but rather came from different fields such as “physicists, engineers, mathematicians, journalists, lawyers, community leaders, exobiologists, environmentalists, operations researchers, business managers and executives.” Though Bell drawn attention to the positive contribution of these futurists to sociology, it can also be asserted that the basic assumptions and methodological tools of the field confine the content and scope of these contributions to some extent.

A similar assortment in the field to that of experts working in the field can also be found in the denomination for the field. In this respect, it is difficult to claim that there is a consensus on the name of the field, even though “the futures studies” is employed in

this study in accordance with the texts evaluated in this subtitle. While the futures studies has mostly been used by American futurists, European futurists generally employed “prospective” as well as there are some other names such as “prognostics”, “futures research”, “futuristics”, “futures field”, “futuribles” (as the combination of future and possible), and “foresight.” In addition, the plural suffix “-s” at the end of many names signifies the plurality and openness of the future (Bell, 2009; Dator, 2011). In order to reveal confusion in naming, Sardar (2010) listed some prominent names of the field such as “social mathematics”, “foresight”, “scenarios approach”, “futurology”, “conjecture”, “prospective analysis”, “futures studies”, “futures research”, “futures study”, “strategic management”, “visionary management”, and “futuring.” Thus, Sardar pointed out that futurists has unduly concentrated on naming, but changing the name cannot solve the problems of the field. Similar confusion and diversity can also be found in the imputed predecessors of the field such as H. G. Wells, Jules Verne, Plato, Comte, Condorcet, Rousseau, Marx, More, ideas of utopian socialists, and Judeo-Christian theology. As historical antecedents, planning especially done during the World War I and the Great Depression, social engineering in Italy, Germany and Soviet Russia, and William F. Ogburn’s studies on social trends and technology in the 1930s have been referred (Bell, 1999).

While various sources are cited as antecedents, the current content and form of the futures studies began to sprout in the atmosphere of the World War II and afterwards. In this process, besides how to manage the war and subsequently the Cold War, planning and management of the newly-established nation states cause to increase in the interest in the future, especially in the Western governments. For this reason, it is possible to claim that the future has become one of the most important fronts of the Cold War. This interest based on the planned, open and controllable future has also been very influential on the methodological and theoretical features of the futures studies. The first step in the field was taken in 1943 by the German philosopher Flechteim to establish *futurologie* as an applied research field with some objectives such as preventing war and strengthening peace, balancing population growth, preventing hunger and poverty. In France, as equivalent step with Flechteim, “the prospective studies”, at the end of 1950s, was established by Berger who claimed that the future is embedded within present and that is why preparing to future is more important than forecast. Although the foundation of the President’s Social Research Council on Social Trends in 1933 by Roosevelt was

considered as an important attempt for the field in America, the essential step was the establishment of the RAND Corporation in 1948 to work on the defence issues. This corporation, which also carried out non-military projects in the 1970s, developed many methodological techniques used in the futures studies such as “scenario building” and “Delphi method”, trained many futurists and contributed to make organizations for the future. In this process, the emergence of “operation research” as the combination of technology and military, and of think tanks like RAND, have played an important role in the development of the field of futures studies. In addition, as a result of the increasing interest in the futures studies, various institutions had founded such as the Commission on the Year 2000 (1964), The World Future Society (1966), and the World Future Studies Federation (1973). The purposes of these institutions also give an important clue about the futures studies. One of the reasons behind the foundation of the World Future Studies Federation, for example, was to “promote exchanges between East and West at a time when the Soviet Bloc refuted the idea of several possible futures” (Bell, 2003; Dator, 2011; de Jouvenel, 2019; Poli, 2011; Staley, 2002). Futurist attempts with this aspect that was dominant in the initial phase of the field, has been generally oriented to consultancy in making economic and political decisions. From this point of view, plenty of studies has been done in connection with governments and organizations such as the Recent Social Trends in the United States (1933, by the President’s Research Committee on Social Trends), the America’s Needs and Resources (1947, and 1955 by The Twentieth Century Fund), the Indicators of Social Change: Concepts and Measurements (1968, by The Russell Sage Foundation), and the Social Indicators (1973, by the U.S. Executive Office of the President) (Bell, 2009).

In the process that rationality, science and technology are put at the service of international power struggles, while the field has shaped its methodological tools and taken research opportunities through military purposes and planning in an effort to carry out more effective policies, its theoretical development has also taken its share from this formation. For instance, the Congress for Cultural Freedom as one of the contributors of this formation, supported by CIA and the Ford Foundation, aimed to “promote consensual democracy, liberal capitalism and anti-Marxism, creation of positive image of American culture” (Seefried, 2014). Although this tendency prevailing especially during 1950s and 1960s is accompanied by other tendencies, it is possible to propound that it still preserves its effectiveness in the field. To understand this effect, the information provided by

Fernani (2019) on the content of the journal *Futures* can be helpful. According to this analysis, the most popular issues are “corporate foresight”, “past & futures”, “humanity at limen”, “environmental futures”, “post-normality & complexity”, and “technological trends.” Fernani also suggested that there had been sudden increase in the topic of “corporate foresight” after 2004. On this basis, it can be concluded that the futures studies have been predominantly shaped by practical purposes in compliance with the policy-making of governments and corporations.

This brief history presents only one facet of this field. This face, which is also called as “utilitarian” (Ahlqvist and Rhisart, 2015), and as “empirical and positivistic” (Seefried, 2014), began to be questioned especially since 1970s. In other words, although the field has been shaped by a predictive tendency over the issues of economy and national security, there is also counter-hegemonic (Inayatullah, 1998) tendency. For this break in tendency, besides *The Limits to Growth* (1972) has been referred as an important step, there are also more obvious and challenging approaches that diverge from the mainstream futures studies such as the “normative and ontological approach” which is highly critical of technology and more inclined to moral issues, and the “critical and emancipatory approach” that avoids giving advice to the governments and attaches importance to the creation of critical public (Bell, 2011; Seefried, 2014). Within the framework of this critical vein, there is an emphasis on cultural analysis, especially popular culture as well as emancipatory and public debates as opposed to the mainstream futures studies’ reliance on expert knowledge (Goode and Godhe, 2017), and on “inner meaning”, social construction of the future, and emancipation (Son, 2015). In addition, it is also pointed out the inadequacy of conventional understanding in the late industrial culture that entails critical future studies employing methods to look “beneath the surface” (Slaughter, 2003). Consequently, though the role of advisor in policy-making is still very effective in the field of futures studies, there are also different tendencies. It should also be kept in mind that one side of social sciences, despite not as distinctly and sharply as the futures studies, has been shaped in relation to power.

These relatively different views in the futures studies meet on a common ground with their attitudes towards and the position they attribute to the future, since in the field, the main focus is not confined only into prediction but includes to decide which future alternative is more probable as well as to help people, the public, governments, planners, companies to create and control their futures (Bell, 1999; 2009; Dator, 2011; Huber and

Bell, 1971). For this reason, normativity, which is contentious issue in social sciences, is not a problem in this field that concerns for not only what would happen, but also which result is more desirable. The distinction between “possible”, “probable”, and “preferable” futures made by Bell (2004; 2009) can provide important clues about the normative stance of the field. In this distinction, the possible future implies “the reality of present possibilities for the future”; the probable refers to the “most likely futures”, and the preferable futures signifies morality. Bell also pointed out that determining the preferable requires “objective-universal procedures and systematic methods” that go beyond observation, independent of political ideology, religious beliefs and traditions.

Besides many methods and techniques familiar to social sciences such as statistics, sample survey, and content analysis have been employed in the futures studies, there are other field specific techniques that provide important clues about the approach of the field. For instance, “Delphi technique” invented by experts in RAND is based on the evaluations of predictions on a specific topic made by a group of experts hiding themselves until agreement is reached (Dator, 2011). The other peculiar method of the field is the “scenario building/writing” which is constructed on the question of “what might or could happen under certain circumstances, if current trends continue.” The “futures wheel” identifying “primary, secondary, tertiary (or more) consequences of a specific technology, event, or trend” is also one of the field specific techniques (Bell, 2003; Dator, 2011; Son, 2015). Despite highly developed in methodological tools, the field as the amalgam of two different perspectives based on shapeable future through consultancy, planning and policy-making on the one hand, and contingent future on the other, has not been improved enough on theoretical ground. The theoretical underdevelopment of the field stems from not only the field has been shaped through practical advices and consultancy, but also comprise of experts who has come from different disciplines and educational backgrounds. In addition, since it has been developed through practical aims, the field has not matured enough in academia as compared to social sciences (Bell, 2003; Dator, 2011). With regard to theoretical point of view, Bell (1999; 2009) defined critical realism as proper perspective for the field on the grounds that it emphasizes, unlike positivism, on conjectural aspects, and unlike post-positivism, on reality independent of human construction and senses.

Complaining that the interest initiated by sociologists and developed by futurist-sociologists has been neglected by contemporary sociologists, Bell (1999; 2002; 2009),

as sociologist-futurist, indicated that sociology as more coherent in theory can contribute to more fragmented futures studies, while the futures studies that is more open-minded and inclined to moral judgements can also help sociology. Similarly, Inayatullah (1998) propounded that macro history studying in the history of social systems, the patterns and the laws of social change is significant for future scenarios by showing what is historically changeable, and also emphasized that history can balance the images of the future. Urry responded to what Bell said in the futures studies from the front of sociology. Drawing attention to the necessity of evaluating the futures studies in terms of social sciences and day-to-day, Urry (2016) emphasized on the effects of future visions on the present, and also pointed out that “social futures” should not be left to the states or companies.

The futures studies of which basic characteristics, methods and history are briefly mentioned generally conceptualize the future as open and shapeable field, albeit including different tendencies. Therefore, although the future has been discussed in terms of its effects on the present, the aim in this field is to make inferences about the distant future that can be formed, predicted and desired. In that case, the field that differs from social sciences in terms of methodological and theoretical foundations shares the similar conceptualization on the future. This distant and not-yet position as the main obstacle to establish a genuine relationship with the future has existed in relatively different ways in social sciences. The quite fertile ground to evaluate this position can be discussions on time that has attracted more interest in social sciences as compared to the subject of the future.

2.2. When Time is Socialized

The future, albeit rare alternatives, generally infiltrates social science, as mentioned above, through the analysis of specific literary genres, inferences on the effects of technology, globalization, and risk, the inventories of expectations and intentions, and comparisons between epochs, societies, groups, individuals or classes by means of their visions of the future. This infiltration can be construed as a reflection of the general opinion on the position and content of the future in social thought. Therefore, reflecting on the way to connect with the future requires at first to consider on this prevailing understanding. Contemplations on time in social science can be proper way to understand and make inferences on this position since the subject of time has caught the social

sciences' attention more than the future; ergo, can provide clues about the future as well as the present and the past.

Although time has received more attention than the future, it is still possible to come across criticisms that the subject of time has not been adequately addressed by the social sciences. The imputed reasons for neglect of time are more or less similar with disregard for the future. In these criticisms, state perspectives (Hassard, 1990), omission of sequence in social events (Moore, 1970), division between synchronic and diachronic embraced in functionalism and structuralism (Giddens, 1995), the lack of concern in contrast with physical and life sciences (Zerubavel, 1985), and adopting classical philosophical understanding (Elias, 2000) have been calumniated. It is also possible to find claims on the break with tradition such as the loss or underdevelopment of the subject of time in social sciences except for Durkheimian school (Sorokin and Merton, 1990), the inadequacy of interest albeit increase after Sorokin and Merton (Lewis and Weigart, 1990), and a definition of bumpy road constructed by the work-leisure time discussion in the 1970s, then rise in interest in the 1980s, and decline again in the 1990s (Subrt, 2021). Thus, some social scientists announced to aim bringing time into social science by means of constitutive relation between time and social systems (Luhmann, 1982), by the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1995), and by emphasis on practice as time-maker (Bourdieu, 2000). Contrary to these claims, however, time has attracted interest both in theoretical discussions and fieldworks. Regarding this point, Baert (2000) pointed out two different ways of studying social realm in relation with "temporality"², one is mainly empirical focusing on perceptions and allocations of time as well as social rhythms, and other is primarily theoretical debates on synchrony-diachrony, the future, and temporal flux. Thus, the problem of approaches to time, like to the future, does not stem from the quantity, but the quality of interest, though surely this quantity contributes to the ossified quality of the subject of time in social science.

The most apparent tendency in social science with regard to time has been crystallized in the notion of "social time" that has been shaped through the struggle of demarcation of the field. From this struggle, time has taken its share and get out of the battle with a crown on its head made out of "social." Today, the word "time" used in

²Since in this study temporality is employed in different sense from prevailing meaning in the literature, the word is used in quotation marks in order to remain faithful to the referenced text employing the word temporality.

social science, even without bearing the title social, has the power to indicate peculiarities that distinguish time in social science from other forms of time such as “astronomical time”, “physical time”, “biological time” and “individual time.” Social time of social science added to the other forms of time falling into the field of other sciences, was fed by thoughts of Durkheim who drew an important framework for the subject of time despite his main focus was different. Considering time as one of the categories along with other concepts such as number, space, and cause, Durkheim (1995) pointed out that categories as the framework of our thoughts are themselves the products of collective thought. In this respect, since time rooted in the rhythm of society is impersonal and universal, according to Durkheim, it cannot be reduced to time grasped by states of consciousness and subjective experiences. In addition, all categories including time are not only grounded in social but also what they explain and imply are also social. It is this conception of arising from social to getting back to the social, or more briefly the social circuit, is the basis for the subsequently developed concept of social time.

The conception of time constructed on two-sided assumption that time functions to organize social life which in return supplies the basis for functions and rhythms of time implying social time first appeared in 1937 in P. A. Sorokin and R. K. Merton’s famous study, “Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis”, and then again in 1943, *Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time* written by Sorokin (Subrt, 2015). Sorokin and Merton (1990), in the aforementioned study, defined time as “expresses the change or movement of social phenomena in terms of other social phenomena taken as points of reference” by means of some examples such as “after the World War II” or “for a working day.” On the base of this definition clearly affected by Durkheim’s ideas, Sorokin and Merton emphasized that social time based on the common values and beliefs of the group and the rhythm of society, unlike astronomical and calendrical time, has qualitative aspects besides quantitative ones. This understanding which has widespread and long-lasting effects, echoes after years in Zerubavel (1985) who linked order of social life with time by means of “sequency”, “duration”, “temporal location” and “recurrence”, and made a distinction between “sociotemporal”, “physiotemporal” and “biotemporal” in conformity with the different fields of science. If one of the conclusions drawn from Durkheim’s thought is that time reflecting the rhythms of social life is different from astronomical, biological or physical time, the other one is that this time is also different from individual experiences of time. Mukerjee (1990), for instance, betokened that social

time superimposes on human time, and because social organization entails common and invariable time frame, it cannot be constructed on unreliable individual time experiences. In other words, social time is not only differentiated from astronomical or physical time by means of qualitative aspects, but also from individual, biological and psychological time experiences on the base of assumed need of common and invariable time frame that individual times cannot secure.

The tendency to define time in terms of social has been taken a step further with an emphasis on the diversity and heterogeneity of time at various degree depending on the conceptualization of social. Thus, the accent on social as an inhomogeneous unity including different rhythms and diversity has created an important break in the meaning of social time. One of the prominent examples of the emphasis on the unity in diversity is Hubert and Mauss's (1898/1964) study on sacrifice according to which sacrifice and sacrificial rituals vary even to the degree that intertwinement of "desacralization" and "sacralization" which gives rise to harmonious unity within the frame of the same system. Within this diverse unity, sacrifice, defined as both regular and occasional, signifies simultaneously regularity and irregularity as well as continuity and discontinuity making together social time heterogeneous. Henceforth, the emphasis on the layers of social with different rhythms and contents rather than social time as homogeneous block over against other forms of time gave rise to the understanding of multiple sociality and proliferation of time-related adjectives. Lewis and Weigart (1990), for instance, defined social time as opposed to homogeneous physical time in compliance with their tripartite conceptualization of social structure consisting of individuals, groups and cultural levels respectively characterized by "self-time", "interaction time and institutional time", and "cyclic time", all of which are connected through principles of "embeddedness", "stratification", and "synchronicity." The tendency to define time as unity in diversity in conformity with the conceptualization of multi-levelled social reality finds its clearest and strongest expression in Gurvitch's analysis on social time. Inspired by the concept of "total social phenomena" coined by Mauss, Gurvitch (1964) defined eight types of time pursuant to his understanding of social reality³ consisting of various levels in a conflictual

³According to this multi-level reality, Gurvitch (1964) distinguished three basic types of sociability (communion, community, and mass relations); fourteen types of inclusive or global societies (four primitive, six historical - charismatic theocracies, patriarchal societies, feudal societies, city-states, societies of nascent capitalism, and developed competitive capitalism-, and four contemporary societies - societies of developed and organized capitalism, techno-bureaucratic fascist societies, state collectivism, and pluralistic collectivism-); and the depth levels ("the ecological surface", "organizational level", "models,

unity. Each one of the types of social time, “enduring”⁴, “deceptive”⁵, “erratic”⁶, “cyclical”⁷, “retarded”⁸, “alternating”⁹, “time in advance of itself or time pushing forward”¹⁰, and “explosive time”¹¹, differs in respect to the relation between the past, the present and the future, continuity and discontinuity, and qualitative and quantitative characteristics. In this manner, Gurvitch, emphasizing the need of dialectical understanding, offered an analysis on the fact that all the depth levels, types of sociability, classes and global societies alternate between these types of time according to the structural characteristics of each element, changing relations with each other, and historical circumstances. Multi-layered time reappears one more time in Giddens (1995; 1996) who aimed to give a constitutive role to time-space even though did not divide social reality into depth levels, and consequently, presented three intertwined forms of time in parallel with the theory of structuration based on the notions of system, structure and action. From this base, Giddens putted forward “the *durée* of day-to-day life”, “the *durée* of the lifespan of the individual”, and “the *durée* of institutions” in company with three modes of contingency of interaction, of life, and of structural principles.

The emphasis on the multiple time and layered social reality has revealed another trend in discussions about time. This tendency is to compare different societies, various societal positions or social periods through time measurement and experiences as well as

rules, signals, signs, and conduct of relative regularity”, “social roles”, “collective attitudes”, “symbols, ideas, collective values and cultural products”, and “collective mentality”).

⁴Enduring time as the most continuous type of time in which past is projected into present and future, characterizes ecological level, kinship and locality groups, the peasant class, and the patriarchal structure (Gurvitch, 1964).

⁵Deceptive time as the time of large cities, passive communions, political publics, and the charismatic theocratic structures is characterized by sudden and unexpected crisis under the long and slow duration (Gurvitch, 1964).

⁶Erratic time was defined as the time of irregular pulsation between the appearance and disappearance of the rhythms. In this uncertain and discontinuous time, present prevails over the past and the future. This type of time belongs to the social roles and collective attitudes, technical patterns in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mass sociability, non-structured groups, classes in the process of formation, and global societies in transition (Gurvitch, 1964).

⁷In cyclical time as the time of archaic societies, communion sociability, and mystic-ecstatic groups, past, present, and future project into each other (Gurvitch, 1964).

⁸Retarded time as delayed time is related with the social symbols, community sociability, the nobles, the landed gentry, and the feudal society (Gurvitch, 1964).

⁹Alternating time implies the struggle between past and future to realize in the present. This discontinuous time is associated with the patterns, rules, signals, signs, and the initial phase of capitalism (Gurvitch, 1964).

¹⁰ In this form of time as the arena of triumph of discontinuity, contingency, and qualitative characteristics, future becomes present. This is the time of collective aspirations, active masses and communions in revolt, the proletariat, and the competitive capitalism (Gurvitch, 1964).

¹¹ Explosive time in which both past and present dissolved in the creation of transcended future is the time of acts of collective creation and revolution. This type of time also played a supportive role in organized capitalism and fascism (Gurvitch, 1964).

conceptualizations on time and the future on the base of presupposition that each of which has different forms of social organization. Although the tendency does not historicize time and the future, it still presents a history through connection between historical and social changes and differences in relations with time (with the past, the present, and the future as well). Based on the traditional-modern dualism, Coser and Coser (1990), for instance, pointed out that while the names of days, months and years were determined by the rhythm of the economic and social activities in primitive cultures, modern complex societies use concepts referring to the social time rather than chronological or calendrical time such as “a semester” and “a weekend.” Similarly, examining the historical transformations of “timekeepers” and time measurement, Nowotny (1975) indicated to historical periods having no common medium to measure time, and also the transmission of clocks on the line stretching from aristocracy to bourgeoisie and finally to the working class. The same process of time measurement evolved from observation of periodical natural events to the usage of time devices in parallel with social changes such as urbanization and mechanization was depicted by Elias (2000) through ruptures and recurrences although, according to Elias, current time understanding is the resultant of cumulativeness based on the development of “capacity for synthesis.” In a more or less similar vein, time was also given a history by Giddens (1987; 1995) who attempted to construe the problem of order via the ways of binding time and space in social systems. According to this analysis, historical transformation of binding has been evolved from the “predominance of presence” in the illiterate societies to the high-level “time-space distancing” by means of improving “storage capacity.” In this framework, Giddens betokened changing patterns of relation with time and the future in parallel with the development of some forms such as files and money. In a similar tendency, Luhmann (1976) linked the transformation of time and future with the emergence of bourgeois society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During this transformation, according to Luhmann, the past became an open resource for historical research, present was positioned at the turning point between the past and the future, and the future was assigned as the container of possibilities. Thus, Luhmann defined bourgeois society as revolutionary due to the simplification of social and environmental relations by means of its strong emphasis on time. In addition, depending on time-using and time-binding mechanisms such as money and legal procedure, according to Luhmann, bourgeois society grounded its future on the denial of the past.

The tendency to make an history through comparison reverberates into the realm of the future. For instance, Toffler (1970), as the prominent figure in the future literature, placed societies on the line by means of their attitude towards past, present, and future. According to this arrangement, “super-industrialism” following agricultural and industrial stages is the third stage characterized by transience and novelty in terms of accelerating turnover that creates the “future shock.” In order to cope with future shock, Toffler, beside many other means, stressed on the importance of education which was based on the past in the stagnant societies, on the present in the mechanical age, and must be on the future in super-industrialism. One more interesting attempt to make a history for the future was propounded by Adam (2010) on the base of the tripartite understanding of “fate-fortune-fiction.” In this schematization, while “the fate” refers to the phase in which time belongs to God, and the future fed by mythology as pre-existing realm entailing “message-bearers” such as oracles, mediums and prophets to help people to prepare their fates, “the fortune” implies the phase in which future becomes an open, abstract and empty field shaped and exploited especially by social engineers as new message-bearers. The last phase, “fiction”, was depicted by the failure of the assumptions on open and calculable future as well as the idea of progress. Moving from the concept of “horizon of expectation”, Staley (2017) also tried to narrate the history of both time and the future. According to him, cyclical view of time and pre-existing and fixed future of the earlier societies gave way to the evolutionary conception bringing multilinear future and non-teleological temporality by the late nineteenth century that was then transformed into the uncertain and unpredictable future resultant of modern time created by scientific developments in the early twentieth century. More importantly, indicating that cyclical view is not confined to ancient societies, by reference to Schlesinger Jr., Staley also made the history of time and the future cyclical too as in the cyclicity of American history oscillating between “conservatism” and “progressivism.” These relatively deficient attempts to make an history based on the comparison of perceptions and conceptualizations of time and the future, has proliferated the adjectives that time receives on the one hand, and has evolved from comparison between periods, societies and conceptions of time into the creation of adjectives for time according to the isolated time experiences on the other.

Besides the notion of social time which implies time as regulator and the social as basis for time, the approaches assuming a constitutive relationship between social and

time establish another line by which time acquires very different character. Mead (1932), presenting one of the most prominent examples of such an approach, reversed the framework constructed in social time discussions with his understanding of sociality knitted around various concepts such as “emergence”, “passage”, “novelty”, and “event.” Within this dynamic and ceaselessly changing sociality, present was defined as the “locus of reality”, while the past and the future continuously reconstructed in the light of ever-changing present could gain reality status only in mind. By emphasis on the past as both “irrevocable and revocable”, on the present as “specious present... like the flash of the meteor”, and on the future as constantly renewed correspondingly each emergence in the present, relation between social, experience, and time was established by Mead in order to challenge to on the one hand, “behaviouristic psychology” assuming automatic relation between the past and the future by means of stimuli-response connection, and on the other hand, to historical and scientific tendency analysing present via past data. In this theoretical framework, while time is in constitutive relation with sociality, social is defined as “readjustment” to emerging events, because identifying social with the result, according to Mead, means to identify social with the system. The tendency to establish a constitutive relationship between social and time is also exemplified by Schutz (1959; 2018) according to whom experience takes place in the “Now” which is very similar to Mead’s specious present, through the “stock of knowledge at hand.” Borrowing from Husserl’s terminology, Schutz explained social via extension into the immediate and distant pasts by means of “retentions” and “recollections”, and into the immediate and distant futures via “protentions” and “anticipations.” This experience-constructor extension becomes possible by means of anticipation of act as accomplished action in the future perfect tense that implies “reflective act precedes the action.” This approach considering the past and the future only as horizons of immediate present of experience privileged by reality status can be understood as the reflection of the philosophy of St. Augustine (1978, as cited in Adam, 1990: 33; 1961, as cited in Jaques, 1990: 22) who stated that if no one asks he knows what “time” is but when he tries to explain he does not. Thus, St. Augustine solved this dilemma by placing time in mind through memory (as present of past things), perception (present of present things), and expectation (the present of future things). This idea on time taken over in the context of experience by Mead and Schutz both of whom ascribed a constitutive function to time through the immediate present by the help of the past and the future as auxiliary elements and

horizons, reappears in Luhmann through the self-maintenance and self-ordering of systems. Considering relation between time and system as constitutive by employing various concepts such as “possibilities”, “selection”, “meanings”, “action”, “events”, and “complexity”, Luhmann (1976; 1978; 1982) gave more priority to time arising from the self-regulation of the system than universally valid and precise concept of time. Yet, as society becomes more complex, so does the need for abstract time, since the sequential arrangement of relationships becomes more important than simultaneous arrangements. Thus, according to Luhmann, temporalized systems consist of only temporalized elements, i.e., events depending on their own present that has its own past and future horizons. In this context, “iterated or reflexive modalities” come into play to decide the past, the present and the future of the “world time.” These iterations historicizing and futurizing world time, according to Luhmann, were appeared with modern time characterized by increase in possibilities of the future feeding present selections. Constitutive relation between social and time carried from the realm of experience and mind exemplified by Mead and Schutz to the level of systems by Luhmann continues to exist in approaches that claim to balance between subject and object. Giddens (1986; 1995), for instance, stressed in “the theory of structuration” that social sciences should focus the organization and constitution of social practices in and by time-space rather than embrace the division between synchronic and diachronic as by functionalism and structuralism. Similar constitutive relation was pointed out by Bourdieu (1990; 2000) in terms of practice defined as “not in time, but makes time.” Through practice, or more correctly, intersection of practice, habitus, and field, according to Bourdieu, “human time” as temporalization of agents arises as opposed to the biological or astronomical time which conceals the relation between power and possibility. Alike Mead and Schutz, Bourdieu’s humanized time reaches out the past and the future through “practical anticipations and retrospections” in the immediate present differed from memory and conscious project. Yet, unlike Mead and Schutz, time is connected less with consciousness and mind, but more with practice and habitus as the presence of the past and the future, or more correctly “forth-coming”, in the present. Despite all the salient differences of these approaches, the point they have in common is that they subordinate regulative function of time, and assume a constitutive relationship between time and social in contrast to the emphasis on regulative function in social time discussions. In addition, these approaches conceptualize the future and the past as horizons that serve as

auxiliary elements of time established in the context of the immediate present. Before evaluating the influence of these approaches on the relationship between the future and social science, it is necessary to mention one last vein in order to form a framework that will help to reflect on the main question of the study.

Time, stuck in the social circuit on the one hand, and confined in the establishment of experience, sociability, system, structuration, and practice on the other, has found a place for itself as fundamental element to make sense of great social and historical transformations. Along this line, time, despite not main focus, becomes an important part of processes and historical changes. Establishing a connection between a religious ethic that prohibits idleness and sanctifies work in itself, and the spirit of capitalism based on rational organization, accumulation, and calculation, Weber (2005) invited time to his analysis, albeit indirectly. In this connection, “the idea of calling” in Puritanism provided a fertile ground for capitalist accumulation and the spirit of capitalism by condemning waste of time and leisure, glorifying work for God, and prohibiting overconsumption. In this handover, what was attained is not only an ethos, but also understanding of time as the part of this ethos. A more or less similar process was evaluated by Simmel (1908/1971b;1903/1971f) with regard to changes brought by metropolitan life characterized by the money economy and the reign of the intellect. This process as the tyranny of objective culture over subjective culture was depicted by Simmel not by the transfer of an ethos as in Weber but by balance between two extremes in accordance with Simmel’s general theoretical framework based on the line stretching between form and content, life and form, sociality and individuality, unity and peculiarity, and objective and subjective. Thus, in the face of the overgrowth of objective culture, exaggeration of extremities, peculiarities, individualities also become inevitable as in fashion (Simmel, 1904/1971e) that simultaneously includes “imitation and conspicuousness.” For this reason, unlike Weber’s understanding of time transferring from one historical individual to another, in Simmel's thought, time becomes a part of change not by transferring but by balancing between two boundaries. The approach of Simmel resembles the balance between homogeneous and heterogeneous assumed by Tarde albeit with a quite different emphasis and concern. Tarde (1893/2012) pointed out that population growth has been balanced by means of the simplification and regulation of laws and administration as opposed to the general understanding that conceptualizes changes from homogenous to heterogeneous. In other words, the uniformization of laws and customs by the

development of civilization is not disconnected from the other end, namely the diversification of individuals. For certain, though main concern and interest of these theorists are very different, even quite the reverse for Tarde, their ideas combining opposite tendencies can help to contemplate on some approaches being fascinated by peculiarities and singularities of time experiences and accordingly dividing time into more and more parts, and embracing only one side of these parts. Combination of regulative and constitutive aspects of time reaches higher level in Marx (1867/2010; Marx and Engels, 1845-46/1998) who embedded two edges to each other as well as other realms of life. Hereby, time as important part of historical transformations is neither an element to be transferred as in Weber nor a balance between two extremes as in Simmel, rather becomes a faithful companion to historical processes in Marx who understood history as the history of class struggles that was built around various concepts such as labour, value, commodity, exchange, and production. In this understanding, time became simultaneously producer and product, regulator of and regulated by social processes not only as “labour-time” since living human individuals and production of their means of subsistence were defined as the first condition of history, but also as “masses of congealed labour time” in commodities, and as companion of exchange processes. Additionally, division of time into various types was understood as inseparable part of the process of separation and conflict between town and city, between industrial, commercial and agricultural labours, and correspondingly alienation. In brief, time, in Marx’s ideas, becomes a part of historical transformations as both a constitutive and regulative element.

On this line connected time with historical and societal changes, time has also been treated as a gluttonous monster rather than a faithful companion. Here is great emphasis on acceleration of life and instantaneity resultant especially of information technologies, mass media, globalization, flexibility, and other similar developments and inventions. Two concepts, “time-space distancing” used by Giddens (1986; 1995; 1996) and “time-space compression” by Harvey (1997), albeit from different viewpoints, epitomize such an understanding of the engulfment of space by monstrous time. The concept of “timeless time” coined by Castells (2008) who interpreted similar process as the “revenge of space” in relatively reverse angle, can be added to this tendency. By the concept of time-space distancing employed to deal with social order by means of the ways social systems bind time and space, Giddens (1986; 1995; 1996) intended to shed light on the dynamic, discontinuous and globalising character of modernism. This

peculiar character of modern institutions is closely connected, according to Giddens, to higher level of distancing and recombination of time and space by dint of “disembedding mechanisms” including “symbolic tokens” and “expert systems” both of which make possible trust in absence and lack of information. Time-space compression, on the other hand, as the new phase of inherent tendency of capitalism, implies acceleration of life and decline of spatial obstacles. From this perspective, according to Harvey, the vision of Enlightenment on control of time, space and the future that had become possible by the help of maps, chronometers, Newtonian time, scientific prediction, progress, social engineering, and rational planning, collapsed with the time-space compression that explains the transition from “the Fordism to the flexible accumulation” as well as speeding up of exchange and consumption (Harvey, 1997). The idea of the destruction of space by time that has been gradually trapped in the instant culminates in Virilio (2000; 2003) who pointed out that while instantaneity, global communication system, and simultaneity have destructed sequency and geography, the political frontiers has shifted from the “real space of geopolitics” to the “real time of the chronopolitics of the transmission of images and sounds.” Thus, according to Virilio, globalization is complemented by the reduction of space in every sense, and spread of “tele-surveillance.” From this perspective, Virilio (2000) interpreted the Kosovo War as opposite the World War II on the grounds that the Kosovo War took place “not on territory but on air” and not by “nuclear bomb, but information bomb.” The difference between two wars correspondingly old and new world stems from what Virilio called “speed politics” that means usurpation of space by real time, even globalization was defined as the “speed of light.” Captivated by speed, Virilio endowed the right to take a war decision to “a piece of software” rather than “Caesar or Napoleon.” In this understanding fascinated by speed, time turns into a destructive and disintegrating monster rather than constitutive element through the instantaneousness by the help of technology, or this atmosphere can also be construed as the agent and founder of disintegrating process. Castells (2008), on the other hand, declared the revenge of space in the network society by means of the concept of “timeless time” appearing through unified global market, new information technologies, flexibility, multi-media and similar concomitant developments. This is the time of “real virtuality” that brings simultaneity and timelessness destructing sequential, chronological, measurable, linear, and predictable understanding of time. Though, according to Castells, this new time

belonging to the “space of flows” does not comprise all time experiences, it is also one of the pillars working in tandem with the idea of the end of history, and postmodern architecture all of which concertedly support the network society and flexible capitalism. Time which finds a place for itself, albeit disintegrative manner, lost all its meanings and connections in Baudrillard (2011) in direct proportion to the general loss of meaning and sense of history. Unsurprisingly, in the case of “hyperreality” produced by models without any reference, essence, origin, and difference between real and imaginary, it cannot be expected to give us a sense of time and the future as in “hypermarket” as a model for subsequent forms of social control characterized by functional simultaneity deprived of the past and the future, or in photography defined as simultaneity without temporal depth. As a result, time stretching and shrinking in Giddens and Harvey, swallowing space in Virilio, and lost its sequential meaning in Castells cannot find anything to ingest in Baudrillard’s world, since this world consists of information devouring communication, events that lost their meaning as soon as appear, and media bereft of its traditional position, the only thing related with time, according to Baudrillard’s framework, can be artificial resurrection of history on the screen through nostalgia. However, as indicated above, time and space neither wither nor swallow each other, in fact what is withered and swallowed is our gaze fascinated by speed and technology. Relatedly, Jameson (2003) explained the disappearance of time, i.e., “the end of temporality”, by means of “imprisonment in the present” as peculiar character of postmodernism, and reflection of late capitalism. In addition, Jameson also quite meaningfully pointed out that though future of capitalism was confusing problem even in the nineteenth century, there have been a few historical periods that are destitute to produce alternatives like our own age. Alike, Bloch's remarks on the “abstract utopias” can be indirectly considered as an appropriate expression to contemplate on the tendencies fascinated by instantaneity and speed. According to Bloch “purely technological images of progress have thus always made progress appear too cheap, too linear; just as today, presented in isolation and with social change left out, they are delusions or means of deception” (Bloch, 1955/1995). Although it is partially true that all these changes bring instantaneity and speed, it still seems like a hasty decision to interpret instantaneity as destructor of linearity, chronology, and relatedly conceptualization of history of the nineteenth century and also time. Since, the notion of instantaneity, far from destroying linearity, seems more suitable for sequencing than historical stages covering

wider processes. In other words, if everything is more and more compressed into instants, these point-like instants can easily be strung on a line like small beads that creates together successiveness of instantaneity. Even if instantaneity is flowing from all directions, this can only multiply the number of lines.

The first conclusion drawn from the evaluations carried out on time discussions in order to apprehend the relationship between the future and social science is that time has acquired different meanings and forms in parallel with how social is understood. In the emphasis on social time fed by Durkheim's ideas, the understanding of time that is originated in social organization and rhythms of society, and regulates the social in turn appears as very prominent and influential tendency. This tendency in which the future does not catch great attention, has contributed to the inclusion of the future, albeit imperfectly, by opening the door for the very common trend based on comparisons between future visions, as well as between traditional-modern, and cyclical-linear. In the second tendency which has constructed a constitutive relation, despite with quite different emphases, between social and time in the context of experience, structuration, practice, or systems, the future has found relatively fertile ground as compared to the first tendency, but it is reduced to an auxiliary element that is called for duty to quasi-automatically constitute immediate present. In the third tendency, time has been included in social and historical processes in order to make sense of changes in parallel with the different evaluations on more or less similar processes. However, it should also be noted that the boundaries of these three lines are not always sharp, and they come into contact with each other frequently.

This brief outlook to the theoretical considerations on time in social science in accordance with the aim of the study, reveal two important issues that have great impact on the future and the social sciences. One of them is continuous division of time into parts and accordingly the proliferation of adjectives qualifying time, and the other is the problem of the distinction between time and temporal. Both of these issues have important consequences for the relationship to be established between social science and the future.

2.3. Two Problems of Time in Social Science

The unsteady perception and conceptualization of time according to the definition of social in approaches on time which are appraised in order to fathom the future, reveal some obstacles to establish a meaningful connection with time and the future within the

framework of social sciences. These problems and obstacles arise from not that time has not been adequately addressed as in the above-mentioned criticisms, but from the position of time in its relationship with the social. The tendency to divide time by constantly prefixing new adjectives in order to describe is the first problem. Moreover, it is quite impossible to claim that there is a general discussion and an effort on consensus about these adjectives and typification. This situation induces that not only the literature has not matured enough despite all its richness, but also connection between time and social has constantly been established and broken. The first one precipitates the second obstacle that is highly significant for the establishment of relationship between the future and social science. This second problem that is closely related with the establishment and broken of connections is that there is not enough distinction made between time and temporal. These two words are interchangeably used in most cases, even within the same texts, and this means to leave aside the power both words have with regard to social science. When a distinction is made between them, it is usually based on the division between the regulative and the constitutive functions, roughly outlined above. Thinking about these problems also means to scrutinize the relationship the study contemplates on. In this framework, the analysis of these two problems will be made mainly based on the time approaches discussed above. Firstly, the problems created by the division of time into adjectives both for understanding time and for the position of the future will be discussed. Afterwards, the approaches on time discussed above respecting the connection between social and time, will be evaluated by means of their temporal qualities in accordance with the distinction between time and temporal made in this study, and also the offered features and content of temporality will be discussed.

2.3.1. Abundance of time-related adjectives

Since the discussion that is made to think on the content of deeper and comprehensive relationship beyond the future as subject, entails first of all to consider the position of future, this position has been tried to capture through the conceptualizations of time which has attracted more attention than the future. The problem of time's acquisition of different qualities in parallel with the different definitions and delamination of social has been resolved via using various adjectives to express the distinctive features of time in social sciences. The tendency to qualify time with various adjectives to express these different characteristics is to some extent

understandable and even necessary. However, it has gradually evolved into the fragmentation of the social and time into small parts.

Time, as mentioned above, had acquired the adjective social in the struggle of social sciences to determine its boundaries and distinctive subject matter, and later on, reached the power to indicate, without bearing the adjective, to the specific type of time distinguished from other types of time falling to the other sciences' share. This first struggle on time that found its most mature example in Durkheim, means to add a new type of time alongside other ones such as astronomical, biological, psychological and physical and this supplementation is necessary to some extent. This first adjective that implies to consider time through the reference of the social to the social leads to the emergence and elaboration of derivative adjectives such as traditional-modern, cyclical-linear, private-public, local-standard which are resultant of comparisons between historical periods, societies, and social groups according to their time-regulations and time conceptions. These efforts to construct an history, albeit its deficiencies, are significant to indicate historicalness of time measurements and conceptualizations. With regard to this point, although Urry (2016) attributed positive meaning to the contribution of social sciences in the destruction of the uniform understanding of time, the problem began to gradually intensify after this point since, as will be discussed in more detail in the second chapter, a tendency to historicize time has been slowly crystallized in which one side of the pairs of time has been constantly blessed while the other has been treated as nightmare descending over. This situation paved the way for the disconnection by means of the division of perception on social and time into two parts. In this framework, abovementioned adjectives have been supplemented by the new adjective pairs that exhibit the separation between two forms of time, one of which is conceptualized as more dynamic, fluid, constitutive, related to life and experience, and the other is static, rigid, regulative, and connected with social institutions and structures. In this way, the understanding of time rooted in philosophy that is based on two separated blocks of time standing side by side and one of the blocks exert pressure over other such as homogeneous-heterogeneous, quantitative-qualitative, continuous-discontinuous, reversible-irreversible, and objective-subjective, has become prevalent in social thought. Besides, the emphasis on the heterogeneity of social and the diversity of experiences has also significant impact on the proliferation of adjectives. Thus, time has gradually become

rich in adjectives in parallel with the multi-layered social that found its clearest expression in Gurvitch (1964) who defined eight types of time.

The adjectives that have been proliferated by the first and second lines, i.e., regulative and constitutive understandings of time, continue to increase in number on a relatively different axis in parallel with the division and formation of social through the historical and social changes. In this process, transformations in experiences and regulations of time accompanied by changes such as industrialization, capitalism, and urbanization have led to the emergence of new adjectives expressing these changes. The notions of clock-time and standard-time emerged with the establishment of a new understanding of time on the one hand, and some other adjectives such as work, labour, leisure, free, spare, and recreational began to commonly be circulated on the other, and to the extent that these changes express the differentiation in types of societies some additional adjectives such as traditional-modern, agricultural-industrial have become prevalent. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the second chapter, some other adjectives have been invented to accentuate different time experiences such as women's time experiences and time in flexible and precarious work that are not encapsulated in previous adjectives. Unfortunately, with the gradual transformation of emphasis on heterogeneous and historically changing social into the singularity of experiences, time has become more and more fragmented in accordance with endlessly proliferated adjectives. For instance, Adam (2008a) indicated to the multidimensionality of time by implying that time experiences existing together in daily life such as "clock", "body", "biographical", "generational", "communication", and "historical" as opposed to the conventional tendency based on dualisms, and thus, emphasized on the importance to connect micro and macro, as well as process and structure. Yet, the problem of this meaningful emphasis stems from that not only all these adjectives have not been adequately discussed among social scientists to develop more or less common conceptual language, but also danger of not being reunited of created parts in order to reveal richness of time experiences. It is extremely true that people's experiences are important, and each experience impacts on the relationship established with time and the meaning given to time. The problem with this adjective proliferation, however, is not that it emphasizes on the singularity of experiences, but that it shows how the social sciences disjointedly developed in general, and time literature in particular. Other face of the problem which is not peculiar to time literature but spreading to many other subjects of social sciences is the destruction of a

common ground of communication by the tendency to crumble into smaller pieces. To exemplify, for the process of thesis preparation, it is possible to invent “thesis time”, and it can even be endlessly divided such as into “break time”, “reading time”, and “writing time” in order to be more satisfactory for the prevailing tendency. Moreover, each student can rewrite a similar experience again and again under different names. Consequently, the only remnant is the pride of discovering new adjectives that detach individual experiences from each other and more inclusive processes, and confine them into isolated field of experience.

The tendency to constantly ascribe new adjectives to time is also problematic for the self-relation of the social sciences. If concepts and existing assumptions are inadequate, for certain, they must be scrutinized, challenged, and then changed. Yet, when the way to question and find solutions is to peek in on existing ones in order to construct additional blocks right next to them, various predicaments arise. Above all, social science is a field occupied by many, not only those who are living, but also not living and have not yet been born. Therefore, making changes in language and thought to invent new ideas and concepts can gain meaning only by connections based on common ground which can be rejected or adopted. Only in this way social science can get a chance to gain a temporal and futural view towards its subjects and itself.

To reiterate, it is necessary to reveal the specificity of the field defined as social, and thus to identify the distinctive features of time in this field. In addition, considering that the social is not homogeneous and contains conflicting and variable relations, it is acceptable to a certain extent to create various adjectives. Yet, the main complication springs from that the connections between created time pairs are not adequately elaborated on the one hand, and time gets stuck in a tendency to isolate specific experiences on the other. This comment may be objected on the grounds that abandoning proliferation would mean to collapse meaning of singular experiences into more inclusive ones. However, indefinite proliferation may also destroy the meaning of these experiences that reveals in relation to other experiences and larger context. Moreover, the attempt to divide time into different types and fields in order to overcome the dualisms may bring a greater and more insurmountable dualism in which rigid, homogenous, and static time is placed against a multiple, heterogeneous, and dynamic time. The problem created by adjective-inventor tendency for the main question of this study is rooted in this very point. Since, while aversely positioned time pairs at least allow for connection, and

consequently for gain meanings in relation with each other and other social processes, the isolated one can only be imperfectly described. The problem of establishment of connections brings the discussion to the second problem of time, which is significant for the possibility and content of relationship between social science and the future, namely the lack of adequate distinction between time and temporal.

2.3.2 Time, or temporal?

The general understanding of time in social science has engendered one more problem that either time and temporal are not adequately distinguished, or both concepts are often used interchangeably. When a distinction is employed, albeit some exceptions, temporal is generally positioned in constitutive relation with experiences, consciousness, and practices in order to imply relatively changing present. Considering on these two words can be guide for main question of the study, i.e., the necessity, possibility, content and consequences of relationship between social sciences and future, since in this study temporal is conceptualized as precondition, albeit not sufficient, for the relation in question. Yet, it should also be indicated that various more elaborated definitions of temporal can be made apart from this one, as in many other subjects in social sciences.

Time as noun and temporal as adjective denote significant difference, accordingly the sociology of time and temporal sociology/temporal social science represent two different stances that neither completely excludes each other nor compulsorily coexist. While the former refers to the specific subject selected to be studied, temporal has the power to endow the names with certain qualities. Elias (2000), with more or less similar emphasis, stated that perception of time as measurable object can be overcome by substitution of verbal form as reminder of human action for substantival form. Yet, the distinction made between time and temporal in this study establishes temporal not as a reminder of human action, but as a perspective in social sciences. The distinction also implicitly states that focusing on the subject of time is not enough to make any approach temporal. In other words, providing in-depth analysis of time, despite its all importance, is not a sufficient criterion for being temporal. Likewise, in some cases, a certain part of or any concept in an approach, whether it is directly related to time or not, can be temporal, independent of other parts and concepts. Therefore, it is possible to be temporal in various degrees and levels. In addition, this feature is considered as directly proportional with the established connections. The reason behind the assumed affinity

between temporal and connections stems from, besides many other reasons, the lexical definitions of temporal such as “relating to worldly as opposed to spiritual affairs; secular... Relating to time... Relating to or denoting time or tense” (Stevenson, 2010), and “...pertaining to human life, worldly; secular... relating to time or tense...” (Hoad, 1996). “Relating to time or tense” in these definitions is significant starting point to indicate the importance of connections to temporality, since any question and subject social scientists deal with can be related with time and tense only by removing from isolated and narrow focus. In other words, establishing a connection is latitudinally and longitudinally broadening and deepening the subject and/or main problem towards different parts of the social. Thus, as the subject gets out of isolation, it will be possible to obtain more detailed information about the past and the future of the subject, but more importantly its current situation. For instance, in the aforementioned example of “thesis time”, a researcher who questions the experiences of students can give temporal quality to the subject by connecting these experiences with many other subjects such as education as social institution, power relations, social background of students participated in study, and institutional culture of the university rather than presenting results in isolation. For sure, one can prefer evaluating experiences in their singularities, because being temporal through connections is not the only way to dealt with the social. Yet, proposed definition of temporal in this study is constructed on the idea of connections. At this point, this emphasis on connection and its relation to temporality, which is supposed to be a necessary condition of the relationship to be established with the future, may become clearer through the evaluation of the approaches to time discussed above.

Gurvitch who wrote one of the most comprehensive texts on time and whose contributions to the subject are indisputable, clearly exemplifies that basic condition of being temporal is not the focus on time. Gurvitch (1964) challenged with the ideas which associate time with eternity and reduce it to consciousness by the help of the concept of total social phenomena borrowed from Mauss which consists of depth levels in a conflictual unity and cannot be reduced to these levels, and accordingly defined, as mentioned above, eight types of time. There are two basic elements that define Gurvitch’s understanding of social reality, which is the source of these different types of time. One is that this reality is in constant conflict and permeating, and the other is that these relations and their features change according to the phenomenon under consideration, depth levels, types of society and conjunctures. Because of this extremely dynamic

understanding of social reality as conflictual unity and complexity, Gurvitch asserted that the way to understand all the qualities of time defined as “discontinuous continuity and the continuous discontinuity, the duration in succession and the succession in duration...” is “dialectic hyper-empiricism” (Gurvitch, 1964). This is the point at which the problem of Gurvitch’s rich and profound approach arises. It is true that social reality and everything it contains continuously change. However, Gurvitch’s perception of change rests in part on a relativism, and therefore, not only analysis but also conceptual tools must be continually reconstructed. For this reason, while this understanding advances on temporalization by capturing change, misses the possibility of being temporal by being trapped in a constant change. Although Gurvitch averred that he divided time into types in order to capture their unifications, his identification of sociology with the “discontinuistic typological method” unlike continuity-based history gives the impression that there is a change but it is difficult to genuinely speak on. On the other hand, Gurvitch partially acquired temporality by including the past and the future, and by historicizing time to some extent.

Temporality entails to understand social relations in change and contingency, but also depends the degree of them, since higher and lower than certain level complicates the possibility of temporal stance. In that case, either grasping and establishing connections for hyperflexible becomes impossible, or pre-given unchangeable totality does not entail connections. Thus, conceptualization of reality as constantly being made and destroyed, or as fixed in some patterns equally brings similar perspective stalemate. Two other approaches that creates similar pain point are Giddens’s “theory of structuration”, and Weber’s notions of “historical individual” and “ideal type.” Giddens (1986; 1987; 1995; 1996), in the theory of structuration constructed on practice, structure, and system and coined as against to the synchronic-diachronic distinction, frequently accentuated on contingency in order to escape laws, schemas, intrinsic tendency to change, and human as inherently historical. Within this scope, while social systems comprise “situated practices”, structure analysed as rules and resources is reduced to the “virtual existence” that exists as moments in production and reproduction of social systems. The main predicament, however, arises not from reduction of structure to virtual existence, but from the assumption of “human knowledgeability in practical consciousness” as basis of structuration process in order to escape determinism and teleology. In addition, contingency of social reproduction proceeds from circumscription

of human knowledgeability by unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action. Thus, on the one hand, social relations and relatedly time-space distancing are explained by “ontological security” rooted in unconscious and associated with “being-in-the-world”, and on the other hand, in order to avoid evolutionary understanding and explain “discontinuities of modernity”, history is understood through notions of “episodes” which implies structural transformations and “time-space edges” which refers to simultaneously existing societies. Therefore, “the duality of structure”, which has significant explanatory potential, is sacrificed to various inscrutable concepts of which resources and connections are either ambiguous, or coming from unconscious. Consequently, in structureless and causeless theory of structuration coined by Giddens by connecting agency and structure in order to bring “temporality into the heart of sociology”, Giddens brought time to sociology but yanked temporality out of, since he did not establish such a connection.

In every case of disconnection or loosened connections, the possible ground for temporality begins to disappear. Weber’s basic concepts, “historical individual”, “ideal type”, and “cultural significance” create a similar problem. Defining social sciences as empirical science of concrete reality and aiming to understand relationship and cultural significance of contemporary individual events as well as causes of their existing situations, Weber (2012) asserted that events do not acquire their qualities objectively, but conditioned by people’s “cognitive interests.” Thus, Weber opposed the concept of historical individual to the law-based understanding that focuses on recurrences of causal relationships to gather similar phenomena under the same law, and trivializes aberrant ones. According to Weber, social sciences should focus on the “individually-structured configurations” of which relationships and developments are also individually structured. Hence, the role to discover causal meaning of phenomena was bestowed to neither their relations with each other, nor the laws implying value-orientation, but to imputation and cultural significance. The emphasis on imputation brings the issue to ideal types which are constructed in order to be compared with empirical reality. The target of these types which can also be derived from ideas of people living in an epoch, or can be constructed as developmental sequences, and defined by Weber as not hypothesis or not definition of reality but utopia, is not “the average character but the unique individual character of cultural phenomena” (Weber, 2012). On this basis, for instance, Weber asserted that to understand how a war is made entails to construct an ideal type of commander.

Eventually, the prominent impasse in this understanding with regard to temporality is that we are left with loosely connected, and extremely contextual concepts such as historical individual, ideal type and cultural significance. All these methodological perspective and heuristic means are the culprits that cause to stroll the spirit of capitalism among us existed before “capitalist order” as in Franklin’s country; ergo, Weber wrote such sentences: “Where it [the spirit of capitalism] appears, it produces its own capital and monetary supplies as the means to its ends, but the reverse is not true” (Weber, 2005). Since this spirit curses everything touched by it, becomes atemporal and ahistorical as well.

Another source from which the puzzle of connection relating to temporality arises is the separation of social time from astronomical or physical time by its qualitative aspects and from individual time by its assumed generality and coercivity. This issue is also related with the problem of distinction and balance between society/culture and nature as well as society and individual. To the extent that the balance and distinction determines the content of the approach, it also significantly results in temporal perspective. First of all, it should be highlighted that the distinction between nature, society, and individual employed in Durkheim-inspired social time discussions has narrowed the room given by Durkheim (1995) who not only associated time with the rhythms of society, but also interested in the sociological theory of knowledge in his analysis of categories. On this basis, as opposed to empiricism understanding categories as artificial constructions, and to apriorism defining categories as naturally given, Durkheim defined categories as “works of art that imitates nature even more perfectly”, and indicated that confining categories within social means to forget that society is “not an empire within empire” but the part and the highest expression of nature. Thus, even though categories are fabricated by social elements, according to Durkheim, they also have objective values, and connectedly individual’s life and universe have also rhythms like collective life, but collective one is just more obvious than other ones. However, approaches that has connected social with time based on the notion of social time has attenuated the space Durkheim had opened. For sure, the aim in here is not to read Durkheim’s intention, but if these approaches and considerations were not simply stuck in the regulative relationship between time and social, the probability of the emergence of a different time literature would have increased. In a similar manner, like confining time and space in a narrow area, infinite expansion of social is also equally contestable.

Thus, the main issue of time discussion is the question of how to establish this connection and balance between the social, nature and the individual. If the boundaries and content of social is collapsed by stuffing with atoms, molecules, mechanical beings and cells as societies like Tarde (2012) who placed “all real and possible things at the basis of each thing”, temporality face with similar predicament, since temporality increases with content and extent of connections that becomes possible with not arbitrarily adding new things in social but with defining principle lying under their very relations with other things and social in general. This means neither to place society and human being to superior position nor to exclude non-human or inorganic beings from the social, but to nonhierarchically relate all of them without implosion of their contents and boundaries. In other words, as Marx and Engels (1998) pointed out that the history of man and the history of nature as two sides of history are inseparable and interconnected, thus what should be done is not sacrificially uphold the existing boundaries of the social, but contemplate more on the way to connect without collapsing that ambiguates the possibility of connection. For instance, the comparison Tarde (2012) made between movements of spore and railway mechanic or the connection he established between railway networks and great minds can acquire meaning only by taking into account milieu as common ground that was degraded by Tarde as “talisman and phantom” (Vargas et al., 2008). If he had taken into account the milieu or any concrete common ground, perhaps Tarde would not have had similar prejudice with others’ that preventing them from believing in monads, and consequently, would not have called social functions as “simplest and banal”, and not have considered spores more superior than railway mechanics. The importance of connection between particular genius with milieu or social can become more apparent by the help of Bloch’s (1996) considerations on inspiration that, albeit generally mythologized as coming from above, can only emerge by the intersection of “creative propensity with the propensity of time”, i.e., subjective and objective conditions through which “Novum” becomes apparent as in the “cogito ergo sum” arising from “capitalist mandate” or as in historical materialism arising from “proletarian mandate.” In the absence of ground and connection between great minds and milieu, or subjective experiences and objective conditions, there is no other choice but attribute the movement of spores to “particular cosmic plan, the vital element...and hidden resources” (Tarde, 2012), as in “ontological security” and “human knowledgeability” (Giddens, 1986; 1995; 1996), or in Weber’s (2005) “spirit of

capitalism.” Moreover, since social is not a sack in which we can put everything, but a form of relationship and connection, inclusion of “infinitesimal”, “spores”, and “molecules” (Tarde, 2012) in social entails stronger criterion than “more perfect.” Likewise, if all the realms are to be reduced to each other, it would mean disrespecting the distinctiveness and content of what is defined as nature and as social as well as destroying both. Indeed, the main issue is how people perform their natural processes in sociality, and how they reconcile their sociability with their natural aspects, i.e., people live their natural aspects in sociality, and vice versa. Therefore, pointing out the existence of “non-social or anti-social instincts” inasmuch as we are mammals as well as members of a nation (Tarde, 2012), or defining “stranger”, “criminal”, “love”, and “friendship” as “non-societal” parts (Simmel, 1971b) stands as an obstacle to temporalize social. Social can be considered as amalgam of all of these rather than threatening and gigantic entity individuals confront with. When the social is grasped as such, it becomes more dynamic, changeable, and eventually, temporal, because temporal perspective can only be strengthened by associating all these elements. Therefore, what needs to be done is not to avoid social, attach other blocks to it, or to reject it altogether, but to discuss its limits and contents, because it is easy to consider the smaller and fluid as temporal, but the genuine temporality can only be captured by connecting these smaller ones through non-fictional principle. In other words, the social does not have to be conceived as “big brother” above individuals, life and nature, and even it is possible to loosen its oppressive aspects only by talking about its limits and content rather than totally rejecting it. Latour’s (2005; 2011) avoidance of social by employing expressions of “collective entities”, “associations”, and “network” and his definition of social as “a tiny set of narrow standardised connections” rather than milieu, and his invitation us to “look down” in order to be a good sociologist stems from similar misconception. In fact, temporal glance entails to look into all directions, including down.

The issue of sociality and anti-sociality brings the issue to the question of how the social has been shaped in relation with time. While in social time discussions, time functions as regulator for the social that in return functions as basis for time and exhibit relative stability in time, in approaches that assume a constitutive relationship between time and social, perhaps Bourdieu can be partly accepted as an exception, the constant state of structuring arises. In this framework, while modalities do not come into play in the former understanding since social is relatively stable and ahistorical, the past and the

future find a place for themselves in the latter one. However, this placement brings some problems to temporal stance, since distinction made between time and temporal, as mentioned above, has generally been constructed on this constitutive function, and accordingly with reference to experienced and lived time as opposed to the regulative aspects of social life. Above all, despite all their differences, the common feature of the approaches assuming constitutive relationship is that they position the past and the future as horizons by prioritizing the present, and they lean on a distinction, albeit to varying degrees, between the distant and the immediate pasts and futures. Moreover, although the most important contribution of these approaches is that they depict time as two-way horizons flowing towards immediate present, and in constant novelty as opposed to time imagined as line on which past, present, and future sequentially moves, precisely the incessant renewal hampers to establish connections. For instance, Mead (1932) depicted this constant renewal defining temporal quality of sociality as “passage in emergence” owing to which mind moves between different systems; with his own words, “this present is the scene of emergence which gives always new, and its sociality is the structure of our minds.” A second problem here in terms of temporality is that the constitutive relation has been transferred only to immediate context. Yet, Mead distinguished between specious and functional presents, and defined boundaries of functional one via “undertaking/what we are doing” of which can be placed in more extended present having wider horizon in relation with its own undertaking. Partly similar distinction between immediate and distant pasts and futures was proposed by Schutz (1959; 2018), as mentioned before, with reference to the “stock of knowledge at hand” through “retentions” as well as “recollections” towards past, and “protentions” and “anticipations” towards future. In a similar vein, Bourdieu (1990; 2000; 2018) placed temporality in “directly perceived present” that has no connection with project, but with “practical anticipations and retrospections.” On this basis, Bourdieu contrasted the notion of open future with the Kabyle peasants’ forthcoming as the horizon of perceived present, and relatedly the possible with the potential. Inclination to immediate present and horizons reaches to different dimension in Luhmann who carried the distinction between distant and immediate to the level of systems by asserting that far periods of time does not belong to time, but only obscure zones due to the “experiential perspectives of subjects.” Yet, according to Luhmann, individuals can access to others’ times by communication that entails individual-independent time through which time horizons converge. Intersection

of different presents in Mead (1932), on the other hand, becomes possible through the structural organization of society and communication by which community infiltrate individuals' experience and in turn, individual undertakes the role of "generalized other." Similarly, Schutz (2018) placed experience in "Lebenswelt" in which objective world is converted into possible means in subjective experiences, and indicated to Husserl's concepts of "formalizations" and "idealizations" in order to explain that anticipation becomes possible by following them, though experience carries indeterminacy to some extent. To Bourdieu (2018), it can be asserted that the same process is achieved with the sense of game through field, habitus and capital all of which reverberates into the practice in immediate present. At this point, since there are quite different approaches in this line, it may be necessary to recapitulate the problems these approaches create in cooperation. Firstly, the fundamental predicament in this line arises in relation with the new that completely disappears in Mead because it emerges at every instant, while hardly appears in Bourdieu in the concept of habitus. Moreover, this understanding of new does not offer an answer as to where the processes are going to. The disappearance of new is precisely due to the realization of the entire process in the immediate context of experience, practice, consciousness, system in which the distant future or the past being pushed out of this constitution. Besides what is the criterion of the distance is not clear, this understanding also leaves unanswered the question of impact of expectations and phantasies for the distant future as well as does not effectively account the establishment of experiences or practices at the intergenerational or collective level. Yet, it may be asserted that communication, Lebenswelt, field, and system provide such a ground for collective and intergenerational level. Alas, the ground in question which has acquired different content in each approach loses its explanatory power to the extent that it is based on the distinction between constitution and regulation. For instance, with regard to the distinction between forthcoming and future made by Bourdieu, albeit the richness of his perspective, it is possible to ask whether future as integral part of today's people life can be considered as part of the habitus and immediate present. Similarly, Mead's and Schutz's ideas can be scrutinized on the grounds that besides intersubjective was considered as more or less flat surface, the essential element of these ideas is not the inter but the intra, i.e., inter seems to be sacrificed to the intra. Additionally, the more striking problem with regard to temporality and the future as stance is that the present defined in these approaches is very narrow, and not a genuine present. The maturation of the present,

on the other hand, requires looking at the present from a different angle and with other questions, as will be discussed later.

The problem created by the strict distinction between immediate and far stems from the fact that it invites the further distinctions between regulative and constitutive relations, and relatedly between internal and external. In this respect, social produces time that regulates the social in the conception of social time, thus while social establishes an internal relationship with time, time functions as an external organizer in its relationship with the social. On the line assuming a constitutive relationship between time and social, on the other hand, while time plays a role in the formation of social, social organizes time by selection and invocation in the context of its formation. It is interesting that the latter of two upside down versions of each other is more consecrated in the name of temporality. The reason behind this choice is emphasis on continuous renewal and emergence in this second line, especially in Mead. Moreover, since it seems to signify a relatively dynamic tone as well as processual and fluid understanding of social, this constitutive relation also undertakes the duty of being a shelter of refuge in the face of fear of giant society. Thus, endeavours to temporalize social sciences has clung to these subjectivities, experiences, and the images of flowing life. Baert (1992, as cited in Subrt, 2021: 204-211), for instance, placed diachronic analysis at the heart of his attempt to temporalize sociology, and distinguished four types of approaches according to their view on order and the future, which are “unchanging order”, “order revealing over time towards closed future”, “closed history but human intervention”, and “order revealing in time but open future.” On this basis, placing this fourth approach exemplified by Darwin, Mead, and Bergson at the base of temporalized sociology, Baert defined temporal sociology with the characteristics of processuality, diachrony, relatively open future, discontinuity, emergence, new events (Mead) and *durée* (Bergson). Therefore, here again, temporalization has turned into a problem of prioritizing experience, consciousness, intuition, and lived time with the emphasis on process and diachrony, and with reference to theorists such as Mead, Schutz, and Bergson.

The fundamental problem of time in social science arises precisely from the reduction of temporalization to mere experiences or actions directed towards change. It is undeniable that temporality entails to take into account experiences and actions, but to the extent that these actions and experiences are considered only within the immediate context, the question of how to interpret broadscale historical and social process, and

social phenomena in which human action cannot be directly perceived remains unanswered. Contrary, temporal stance entails not to reduce time to immediate experiences, but to see experiences temporally. Additionally, subjectivity, body and cyclicity are not the only way by which life is experienced and lived, processes and structures that organize life and even oppressed us also get involved in life. Thus, for instance, compliance with strict time schedules or working synchronically with the rhythm of machines are equally open to be temporal stance as immediate experiences since these regulations and more stable parts of life does not descend from the sky, but made in social. Moreover, what makes an approach temporal is not that it focuses on consciousness, actions, experiences, and time, since temporality in the sense that this study employed is related with how an approach achieves this focus relatively independent of what it focuses on. This also means that a connection must be made, both internal and external, according to the subject in focus. Hence, the division of life and social into two parts as in the prevailing conceptualization of temporal, i.e., more fluid, heterogeneous, subjective, and dynamic as opposed to solid, homogenous, static, and objective, indicates the problem of stance. In this disguised division of regulative and constitutive considerations on time and social, for instance, linear time as measurement of physical events is contrasted to the temporality of life (or lived time) which is characterized by cyclical processes and subjective bodily experiences (Fuchs, 2018). In a similar emphasis, Adam (1995) labelled transformation of lived time into a source by labour and money as “the creation of a non-temporal time.” Eventually, against the human time experiences in which time is constituted, another form of time is considered as imposed on lived and experienced time as external framework and regulator. This contrast imputed to social experiences of time brings the issue back to the dual conceptualization of time. This prevailing conception of time traces back to Bergson (1907/1944) who distinguished external, measurable, quantitative abstract time, and internal, qualitative, living real duration, i.e., “unorganized bodies and abstract time” and “organized bodies and real duration.” According to this idea, while the former is repeatable, having no history and no creation, ageless, the latter implies ceaseless new and unforeseeable. These two types of time corresponding to two different worlds were apportioned by Bergson between philosophy entrusted with irreducible and irreversible, and science and ordinary knowledge dealing with a world “dying and reborn at every instant.” Time was also divided into parts by McTaggart (1908) who indicated the unreality of time by means of

distinction between the “objective B-series of time” implying before-after relation of events, and the “subjective A-series of time” including the past, the present, and the future all of which are relative to observer. These philosophical considerations serve as basis for the concern to distinguish between time and temporal in social sciences. Considering the time approaches in social science discussed above, it can be noticed that the similarity, especially with Bergson, is quite evident with the approaches that assume a constitutive relationship with time.

In fact, the most fundamental issue in the understanding of time in social science proceeded from the fact that the constitutive and regulative qualities are positioned so separately. These are mainly two sides of time or of relation with time, and it is not even clear which one is fundamental. The relationship between these two faces may well be established as conflict or cohesion, but the point is that one is completely excluded from the realm of individuals and experience, and the other from the society and organization. Furthermore, while the ability to constitute is given only to interaction, socialization, consciousness and so on, the larger entities are considered as cumbersome and far from being constructive. Thus, there is no choice for the magnitudes like structures, social institutions, and society that can only connect with time or the temporal through the function of regulation, but loom on nature, human, and biological rhythms like a nightmare. Moreover, they are not considered temporal because of their coarseness.

Here again, in order to see the unity of constitutive and regulative in terms of both time and social, and to connect two relations without separating or collapsing them, we can surprisingly return to Durkheim who understood social reality through the relationship between the sacred and the profane. It is surprising because while those insist on constant flowing, reject grand narratives and historical laws, and claim to construct dynamic relation between agency and structure are always applauded for their achievements in temporality, it may be surprising to say that this connection can be found in Durkheim who has been generally blamed for saddling us with society monster. Durkheim (1982; 1995) opened the door to rethink the distinction between constitution and regulation by connecting the sacred and the profane through action and collectivity, and wrote that “if it is general because it is collective... but far from being collective because it is general...echoed in each one of them... because of the special energy derived from its collective origins” (Durkheim, 1982). The assumed relation in here between the general and the collective has been narrowed or distorted, just as discussions of social

time do. For instance, Latour (2011), seems to have overlooked this emphasis of Durkheim in the expression written to criticize Durkheim that “a phenomenon may be collective without being social.” More importantly, this emphasis of Durkheim on the collective has been sacrificed to emphasis on generality in social time discussions. The relationship established by Durkheim refers to the need for society to aware and affirm itself, that is, the emphasis on its need for periodic renewal in order to exist (Durkheim, 1995) can carry society beyond stability, and coerciveness. Society, which can only be basis for time, becomes dynamic here because of the need of renewal, thus this entails to reconsider the constitutive-regulative distinction. In Durkheim’s understanding, while the profane is periodically charged with the energy produced in the sacred, the sacred finds its meaning and foundation in the organization of the profane. The boundary between two realms offers the opportunity to think temporally as well as to expand the field narrowed by both social time discussions and the approaches focused on experience and consciousness. If, in accordance with the tendency to divide time into parts, this relationship between the sacred and the profane is given a name at the expense of proliferation of time adjectives, it can be asserted that time poses as the regulative “social time” and the constitutive “collective time.” This understanding, first of all, points out that conceptualization of social time focuses on only one aspect of the issue, and secondly and more importantly, being constructive and dynamic does not require to down to the smallest units. Although two different names are given here in accordance with the general trend, these two times (and two worlds) that point to two different emotional densities, far from separated, cannot exist without each other, for this reason, they are both same social and same time appearing in two different costumes. Similarly, paying attention on rhythms like Durkheim, but from a different perspective, Lefebvre (2007) opened a door to see the constitutive and regulative relations together, by indicating spontaneity and measurability of rhythms that combines quantitative and qualitative aspects, and the impact of rational rhythms on the multiple natural rhythms of the body. Elias (2000) who leaned on the social aspect of time by the capacity of synthesis and of intergenerational learning, associated the distinction between physical and social time with the development of natural sciences, and with the separation between nature and society. Time in physics and philosophy, according to Elias, is understood in elaborated abstraction, whereas in the realm of society time reduced to the “regulatory device.” Yet, according to Elias, since timing is people’s capacity for connecting two or more

sequences, one of which serves as a timing standard for the others, and sequences at the physical, biological, social and personal levels can be synchronized, the strict distinction between nature and history is meaningless. Combining regulative and constitutive understandings with the notion of transcendence and two extremes both of which diffuse through his entire thought, Simmel (1971b; 1908/1971c; 1918/1971d) offered a rather confusing approach in terms of temporality. It is confusing since while the idea of transcendence inconveniences temporality, he proposed significant connections that engenders temporal qualities in his analysis of fashion (Simmel, 1971e) and metropolis (Simmel, 1971f). In his colourful theoretical stance, Simmel (1905/1971a; 1971b) depicted life and mind in constant flow circumscribed with boundaries to create forms, and accordingly there is no ready-made society and interaction, but society, or more correctly sociation, arises through interaction which is itself arises from contents such as drive, purpose, and interest that are not essentially social, but becomes social only after acquires form. In this relation between form and content, which resembles Bergson's ideas, Simmel (1971d) distinguished between time of "logically observable object", and time of "subjectively lived life" based on the notion of present which is transcending itself to become present, and placing human at a border between present and the future. What makes Simmel confusing in terms of the framework of temporality this study attempts to construct is swiftly shining and tarnishing of temporal qualities in his entire thought. First and foremost, why essentially anti-social contents such as purpose and drive tend to come together to become social in forms remains unanswered. Considering that Simmel's answer is the transcendence of life and the dual nature of human that are themselves atemporal presuppositions, temporality fades away. Adding the immortality of form as oppose to the transitory character of each individual fashion (Simmel, 1971e) to this, temporality almost completely vanishes. In addition, if life is characterized by reaching out itself, and overflowing from forms, it is possible to expect erosion of boundaries of forms, or at least loosening of boundaries by pressure of changing contents from within, relatedly one can expect that life should not be able to pass with the same fluidity in every form, at least depending on the contents. This understanding, albeit its richness, has predicaments in regards to temporality even when the idea of transcendence is accepted for a while, since it does not establish a relationship between different flow rates in forms, not give a history to forms at least through flowing life, and not deem forms worthy of even transcendence in order to go beyond themselves. As indicated at the very beginning

of this subtitle, however, sometimes certain parts or concepts of any theory can acquire temporal qualities independent of entire framework. For this reason, although Simmel's theoretical ground is established on transcendence and extremes, he must be given credit for temporal elements especially for his analysis of fashion (Simmel, 1971e) and the analysis of metropolitan life (Simmel, 1971f) to some extent.

At this point, the importance of the distinction proposed in the study between time and temporal as the precondition for the relation to be established between social science and the future, and the features of temporality dispersed among above paragraphs can be recapped. First of all, in contrast to the prevailing tendency that has alternately employed two terms, and defined temporality, in relatively rare distinction, with reference to the experienced and lived time, temporality is employed in this study to signify the perspective and stance of social science, not experience. Thus, for instance, there is a difference between sociology of time implying a specific subject, and temporal sociology referring to the perspective. By leaving out the distinction between experienced or lived time and regulative time, this perspective expands the meaning and scope of temporality to include society, institutions, structures and regulative relations generally excluded from temporality. Additionally, though temporality as stance means above all that this quality is independent of dealing with time as subject, considering time from such a perspective may offer a different analysis of time.

Two fundamental features of temporality, drawing from above analysis, are connections, and in conjunction with the first feature, incrementality. The coexistence of these two qualities indicates that temporality is directly proportional with connections established through the expansion of any subject social scientists deal with towards different aspects of social life. First of all, what is meant by connections is the extension of the subject in every possible direction, from experiences to the structural relationships. In addition, as noted above, any parts of an approach or certain concepts may acquire this quality. For example, while Simmel's approach moves away from the temporality because of the fundamental principles his theory constructed on, his analysis on fashion referring to different historical periods and social positions acquire temporal qualities to some extent. In a similar vein, Durkheim's (1995) categories and Marx's (2010) usage of the concept of commodity exemplifies the temporal concepts that absorbs history and social relations. At this point, defining temporality as directly proportional to the connections and as feature that can be acquired at various degrees may raise some

questions regarding this expression used to imply stance. Firstly, the emphasis on expansion by connections may raise the question of whether an inquiry and analysis of singular experiences can be temporal. For certain, the focus on specific experiences may also be temporal, but for this, as briefly touched upon in the above discussion on the adjectives of time, it needs to be expanded and deepened into the broader ground in which experiences gain meaning. Yet in the same way, an inquiry that starts from a broadscale question can also expand into the field of experiences. To make this point more apprehensible, for example, a more inclusive inquiry such as the “clock-time and power relations” and an inquiry into “the impact of strict timetables on time experiences of employees in specific institution” can be compared. Both inquiries can become more temporal by extending into the other realms such as meaning of power and time, specific experiences, cultural, economic, and political fields, and variation of time experiences in various social positions. This may justifiably raise two more questions and objections that whether there is a limit to expansion with connections as well as a social scientist working on a subject can only expand to a certain extent considering limitations such as the constraints of time, conditions, lifespan, limited means and available information. First of all, it should be noted that the quality and establishment of connections can vary according to the content and scope of the subject under consideration and be shaped in the course of study. Moreover, comprehensive issues may in some cases require less connections than inquiry on specific experiences. This evokes Durkheim’s (1982) emphasis on that to formulate laws does not entail looking into all the facts. Furthermore, a principle or commonality that emerges and becomes evident as the establishment of connections develops can ensure that connections is not arbitrary, and expansion is limited. This means that temporality can be considered as an expansion and, then contraction. For certain, this imply neither immutability nor extreme mutability of principle(s), but dependency of principles on the selected subjects and changing historical and social conditions. However, if this principle is a kind of presupposition or abstraction such as human knowledgeability (Giddens, 1986; 1995) or transcendence (Simmel, 1971d), establishment of connections becomes arbitrary and unlimited. As for the second related question, it must be admitted that expanding the connections can in most cases exceed the time and possibilities of the individual social scientists. This point brings the issue of heritage, and relatedly the importance of discussions on concepts and ideas at common ground, and making reference to previous ideas by rejection or agreement instead

of arbitrarily construction of new blocks without looking into existing ones reveals itself at this point. Surely, as in the literature today, similar subjects and questions may have been explained by very different connections. Yet, the colourfulness of this legacy is still more amenable to the connections needed for temporality than endless proliferation of adjectives. Moreover, as the connections are expanded, those that seem singular at first glance perhaps can fit one of the existing adjectives without reducing their specific aspects. Finally, it is also possible that some of the already established connections can be transformed, discarded and re-established through expansion and contraction.

After all this long discussion, a final and legitimate question on the relevance of temporality and connections to the relationship between social science and the future may arise. This question will be tried to be answered starting from the next subtitle until the last part of the text. Yet more importantly, since the suggestion is to be temporal through connections, the temporality of this study based on time and the future can also be questioned. In this context, it can rightly be claimed that the expansion of the study to the discussions of time in physics and philosophy, and more importantly, to different temporalities can further increase its temporal quality. At this point, although there are approaches that extend their focus to physical systems (Luhmann, 1982) or animals and plants (Adam, 1990; Mead, 1932; Luhmann, 1982), it can be referenced to one of the most comprehensive approaches on temporality proposed by Fraser who defined temporality by dividing reality into different layers. Fraser (1978; 1992) with reference to Jakob von Uexküll's concept of Umwelt¹², conceptualized nature as "evolutionarily open system" characterized by different levels all of which has its own temporality. These levels are "sociotemporal" refers to the collective umwelt, "nootemporal" to human mind, "biotemporal" to all living organisms, "eotemporal" to cosmos and astronomical world, "prototemporal" to elementary particles, and "atemporal" to electromagnetic radiation. All of these levels also differ in their relations with past, present, and future. Therefore, the study is deficient in terms of temporality since it does not expand to different time literatures and different types of temporality and levels of reality, but starts from a limited and pre-given definition of the social. However, since expanding into different fields and incorporating different elements into analysis entails

¹² Umwelt refers to "an animal's receptors and effectors determine its world of possible stimuli and actions, ... define the nature and extent of animal's universe" (Fraser, 1992).

starting from the present, and the present of this study is time literature, it can be asserted that the study at least has partly proper start.

2.4. The Portrait of the Future

Evaluations of the theories and approaches on time, which was accepted as more legitimate subject than the future, and consequently attracted considerable interest, propose important clues to contemplate on the relation the study searches for. As stated before, the future has only been included in social sciences with certain prevailing tendencies because it is one of the difficult subjects to talk and think about in the field of social science. This difficulty arises from the way the social is defined on the one hand, and the fundamental principles of science on the other. While the discussions in this chapter is based more on the relationship between social, time and the future, the relation between science and the future will be addressed in the last chapter of the study. The partially ambivalent relation established through certain tendencies requires firstly scrutinizing the position of the future in social thought in order to establish a more immanent relationship between the future and social science. In other words, establishing a relationship entails first of all to know the deployment of the subject to be associated that is one of the main determinants of the quality of the relationship to be established and of the position of the person relating to the subject. So long as having such recognition, it would be possible to comprehend the place we tend to, the angle we position on, and if the thing would come to us, the direction we expect its arrival from. Accordingly, in order to connect and grasp any subject, social science should pre-emptively situate its subject on more or less correct position as well as situate itself with respect to subject's attributed position. Thus, the content and perception of the future in the above-mentioned theories needs to be more crystallized.

The approaches discussed above exhibits profound differences with regards to the established relation between social and time as well as the level of considerations on the future. On this basis, it is difficult to find a place for the future in the approaches constructed on the notion of social time that connected time with the social on regulative function. Yet, the future has been included in sub-tendency of this line, albeit not full-fledged, through comparisons of various societies, groups, social positions or historical periods over the future expectations or future visions. On the other hand, in the approaches that emphasize on constitutive relation and build this relation, according to

definition of social, on experience, consciousness, systems, structuration and practices, the future finds more place for itself. Alas, in this case, the future, together with the past, is entrusted with being a horizon and auxiliary element that is summoned to formation of the immediate present. Moreover, the future has not found a genuine place for itself even in the field of futures studies devoted to the future. In this field, even though the future becomes the main focus and subjects to some elaborated distinctions such as probable, preferable and possible (Bell, 2004; 2009; 2011), the future is still overwhelmingly conceptualized through familiar tools such as future visions and planning. Hence, the futures studies and the approaches in social science are in harmony on deploying the future. This sound surface remains unshakable in the emphasis on the social aspect of time, in the insistence of social science on focusing on the present and the past, in comparisons made over different conceptions of time, in modalities and iterations that focus on the immediate present, and in the production of time by consciousness and experience. Therefore, although the future sometimes comes to the immediate context of experience as a constitutive element, finds a place for itself as a field to conserve expectations, opens a space for itself through the evaluations of various literary genres, and is implicitly included in the discussions of social change, all these insights fundamentally united in the imputed position of the future as distant and not-yet. Consequently, it cannot be expected from the distant and not-yet future find a meaningful ground in social science apart from certain tendencies. What can be done within such an understanding is to either exclude the future from social sciences due to its unobservability and immeasurability, or to labelled the expectations and hopes affecting the present experiences and choices as the future.

It is possible to say that there is a great consensus on this position of the future not only in social sciences but also in general opinion. An example given by Staley (2017) about the cover of the book, *The Road Ahead*, on which Bill Gates “standing in a desolate landscape on a paved road that leads off to the horizon” can be explanatory to comprehend this position. According to Staley, the cover seems to declare that the future is already exist in someplace and wait to be discovered by someone like Gates. Thus, in the face of the future lying on the horizon of the present, the only thing people can do is either to wait for revealing the future itself, or to conquer this distant island. The difference between these two options, on the one hand, is related with the role of human action in relation to this distant field that signify the familiar discussion in social science on

normative stance. On the other hand, same difference also expressed two different approaches to the future that are exemplified within the distinction between the “present futures” as approaching to the future from the standpoint of the present and the “future present” as looking from the standpoint of the future. In the first case, the future becomes an extremely open space to be conquered, shaped, and exploited while in the second case implies the concern and responsibility for the future generations (Adam, 2005; 2010; Adam and Groves, 2007). Relatedly, Clancy (2014) highlighted that feel insecure about and loss confidence in future are hand in hand but different, since the first one related with “what is coming at you” and the latter implies “what people can do in future.” However, for all its importance, a distinction made between the future that is coming to us or we move towards it, is still the approach of a distant object or our approach to it. Thus, from the viewpoint of social science, future as combination of distant and not-yet, is situated to an invisible but only intuitional point. As in the case with all invisible, unknown, and putative things, a strange feeling as the mixture of fear and curiosity springs about the future. This strange feeling signifies the attitude of social science concerning future. Even though incognisant of how far away future is, to conquer the fear and curiosity as well as make future more knowable, social science attempts to pull future in close and predict, or transfer expectations, fears and hopes to this field.

The position that makes the relation between social science and the future ambivalent is also a relatively dangerous. To get rid of this danger, efforts are generally directed towards turning the future into forms that are accepted as more proper and legitimate. Thus, the future is gradually reduced to consciousness, hopes, expectations, and becomes something that cannot be talked about apart from these. With regard to ideas, Weber (2012) asserted that it is possible to construct people’s ideas in certain epoch as ideal types because they exist in people’s minds empirically. This assertion is partially right, since these thoughts are shaped by the conditions and to the extent that they affect the actions, they provide important clues about social. Yet, although their importance is undeniable, considering the expectations, concern, images and dreams about the future in the human mind as the only data about the future brings some problems in terms of the relationship between the future and social science. First of all, what can be talked about as the future in such an understanding is the future that has to remain always as future like Derrida’s (1994) door that always remains open. Beyond any doubt, the distinctiveness of the future from what is defined as the past and the present must be

emphasized, otherwise everything would have remained the same. If this separation, however, is conceived as a distant point and absolute differentiation that can only be reached with images, the connections of the future with the present and the past are loosened. The future, which must always remain a future on its inaccessible kingdom in the sky in order to be the future, does not also lose much of this position in approaches that assume a constitutive relationship even though they seem to open up a space for the future. Luhmann (1976), important representative of this understanding, indicated to the three ways of conceptualization of the future which are “chronological conception”, “the theory of modalities”, and “the phenomenological analysis.” Adopting the third one, Luhmann fixed the familiar position of the future since phenomenological analysis accepts both future and past as horizons implying that, according to Luhmann, “the future cannot begin since we cannot touch the horizon, but it contributes to the definition of situation.” In a similar vein, Mead’s (1932) association of the future and the past with the present as “the locus of reality”, Schutz’s (1959; 2018) construction of the relation between action and act, and Bourdieu’s (1990; 2000) forthcoming related with the immediate present cannot change the position. Hence, in the portrait, the future appears as a distant point, and a field following the present which is itself ambiguous. In terms of social science, the problematic aspect of this distant and not-yet position which can only semiautomatically come closer as the horizon of the present in constitutive understanding is the inability to establish a genuine relationship with the future as well as, perhaps even more, with the current age. In other words, this position also renders definitions of the present flawed, as discussed above in the discussion of temporality in relation with connections which can be consolidated not only by laterally expanded but also longitudinally and profoundly that entails to include the past and the future in connections. The future as distant cannot invite anything but an act that we can just look towards ahead as our hands on our foreheads from the place that is ambiguously called as present. In that case, to connect with the present, social scientists try to interpret the genres of the future, or assume to get closer to the future with the advances in technology. Thus, social science that repeatedly returns to the same impossible task, almost like Sisyphus, should begin with questioning the assumed position of the future to get rid of this situation. This entails to see the future with different eyes to understand the current age and social as well. Different eyes imply not to future as subject but to future as stance. What is meant by stance is not like the choice of Dasein between either stay in “they-

self”, or acquire authenticity by undertaking its ownmost possibility, i.e., death, is a both ownmost and uttermost “possibility-of-Being as the possibility of impossibility of Dasein.” The relation with death, in that case, is not the relation with something not-yet but needs to be undertaken by Dasein to come towards itself since in “they-self” as Dasein’s “everydayness”, “thrownness” and “falling” character, Dasein faced with death only as empirical reality, not as potentiality. Since death already belongs to Dasein characterized by disclosure and “Being-in-the-world”, Dasein cannot be understood via its properties but possibilities (Heidegger, 1927/2006). Even though assuming death as a potential in itself seems at first glance the reminiscence of the study’s emphasis on the future as a stance to connect with the present, there are significant differences. Before anything else, if death is something Dasein must undertake and always carry within itself, thus sees everything through the window of being finitude, direct transfer of this understanding to social science carries the risk to invite teleology as familiar ghost periodically haunting social sciences and the future. Besides, if death is something that human undertakes in the present and always carry within them, then living life from the window of being finite evokes the Christian eschatological expectation constructed on the Second Coming of Christ that implies act in the present from the window of the expected and to partly already been future (Love, 2019). With regard to this point, Osborne (1994), as in the anticipation of death as the condition of temporalization of time, indicated to the importance of anticipation of historical end as condition to construct temporal horizon beyond generational boundaries. Contrary these understandings, the future in this study is considered as neither an end to be undertaken or a new beginning, nor potential already carried within the present, but employed simultaneously with the present as well as not determined end in strict sense. The relation between social science and the future through stance, as will be detailed in the last chapter, is called as futural throughout the study. As this futural character is discussed, it will become clear why temporality is employed as precondition for futural, and futural stance is also a significant for temporality.

Quoting from Kafka’s parable about a human, Kafka called as “he”, who caught between two fires and imagined going out from the battleground and becoming “umpire”, Arendt (1961) indicated to three simultaneous fighting in the story that mainly springs from the existence of “he”, since otherwise these two forces would destroy each other. Yet, the problem in the parable, according to Arendt, that though Kafka understood existence of “he” as breaking unidirectionality, he still thought in conventional linear

image of time that is the reason why he dreamed of stepping out of the fighting line. Contrarily, Arendt defined the line he stands on not as interval but as “diagonal force” that deflects the other two forces, i.e., the past and the future. Hence, according to Arendt, if Kafka’s “he” would have moved back and forth on this diagonal line, and rooted in the present, then he would not have had to imagine leaping beyond this line in order to find a position as an umpire to impartially judge the forces. However, besides position of the line and of the hero, this story also requires to consider the position of the forces in order to reach futural stance the study discusses on. If the line is affected by the existence of “he”, but the force, the future, is distant that human on the line never know where the force comes from and how to resist it, and consequently, there will be no fight, but attack coming from unknowable front. In this case, it is possible neither to perceive the line nor to understand influence, then what needs to be done is not only going back and forth on the line as Arendt proposed, but also scrutinizing the position of the future in thought, after that it may be realized the necessity to draw up closer the extremes of the line instead of just moving forward and backward. Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on this position in order to reflect on the relationship between the future and social science, to save the future from being a strange point in the distance, and to establish a relationship between social sciences without turning the future into a vessel of expectation or concern. In accordance with this aim, the approaches having more practical concern, and conceiving time as not homogenous but including tensions and inequalities can help to understand that it is difficult but not impossible to break this ossified position in thought.

3. THE POLITICS OF TIME

In the effort to reflect on the recommended relation between the future and social science as stance and perspective, it has been inferred that relationship is closely related to both temporality as a precondition and the position of the future in thought. The prevailing understanding and position in question, to reiterate, is characterized by the sharp dissection of time into various types ignited by the emphasis on social time, the tendency to compare and qualify time through adjectives, the consideration of temporal with reference to the experience and constitutive relation between social and time, the division between flowing, heterogenous, qualitative, subjective time, and rigid, homogeneous, quantitative, objective time, and the conventional assumptions of the distant and not-yet future. This prevalent understanding has been reproduced by another tendency in time-oriented approaches labelled in this study as an umbrella term, “the politics of time.”¹³ Rethinking all the characteristics and the two problematic areas discussed in the first chapter through the approaches in this chapter can provide a significant basis for the main question of the study, because while the portrait of the future revealed in the first chapter have a great impact on the approaches that will be evaluated in this chapter, these approaches revealing the connection between time and politics generally respond by reproducing a copy of the portrait drawing in the first chapter.

The studies to be discussed in this chapter are important for several reasons to consider the relationship in question. First of all, the tendency to separate social time from other forms of time, or to compare various types of societies and historical periods through their time perceptions, mentioned in the first chapter, has been enriched by spreading to different areas, has evolved into the tendency that isolates each experience surrounded by its specific time, and thus gradually made the issue of establishing connection that is important to temporality more inexplicable. Secondly, since the approaches evaluated in this chapter are closer to the field of practice, they have the power to present a more detailed and tangible picture of time. In addition, these studies are also important because they provide insight in the current trends of the social sciences’ approach to time, since studies today are generally carried out on differences in the experiences of time contrary to the theoretical tendencies of the earlier periods. In

¹³The expression has been used in various texts in the time literature (Bevernage, 2016; Bryson, 2007a; 2007b; Mudrovic, 2019; Osborne, 1994; Stevens, 2016), sometimes as “time politics” (Adam, 2002), or “politics of temporality” (Clancy, 2014). It is used in this study to simultaneously refer to three different meanings, including its general meaning in the literature.

connection with this point, since the first chapter portrayed the future as distant and not-yet, how this distance is handled in these studies standing closer to the field of practice and experience, can offer clues about the problem of perspective. Moreover, how the distinction between constitutive and regulative relationships established between social and time has been reproduced in these studies focusing on individuals, societies, and various social positions' perceptions and experiences of time may help to evaluate the strength of the mentioned distinction. Although this distinction is recreated in various forms, a glance at the history of dominant understanding of time may help to think these forms historically instead of as a nightmare. In addition, the constitutive relation considering the future and the past as horizons of the immediate present mentioned in the first chapter, can be carried to the different realm by the help of studies evaluated in this subtitle that indicate the inequalities and conflicts within the presents as well as connection of presents with the control and regulation of time.

In this chapter, firstly, the reasons for choosing the title, that is, the characterization of time and the future as political field will be discussed. As a second step, the emergence and prevalence of clock time, linear time and standard time, and relatedly work time and leisure time will be evaluated because the studies have overwhelmingly concentrated on these forms as well as these forms are the basis for further distinctions. Afterwards, besides approaches that meaningfully question and challenge to the dominant understanding of time and the separation of work and leisure time, examples from studies that increasingly compress time experiences into the specific and isolated fields will be mentioned. Finally, the problems created by the approaches evaluated in this section and the possibilities they offer for a temporal and futural stance will be discussed.

3.1 Why Time and Future are Political?

Time, as mentioned before, is an important component of regulation and organization of social life, as well as its formation and constitution. For this reason, people have reflected on and made sense of time in various ways throughout their history. Since time occupies a central position in social life, for and by whom time as well as past, present and future are regulated, controlled, arranged and planned has always been battleground. This is, for sure, a field of intense and profound discussions including historiography, planning and imagining the future, and on what basis the present is

defined. For that very reason, time can be considered as political sphere. In addition, it should be noted that the reversion of expression as the time of politics carries similar significance, since like all human actions, as Stevens (2016) propounded, politics, which borrows from past and orients towards future, has temporal dimensions. In spite of this importance, the main focus of this chapter is the politics of time, although these two sides cannot be completely separated from each other.

The political character of time can be considered by means of a few different meanings. First of all, because common thought of time is often characterized by opposing positions or by various dualisms, time can be characterized as political through the tension of these pairs. As Fraser (1978) indicated that from the very beginning, contemplations on the nature of time illustrate the contradictory and political characteristic of time since these contemplations have been shaped through two conflictual views between “becoming and being” as well as “change and permanence” that create the additional contested concepts such as “necessity and contingency”, “one and many”, and “infinite and finite.” It can be remarked that dualistic conceptualization of time, which is continuously reproduced in various ways in social science, can be interpreted as the resurrection of the “chronos” and “kairos” distinction made in ancient Greece. In this distinction, chronos is quantitative, measurable, abstract, and uniform while kairos as qualitative time implies time of opportunity, critical, right time, juncture (Cocker, 2015; Smith, 1969; Stevens, 2016). This also corresponds to prevailing and very familiar division in social sciences between chronological, clock-based, linear, regulative time of organizations, and the event-based, cyclical, constitutive time of experiences, body, and practices. In addition to the similar distinctions exemplified by Bergson (1944) and McTaggart (1908) in the first chapter, the division between the rigid and regulative and the fluid and constitutive forms can be interpreted as the reflection of social experiences into the world of thought. Even though each division is constructed on different dualism, they all merge to consecrate inner and subjective form considered as more suitable for life and temporality against abstract, acontextual, and objective form. This implies inexhaustible tendency to create pairs such as becoming-being, heterogeneous-homogeneous, qualitative-quantitative, subjective-objective, discontinuous-continuous, cyclical-linear, private-public, traditional-modern of which first part is generally glorified. This tendency lamenting for one side and exorcising the other becomes a political ground to the extent that the relations between parts turn into

battleground. In other words, as the reflection of the real dichotomous experiences, these opposing philosophical ideas can be interpreted as the indicator of the relation between time and politics. This relation also appears in the cyclical-linear, and traditional-modern time comparisons, mentioned in the first chapter, due to the dominance of the latter ones as well as yearning to and rhapsodizing about the relatively unfamiliar forms of time as a saviour. For instance, linear, quantitative, and modern understanding of time has been condemned since it immediately reminds the idea of progress which is one of the most controversial issues in social thought, or the emphasis on heterogeneity, becoming and discontinuity has been sanctified on the grounds that it is creative, challenging and outside the dominant ideas. These basic assumptions, in fact, show not only that time is a political field, but also questioning assumptions without taking sides and without endlessly dividing time has political implications in terms of social science.

The division of experience and the social into two conflicting forms of time by uttering an alienating feature of one form while longing for the other, makes time political in another sense. In other words, time, partly related to the first meaning, has a political basis insofar as it refers to the temporal inequalities and conflictual experiences. The tendency to implicitly or explicitly consider time as well as the future as political sphere can be found in many approaches from the very beginning of the social sciences, since the inequalities with regard to shape, control and decide that makes time and future political have been evolved through the changes brought by modernism, industrialism, and capitalism that are also the *raison d'être* of social sciences. In this framework, separation between work time and leisure, demands for working hours, pressure on work time and leisure activities, tensions created by the conflict between industrial time and natural time, the expression of various religious practices in certain time periods against the clock time, disparity between domestic or flexible labour and work-leisure distinction can be the field of time politics. Time, especially work time, has great influence on life, as Castells (2008) indicated that working hours and its regulation has great impact even on how people feel. Thus, as Harvey (1997) stressed that spatial and temporal practices are often the subject of intense social struggles. Bryson (2007a), for instance, argued that women's unpaid labour hinders their access to leisure activities and political opportunities, inequalities in the use of time are part of the exploitation of women, and that scarcity of leisure prevents women from expressing their time-related experiences in order to draw attention to the need for a temporal rhythm outside of "commodified clock

time.” Similarly, Mukerjee (1990) pointed out that, unlike the rhythms shaped by the cycle of nature in agricultural societies, the social and economic rhythm in industrial society is determined by the speed of the machine system, and argued that urban residents who cannot adapt to this new rhythm are seen as dangerous both for themselves and for the society. With regard to same point, Lefebvre (2007) indicated to the alterations in the natural rhythms in parallel with technological, and socio-economic transformations. Alike, Adam (2003) remarked that application of invariant measures as a norm to different situations, contexts and processes leads to some negative consequences. In this framework, according to author, even if we know that not all children learn at the same pace, age-related and educational goals are applied as norms; working time differs in daytime, weekends, and nights; and the clock-time is not suitable for husbandry and agriculture. At this point, Adam pointed out that the conflict here can be read as an expansion of industrial life, but also as a potential for change. All of these remarks quite meaningfully provide an important ground to question the unequal experience and distribution of time. It is this ground on which approaches gathered under the umbrella term, the politics of time, have grown and that will be overwhelmingly discussed below.

Time and the future can be considered as political in third sense in terms of the social sciences. This meaning, which is also related to the basic question of the study, refers to be a political field in the sense that social sciences problematize its relationship both with the field it is directed towards and with itself. Being political in this third sense is not independent of the first two senses, but it is not entirely subordinate to them either. On this base, to discuss the possibility of temporal and futural perspective requires to establish different connection with the questioned field beyond the tendency to just take a blurred photograph of the present, that is, it means to challenge and problematize the established assumptions of social sciences. However, this is neither the question of what will happen in the future, nor the creation of more challenging images of the future, but rather political in the sense that it looks at what is existing from a different perspective. In fact, the act of looking and speaking has a political meaning regardless of the angle.

In summary, time can be seen as a political ground because it is considered in opposite pairs; it is unequally experienced, controlled and regulated in mutual determination with social inequalities; and it has power as stance for the social sciences. In this frame, since especially the second meaning has been focal point in social sciences, discussions in this chapter will be carried out on the approaches in this axis. It is important

to path through this road to reflect on the third meaning which is the most essential one for the study. Therefore, an inference about the political potential in this third sense will be tried to be reached by considering the understandings fed on the first two meanings.

3.2. The Basis of the Politics of Time

One of the most important results released from the approaches to time and their evaluation through temporality is the prevalence of an understanding based on the repetition of the distinction such as the subjective time of our inner experiences and the objective time of organization; the cyclical time of traditional societies or nature and the linear time of modern and capitalist societies; the local time and the synchronized global time. In other words, two different and contending forms of time collaterally stands in the social thought. These two faces of time, or time in different clothes, are not considered as two states of the same time, but as two different times standing side by side and/or facing each other. Regarding this, Elias (2000) mentioned that when people succeed in measuring by human-made devices, they started to feel their own time consciousness as an enigmatic part by adapting their behaviour to clocks, and they began to perceive time as an objective, external entity, and a gift from gods. Indeed, the time measurement that organize social life are taken for granted today, as if it is forgotten that they are also human-made. Therefore, a brief glance at the history of prevailing time conception is crucial to show that they are not absolute and not descending enemy from the unknown source, but rather historical.

What the confirmed evils of two opposite times like angel and archfiend are “clock-time”, “standard time” and “linear time” as the three pillars of time understanding on which social life has been organized. While the adverse impact of these forms on our lives are undeniable, the problem in terms of the possibility of temporal and futural social science is the way these impacts are handled. However, the history of the emergence and settlement of this intertwined trio provides important clues as to why time is considered as political field. Time has acquired new adjectives such as “commodified”, “capitalist”, “abstract”, and “rational” in this history that has been formed by amalgamation of members of trio in various amounts and in different contexts as well as their collaboration with interconnected historical processes such as industrialization, capitalism, rationalization, urbanization and modernization. Especially with the spread of industrialization and relatedly the capitalist relations of production, the problem of

regulation and coordination of time has become much more intense. Mumford's (1934, as cited in Hassard, 1990:12) comment, "the clock, not the steam engine, was the key machine of the industrial age" sums up the situation quite well. This process necessitated the spread of a new understanding of time in parallel with the new social changes, and it was also necessary for all layers of the society, but especially for the workers, to adapt to this understanding. However, it was not easy to break the established habits and assumptions of time based on the nature and/or the sacred realm. Even today, the relatively new and old understandings still go hand in hand. Therefore, while the acceptance and solidification of this understanding entails the widespread discipline and coercion, the issue of who controls time has also historically varied. In brief, the establishment and pervasiveness of clock-, standard-, and linear- times has very long and conflictual history running together with industrialism, capitalism, modernism and other related processes that give also birth to social sciences. Thus, the history of prevalence of the new time perception and the standard time, and even the usage of clocks and watches could open a field to realize social inequalities making time unequal.

Although time-measurement has longer history, more significant transformations were ignited by the use of the "church clocks" and "public clocks" in the fourteenth century in compliance with the transformation from feudalism to industrial capitalism. However, clock-time did not equally reach to and was not embraced by the all segments of society. As status symbols, clocks and watches had sprawled among privileged classes and groups of whom daily activities are even obsessively organised according to clock time while these devices were unaffordable for the labourers. As "timekeepers"; monasteries, merchants, states, and markets has alternately controlled time depending on the historical balance of power. As a complementary part of this story, standard time was predominantly settled at the end of the nineteenth century in accordance with the demands and needs of railway companies, trade, widening communication network, and industrial capitalism. These demands on synchronization and standardization were later satisfied by the "International Meridian Conference" in 1884 that appointed Greenwich as zero meridian, and also determined "standard beginning of the daily cycle" as well as the "international date line." The total eradication of local times, on the other hand, was complemented by the "International Conference of Time" in 1912 (Kern, 1983; Nowotny, 2005; Thompson; 1967; Thrift, 1990; Zerubavel, 1982). This process is strikingly depicted by Simmel (1971f) who wrote that "if all the watches in Berlin suddenly went

wrong in different ways even only as much as an hour, its entire economic and commercial life would be derailed for some time.” This change created by the cooperation between metropolitan life and money economy, according to Simmel, was based on “punctuality, calculability, and exactness... exclusion of irrational, instinctive human traits.” The full maturity of the process of consolidating clock time and standard time has been realized with the establishment of linear time understanding as the complement of other two companions. The notion of linear time, firstly developed in the Judeo-Christianity with the “idea of salvation as a process directed into the future through appearance of Messiah”, has reached its current sovereignty by modernity and the development of modern science especially by the help of “Newtonian time.” This linearity imputed on time as homogenous, abstract, empty, and non-contextual resource has indurated in parallel with industrial capitalism which has been desirous for progress, change, and innovation (Adam, 1993; Fuchs, 2018; Luhmann 1982). Thus, linearity means to revalue both past as field to be historically searched, and future as open and empty that can be easily commodified, colonized, exploited, and controlled by the support of some instruments such as economic calculation, insurance, banking, and statistics (Adam and Groves, 2007; Thrift, 1990).

The history of the prevalence of these three forms of time, clock-, standard-, and linear-, however, has not evenly and sedately flowed, since not only time-regulation was seen as intervention to divinity and natural order, but also there was a very different scene at the other side of the coin that was full of medieval peasants who were task-oriented as well as unaware of punctuality, history, and the future, and workers who gave up working when they earned enough money for a week (Nowotny, 2005; Thompson; 1967; Thrift, 1990), as in the struggle of the spirit of capitalism with traditionalism, suggested by Weber (2005), that finds one of its best expression in the decrease of the amount of work as a response to the increase in “piece-rates.” Even, universal and standard time frame taken for granted today was not immediately accepted in some countries in its early periods, and led to some counter-practices such as resistance in England against Gregorian calendar (Thrift, 1990). One of the striking examples in the history, if not the most, that clearly shows the political character of time (and of the future) taking place over time regulation and control is the “French Republican Calendar” or the “Revolutionary Calendar” used between 1793 and 1805, and readopted by Paris Commune in 1871. To announce a fresh beginning, and the total disengagement with time

conception regulated by church and tradition, this calendar introduced “new chronological dating... a new annual cycle...uniformization of the months... abolition of the seven-day week and Sunday... subdivision of the day...new nomenclature for days and months... and decimal system” (Zerubavel, 1977). The conflict, which becomes visible through the time-regulation, is also the reflection of great intellectual and social break that is connected with what Durkheim (1995) called as the deification of society itself by the transformation of the secular things such as “Fatherland, Liberty, and Reason” to the sacred ones; what Luhmann (1976) imputed the transformation of the meaning of revolution into “moving forward” that putted the word “avenir” into common use; and what Benjamin (1940/2007b) labelled as “consciousness of exploding the continuum of history.”

Although changes making apparent the political dimension of time and the future has partly been fed by urbanization, commerce, “Puritanism and Methodism” (Blyton, 2017), the most striking part of the story began with the emergence of industrial capitalism. Before anything else, this conflict making time political creates a growing need to engrain the new time discipline into minds in compliance with the need for controlling and synchronization of labour. In this process, on the one hand the disciplinary methods of timekeepers range from “wage incentives, fines, bells and clocks, schooling, timetables and even the locked factory gates” to the reformist reactions with an emphasis on self-improvement, and on the other hand struggle began as “time-thrift” transformed into the matured class struggles on the labour-time resulted in various legislative regulations such as “The Factory Acts of 1833 and 1844”, the “Ten-Hour Act of 1847”, and the “Holiday Acts of 1871 and 1875” (Adam, 1993; Blyton, 2017; Nowotny, 2005; Thompson, 1967; Thrift, 1990). During this long and painful process, the length of work time has gradually decrease in the nineteenth century due to the organized labour as well as increase in productivity that created a twin term, so-called “leisure time” which has transformed in parallel with the changes in work time. After that, leisure time has become the focal point for disciplinary practices in order to compensate the loss. In this process, old popular activities such as drinking and gambling replaced by the organized ones such as “railway outings, various sports, and Bible study groups”, i.e., activities making leisure more alike with work time by means of tailoring labourers’ body and mind for work (Blyton, 2017; Thompson, 1967; Thrift, 1990).

Even though “leisure” has been generally preferred to indicate the time period outside of work, “free time”, “spare time” and more rarely “idle time” have also been employed. Spare lexically means that “leave unharmed, abstain from destroying, injuring, using”; idle is defined as “empty; worthless, useless; doing nothing, inactive”, and more popular word, “leisure” implies that “freedom or opportunity; freedom from occupation, free time” (Hoad, 1996). In addition, though there is no full agreement on the meaning of the word “leisure”, Veal’s (1992) compilation of definitions in the literature on leisure shows that there are some iterant features such as “unobligated time”, “temporary exemption from work or duties”, “discretionary time”, “free will”, “pleasurable”, “creativity”, “freedom from constraints”, “non-work”, “excludes existence and subsistence time.” Therefore, leisure becomes a period freed from existential and substantial needs, and spend for people’s own pleasure and self-improvement. However, while the meaning of leisure gradually absorbs existence time, “subsistence time” has been reduced to time spend at work that has acquired predominancy on other activities given in the definitions of leisure such as “prepare to make a living as in school, or pay for what we want done if we do not do it ourselves” (Brightbill, 1960, as cited in Veal, 1992). In this way, leisure gradually becomes more alike with work time. This affinity found its expression in the period of “non-work” time as the prolongation of work time has been greatly strengthened by the invasion of clock time in life (Adam, 1993), since clock-time transforms labour into hours by emptying the qualities of all types of labour out. More importantly, reduction of working hours, and decline in organized labour reverberates into the meaning of work that becomes to be perceived as a kind of reptilian. In other words, while discussions on leisure problematize the content, those on work targets its existence. Regarding the meaning and content of leisure time, for instance, Russell (1935/2005) pointed out that in spite of the development of modern techniques making possible equal distribution of leisure time which had been once the privilege of only a few at the expense of overwork of majority, could not be turned into a source of happiness because work is accepted as virtue in itself. To overcome this issue, Russell proposed to reduce working hours to four per day that can led to decrease in unemployment as well replace, by the additional help of education, passive use of leisure such as seeing, watching and listening by more active and meaningful ones. The devaluation of work also disguises as the centrality of phenomenological time in life implying well-being, as Clancy (2014) did, by contrasting the “empty free time” with the

“resourced free time.” However, as opposed to such claims, what makes leisure time problematic is not its definition as residue, but the character of work from which leisure becomes residue. In fact, the meaning of the act of work itself is surrendered to the prevailing and alienated current form of work. For this reason, the relevance of work to human existence seems to have forgotten, and this forgetting is filled with emphasis on phenomenological human existence. Fortunately, there are some approaches that evaluate the content of leisure in relation with the changing and alienated content of work. Adorno (1991), for example, taking the issue from virtue propounded by Russell to the level of quality and content of work, indicated that under the existence of commodified labour, free or spare time becomes unfreedom, that is, hobbies and free time could only be the “extension of profit-oriented social life.” Although Adorno connected free time with the culture industry and unfreedom, he still found a hope that people can resist to total inclusion in the culture industry. With very different point of view but similar emphasis, Moore (1963) stressed on the alienation from work as the reason making leisure problematic. Thus, according to Moore, constructiveness in work has directly proportional with the “constructive use of leisure” as in the experiences of professionals and officials. More interestingly, free time not only becomes more alike its own opposite but also become a kind of status symbols as in the prevalence of watches and clocks in the fourteenth century. As opposed to Russell’s praise for more leisure, however, leisure time, formerly the privilege of a minority over a working majority, has now evolved into a situation in which the scarcity of leisure has become more valuable that becomes explicit in comparison between prolonged leisure and invaluable time of “subproletarians” and the precious time of very busy executives (Bourdieu, 2000), i.e., time scarcity is connected with the high level of integration of social life as for those using time in creative ways and feeling greater pressure (Moore, 1963). In other words, the content of leisure filled with “creative” and “fertile” activities entailing cultural and economic capitals in Bordieuan terminology has been considered as more precious than the amount of leisure. Accordingly, leisure time is not homogeneous, but includes different possibilities as Lefebvre (1991) propounded that leisure as “non-everyday within the everyday”, and as social need, which includes range of possibilities such as “undifferentiated actions (walking), passive (watching) and active or cultivated (photography) attitudes”, is placed in conflictual unity with work, family, and private life. Thus, Lefebvre coined the term of “appropriated” time during which one forgets time in

fruitfulness and creation such as occupation, mediation, and game that evokes the term “skhole” (Bourdieu, 2000) which is the time of intellectuals and artists freed from external constraints as opposed to the time of subproletarians and overworked executives.

The processes that led to the establishment of the separation of working time and leisure time and create great changes on human and nature has been fed by the notion of linear time in collaboration with the clock-time and standard time, and also brought the idea of contrast between cyclical and linear. This contrast, as clearly seen in traditional-modern comparison mentioned in the first chapter, refers to the historical change of the types of social organization on the one hand, and to the dominance of linearity on the cyclicity of nature and biological rhythms on the other. Addedly, since the linear time signifies the notion of progress and gradual understanding of history, it becomes one of the chief enemies of the later processes of social sciences that not only emphasize the historical experiences of non-Western societies but also question the prevailing assumptions. This opposition between cyclical and linear has also been problematized in the guise of notions such as continuity and discontinuity, irreversibility and reversibility that reverberates into the accent on the intermittent history against linear understanding. The dominance of the linear understanding over the cyclical one also means to change the relationship established with the modalities of time and the conceptualization of history. This shift was presented by Eliade (1994) as the difference between archaic societies connected with the cosmos and cosmic rhythms, and modern human who sees themselves connected to history that is quite different from the history of the eternally repeatable and sacred cosmos of archaic human. To this process through which the cycle slowly unfolds and becomes a straight line, one intermediate phase was added by Adam and Groves (2007), i.e., the circle that brought by rituals and traditions as the first cultural achievement which replaced the difference and similarity in cycle with sameness. In addition, according to authors, with the idea of progress, the meaning of past, present and future has been strikingly changed that golden age is not an ideal searched in and returned to the past, but becomes to be created in the future. Young (1988), on the other hand, interpreted the opposition between the cyclical and linear as two complementary ways to look into and two alternative conceptualizations of the same phenomenon. Yet, according to Young, since in the “metronomic society” everything seems going forward, the future, change, and new have been attracted more attention than the past, permanence, and the old. The contrast established on the new has become more evident with an emphasis on

industrialization, and concomitantly on linearity in conformity with the process of capitalist accumulation. While this process, accompanied by the idea of progress, has changed the meaning of the future as open horizon, the future, as Nowotny (1975) indicated, has been gradually reduced to the extended present, and lost its content. Although the future gradually been reduced to the present by the impact of postmodernism in social thought (Jameson, 2003), and turned into the exploitable resource especially with the capitalist relations of production, the linear understanding, in other respects, has brought the idea that opens the door to human intervention, change and newness with the notion of the open future despite all the negative implications of the idea of progress. Another problem of the opposition between linear and cyclical time is that, according to Adam (1995), the abstract, linear Western understanding of time has become the basis of the establishment of the “other time.” Consequently, endless oppositions have been produced such as “historical and traditional, clock-based and event-based, decontextualized and embedded, diachronic and synchronic” and so on. Instead of these dualisms, Adam accentuated on the complexity of times and the dependence of qualification to the framework of interpretation and observation. Thus, according to Adam, we should place ourselves in the position of the “stranger” in a phenomenological manner rather than explain the time of “other” through unquestioning time of “we.” This interpretation of Adam is also valid for the definition of many other aspects of social. Yet, quite interestingly, it is possible to claim that the debates on time and social still deal with the same problem, i.e., the problem of selecting one criterion and defining the other accordingly, but in reverse side. In other words, approaches have increasingly used cyclical, fluid, discontinuous, small as the basis to give the meaning to linear, static, continuous and society as others, just as the times of other is defined by what it is not.

The presented brief history of the understanding of time taken as given today, and the accompanying separation between work and leisure, shows the inequalities and conflicts created by the regulation, experience, and control of time, and relatedly its political nature, both in theory and in practice. Absorbing by this history is far from effacing the main focus of the study even for a while, contrary, indicates that some of the evaluations in certain respects contain controversial aspects with regard to the relation in question. Before focusing on these aspects, it can be meaningful to mention some other discussions in the time literature that are scrutinizing the established understanding of

time and the separation of work-leisure from various aspects. It is important to take a look at these criticisms and challenges before making a general assessment in order to capture the content of the politics of time.

3.3. Other Battle Fields and Various Combinations

The politics of time has been predominantly shaped by the questioning of temporal inequalities through the triad of standard time, clock time and linear time which is accompanied with the historical changes brought by capitalism, modernization, rationalization and other related processes. This prominent tendency, however, has been challenged due to its narrow focus, and the given framework of the work-leisure distinction which has been harshly criticized inasmuch as it does not cover many other temporal experiences and inequalities. There are two important areas of discussion that stand out in challenges to existing framework. One of them, in parallel with the power and visibility brought by the feminist theory and practice, is the discussion on women's labour and time experiences which does not coincide with the existing work-leisure framework as well as the linear conception of time. Secondly, as the reflection of flexibility in the labour markets, some forms of labour such as part-time, temporary labour, and unemployment as well as the experiences of labour such as precariousness, which ambiguates the given definition of work and leisure, and unsettles the predictability and plannability of the future, also become crucial issues.

An important line on which the prevailing time understanding and the existing framework of work-leisure are challenged has been fed by the emphases on the relationship between women and time. These emphases are constructed on two interrelated inquiries that on the one hand linear understanding of time does not overlap with women's time experiences overwhelmingly characterized by cyclicity, and on the other hand women's experiences does not fit into the given schema of work-leisure on account of the fact that women are excluded from the labour market as well as women's labour and leisure experiences are more fragmented, discontinuous and heterogeneous. The main objection of these discussions to the framework based on the separation of working time and leisure is, first of all, that this framework is gender-neutral because it does not take into account the care and housework that is mostly accepted as the responsibility of women, and also does not cover the experiences of those not included in the labour market such as women, children, retirees, and the unemployed. Moreover, it is

also indicated that women's time is mostly determined by the school hours of their children and the working hours of their spouses (Adam, 1993; Moore, 1963; Nowotny, 2005; Thompson, 1967). Additionally, even when women's leisure and working time are quantitatively equal to men's, huge qualitative differences reveal, since women have to tend towards less demanding, part-time, and insecure jobs. In addition, women's leisure time exhibits quite different qualities because while men's leisure time is less contaminated and less divided by unpaid responsibilities, women's leisure time is both more fragmented and more unpredictable due to the fact that unpaid labour, housework and childcare are still accepted as women's responsibilities. For example, when women are watching TV or cooking, they simultaneously have to look after their children. Furthermore, women's unpaid labour prevents them from participating not only in leisure but also in political activities. In this framework, women encounter inequality and exclusion both from and within the labour market, and thus their relationship with the working and leisure time frame becomes doubly contestable. Since temporal inequalities are important part of gender inequality, it is emphasized that a different temporality should be defined from the "commodified clock time of capitalism", and thus the invisibility and subordination of women stands out as an important element of the politics of time (Adkins, 2009; Bittman and Wajcman, 2000; Bryson, 2007a; 2007b). Therefore, the general framework the politics of time is based on has been criticized since women's experiences (as well as experiences of other groups not involved in the labour market) fits the current definition of neither leisure nor working time. While the one scrutinizing line is constructed on the work-leisure in relation to women's experiences, the other targets are the linear understanding of time and the dominance of clock time. In this manner, it is claimed that besides the rhythms of clock time are not suitable for women's works (Thompson, 1967), the natural temporal rhythm of the care work entrusted to women also does not conform to the strict time frame (Bryson, 2007a) as well as relationality, circularity and repetitiveness of domestic labour do not fit into the linear time defined as "masculine project" (Odi, 1999). With similar emphasis, Kristeva (1981) indicated that since repetitive and eternal character of women's temporality is unsuitable for linear, teleological, prospective time of history, women are identified with space as "generating and forming the human species" rather than "time, becoming, or history." To cure this problem, as Adkins (2009) indicated, two strategies has been formulated in the feminist sociology. The first one targets clock time, and other endeavours to emphasis

lived time as opposed to the prevailing conception of mechanical time. The very notion of linear time has also been criticized because of its narrow definition of the future. Regarding this point, Gunnarsson-Östling (2011), reviewing articles in the journal “Futures”, pointed out that the male-dominated perspective of the field excluded alternative futures of women as well as non-westerners. However, these attempts to open a space in social thought for women’s time and alternative futures, have also been contested on the grounds that they reproduce the “phallogentric linear time” and the “Otherness” of women in feminist discourses (Odih, 1999), and on account of the fact that they are grounded on “heterosexist construction of temporality” as linear and progressive that makes women and queer lives atemporal and ahistorical (Freeman, 2018). In addition, gender also acquires temporal character by means of emphases on performance and construction. Defining gender as process, Butler (1988), for instance, interpreted Simone de Beauvoir’s assertion on the “becoming of women” as constitution of gender in time through repetitive acts rather than something stable and fixed. In this interpretation, body becomes gender by means of performative acts. Thus, according to Butler, gender is not injected into body by nature, patriarchy, or language, rather creatively undertook and constituted. In addition, Freeman (2018) also asserted that sexuality is the product of “temporal regime” as clearly exemplified by sexuality and reproduction of indigenous people intervened by imperialism.

Another important break in the discussions on the politics of time is the changes in labour processes that cause the framework of the familiar separation of working time and leisure time to be questioned, since in the labour history, pre-existing conflictual relationship between time, work and leisure has become much more complicated with the invention and predomination of the new types of labour to compensate for the reduction of working hours, holidays, and higher wages. Thus, “overtime”, “short-time”, “shift work”, and “flexibility” has become very familiar concepts to define changing labour-time relations. These new types are also accompanied by acceleration, shorter time horizon, insecurity, individualization and the decline of collectivity in the labour processes, besides crises, and the reactions of workers (Adkins, 2009; Harvey, 1997). These changes in labour have also blurred the taken-for-granted relation between work and leisure by transformation of the meaning of flexibility from employee’s control on time to the unpredictability of working time at the end of 1970s (Blyton, 2017), or more correctly, “flexibility for the worker to the flexibility of the worker” (Elchardus, 1991).

In addition, two meanings of flexibility are shared amongst disciplines that on the one hand management, business administration and economics focus more on the older meaning that associates flexibility with the increasing capacity of firms, satisfaction of workers and decrease in unemployment, and on the other hand, sociology and political sciences overwhelmingly connect flexibility with the unstable employment, low wages, bad working conditions and the erosion of the welfare state (Nienhuser, 2005). Yet, for all intents and purposes, flexibility brings ever-increasing invasion of time especially by the help of devices, for instance, mobile phone makes employees on duty at all time bringing the “zero-hour contracts” (Virilio, 2003). Besides creating great changes in the relation between work and time, flexibility and its companion, precariousness, bring uncertainty to the realm of future (Adam, 1993) as well as to the living conditions labeled as “cultural flexibility” by Elchardus (1991) in order to indicate the deprivation which is very similar with the “futureless subproletarians” (Bourdieu, 2000) making apparent the discrepancy between subjective expectations and objective conditions. More importantly, with regard to the ambivalent character of this process, Castells (2008) indicated that decrease in the labour time has been accompanied by increase in the homogenization and regulation of working time between 1870 and 1980. Thus, while longer working hours characterizes “high-level professionals and unskilled service workers”, shorter working time and flexible patterns as part time and temporary works are occupied especially by women and low-educated youth. Thus, according to Castells, the main problem is diversification of work time and shortening of actual working years.

These meaningful endeavours, which criticize given framework of temporal inequalities in relation with the women’s time experiences and changes in labour processes, however, have been gradually confined within the focus and emphasis on the specific and isolated experiences, perceptions and expectations. This means that as the scope and profundity of the politics of time have been increasingly narrowed, the possibility of a temporal understanding has also gradually decreased. Even if this tendency seems to offer the opportunity to expand the scope of time politics by presenting a colourful picture in terms of revealing different time experiences, this possibility is gradually lost as the ways of dealing are increasingly confined to describe the specific experiences in isolation. This disappearance is revealed through various examples that enriches experiences by the conglutination of different inequalities in various combinations, but impoverishes in terms of temporality. For instance, by examining

employment, underemployment and enforced leisure in the context of social integration, happiness and personal well-being of respondents, Zuzanek and Hilbrecht (2019) concluded that preferred part-time work is more satisfactory than unemployment and full-time work. In a similar vein, through experiences and opinions of 50 people working part-time in finance sector, Smithson (2005) propounded that part-time is gendered category. Similarly, by means of data on “dual-earner couples from different classes”, Warren (2003) indicated that the level of occupation is inversely proportional with the notion of male-breadwinner while the assumption of unpaid care as women’s responsibility demonstrates similar patterns in all classes. One more example is about the effects of precariousness on Australian students working part-time that seems less severe than other part-time workers due to several reasons such as limited participation, and the possibility of alternative career paths (Campbell and Price, 2016). Despite the contribution of these studies to make visible different experiences and practices, the common problem is that these experiences and results are handled and presented without relating them to a broader context. For certain, as indicated before, these attempts are no less social science inasmuch as there can be different ways to deal with and understand social. Yet, the meaning of temporality proposed in this study does not overlap these understandings, not because their focus on experiences but their ways to present these experiences. In addition, it is clear that these studies exhibit very different concern and content from the aforementioned discussions on the politics of time. It must also be stated that they can also be a ground for time politics, but the constructed relation between time and politics in accordance with the temporality and futurity in this study does not embrace such a meaning of political, not because these studies’ political inclination but their temporal and futural stance. The tendency to squeeze into narrow focus and enumerate only certain qualities is spreading unceasingly towards different areas as well. A study conducted on the data of participants aged between 64 and 98 on whether time passes faster as they get older, exemplifies this situation. The study concluded that although it is generally claimed that time flows faster as people get older due to the slowing of the biological clock and the difficulty in remembering events, the passage of time is associated with the emotional state rather than age, since time flows more slowly for the participants staying in the retirement home (Droit-Volet, 2019). As another blend, Hill, Block and Buggie (2000) focused on the effect of race and culture on the beliefs about physical, personal and experienced time as well as experienced and remembered duration through a

questionnaire applied to “750 Black American, Black African and White American students”, and concluded that these three groups of students are different with regard to beliefs on physical and personal times while they have similar beliefs about durational experiences. In these studies, on the aging and culture which are themselves are also time-related processes, inquiries are made by only employing the “what” question. However, to reveal connections to some extent and comprehensively answer the question “what” entails to employ the question “why.” Thus, for instance, the importance of the category of poverty (or “lower classes” as generally called in the studies) of which temporal inequalities are most severe, is made invisible by evaluated in isolation. LeShan (1952) analysed the stories covered by 117 children aged between 8 and 10 to reach the results on the differences between time-orientation of “lower-lower”, “upper-lower, middle, and lower-upper”, and “upper-upper” classes. According to this analysis, the lower classes focus on the near future (eat when hungry), the second group make long-term plans such as retirement (eat at regular hours), and the upper-upper class, which sees itself as the successors of previous generations, is past oriented (eat at traditional hours). Drawing from LeShan, Ellis et al. (1955) interviewed with sixty upper-middle class children in order to research correlation between action-time span and frustration tolerance, and concluded that there is no relationship indicating socioeconomic homogeneity. In a similar vein, based on the data from interviews with 172 people about occupation, income, and education to understand their future orientations, it is concluded that lower social status orients more to the present while upper levels to the future, and these differences in orientation are resultant of occupational prestige and income, but not of education (Koenig, Swanson and Harter, 1980). Despite the importance of these studies which are just a few examples of the very common trend, some questions still remain unanswered such as why the poor are present-oriented, on which basis present and future are defined, how these experiences are constructed, and where they lead to. On the contrary, temporal inequalities and distinguishability of experiences entails to connect in order to make these experiences sharpen and visible by questioning the reasons and sources instead of just pointing out differences in isolation. For instance, as opposed to the conventional studies that either do not take into account children’s time experiences, or focus just child labour or harmful leisure activities such as watching TV, a study indicates that children’s time experiences differ according to gender, culture or class position and are shaped by negotiations with adults (Vogler, Morrow, and Woodhead,

2009). As another example to expand specific experiences to some extent, Güell and Yopo Diaz (2021) objected to the studies that associates poverty with only present-orientation by means of biographical narratives of twelve poor people from Chile, and accentuated on the temporal structure of poor people which is the combination of pragmatic present and a social mobility story in order to struggle for the future. In addition, authors indicated that the temporal structure of poverty varies according to the cultural and social arrangements and context. To the extent that experiences are evaluated in isolation, it becomes possible to name each of the experiences in an unconnected and endless way. In fact, this field becomes so specific that even “academic time” can be invented to refer to the fact that chronometric time does not account differences in terms of age, gender, and race (Tower and Hoofd, 2018). Eventually, we are left with only a mosaic of fragments divided into aspects of social life. Despite the importance of authenticity of the experiences, social scientists should not qualify any experience as authentic simply because it is not similar to theirs. This point brings the discussion back to the proliferation of adjectives in the first chapter, since every experience is specific it is possible to generate many concepts as we want, and even any experience can be broken down endlessly. For certain, the social sciences should generate and invent new concepts, but these concepts should be formed by deeply questioning the old ones, not by looking at isolated experiences. Consequently, when we move from the beginning of this subtitle to the end, it becomes more evident that the focus is getting narrower, the connections are broken, and the temporal and futural potential is gradually disappearing. Moreover, the richness, power and diversity of experiences also gets stuck in the act of pointing out by simply saying that “there are various experiences.” Yet, this does not mean that more inclusive inquiries such as working time, women’s time and linear time are smoothly invites temporal and futural stance and perspective. To consider more closely the causes of this problem it can be take a closer look at the second portrait drawn by the approaches in this chapter.

3.4. One More Portrait

The line, which became evident through the above approaches, defined as the politics of time due to its focus to reveal and question inequalities in time experiences, is the most obvious trend in the approach of social sciences to time today. In addition, due to its closeness to the field of practice, it provides fertile ground to think about the futural

and temporal stance. Since the inequalities in question, which emerge through the regulation, control and experience of time, have been crystallized through clock-time, linear time and standard time all of which are in a mutual determination with the processes such as industrialization, capitalism, and modernization, inquiries are predominantly shaped on this axis. While the distinctions of “work-leisure”, “cyclical-linear”, “local-universal/standard” emerged from this mutual relation, various adjectives such as “commodified”, “abstract”, “de-contextualized”, and “labour” employed to express inequalities also became the basis of interrogations. Alas, these approaches which have power to provide a relatively concrete basis to interrogate the current age because of their affinity to the field of experiences and practices, have gradually become impediment to the futural and temporal stance.

The tendency to compare by means of various adjectives has become more and more evident with the approaches in this chapter called as the politics of time. Though the necessity to employ adjectives in order to emphasize and make visible time-related inequalities and conflicts is undeniable, confinement of the focus ambiguates the importance of these inequalities and experiences. Moreover, the tendency to compare that provides a remarkable basis to understand in spite of its deficiencies, has also been gradually disappeared. What is looming up is a tendency that externally, and thus darkly, demonstrate the singular and specific in its singularity and specificity. It is clear that there is a great qualitative difference between the contrasted social and other types of time, or linear and cyclical, and the comparison between the plucked parts of time. In the first case, compared parts are antithetically positioned since they signify to different but closely related periods, societies, or different fields of life. Therefore, comparison in this manner, despite its deficiencies, gives more or less comprehensive understanding about the connection and process. By contrast, cutting the compound in small pieces makes the issue more inapprehensible.

The focus of the politics of time which has the power to closeness to the field of practices, gradually moves away from the processual aspects as well as the empties out the content of practice. Despite their contestable sides, the perspectives evaluated in the first chapter presented more elements in terms of temporality and futurity. It is possible to find strong elements, or at least crumbs, of temporality, for instance, in the relationship between the sacred and profane (Durkheim, 1995), the concept of commodity (Marx, 2010), the analysis on fashion (Simmel, 1971e), the construction of experience in the

context of immediate present (Mead, 1932), and even the comment on the iron cage (Weber, 2005). By comparing various forms of time, focusing on changes in relation with time, and grasping future within the nucleus of the present, all of these approaches have constructed the more or less meaningful base for the subjects of time and future. The tendency discussed in this chapter, on the other hand, gradually transformed the meaningful line based on the more comprehensive understanding of working time, women's time, or changes in the labour processes, into the more specific experiences and the narratives of experiences without placed them into comprehensive context, or without compares them with other experiences to show their distinctiveness. This means that the connections of which importance was pointed out in the first chapter in terms of temporality has been gradually narrowed or completely broken. In this way, while the focal point changes gradually into the concentration on states, the way to handle with the issue has shifted from the concepts and processes such as social facts, class, commodity, individualization, objective culture, rationalization, and ideal types, to the isolated practices and experiences. This shift in perspective can also be partly considered as social scientific endeavor to dissect its roots and connections within some notions such as science, progress, and modernism. As for the subjects of time and future, it becomes clear that both of which are divided into practices, experiences, and perceptions that in return are divided in conformity with time. Thus, while social, as the familiar base for time and the future from the very beginning, has been reduced to the narrow definition of practice, the meaning and existence of the practice have also been narrowed to the isolated experiences. In other words, efforts to rescue, open and deepen the meaning of the social as well as of the social science turn into its opposite that has great effects on both time and future. However, it must be highlighted that this attitude shift is not strict before-after comparison, i.e., there are always exceptions and deviations.

Today, the change in working practices, the dominance of linear time, swallowing of local time frame by standard time, women's double exploitation in terms of time inequalities are all undoubtedly the changes we consciously or unconsciously face with. However, emptying out of the meaning of work by reducing just to the companion of leisure, condemning the linear view of time which can be a tool to emphasize on human action to change, and reducing of women's time to the couple of cyclicity and affection, make the temporal potentiality of these inquiries incomplete. Dismantlement of entirety, as mentioned above, also hampers to understand future.

Inquiries on working time, which is one of the most basic sources of temporal inequalities, reveal this situation quite clearly. Because as work time has lost its place within the broader context and became only the partner of leisure time, these partners simply and only signify each other, and hence time and future come up against the brick wall. In that case, the only thing we can think about may be what can be done in leisure time. The problem becomes more intense, when it carried from the level of time and future to the temporal and futural perspective. Although the reduction of work to leisure deserves to be deeply discussed, the more crucial point is that work and leisure time gradually lost their meanings. In this respect, search for alternatives to the politics of time is shaped by cursing work time, adding some emphasis individual autonomy, or by pointing to the emancipation from work. In this framework, to overcome both the reduction of the politics of time to the working time and the consideration of free time in the axis of work, for example, Clancy (2014) combined the traditional understanding with the phenomenological one in order to incorporate self and existence to the politics of time by creating the “temporal autonomous spaces.” In a similar vein, Osborne (1994) also emphasized on phenomenology for the politics of time with reference to Heidegger and Benjamin. Besides these emphasis on phenomenology and practice, emancipatory potential of new forms of labour has also been accentuated. In this manner, Brown (2012), drawing from Negri, indicated to the emancipatory potential of precariousness since possibility of freedom is in everywhere and every moment due to the indistinguishability of work and non-work. Along similar line, Hardt (1999) highlighted the emancipatory, biopolitical and anti-capitalist potential of the affective labour despite its ingrained relation with capitalism and patriarchy. Alas, these important attempts, which defines more inclusive politics of time that transcends the work-leisure framework and emphasizes on the emancipatory potential forms of labour, partially overlook the historicity of working time itself. Indeed, working time can become a highly temporal and futural depending on how it is defined. Marx (2010), presenting one of the most comprehensive analyses of working time, or more correctly the “labour time”, and indicating to the establishment of a normal working day as the result of centuries of struggle between capitalists and labourers, gave great details on the labour time through the examples of various types of labour such as potteries, manufacture of matches, and baking, of laws and acts, quotations from children and adult workers’ expressions, reports prepared by the factory inspectors and commissions, and even an example of “death from

simple over-work.” One of the examples to grasp historical and futural character of work time, given by Marx, is the comparison between the “English Labour Statutes” and the “Factory Acts.”

Twelve working hours daily in the Ideal Workhouse, in the “House of Terror” of 1770! 63 years later, in 1833 when the Parliament reduced the working day for children of 13 to 18, in four branches of industry to 12 full hours, the judgment day of English Industry had dawned! (...) The “House of Terror” for paupers of which the capitalistic soul of 1770 only dreamed, was realised a few years later in the shape of a gigantic “Workhouse” for the industrial worker himself. It is called the Factory (Marx, 2010: 282).

The striking result taken from these details is that work (and relatedly work-time) and its counterpart leisure, are not static and complete, but historical and processual. Referring to a similar situation with Marx, but from a quite different perspective, Moore (1963) indicated to the achievement of modern worker on the same amount of leisure with the thirteenth century, by examining the days of substantial activities in the Roman Calendar. Forgetting the long history and significance of work time means to constrict time and future only within the realm of experiences, positions, identities, perceptions, and mundane practices. In this case, the important questions of temporality, “why” and “how”, remain unanswered. The only answer is just for the question of “what”, but in vague way.

Another significant issue in the politics of time stems from the manner of comparison between linear and cyclical times since linearity is simultaneously criticized in company with latent craving for cyclical time, and unquestionably invited by the conceptualization of distant future. With regard to cyclicity, on the other side, an interesting attitude emerges as the social is defined in a cycle coming out of various dichotomies, especially evident in the work-leisure, and the solution is offered by means of putting forward one element of the cycle. In other words, the main source of the problem is not that these approaches are the peculiar mixture of linear time and cyclical time, but the emphasis on the cycle to emanate from the cycle, or on changing the balance of parts already in the same cycle. Relatedly, linear time is also attacked inasmuch as the basis of some notions such as progress, the end of history, and project onto extremely open future as creators of our inability to meaningfully think about the future as well as the exclusion of alternative futures.

The loss of temporal potentiality through gradually restriction of focal point to the isolated experiences and practices also contorts temporality of gender. It is extremely true

that women's time does not fully coincide with the frame of work-leisure dichotomy and the notion of linear time. Yet, simply contrasting cyclicity of women to the male-dominated linearity, and confining the endeavours to problematize the meaning and content of work and leisure only to the exclusion of women from labour market, miss the opportunity to temporalize women's relation with time. In order to summon temporality what needs to be done is to put in a claim for right to linearity without giving up claim on cyclicity, to reveal the connections between circularity and linearity, and even to demonstrate circularity within linearity and vice versa. As Lefebvre (2007) remarked that cyclicity and linearity are closely connected in spite of analytically separated, and as Adam (1989) propounded that "time is simultaneously abstracted and reified, experienced and constituted...everything affecting everything else." Moreover, if linearity, albeit all its strong negative connotations, implies change, new possibilities and open and shapable future through action, time experiences of women as well as the history of the feminist theory and practice can also be understood as linear in the sense that it affects the existing conditions and the future of women. Such an attempt was exemplified by Kristeva (1981) who depicted history of feminism in three waves according to which the first generation, suffragists and existential feminists, moved in the linear time "as the time of project and history", the second one emerged after May 1968 that was refused the linear time and attached to "the arch memory, and cyclical or monumental temporality of marginal movements", and the third generation simultaneously embracing and rejecting history appears as the mixture of previous ones. More to the point, according to Kristeva, the word "generation" does not imply chronology, but "signifying space" in which all three generations interwoven in a parallel existence in the same historical time. This analysis of women's movement propounded by Kristeva can be commented as the embracement of both cyclicity and linearity. More importantly, if linearity evokes the image of line, this line does not have to be considered as ultrathin allowing just to march in a single line. Rather, this line can be contemplated as latitudinal making possible to walk side by side or a little farther, to go back and forth for various subjects meeting and colliding on the line, trying to shift to the side or throwing down each other. If history or historical is partly understood by means of linearity, women should not leave history by being drawn into the sphere of circularity, rather should struggle to make all their positive and negative contributions visible. This could be initial small step to capture temporal and futural perspective for time and women relation. An opposite attitude would disposition women

as mere victims in the face of prevailing time conceptualizations. Likewise, as women's time has engaged with the flawed conception of work time, the feminized politics of time only tend to append women to existing frame without deeply questioning its meaning and boundaries. Although there is no doubt women's labour is more exploited by the cooperation between capitalism and patriarchy, the loss of broader meaning of work time makes women's labour more invisible. Rather, work (and leisure) time should be conceptualized as longer process not confined within working hours, but pervades into other spheres of life, like commodities as process subsuming value measured by the quantity of labour that in turn measured by duration of labour which is measured by weeks, days and hours and reaching out to the exchange (Marx, 2010). In other words, although it is absolutely necessary to analytically use such concepts, content and relations of these forms of time should not be conceptualized like a tennis match between work and leisure, or between cyclical and linear. For this reason, the boundaries and content of "work" (and work-leisure relation) should be insistently discussed and evaluated with regard to women's experiences rather than totally rejected by constituting another block made of relationality, care, affection, and generativity alongside the work time.

Formations of inquiries on the time-related inequalities by questioning the meaning of these unequal experiences and the connections between them, and without ignoring the tensions between different poles and experiences can also change the position of the future. Otherwise, the future will settle into a distance that cannot be seen in the dust of abundance of isolated experiences. Moreover, attempts to construct new adjectives without touching the boundaries and contents of existing ones prevent the possibility of futural stance. In this sense, endeavours to include the future in the politics are nourished by a distant future, despite the importance of their greater interest and concern for the future. The distinction between "present futures" and "future present" (Adam, 2005; 2010; Adam and Groves, 2007), mentioned in the first chapter, is partly fed by the conceptualization of distant future. Similarly, the concept of "chronopoliticism", proposed by Cwerner (2000) opposing to the spatiality of cosmopolitanism and the conceptualization of modern history, implies that "responsibility to past, present, and future generations as well as diversity of histories and rhythms of life that coexist in the global present" in order to create not tradition, but "intergenerational memory", which is the reminiscent of, despite not totally correspond to, Benjamin's (2007b) "secret protocol" or "weak messianic power" connecting all

generations. When the politics of time expands to refer to the unity between generations, the boundaries of the present also become more significant. At this juncture, Adam's (1995) abovementioned comment on the Western time as the reference of "other time" brings the issue to a significant line. In this sense, the politics of time comes into play not only through the differentiation of temporal experiences, but also who can occupy the defined boundaries in time. With regard to this point, Mudrovcic (2019) indicated to the transformation of contemporaneity in the nineteenth century from the "chronological simultaneity" to those who share the similar defined present. This transformation leads to the separation of the present from the past on the one hand, and the exclusion of those who do not share the same produced present on the other. This also means, according to author, to establish temporal otherness which define as past those who do not comply with the defined present, even they live in the same present. This meaning of contemporaneity is the same with Habermas' identification with the nineteenth century aesthetic modernism by saying that "we are still contemporaries of that kind of aesthetic modernity which first appeared in the midst of the nineteenth century" (Habermas and Ben-Habib, 1981). This conception of contemporaneity is quite staggering in terms of the linear conception of past, present and future. Toffler (1970) also produced similar effect making people sharing the same present noncontemporary when he asserted that the future comes early for some. However, the main problem of this definition of contemporaneity, as Bevernage (2016) indicated, stems not from the fact that other lives in another time, but considered as the earlier phase of our time.

To recap, it is possible to assert that the tendency evaluated in this chapter lost its power by confining the practice, as the source of this power, to the isolated experiences and practices. Hence, a challenge should be against not only existing conceptions of linear, clock, working, and leisure times, but also the confinement of experiences. Otherwise, these powerful questionings cannot go beyond the narrow description of the situations. In that case, as in some approaches in the first chapter, a very colourful picture of time can be drawn, but as temporality and a futural quality disappears, the ground for the politics of time is also collapsed. This is the trend into which the study of time, as in many other fields, is increasingly being drawn into today. In terms of the main subject of the thesis, the nature of the studies here once again reveals the problem of the perspective of the social science. First of all, the tendency to compare and divide time into adjectives, mentioned in the first chapter, evolves into a more arbitrary attitude that cause to

disappearance of connections, and thus, make the relation of time to social more ambiguous. It is forgotten that especially clock-time and linear time are not floating in space on their own, on the contrary, emerged from and evolved with historical changes. This is the first visible aspect of the connection problem brought by changing in the politics of time. Additionally, as working and leisure are generally conceptualized in circle referring to each other, their dynamic aspects totally disappear, since connections requires not only to be established between two forms but also to understand dynamic contents of these forms. When this is forgotten, it is just possible to say that what leisure time is different from, but the source of this difference remains unanswered. Correspondingly, when the meaning of work is reduced only to its alienating effect, the connection of work with creation and production sinks into oblivion. A similar problem arises in the discussions on women's time and changing forms of working time. The reduction of the circularity as the important aspect of women's time to the simple rejection of linearity, and similarly forgetting that the flexibility acquires a rigidity by seeping into the many aspects of life, decreases the possibility of the temporal and futural perspective. Thus, the third meaning imputed to the political potential of time and future in this study can only be revealed by recognition that the assumptions which question the given assumptions become given to some extent.

In this second portrait as the reproduction of the first one, the future either settles into a completely invisible distance, or is drawn as perception, expectation, images, as other faces are cast on its face. More importantly, to the extent that an imperfect picture of the age and the present is drawn, the genuine relation with the future become impossible, and this impossibility also means that the definition of the age cannot be detailed. The emphasis that time and the future are political in the third sense in terms of social science is related to this point. One way to tap into this political potential is to stand up to the tendency which is fascinated by emphasizing the fluidity and singularity of experiences and increasingly discredited the temporality and futurity of larger and ostensibly stagnant parts of the social. It also requires to go beyond the image based on the succession of past, present and future. For such a possibility, it is necessary to step out of social science and embark on a journey towards manifestos.

4. TEMPORALITY OF THE GENRE: MANIFESTOS, THE FUTURE and SOCIAL SCIENCE

In the process of discussion on the relationship between the future and social science, the evaluations made so far have been made on two different but related tendencies to time which attracted greater attention than the subject of the future. In the first tendency which is more theoretical, time emerges as an accompanying element to varying degrees since the main focus is on the definition and discussion of the social, while the discussions in the second chapter, called as the politics of time, rather problematize the inequalities between time experiences. The result brought by these assessments is that the future, despite the different perspectives, is usually placed in a distant position that loosely connected with the present. More to the point, this outlook induces the relationship established with the future to be stuck on the axis of prediction, expectation and intention, while causes the connection with the present to remain problematic and incomplete. This question of perspective related to time is also reflected in the definition and evaluation of the social that engenders the tendency to isolate and dismantle the subjects. Additionally, self-relation of social science becomes also beleaguered since the effort to insulate experiences undermines a consensus and linguistic commonality among individual social scientists. This, for sure, does not mean that there are no exceptions, but it should be said that it is becoming more and more common.

At this juncture, searching the answer in a different field by stepping out of the field of social science for a while may create further opportunity to think about the main question of the study. In this context, the temporal structure of manifestos, which are predominantly analysed as literary genre, presents very different scene of time and the future. Indicating to the manifestos may arise a question on why a literary genre is chosen, since while the subject of the study was negatively defined at the beginning of the text, it was stated that an evaluation of the future in this study is not constructed on the analysis of utopia, dystopia and science fiction. The first point that makes the manifestoes important for the main question of the study is that the genre establishes a more concrete connection with historical and social conditions than other mentioned genres. Undoubtedly, texts in the other future-related genres have also been written under the influence of the periods and historical conditions they emerge from, and even in most cases as a response or reaction to them. Yet, the way these answers are temporally (as well as spatially and socially) presented is quite different from the manifestos since in

these texts, answers are predominantly given in a fictional time and place, and indirectly related with the social conditions, while manifestos directly respond to what is existing by means of solutions, albeit sometimes very striking and extreme, that have the potential to be realized in this world. In addition, manifestos also reach the issues that are urgent from their point of view through the description and analysis of the era they emerged from. Therefore, first of all, the subjects and problems that the manifestos and social sciences scrutinize are relatively similar, although their approaches, aims and styles are different. In other words, social sciences and manifestos are different responses and evaluations to the more or less similar conditions. Moreover, as it will be seen later, some social scientific texts resemble the style and content of manifestos, while some manifestos can analyse social conditions much better than some texts in social sciences. Regarding the main question of the study, however, the most important feature that makes manifestos significant is the temporal structure of this genre. It is possible to say that this temporal structure is quite different from the general time frame of the social sciences discussed in the previous chapters. At this point, it should be stated that the most important factor behind the differences in temporal structures stems from the differences in perspective. In this respect, the manifestos can open up an important area for a futural perspective, as they carry the temporal perspective that is tried to be drawn in this study.

Before proceeding to the analysis of the temporal structure in question, two points should be stated. Evaluations on the various literary genres or various works of art are generally conducted through their relationship with social and historical conditions, and usually directed to the content of selected examples. Contrarily, this study mainly aims neither the analysis of the texts and the genre by means of their literary features, nor their direct association with historical periods and conditions, although information is given about the conditions in which the texts emerged in order to reveal the content of the presents they constructed on. Here, without digression, the manifestos are considered as a kind of reflector to think about social sciences, thus the aim is to look at the social sciences through the genre, not to the genre itself. In other words, although the manifestos are generally considered as literary texts, the texts in this study will be discussed in terms of their temporal characteristics rather than literary ones which requires a different perspective and knowledge beyond this study. Nevertheless, as seen below, it is important to know how the manifestos are defined in general in order to understand the characteristics of this genre which is also occasionally referenced in social sciences. For

this reason, firstly general characteristics imputed to the genre will be mentioned. Following this, the selected texts represented the genre will be analysed with regard to their temporal structure and how they position the future in line with the purpose of the study. These two subtitles will make the third one more understandable in which the social scientific texts that refer to manifestoes in various ways will be evaluated. Finally, what the fall to social science's share from the temporal structure and futural qualities of the genre will be discussed.

4.1. Defining the Genre

The manifesto genre emerged as a challenge and a call for renewal of which historical importance is generally accepted has not unfortunately been attracted significant attention in social sciences except for references given to the certain texts or bearing the title of "manifesto." However, the manifestos are built on a very interesting and instructive temporal structure. It is noteworthy that the temporal structure presented by these texts, which emerged as a challenge and a call, has been evaluated much less compared to the other genres in social sciences. Thus, it can be guiding to look at the analysis of the temporal structures of the manifestos and their relationship with social sciences through the analysis of the textual structures of the manifestos, just like the position of the future is removed from the time analysis. That is to say, understanding the genre in a literary sense can be a guide to comprehend the prevailing relationship between social science and the genre that has been summoned for its historical and textual significance rather than its temporal structure.

The word, manifesto, generally brings to mind revolutionary confrontations, challenges to dominant power and a scream to create a new world. This prevailing understanding is fed by not only various historical texts but also imputed meanings of the word in various languages. The word etymologically rooted in the amalgam of two Latin words, *manus* and *fectus* meaning "hostile hand", which had evolved into "public event, a protest, a political demonstration, and a spectacle, aimed to make evident an agenda or program" as *manifestación* in Spanish, *manifestation* in French, or *manifestazione* in Italian (Damrosch, 2009; Lyon, 1999). This granted denotation has also been shaped by the history of the manifesto and the content of some famous texts representing the genre. Though history of manifesto filled with challenging and revolutionary texts, this history also breaks this prevailing understanding since the "hostile hand" was erstwhile sovereign

power rather than revolutionary demands. In the frame of this older meaning, manifesto is also defined as “a public declaration by a sovereign prince or state, or by an individual or body of individuals whose proceedings are of public importance, making known past actions and explaining the motives for actions announced as forthcoming.” In other words, all kind of sovereign powers including state, military, and clergy had employed manifesto genre to announce decisions and measures (Caws, 2011; Perloff, 1984; Winkiel, 2008). Yet despite its senescence, it is difficult to say that this denotation completely vanishes, for example, this meaning was used to declare the First World War by “Emperor Franz Joseph” with a text titled as “To My Peoples” but was generally called as “Manifest” (Punchner, 2006). These two meanings, sovereign and revolutionary, are accompanied by the third one related to religious practices, and rooted in the twelfth century French word *manifestation* which signified the theological principles. This meaning has also served as the model for the revolutionary texts, for instance, for the Reformation in Germany through the “debate between Martin Luther and Thomas Münzer about the Swabian peasant riots”, and also for the “Puritan Revolution in England with the texts of Gerrard Winstanley” and the group called as “Diggers”. In other words, the religious and revolutionary meanings do not totally exclude each other. For instance, the first revolutionary text entitled as manifesto was “A New Engagement, or, Manifesto” (1648), written by the “Levellers”, a radical group in the Puritan Revolution (Lyon, 1999; Punchner, 2006). Therefore, dominance of the third meaning, i.e., manifesto as a challenge to power, over other ones give very important clue of historical importance of the genre.

These interwoven but contending meanings of the word, however, hamper to draw a strict boundary for the genre. Besides these multiple meanings, the other obstacle to define the genre stems from the fact that the title “manifesto” is not decisive characteristic, since some texts have been posthumously defined as manifesto such as the “Declaration of Independence”, and the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” (Punchner, 2006). In addition, the texts including combinations of various artistic and philosophical features also obstruct to classify and define the genre (Caws, 2011). Moreover, alongside some artistic and political ones, some other texts have also been incorporated into the manifesto genre such as Deleuze and Guattari’s *What is Philosophy?* (Cull and Daddario, 2013), “all effective knowledge” such as “Freud’s theories of sexuality, Einstein’s 1905 paper on Special Relativity, Heisenberg’s 1927

paper on Quantum-theoretic kinematics and mechanics” (Ebert, 2003), and “Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads as well as Unabomber’s treatise” (Lyon, 1999). The attempt to define strict boundaries for the genre becomes more challenging when non-texts are added such as “punk” (Kaplan, 1983), “Agassi’s tennis games” (Lyon, 1999), and the “9/11 attack on New York’s World Trade Center” as manifesto in action (Schechner, 2010). With regard to this point, it can be averred that rather than strictly confining such a genre identified with challenge and rebellion in many minds, the boundaries should be expanded to cover even some daily and ordinary attitudes and stances to strengthen the revolutionary meaning as against the sovereign and religious ones. However, extreme obscurity and flexibility should also be avoided since this can be hazardous for the meaning and strength of the genre. Although the boundaries of the genre deserve to be more deeply discussed, this task exceeds the scope and objective of this study.

In spite of the indefinite boundaries of the genre, there are still some recurrently imputed qualities to manifestos such as “impatient”, “manipulative”, “ideologically inflected”, “oppositional”, “immodest”, “forceful”, “exuberant”, “vivid”, “attention grabbing”, “complex”, “convention-laden”, “impassioned”, “hortatory”, “univocal”, “unilateral”, “single-minded”, “not subtle”, and so on (Caws, 2011; Lyon, 2007; Punchner, 2006; Schechner, 2010; Winkiel, 2008). When all of these characteristics are gathered up, emerging picture presents a kind of force imposed forcefully and passionately without accepting any rejection. Besides these qualities, the genre has also been evaluated by means of some other features such as “intensifying human reactions”, “announcing one’s participation in a struggle against oppressive forces”, “intending to provoke actions”, and “defining we against they.” (Caws, 2011; Lyon, 2007; Schechner, 2010). Consequently, the genre becomes furious and self-oriented which neglects the voices of others, conditions and presumptive loss. Yet, the examples discussed below will exhibit very different scene.

The most important discussions on the characteristics of the genre, in regards to this study, are the ones targeted the temporal structure of manifestos. With respect to this point, it is generally claimed that manifestos have not only constructed history of rupture but also produced history itself through its “apocalyptic present tense”, “deformation of past led to millennial present”, and “inevitability”, all of them together make history “mythic” (Lyon, 1999; Punchner, 2002). Emphasis on rupture and production of history

have generally been connected with two contrasted conceptions which are “the gradualist language and the idea of progress of modernity” and the prevalent denotation of revolution. With regard to this, Lyon (1999; 2007) argued on the impatience of manifestos as opposed to the gradualist language of progress, and defined manifesto time¹⁴ as “recalibrate dominant account of history in order to foreground a marginalized group’s unacknowledged history of struggle... the urgent “now” ... that marks the commencement of the group’s radically new, self-determining future.” The notion of rupture imputed on the temporal structure of manifesto, however, has controversial aspects. Firstly, the claim on rupture constructed on the European conception of history and progress going incessantly forward has been criticized because of the fact that this claim ignores manifestos of periphery implying different notion of history and rupture (Winkiel, 2008). Yet, the main defect of the idea of rupture imputed to the manifesto genre stems not only from neglect of different ruptures and histories, but also from the very idea of rupture itself. This deficiency can become more comprehensible by looking at the other half, i.e., the prevalent meaning of revolution that was transformed into, especially after 1789, “a door to the future” and moving forward (Luhmann, 1976; Obrist, 2010). When this conceptualization of revolution and imputed impatience of manifestos are combined with the revolutionary character of the genre, manifestos become the nemesis of the past and dedicated fan of the future, or more correctly, fan of running towards the future. It is this intersection the idea of rupture predicated on. These considerations also locate manifesto genre “between what has been done and what will be done, and between the accomplished and the potential” (Caws, 2011). In other words, manifestos are also depicted as the creature of “zero point in history, a revolutionary overturn” which evokes the beginning of a new future (Punchner, 2002). With regard to this point, Damrosch (2009) indicated that although manifesto intends to be a break, it becomes a link, that is, “aims to be a breach between past and present but ends up as a bridge from the past to the future and back... The manifesto, paradoxically would like to be a new history’s first instance but also ends by being its last word.” The temporality of manifesto, at least in the examples analyzed below, will show that manifesto is neither

¹⁴ Besides manifesto time, Lyon (2007) defined four other kinds of time which are “public time or the general time of society or non-creative time”, “19th century utopian time”, “20th century utopian time”, and “elusive or non-teleological time.”

breach nor bridge, but the announcement of the existent breaches as well as the way to the bridge.

The manifesto genre shaped by three opposing but intermingling historical meanings, defined by unambiguous and flexible boundaries, and positioned as impetuous, hectic and feverish calling, has generally been depicted with regard to its temporality as in-between situation, the tearer of history, and simultaneously a beginning and an end. Such an understanding of temporality places the texts at a position breaking all existent connections as opposed to the imputed characteristics of temporality in the previous two chapters as the precondition of futurity. Thus, a closer examination of this temporal imputation may open up a meaningful space to consider both the content of the genre, and the futural and temporal character of social science.

4.2. The Future Within and Among Manifestos

The temporal structure of the manifestos which is generally described as a future oriented on the axis of an absolute break and rupture with the total rejection of the past, opens up an important area to think about the relation between social science and the future. To the extent that rupture and rejection imply connection, they coincide with the framework of the temporality described in this study, but since the rupture attributed to the manifestos is described almost as absolute, this connection does not provide a very suitable ground for the temporality sought in the name of social sciences. Thus, it is necessary to look more closer at the temporal structure of the manifestos to search such a connection. In this respect, to focus on the temporal structure of manifestos that inspect similar social, political, historical problems with social science can be meaningful step to consider futurity and temporality.

On this basis, ten manifestos will be analysed by means of their temporal structures. These selected manifestos are, respectively, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) (Marx and Engels, 1997); “Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions” (1848) (Stanton et al., 1848); “Humanist Manifesto II” (1973) (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973); “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” (1909) (Marinetti, 2001); “Slap in the Face of Public Taste” (1912) (Burliuk et al., 2001); “Redstockings Manifesto” (1969) (Redstockings, 1970); “Humanist Manifesto I” (1933) (Sellars and Bragg, 1933); “Manifesto of Futurist Woman (Response to F.T. Marinetti)” (1912) (de Saint-Point, 2001); “What Does Lef Fight For?” (1923) (Aseyev et al., 1988); and “Humanism and Its Aspirations: Humanist Manifesto

III, a Successor to the Humanist Manifesto of 1933” (2003) (American Humanist Association, 2003). Though manifestoes have generally been evaluated through chronological order, subgenres they belong to such as artistic, political, and architectural, “-ism” they attached to, and also literary or structural qualities such as definition of “we” and performative elements, selected texts will be discussed in this study through their temporal and futural qualities without confined any classification. In other words, the selection of these manifestos was not made on the basis of criteria such as belonging to certain sub-genres, to a certain historical period or geographical area, or certain point of view. The reason for this is that the study, as stated above, does not aim to evaluate the genre that goes beyond the scope and focus of this study, but on the contrary, it aims to reach an analysis for social sciences through examples of manifesto. In addition, since selected examples have different political stances, were written in different historical periods and are distributed in different subgenres, this dispersion, especially the striking differences of their political stances, may be disturbing. For example, it may seem weird that the Futurist Manifesto which is associated with fascism, humiliates women and calls for war, is on the same list with the Communist Manifesto, feminist manifestos, and humanist manifestos. The reason for this, to repeat, is that the study aims to analyse neither the genre nor the political views, but to consider the relation of social science with time and the future by dint of temporal structure within each text and revealed between texts. In this respect, the connections that are considered in the selection and ordering of the texts have been tried to be established in accordance with the aim of the study. First of all, two of these manifestos, the Futurist Manifesto and the Communist Manifesto, were chosen because of their demarcation of the genre and their historical significance as well as their impacts on social science. Each of the other eight manifestos has been selected by paying attention to their interconnectedness to varying degrees. In this respect, the texts are positioned according to various criteria such as having similar emphasis (e.g., the Futurist Manifesto and the Slap in the Face of Public Taste), contemporaneity (the Declarations of Sentiments and Resolutions and the Communist Manifesto), or carrying opposing arguments (the Humanist Manifesto I and the Manifesto of Futurist Woman), rather than chronology, or -isms the texts sympathize with. For example, the three Humanist Manifestos connected each other by heritage while connect with the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions through their calls for equality on the base of being human, but they have conflictual connection with warmongering Futurist

Manifesto. Similarly, Manifesto of Futurist Woman (Response to F.T. Marinetti) connected with the Slap in the Face of Public Taste and the What Does Lef Fight For? by means of convergency on futurist orientation as well as divergency on their political orientation. The same manifesto also in cooperation with the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, and Redstockings Manifesto on the base of being written by woman and on woman, but in dissolution because of the importance they attribute to women. In a similar vein, the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions connects with the Humanist Manifesto II with their calls to gender equality, while establish a relation with the Communist Manifesto due to being written in the same year but different concern. The reason to choose different criteria is to show how the connection can be established for different subjects, that is, connections does not have to constructed on one strict criterion in beginning and not entail linearity. If this violation by dispersed connections seems uncomfortable for some it is still possible to follow chronology, but a bit tiring. For example, to follow humanist manifestos chronologically, one has to take four steps back and then three steps further.

In contrast to tendency that avoid of expanding connections on the grounds that it brings linearity, schema and law in mind, the analysis of manifestos presents a framework in which each of them connects, clashes and encounters in different ways with each other, yet still forms a history. However, it should be reminded that connections can be expanded by different criteria only for the beginning, and it can eventually turn into principles or commonalities, as in the temporal framework to be reached from the manifestos. In other words, diversity does not have the ultimate purpose to point at the dispersed network of connections. As mentioned in the first chapter, temporality means that intensification of commonality and principles in parallel with the expansion of connection. This intensification, in addition, does not steal anything from the character of the diverse and different. Besides, to reiterate, since the selection of manifestos on the base of one single criterion can entail to deal with history and literal features of the genre, the focus of the study can be distracted. Therefore, it should be noted that it is possible to analyse even the selected examples in different orders and with different connections. Moreover, it should also be indicated that the inferences made in this study on the temporality of manifestos cannot be generalized to the entire genre and are valid only for the examples discussed here. Finally, it can be also stated that since the main subject is

not the manifesto genre, but future and social science, all of the evaluations should be considered with reference to this frame.

...An Italian, Dante, both the last poet of the Middle Ages and the first poet of modern times. Today, as in 1300, a new historical era is approaching, will Italy give us the new Dante, who will mark the hour of birth of this new, proletarian era? (Marx and Engels, 1997:28).

This sentence, quoted from the preface written by Engels to the 1893 Italian edition of the “Communist Manifesto”, or originally “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, can be read as the rebuttal to commonly imputed temporal qualities to manifestos as denial of the past and absolute rupture as well as to distant position of the future in social science and general opinion, since the quotation placed Dante on the threshold, and after 593 years expected the past as the future, and the future as the past.

The Manifesto was written for the Communist League that discussed on the textual form and programme to announce and present itself after its formation in 1847. Yet, the emergence of the form and content of the Manifesto was quite tumultuous because of various groups and opinions the League composed of, and correspondingly other rival texts such as the “Communist Credo” circulated by London headquarters, and the “Communist Confession in Questions and Answers” prepared by “Moses Hess” in catechistic form (Beamish, 1998; Bronner, 2012; Punchner, 2006). Within such a turbulence, Engels, in conformity with his assignment, drafted two texts in catechistic form, the “Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith” in June 1847 including 22 questions and answers, and then the “Principles of Communism” composed of 25 questions and answers. Recognizing incompatibility of the catechism with historical narration, Engels wrote in a letter to Marx that “I believe that the best thing is to do away with the catechism form and give the thing the title: Communist Manifesto.” Then, the text¹⁵ that intended to convert utopian egalitarianism of rival texts into historical understanding was written in manifesto form (Beamish, 1998; Bronner, 2012; Gupta, 2012; Marx and Engels, 1997; Osborne, 1998; Punchner, 2006).

Since the Communist Manifesto has greatly influenced the whole history of the genre, it is generally defined as “ur-manifesto” inasmuch as it has functioned as a

¹⁵The first edition of the Manifesto was published without author names, and a shorter part of the text distributed as flyer in the February Revolution. The names of authors were seen on the paper only after the Revolution (Punchner, 2006). In addition, with regard to authorship, Engels wrote in the preface to the 1888 edition: “The Manifesto being our joint production, I consider myself bound to state that the fundamental proposition, which forms its nucleus, belongs to Marx” (Marx and Engels, 1997).

reference point both previous and subsequent manifestos through redefining form and content of the genre (Caws, 2011; Bronner, 2012; Punchner, 2006). Besides its importance for the definition of the genre, it is generally indicated, with regard to the content of the Manifesto, to the text's specific understanding of history in terms of the immanent tension of capitalist mode of production as well as class struggles, prophetic language to encourage revolutionary solidarity, and eschewal from trans-historical elements such as characteristics of the new regime. This historical understanding attributed to the text is associated with not only history narrated in the text but also crystallization of the events occurred in 1848 in the Manifesto as well as its own historicity created by its subsequent prefaces (Bronner, 2012; Punchner, 2006). After this short cut information¹⁶ about by and to whom the text was written, it is proper to focus on the text in conformity with the aim of the study.

The first apparent aspect of temporality within the text is the impossibility to find strict lines separating the past, present and, the future. Contrarily, the whole history is simmering through sprouting and withering processes as in the emergence of modern bourgeois society from the ruins of feudal one. More importantly, declamations required by the aim and content of the text, and metaphors used to make more attractive and persuasive the text that are depicted in here such as simmering, sprouting, and withering, does not imply any mystification, rather they are balanced with the concrete historical conditions presented in the text. In addition, the past does not completely abdicate for, but insert into the present as in the "history of all hitherto", the very famous opening sentence of the first section, clearly exhibits. The relation with present is also at odds with familiar conceptualisation of the manifesto genre by which present is defined as "mythic", because the present of the Manifesto was depicted as "our epoch" as well as "the epoch of bourgeoisie" both of which create a kind of ebb and flow, i.e., simultaneously different and same presents stand together. In a similar vein, when advance of industry transforms some parts of the ruling classes into the proletariat, the future cease to be something imaginary and distant, but becomes the component of the present. It is these historical processes revealing the new conditions by means of incongruence between the already developed productive forces and feudal relations, converted the existing relations to the

¹⁶ The history of the Manifesto can be more elaborated in parallel with its authors and readers' lives full of exiles, its geographical and translational patterns as Punchner (2006) did, and the rate of its editions synchronized with revolutionary movements as Engels remarked (Marx and Engels, 1997).

“so many fetters.” Additionally, prevalent claims on the manifestos’ invented future swallowing both the past and the present also lost its validity when authors indicated that theoretical conclusions cannot be based on ideas or principles invented and discovered but on actual relations of class struggle, and criticized feudal socialism because of its “total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history” (Marx and Engels, 1997). Concerning prefaces, it can be asserted that the aforementioned meaning of “zero point” is also transformed. Since while Marx and Engels wrote that “the Manifesto has become a historical document which we have no longer any right to alter” in 1872 German edition, they also approved that “the practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions” (Marx and Engels, 1997). This means that zero point has continuously been converted according to changing conditions. In the same manner, in 1890 German edition, the history of the manifesto interlocked with the history of struggles, since “the defeat of the Parisian insurrection of June, 1848.... the League was formally dissolved.... As to the “Manifesto,” it seemed thenceforth to be doomed to oblivion...”, and continues that “but European working class had recovered itself...The “Manifesto” itself thus came to the front again. Thus, to a certain extent, the history of the Manifesto reflects the history of the modern working-class movement since 1848” (Marx and Engels, 1997). This fluctuation between oblivion and coming front challenges the mainstream idea that manifestos blindly and ceaselessly run after their future without any recession. Similar emphasis also springs in the 1892 Polish edition that “the Manifesto has become an index, as it were, of the development of large-scale industry on the European continent.” These remarks show that manifesto as a text also have its own history. In addition, the reason to pay great attention to the new editions and translations within the prefaces can be commented as the reflection of the relation between the history of the manifesto, of struggles, and of capital. From these temporal qualities, it can be indicated that in spite of refluxes of manifesto and slowdown of simmering, the future never lost its connection with the present and the past, as Engels wrote in the 1893 Italian edition that “if the Revolution of 1848 was not a socialist revolution, it paved the way, prepared the ground for the latter... The battles fought in 1848 were thus not fought in vain. Nor have the forty-five years separating us from that revolutionary epoch passed to no purpose. The fruits are ripening” (Marx and Engels, 1997). This is the future in the manifesto which is

not constructed on the total rejection of the past and the discard of the present, but within and by the past and the present.

The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her (Stanton et al., 1848) ¹⁷

This sentence is extracted from the “Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions” aroused from the Seneca Falls Convention in New York that was written in the same year with the Communist Manifesto, but in different country and with different concern. This declaration was prepared by a group of women to demand equality in various fields and claim on natural rights pre-given by God. Although it is not so easy to find clear historical narrative within this text, it is still possible to capture some clues to reverse prevailing assumptions on the relation between the past, the present, and the future.

The importance of this text come from the fact that it marked the beginning of the woman’s rights movement, though there were some other pioneers as Mary Wollstonecraft known also in the United States. The sparkle igniting the Declaration got out in the 1840 World Antislavery Convention in London at which representatives of female antislavery societies, including Stanton and Mott, were denied seating and voting rights. After this exclusion, both women decided to call a meeting for women in the United States, though they have to wait until 1848. Accepting the “Declaration of Independence” as model “except for its gender-neutral language”, the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions was drafted by five women¹⁸ to announce at the “Woman’s Rights Convention” held at Seneca Falls. In the first day of the Seneca Falls meeting reserved only to women, draft and resolutions were debated in detail. At the end of the second day, sixty-eight women and thirty-two men signed the Declaration, “though the number of signers represented only one third of those present, probably due to the radical nature of the statement” (Lerner, 1998).

Although the sentence above quoted from the Declaration includes a conception of history as in the Communist Manifesto, the subject of this history seems to take its power not from historical dynamics but from self-evident truth, since “all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights”

¹⁷ <http://www.sjsu.edu/people/cynthia.rostankowski/courses/HUM2BS14/s0/Womens-Rights.pdf> (Accessed:16.08.2019)

¹⁸ Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, Martha Wright, Jane Hunt, and Mary Ann McClintock. All of these women strived for women’s rights as well as abolitionism (Lerner, 1998).

(Stanton et.al., 1848). Even though this understanding sounds ahistorical and atemporal at first glance, the demands on government, as another subject in the text, opens this self-evident truth to temporality. The text claimed that “whenever” governments do not protect these rights, those who in suffer must insist upon new government. At this point, two important conclusions arise. Firstly, the adverb “whenever” hampers to fix present and future in any preordained point, but makes dependent on the conditions and urgency. Secondly, the urgency and impatience generally attributed to manifesto genre does not mainly stem from the unbearableness of situation, but, as in the Communist Manifesto, the incongruity between components, i.e., between God-given equality and the usurpation of inalienable rights. To prove this history of usurpation, the text sorted “the facts” all of which, except for two lines, began with “he”¹⁹, such as “he has never permitted”, “he has withheld”, and “he has monopolized” which evoke a kind of “all hitherto.” (Stanton et.al., 1848). After these lines, demand and expectation sentences that begin with “we insist” and “we hope” simultaneously signalled the omnipresent rights as well as the future. Then twelve resolutions²⁰ offered to insist on women’s rights and equality all of which has long-lasting effect on subsequent women’s movements. At this point, it can be asserted that the demands for the future manifest themselves in relation and incongruence with the what is existing. Thereby, the future arises from the discordance between the already existing (i.e., inalienable rights) and the conditions hindering the realization of already given as opposed to the abovementioned claims on rupture with the past. In that way, calling for the future was formed precisely in relation with the past and the present.

The decades ahead call for dedicated, clear-minded men and women able to marshal the will, intelligence, and cooperative skills for shaping a desirable future (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973).

After 125 years the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, women and men were again invited to struggle for better future in the Humanist Manifesto II (1973) drafted by Edwin H. Wilson and Paul Kurtz, and signed by firstly “282 and then thousands of people” (<http-1>).²¹ This manifesto was prepared under the head of American Humanist Association that evolved out of Humanist Fellowship (1927) in 1941 and the

¹⁹ Although definitions of “we” in manifestos is not main focus of this study, it should be said that in this declaration “we” and “other” are two-sided. On the one hand, women and men are opposite as clearly seen in the sentences began “he”, but on the other hand women and men form together “we” against “monopoly of the pulpit” as in the sentence that “...untiring efforts of both men and women for the overthrow of the monopoly of the pulpit...” (Stanton et al., 1848).

²⁰ Only the ninth resolution targeted voting right was rejected (Lerner, 1998).

²¹ <https://americanhumanist.org> (Accessed: 10.08.2019).

member of International Humanist and Ethical Union.²² The Association explains its goal as “recognizing the nontheistic and secular nature of humanism”, and attributes its origin and development to the various resources such as “early Greek philosophers, Eastern thinkers, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and scientific revolution.” Furthermore, in the Association’s website, humanism is defined as “encompasses a variety of nontheistic views... values that are grounded in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, informed by scientific knowledge, and driven by a desire to meet the needs of people in the here and now” (http-1). When Manifesto was launched, there had been some historical changes directly affected the content of the Humanist Manifesto II. In this process, since the visibility of women has increased in those years thanks to the women’s struggles, both the association and the manifesto paid great attention to women. In addition, striking historical events in the first half of the twentieth century such as two world wars, Nazism, and the Cold War directly reverberates into the manifesto. Moreover, because of its controversial statements on religion, the text was also denounced by the religious conservatives on the grounds that it is “anti-religious and anti-God.” However, the Association continued to publish statements on similar contesting issues such as “death with dignity, objections to astrology, sexual rights, evolution, and discrimination in the workplace” (http-2).²³

Even though this manifesto, unlike the previous two examples, does not openly have the voice of challenger, but more moderate and prudent attitude in conformity with its title which implies whole humanity rather than controversies between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie or women and men, it is still possible to capture a kind of incongruity but more subtle one. The content of the text is composed of “a preface” in which the previous manifesto (Humanist Manifesto I) and historical events occurred between two texts were evaluated, “a prologue” on features and different versions²⁴ of humanism, and “the basic principles” listed under the various subtitles which are “religion” (2 principles), “ethics” (2 principles), “the individual” (2 principles), “democratic society” (5

²²International Humanist and Ethical Union was founded in Amsterdam in 1952 and published two “Amsterdam Declarations” in 1951 and 2002. Other member of the Union is the “Council of Secular Humanism” founded by Paul Kurtz as the “Council for Democratic and Secular Humanism” that published “A Secular Humanist Declaration” in 1980 (http-1).

²³ <https://americanhumanist.org/about/our-history/> (Accessed: 10.08.2019).

²⁴ This comment on different versions of humanism to consolidate their positions in contrast with rivals in the eyes of audience they targeted is redolent of the Communist Manifesto.

principles), “world community” (6 principles), and “humanity as a whole” (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973).

The present the manifesto stands on was defined by such expressions that “as we approach the twenty-first century”, and “times of uncertainty.” Also, it is difficult to strictly separate present from both the past and the future due to the defined uncertainty which reverberated into the roots of humanism and historical events humanists had faced with. The past, in addition, was approved rather than rejected via some expressions within the manifesto. For example, the manifesto indicated that humanism was traced from “ancient China, classical Greece and Rome, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and the scientific revolution of the modern world.” In a similar vein, “principles of human freedom evolved from the Magna Carta to the Bill of Rights, the Rights of Man, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” were also mentioned in the text (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973). As regards to the future, three additional lines glitter in the manifesto. Firstly, there is a great concern on the future throughout the text.²⁵ Secondly, it can be suggested that the future is placed within the present as in “the choice between despair and hope” which does not imply total rejection of the present an unconditional focus on the future, but effort to convert both the present and the future. The third line on which future glitters is rising on uncertainty the manifesto defined in relation with striking historical events such as “racism, Nazism, totalitarian regimes, brutal face of science, government espionage, and abuses of power.” In spite of these events, the manifesto continued to announce that the humanity “has the potential, intelligence, goodwill, and cooperative skill” (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973). The incongruence between defined devastating events and the potential of humanity is the point the future predicated on. This future, rising above incongruence, does not amount to desire of annihilation of the past and the present. For example, scientific revolution was simultaneously glorified as one of their roots and criticized due to the problems created by scientific methods such as ecological damage, overpopulation, and nuclear disaster. However, rather than totally rejects, the manifesto announces that “we deplore any neo-romantic efforts to condemn indiscriminately all technology and science...”, and proposes for the future that “the

²⁵ As in such expressions: “The future is, however, filled with dangers”, “Confronted by many possible futures, we must decide which to pursue”, “We submit this new Humanist Manifesto for the future of humankind; for us, it is a vision of hope, a direction for satisfying survival.”, “The next century can be and should be the humanistic century”, “Human life has meaning because we create and develop our futures”, and “Each person's future is in some way linked to all.” (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973).

controlled use of scientific methods which have transformed the natural and social sciences since the Renaissance, must be extended...” Additionally, what makes the present as fertile ground for the future was propounded in a sentence which began with “for the first time in human history... no part of humankind can be isolated from any other.” Thus, despite its moderate attitude, the manifesto declared that “the world cannot wait for”, “we urge”, “we will survive”, and “we can initiate” thanks to this fertility and incongruence (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973).

We will glorify war –the world’s only hygiene– militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for woman (Marinetti, 2001).

This quotation, praising for war and humiliating women, is extracted from The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism launched by Filippo Tommaso Marinetti in 1909 on the front page of the *Le Figaro*. This manifesto can be considered as the counterpart of the Communist Manifesto in the scope of art since it is labelled as “ur-manifesto” (Caws, 2011) and “one of the most accurate prophecies of the twentieth century” (Damrosch, 2009). Unfortunately, the fame of the text is also resulted from the affiliation of Marinetti and Italian Futurism to fascism, though their initial aesthetic concern was later turn to politics one in order to contribute to the revitalization of Italy (Lawton, 1988). Although it is asserted that affinity with fascism lasted only between 1919 and 1920 (Dashwood, 1972; Ialongo, 2013), there are explicit similarities between futurism and fascism such as “admiration to speed, violence, and war, scorn for the masses, and extreme nationalism” extending to the sphere of action. For instance, in 1914, while Italy was still neutral on war, the futurists set Austrian flags on fire in public. Similarly, when Mussolini founded the national organization in 1919, Marinetti as one of the founding members of this organization declared in a speech in the same year that “everything must be done to elevate Italy’s standing in the eyes of the world.” During 1920s and early 1930s, Marinetti, defining fascism as the political counterpart to the Futurism, made propaganda tours to introduce the contribution of both fascism and futurism to Italy. The affinity reached its peak, when Marinetti confirmed his support to the fascist regime by accepting the membership of the Royal Academy of Italy in 1929 (Dashwood, 1972; Ialongo, 2013; Punchner, 2006).

The imputed relation of futurism with politics was not confined with fascism. In an article, “Marinetti the Revolutionary?” dated 1921, Gramsci (2000) referred to a

speech at the “Second Congress of the Communist International” given by Lunacharsky, the head of the Commissariat of Enlightenment, who announced that “in Italy there lives a revolutionary intellectual by the name of Filippo Tommaso Marinetti.” On the base of this announcement Gramsci draw a comparison between the proletarian culture and the Futurists. According to him, the creation of a new civilization entails totally proletarian culture and art that must destroy “spiritual hierarchies, prejudices, idols, and ossified traditions” in order to become different from the bourgeois culture. It is this creation on which Gramsci defined the futurists as revolutionary, since according to him, the futurists captured the new cultural needs of their industrial epoch whereas socialists did not interest in this Marxist idea. Thus, Gramsci wrote that “in their field, the field of culture, the Futurists are revolutionaries...When they supported the Futurists, the workers’ groups showed that they were not afraid of destruction... the possibility of a proletarian culture created by the workers themselves²⁶” (Gramsci, 2000). Though Gramsci defined the futurists and Marinetti as revolutionary in the cultural field, it is possible to depict them as counterrevolutionary with regard to Gramsci’s political stance, since Marinetti clearly objected to “international and anti-patriotic socialism” as well as class struggle, and gave the duty to govern only to the elites. In spite of these political differences, the futurists and the “Turin communists” organized together futurist exhibitions first of which opened with Marinetti’s speech, published various texts in collaboration, and even established syndicate for the futurists. This cooperation, however, was short-lived due to the imputed “conservative aesthetics” of the Communist Party of Italy as well as Marinetti’s recognition of the rise of fascism in Italy (Bru, 2005; Dashwood, 1972). Apart from these political issues, the success of the futurism and Marinetti himself supports Gramsci’s comment on the Futurism. First of all, with “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” and subsequent manifestos, futurism quickly became international (Lawton, 1988; Punchner, 2006). This international effect was not only resulted from various texts they wrote but also many other novelties the futurists had brought to the sphere of art. For example, borrowing from science and technology, Marinetti invented the idea of “wireless imagination” for poetry in order to eliminate decelerating elements in language such as “conjunctions, punctuation marks, and adjectives” (Caws, 2011; Lawton, 1988).

²⁶ Gramsci later again mentioned the futurism in his letter to Trotsky, and in a note dated 1930 entitled “The Futurists.” In this note he defined the futurists as “a group of schoolboys who escaped from a Jesuit boarding school...” (Bru, 2015).

Besides linguistic innovations, the futurists also broke ordinary and traditional typographical format as well as dull writing styles via attractive and provocative titles and subtitles in their texts such as “Let’s Murder the Moonshine”, “Against Past-Loving Venice”, “Down with Tango and Parsifal”, and also used plenty of exclamations and extreme terms such as “the automobile as a beautiful shark” (Perloff, 1984). Marinetti and the other futurists also carried manifesto from papers to the stage and streets by performing manifestos in front of audiences, and distributing texts from racing cars, or airplanes (Dashwood, 1972; Punchner, 2006)

The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism is opened with story-like paragraphs, but the very agitated ones. Through these paragraphs, Marinetti’s patriotism and love of technology can be easily captured, as in the analogy between “the mighty noise of the huge double-decker...like villages...uprooted by the flooding Po...” In addition, Marinetti explained the reason to launch manifesto as “to free this land from its smelly gangrene of professors, archaeologists.... for too long has Italy been a dealer in second-hand clothes” (Marinetti, 2001). Since the manifesto is full of insulting words on everything belonged to the past, the futurists and their founding manifesto have always been considered as mere extreme hatred of the past and great passion towards the future. However, looking carefully, the manifesto presents a different picture. “Let’s go! Mythology and the Mythic Ideal are defeated at last...Look there, on the earth, the very first dawn! There’s nothing to match the splendour of the sun’s red sword, slashing for the first time through our millennial gloom!” (Marinetti, 2001). These very poetic sentences written by a poet, Marinetti, indicates existent incongruence and something that began to change “for the first time” through the incompatibility between the “sun’s red sword” (industrial age) and the “millennial gloom.” Likewise, Marinetti announced that “we stand on the last promontory of the centuries...Time and Space died yesterday... We already live in the absolute, because we have created eternal, omnipresent speed” (Marinetti, 2001). These expressions evoke an impression that the epoch they live in already began to change because of speed, hence the only thing they can do is to choose between speed and museums²⁷ to get rid of defined incongruence. In other words, the manifesto does not simply signify pure hatred of the past, rather they just “look at” and chose their side. Thus, they announced “we intend...stand on... will”, and wanted to

²⁷ Thus, the manifesto asks, “Do you, then, wish to waste all your Powers in this eternal and futile worship of the past....?” (Marinetti, 2001).

destroy museums, academy, feminism, and moralism as well as “the horrible shell of wisdom” (Marinetti, 2001). The furious appetite for the future they have, in other words, was prompted by the incongruence between old and nascent components of both the past and the present. For this reason, “good factory muck” smeared their faces, not applied by themselves. In a similar vein, “the world’s magnificence” the quality the world already had, “has been enriched by a new beauty; the beauty of speed.” This expression on the magnificence of the world recalls an idea that they partly hold on already existing rather than completely refused the past and the present all hitherto. Within exclamations, the futurists themselves also acquired a bit of pastness in time, since they announced that “we the young and strong Futurists...the oldest of us thirty...when we are forty, other younger and stronger men will probably throw us in the wastebasket like useless manuscripts-we want it to happen!” (Marinetti, 2001). This pastness they would acquire indicates to the ever-continuing simmer of the world as in the previous examples.

In 1912, the closing sentence of the Futurist Manifesto, “erect on the summit of the world, once again we hurl defiance to the stars!” (Marinetti, 2001) echoes in the “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste” as “from the heights of skyscrapers we gaze at their insignificance” (Burluk et al., 2001). This very brief manifesto was launched by the member of “Cubo-Futurists”, namely Burluk, Kruchenykh, Mayakovsky, and Khlebnikov, in Russia. Although the futurism had great influence throughout the world, the most dedicated and famous futurists were in Italy and Russia albeit significant differences. The futurists in the pre-revolutionary Russia split up various groups, which are the Cubo-Futurists, the “Ego-Futurists” as the only group accepted the legacy of Marinetti, “the Mezzanine of Poetry”, and the “Centrifuge”. Among them, the most prominent futurist group was the Cubo-Futurists that rooted themselves in the “Hylaea group” composed of experimental poets in order to reject the influence of Marinetti²⁸, and even predated some of their texts before 1909, the year the Futurist Manifesto was launched. Even though this hatred and rejection became more salient when Marinetti visited Moscow in 1914²⁹, it is clear that there are plenty of similarities between Italian and Russian versions of futurism. For example, one of the commonalities between two

²⁸However, Marinetti claimed the total opposite: “...the term futurismo (and futurist) appeared in Russia after my first manifesto was published in Figaro...It is without doubt that the theory of futurism, created by me and my friends, spread in Russia with extraordinary rapidity, thanks to the literary success of my book *Le Futurisme*...sold more copies in Russia than in any other part of the world” (Punchner, 2006).

²⁹After Marinetti didn’t find hospitality he expected, he had labelled Russian futurists as “pseudo-futurists” (Lawton, 1988).

versions stems from the Russian futurists' idea of "transrational language"³⁰ and Marinetti's "words in freedom." In addition, organizing futurist evenings, arranging tours to introduce their ideas, an attractive typographical style is also common in both traditions. In spite of these similarities, however, two traditions are different in the sense that Italian futurists were gathered under the leadership of Marinetti while Russian futurism was multi-headed, and have opposing political tendencies (Lawton, 1988; Punchner, 2006)

A Slap in the Face of Public Taste was published in an anthology prepared by the Cubo-Futurists. The target of this very brief, only one page manifesto is the traditional Russian literature including many famous writers such as Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Kuzmin, and Gorky. Because of its shortness and very narrow target, the manifesto becomes one of the most challenging texts to grasp the temporality the study searches. Fortunately, it is still possible to find such a clue.

The strong intimacy with the present was established with a sentence that "we alone are the face of our time" which implies a kind of monopoly on the present excluding other figures in the literature. In addition, the past was defined as "too tight" companied with sentences full of humiliation such as "filthy slime of the books written by..." Even though this tightness attributed to the past in the manifesto has been generally understood as "dismissal of the past" (Punchner, 2006), and as "recalling Marinetti's rejection of past" (Lawton, 1988), this expression seems to signal incompatibility between the frame of the past and the vastness of new literary desires. Within this context, the only thing they could do to end this incongruent situation was to break or flex the frame. Based upon this historical assignment, they dared to write "we order" to indicate four rights of the poets. For this reason, the future merge with the past and the present as in the expression that "if for the time being the filthy stigmas of Your "Common sense" and "good taste" are still present in our lines, these same lines for the first time already glimmer with the Summer Lightning of the New Coming Beauty of the Self-sufficient (self-centred) Word" (Burliuk et al., 2001). On these lines which carried both burden of the past and new possibilities, what they saw was the tightness of the past that must be cracked. Thus, the only thing the manifesto tried was to help this cracking.

³⁰"Transreason" or "transrational language" proposed by Kruchenykh as one of the leading figures in the Russian Futurism, was defined as "organized in phonetic analogy and rhythm rather than grammar and syntax. The reader was required to restructure mental processes to grasp message...alike religious sectarians, in ecstasy start speaking in foreign tongues or non-existent idioms" (Lawton, 1988).

The time for individual skirmishes has passed. This time we are going all the way (Redstockings, 1970).

This sentence is from the “Redstockings Manifesto” carried the challenge against ossified traditions from the scope of literature as the previous manifesto did, to the women’s struggle. The Redstockings³¹ was founded by Ellen Willis and Shulamith Firestone in 1969 as the “very militant, very public group” dedicated to both action and consciousness-raising. The first action of the group was realised as a forum in which twelve women speak-out their abortion experiences in order to protest a more official forum including “fifteen experts, only one was woman (a nun)” that held on the reform of abortion law. This solid and strong start, however, had diminished in time since the group had become less action-oriented as well there were intragroup divisions and discussions. Though the group was dissolved as a result of such problems, it was re-established in 1973 by the endeavours of “Sarachild, Hanisch, Leon, and Price” (Echols, 2009). The group, throughout its history, has circulated various slogans and actions such as “sisterhood is powerful”, “consciousness-raising”, and “personal is political”, and recently define themselves as “grassroots feminist think tank” defending women’s liberation. In compliance with this aim, the Redstockings initialized “The Archives for Action” in 1989 to share the experience of 60s movements (Sarachild and Coenen, 2002).

In the Redstockings Manifesto, as in the previous examples, there is no strict line which distinguishes the past and the present, and impossible to find unconditional rejection or embracement. In the manifesto, the past inserts into the present by means of long history of women’s struggles, as in the expression that “after centuries of individual and preliminary political struggle, women are uniting...” (Redstockings, 1970). In addition, the past is not only defined by means of long-lasting women’s struggles, but also the target of these struggles, i.e., male supremacy, as the “oldest, most basic form of domination.” Though the past entered into the present through struggles, what makes present distinctive is the real unification of women “for the first time” to which the Redstockings dedicated themselves. Thus, in this manifesto incongruity appears between women’s unity and male supremacy. The attitude of the Redstockings against this situation was to strengthen the one side of incongruity, the women’s unity, to help the disengagement of incompatible components. For this reason, the manifesto announced

³¹ The name “Redstockings” is the combination of two traditions that “red” signifies the radical politics and revolution, and “stockings” refers to the nineteenth century feminists called as “Bluestockings” (Echols, 2009; Sarachild and Coenen, 2002).

that “we do not need to change ourselves, but to change men” (Redstockings, 1970), which signifies that the temporality of manifesto rejects only some parts of the long-standing conditions, and desires to carry other parts to the future rather than total rejection of the past.

Man is at last becoming aware that he alone is responsible for the realization of the world of his dreams, that he has within himself the power for its achievement (Sellars and Bragg, 1933)³².

The emphasis on the responsibility of self-emancipation reappears in the “A Humanist Manifesto” signed by 34 people ([http-1](http://1)), which is the predecessor of the Humanist Manifesto II. The forty years between two manifestos shows itself as differences in contents and attitudes of two texts. This interval was referred in subsequent manifesto as “it is forty years since Humanist Manifesto I (1933) appeared. Events since then make that earlier statement seem far too optimistic” (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973). The reason to define the 1933 text as too optimistic is the devastating historical experiences humanity faced with such as Nazism, totalitarian regimes, and wars. This difference also reflects in the presents two texts constructed on. While the present in 1933 was defined as “twentieth century” and “modern world” (Sellars and Bragg, 1933), the second manifesto’s present was defined through the expressions “we approach twenty-first century”, and “times of uncertainty” (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973). This alteration in the definition of two presents, as of “modern”, and of “uncertainty”, is also very familiar to social sciences’ evaluations of modernity evolving in the same direction. Thus, the first manifesto places unconditional reliance on science by contrast with the prudent attitude in the second text. In addition, there are many other differences between two texts resultant from historical changes emerging in forty years. For instance, as a reflection of rising women’s movement, and the Cold War, the “man” and “dogmatic religions” (Sellars and Bragg, 1933) in the first manifesto was replaced with the emphasis on “men and women” and “ideologies... forms of political doctrine” as the impediment to progress (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973). In addition, some other concepts and issues very odd to the content of the first manifesto such as “sexuality”, “euthanasia”, “suicide”, “abortion”, “citizen of world community”, “democratic society”, “cultural pluralism”, “diversity”, and “global measures” (Kurtz and Wilson, 1973) were added to the changing present after

³²Although the authorship of the Manifesto has been controversial subject, Raymond B. Bragg and Roy Wood Sellars are the most outstanding names.

40 years. As for the past, “A Humanist Manifesto” announced partial adoption and rejection like previous examples of the genre, through such sentences “we consider the religious forms and ideas of our fathers no longer adequate, the quest for the good life is still the central task for mankind” (Sellars and Bragg, 1933). The contents of two manifestos change according to changing present, so do their futures. As the 1973 manifesto recognized the possible dangers of the future resultant especially of the application of scientific methods as well as the needs of creation more desirable futures, and need to decide desirable future among possible futures, the 1933 manifesto searches for “social and mental hygiene...discourage sentimental and unreal hopes and wishful thinking” (Sellars and Bragg, 1933). Thus, the manifestos exhibit continuing changeover as per perceived incongruence in the present conditions rather than totally emptied out the past and the present for the sake of the future. The distinctive feature of this temporality stems not from blindly running forward, but navigating with regard to the past, the present and the future. Very similar temporal attitude can also be easily grasped by means of the prefaces of the Communist Manifesto as well as the Futurist Manifesto’s emphasis on which the new generation of young futurists displaced the old ones.

Humanity is mediocre. The majority of women are neither superior nor inferior to the majority of men. They are all equal. They all merit the same scorn (de Saint-Point, 2001).

This quotation is from the “Manifesto of Futurist Woman” razing equality claims of the Humanist Manifestoes and of the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions to the ground equalizing people on mediocrity and scorn. This manifesto was written by Valentine de Saint-Point in 1912 as a response to Marinetti. The manifesto, in order to give its answer, began with a quotation from the Futurist Manifesto that “we will glorify war -the world’s only hygiene- militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for woman” (Marinetti, 2001). The text constructed on futuristic ideals can also be considered as one of the attempts of women to gain voices and acceptance against apparent misogyny in Italian Futurism. In searching such an acceptance³³, de Saint-Point, besides being painter, writer and dancer,

³³de Saint-Point’s need for approval as futurist is shining throughout the text. For example, the expression that “the world is rotting with wisdom” is redolent of “Let’s break out of the horrible shell of wisdom” in the Futurist Manifesto. In addition, she also wrote, “what is most lacking in women as in men is virility. That is why Futurism, even with all its exaggerations, is right.” Moreover, abasement of feminism is also common tendency of the texts written by de Saint-Point and Marinetti (de Saint-Point, 2001; Marinetti, 2001)

as the first futurist woman, gave lectures on the Futurism in Paris and Brussels in 1912, and published one more manifesto in 1913 titled as “The Futurist Manifesto of Lust.” However, these endeavours backfired since de Saint-Point was harshly criticized due to confining women in the role of “mother and lover” in conformity with Marinetti’s contemplation on gender as well as unconditional embracement of the role of “futurist woman” (Lyon, 1999; Punchner, 2006).

Before searching for clues of temporality, it is necessary to understand basic arguments de Saint-Point putted forward. Rejecting to divide into women and men, she defined humanity as a composition of femininity and masculinity. From this basic assumption, de Saint-Point also suggested that “every superman and hero” have both feminine and masculine elements. Unfortunately, these are not claims on equality, but eulogy to war and virility. Thus, “woman without virility is just female”, according to her, while “man without intuition is brute animal” (de Saint-Point, 2001). The same is true for the humanity, that is, humanity must have both femininity and masculinity to be complete humanity. With this respect, she defined the periods characterized by only wars are virile periods, whereas periods turning towards the past and dreams of peace are period the femininity dominates (de Saint-Point, 2001). The elements of temporality hidden in the text can be searched on the base of these assumptions. The period she lived in was defined in such sentences as “we are at the beginning of springtime”, “we are living at the end of these periods”, and “but in the period of femininity in which we are living” (de Saint-Point, 2001). Combination of these sentences gives the impression on somewhere on the edge. To jump this edge, according to her, the only solution is “virility”, since de Saint-Point wrote that “to restore some virility to our races so benumbed in femininity, we have to train them in virility even to the point of brute animality”, or “in the period of femininity in which we are living, only the contrary exaggeration is healthy: we have to take the brute animal for model” (de Saint-Point, 2001). Therefore, it is possible to conclude that her present suffered from femininity can only be cured by extreme virility. Additionally, the present as well as the past are not in pure form, but merged with the future since she defined humanity as the source of heroes which is “more propitious” in some moments, that is, there are “fecund periods...rich in masculinity and femininity.” Thus, the future becomes something not ahead but everywhere and very acquaintant. This understanding reappears when she resurrected heroines by declaring that “women are Furies, Amazons, Semiramis, Joans of Arc, Jeanne

Hachettes, Judith and Charlotte Cordays, Cleopatras, and Messalinas: combative women who fight more ferociously than males.... Let the next wars bring forth heroines like that magnificent Catherine Sforza...” (de Saint-Point, 2001). These unexpected bursts are also fed by her indecisive attitude oscillating between essentiality and history. She sometimes held on nature as in “but in humanity as in nature there are some moments more propitious for such a flowering”, “woman, become sublimely unjust once more, like all the forces of nature!”, but some other times de Saint-Point embraced historical conditions such as “but by instinct woman is not wise, is not a pacifist, is not good. Because she is totally lacking in measure...” and “for centuries the feminine instinct has been insulted, only her charm and tenderness have been appreciated” (de Saint-Point, 2001). In addition, she also simultaneously combined essential and historical elements as in “every superman, every hero... is the prodigious expression of a race and epoch...” This emphasis on both nature and epoch places the future at the juncture of the incongruity between the potential and the actual. To eliminate this incongruity, she gave some advices to women unfortunately making women backyard of men’s world, confined them between the role of mother and lover as complemented parts of each other³⁴, and commanded women to go back to their instincts, to violence, to cruelty, and to set free their men and sons. Thereby, she wrote, “incite your sons and your men to surpass themselves...you owe humanity its heroes. Make them!” (de Saint-Point, 2001).

We believe that through the correctness of our agitation, through the force of the things we are doing, we will demonstrate that we are doing, we will demonstrate that we are on the true path to the impending future (Aseyev et al., 1988).

This is the last sentence of the “What Does Lef Fight For?” written by a Russian futurist group, the “Left Front of the Arts” (Lef), in 1923 as the programmatic declaration. Although pre-revolutionary Russian Futurism composed of rival groups, as mentioned above, the only survivor was the Cubo-Futurists launched the “Slap in the Face of Public Taste”, and also gave birth to the two rival groups, the “Company 41^o” and the “Lef” both of which were main representatives of the Russian Futurism in the 1920s within various challenges and difficulties. After the Revolution, the responsibility of culture gave to the “People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment” (Narkompros) under the head of

³⁴The assumption of complementarity was stated in this sentence: “Woman should be mother or lover. Real mothers will always be mediocre lovers, and lovers, insufficient mothers, through their excess. Equal in front of life, these two women complete each other. The mother who receives the child makes the future with the past; the lover gives off desire, which leads toward the future” (de Saint-Point, 2001).

Lunacharsky who was sympathetic towards the avant-gardes. However, despite his sympathy, the relation between the newly established state and the futurists had always been unbalanced. On the one hand the futurists were invited by Lunacharsky to join the “Division of Fine Arts of Narkompros” in 1918, being supported for their publications, and wrote for the Narkompros’ newspaper, the “Art of the Commune”, but on the other hand, they had to compete with harsh criticisms especially came from the “Proletkult.” In addition, though Lunacharsky tried to protect them sometimes by means of quotations from Gramsci, this protection could not be long-lasting since control on publishing gave to the “State Publishing Firm” (Gosizdat). Thus, Lunacharsky was strongly attacked due to his support to the futurists on the one hand, the futurists blamed him for withdrawing his support on the other. Despite these difficulties, the futurists accomplished to be officially acknowledged as the Lef in 1922 because of the fact that government tried to compensate negative effects of private press as a result of the “New Economy Policy.” Yet, they continued to be exposed strong criticisms such as being fascists on the grounds that affinity with Marinetti, “waste product of the decaying bourgeois culture”, and even “charlatan-advertisers.” To cope with these criticisms, they began to search alliances with the rival groups, and made with one of them in 1924, the “Moscow Association of Proletarian Writers”, to publish and make propaganda for the proletariat. Unfortunately, this attempt was not be a cure for their problems, because while MAPP was recognized as a communist group, Lef was not, and lost its publishing organ, for instance, Trotsky (1924, as cited in Lawton, 1998:46) described the futurists as the “products of bourgeoisie”, and criticized the art of Lef as unsuitable for the communist society. After suspension for two years, the group was re-established as the “New Lef” in 1926, but discarded their distinctive features such as “transrational language”, and decided to focus on the “literature of facts”, i.e., non-fictional genres. This transformation led to resign of Mayakovsky, then Brik, Aseyev, Rodchenko in 1928, and ending of futurists (Lawton, 1988; Punchner, 2006).

Though Lef fade away, they left many manifestoes and texts behind. One of these texts is *What Does Lef Fight For?* published as programmatic declaration of the group. Within the text, the pasts, the presents and the futures of the Lef, Russia, other futurists and even rivals are blended in the historical narration. This blend is mainly constructed on the four important historical events which are “the Russian Revolution of 1905”, “First World War (1914)”, “the February Revolution (1917)” and “the October Revolution

(1917).” In parallel line with these historically important events, the Lef wrote about its own history and objectives through such sentences that “the year 1905...Reaction settled in because of autocracy and the double yoke of merchant and industrialist. Reaction made art and life according to its own image and taste”; “The war in 1914 was the First test of national unity”; “The February Revolution deepened the purge, split Futurism into right and left”; and “October cleaned up, shaped up, reorganized. Futurism became the left front of art. “We” became it” (Aseyev et al., 1988). Through all of these sentences, the manifesto tells the story about art and the futurists by giving references to the various artists and artworks. If it is compared with the “Slap in the Face of Public Taste” (Burliuk et al., 2001) referred in the manifesto as one of the Lef’s predecessor, it can be recognized that changing present had affected the scope and definition of enemies, the future, retrospection, and self-looking. For example, definite enemy of the Slap manifesto, i.e., traditional Russian literature, (Burliuk et.al., 2001) becomes the multi-headed one including old regime, merchants, industrialists, capitalists, aesthetes, the Proletkult, some other futurists and so on. The incongruent parts, throughout this long history, had also constantly changed. In parallel with the striking historical events, the art had poured out artists and groups that are improper or powerless to fight within emerging conditions. This process of pouring out was sometimes narrated in the manifesto with ongoing criticisms and sarcasm while survivals were celebrated. Thus, it can be asserted that the manifesto adopted some part of the past, the present and the future rather than totally rejected or embraced. Additionally, they frequently showed off the futural potential of their past in such sentences, “the old regime correctly assessed the experimental works of tomorrow’s dynamiters”, and “these “not-so-academic” means of struggle, the premonition of something larger still to come” (Aseyev et al., 1988). Through such claims on futural aspects of their past, the sentences, full of “must” and “will”, appear with pure confidence, for example, “we do not simply claim a monopoly on revolutionary spirit in art. We will prove it in open competition” (Aseyev et al., 1988). In other words, what creates the confidence and belief in desired future is the confidence of their positions with regard to the past and the present, that is, while they judged the past and the present with reference to the future, they also made claims on the future on the base of these condemned past and present.

We aspire to this vision with the informed conviction that humanity has the ability to progress toward its highest ideals. The responsibility for our lives and the kind of world in which we live is ours and ours alone (American Humanist Association, 2003).

The claim on the “true path to the impending future” of the Lef echoes in this sentence extracted from the “Humanism and Its Aspirations: Humanist Manifesto III, a Successor to the Humanist Manifesto of 1933” (2003), but in extremely different perspective and after eighty years. Humanist Manifesto III was signed by 71 people including 21 Nobel Prize winners ([http-3](http://3))³⁵. Like the forty years separated Humanist Manifesto I and II, the thirty years between Humanist Manifesto II and III brought additional changes for the age. For instance, secular humanism and the Association faced with some attacks by the religious right in the 1980s. Yet, these attacks had also positive result for humanists, for instance, author Isaac Asimov triggered by this conflict, joined them as the elected president of the Association in 1985. In addition, Kurt Vonnegut was selected as the Humanist of the Year in 1992 and became the honorary president. Moreover, thanks to the technological developments, the Association build its website in 1995 ([http-1](http://1)) in order to reach more people.

This manifesto, as the inheritor of other two Humanist Manifestos, did not make new claims, but only confirmed principles and ideas in the previous ones. Thus, the text repeated basic assumptions on “science”, “reason”, “just distribution”, “secular society” and so on. It also approved, as in the Humanist Manifesto I and II, that “document is part of an ongoing effort” based on consensus, “humanism is a progressive philosophy of life that...aspire to greater good of humanity”, and “science is the best method” (American Humanist Association, 2003). Yet, one missing emphasis shows the difference between presents of these three manifestoes. Though this manifesto employed the word “supernaturalism” for once, there is no “religion”, “religious”, or “theism”, all of which were important concerns for previous two humanist manifestos. For this reason, even though it is not so easy to find distinct incongruity as in the other texts, it can be considered that, through the assumptions such as humanism “evolved through the ages and continue to develop” and “humanity has the ability to progress toward its highest ideals” (American Humanist Association, 2003) the future is not only future targeted by previous manifestos, but also the action of targeting.

³⁵ <https://americanhumanist.org/what-is-humanism/manifesto3/signers/> (Accessed:10.08.2019)

The temporal structure revealed both in each example in various clarity and degree as well as among the texts presents very different scene from the portraits of the future drawn at the end of the first two chapters. Even though manifestos are generally analysed as urgent call for the future by denial of the past and rupture in terms of their temporal qualities, it can be asserted based on the examples examined above that the point of departure of each text is their present depending on the problem they targeted, and thus, calls for change is made in accordance with the defined incongruency. This incompatibility sometimes arises between the inalienable rights of women and the conditions in which these rights are denied, sometimes tightness of all hitherto literature and vastness of new literary desires, and sometimes potential of humanity and devastating events. The future emerges from this incongruence, rather than being predicted or planned. Hence, the future, instead of being a fictional or distant point, settles in a position connected with the present and the past, defined through the incongruity within the present conditions and revealed through the current conditions. Moreover, contrary to the claim that present and past gain meaning with an unconditional call to the future, the reference for the definition of the future is the incongruence of each manifesto's own age. Furthermore, manifestos, rather than completely refused the past, sometimes approved and embraced some parts of the past and carried to the desired future, and also rejected some parts of the past on the base of the conditions transferred from the past to the present. In addition, the connections established between the temporal structures presented by each manifesto show that as continuity can be achieved through ruptures, ruptures can also establish continuity. Moreover, they remind us to be careful when analysing the present based on images, expectations and fictions by showing that similar future ideal can emerge from very different presents. At this point, it may be meaningful to take a brief look at the texts in social sciences that usually relates with the genre in terms of content or name in order to return later to how social science can relate to this temporality.

4.3. Is the Spectre of the Manifesto Genre Haunting Social Science?

The manifestos analysed above exhibit very different temporal structure and the position of the future from the portrait drawn by the approaches in social science discussed in the previous chapters. This temporal structure also refutes the general claims on the manifesto genre that is generally considered as breaking loose from the past and long jump towards future. The future in manifestos serves as mean to evaluate the existing

conditions and also is clarified by the help of incongruences in present and past, i.e., eyes simultaneously turn to inseparable trio of past, present and future. In addition, the emergent temporal structure turns the past and the present into the ground which simultaneously answers the questions of “what”, “where from” and “where to” asked in futural manner. Since manifestos, unlike other future-oriented genres, look towards the similar subjects scrutinized by social science from different angle, this common ground gives a chance to connect with the temporality of the genre. However, manifestos have been generally invited to the social sciences for different purposes instead of their temporal structure. A brief consideration of the content of these invitations may be a step towards reflection on this temporal structure again.

The manifesto genre has been invited to social science especially when societal and political problems become salient, political and social struggles begin to intensify, and also one desire to challenge some ossified ideas in social sciences. This invitation is made by means of the evaluation of certain famous examples of the genre or by giving texts title manifesto in order to announce the need for change and to challenge to conventional thoughts in social science. Thus, it is asserted that theories focused on manifestoes and pamphlets acquire the quality of “act, event, or crime” by borrowing from and infected by these texts (Kaplan, 1983) as well as manifestos affect theorists and researchers studying on manifestos (Yanoshevsky, 2009). As for the second manner of invitation, it is also propounded that the title of manifesto cannot be adopted lightly even for revolutionary texts created in Marxist tradition, because of the historical reverence to the Communist Manifesto (Punchner, 2006).

Manifestos have been summoned to social sciences as a device to be used for various debates rather than their temporal structure, as already been said. One of the important features of the manifesto to be summoned is the definition of “we” or the subject of change that is also strongly alleged by literary critics. Thus, there emerges a line through which the spectre of the genre was conjured up to discuss on the formation of political subject haunting a few thinkers’ mind. On this line, Gramsci (2014) labelled Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, albeit considered generally as utopian due to the fictional Prince, as political manifesto inasmuch as the author carry the discussion from ideological, theoretical, and transcendental realm to the concrete experiences and human action. In addition, the manifesto-like quality, according to Gramsci, also arose from Machiavelli’s identification with people, and style of writing resembling action and party

manifesto. From this base, Gramsci arrived to the party as his Prince, rather than a single individual as Machiavelli did. In the analysis of Gramsci, the definition of “we” as one of the distinctive imputed characteristics of the genre is shining on the formation of political subject. These light beams reach to Althusser (2000) who commented Machiavelli as author writing on actuality rather than imagination like Gramsci did. The present Machiavelli wrote on, according to Althusser, was characterized by the urgency of the formation of the nation state under the condition of development of bourgeoisie in the sixteenth century Italy, thereby Machiavelli gave this urgent assignment, the unification of Italy, to the Prince. Concurrence with Gramsci, however, was terminated in respect of manifesto-like quality imputed to *The Prince*, since according to Althusser the relation between the discourse, its object, and its subject exhibit very different scene in *The Prince* and the *Communist Manifesto*, second of which locates itself on the position of the proletariat to summon the same proletariat while Machiavelli adopted the viewpoint of the people in order to call for prince making subject-object relation discordant. For that reason, Althusser defined Machiavelli’s Prince as “a kind of revolutionary manifesto, but utopian one.” The spectre of the manifesto by means of its constitutive characteristic, i.e., “we”, masquerade as “multitude” as the subject of postmodernity, in Hardt and Negri (2000) according to whom manifesto is not proper form to connect the subject (neither prince nor proletariat, but “the multitude”) with the object (not nation-state or party, but “cosmopolitical liberation”) in the paradoxical postmodern situation. In such a situation, though Machiavelli’s *The Prince* is more proper, according to authors, the “utopian outside” instantiated is inadequate to form the multitude which needs a discourse not deterministic and utopian, but based on the activity of the multitude. Even though authors’ avoidance of manifesto stems from imputed determinism and “words from high” to manifesto, this claim becomes contestable in view of the prefaces of the *Communist Manifesto*, three *Humanist Manifestos* published at intervals, Saint-Point’s answer to Marinetti as the leader of Futurism, and incongruences within the presents of the manifestos generally appearing in relation with the power and dominance. Thus, manifestos, at least in its third meaning, are neither deterministic nor “words from high” like royal charters, but determined by conditions and calling to eliminate incongruences the conditions have created. Besides this assumption, the distinction between deterministic and utopic can also be questionable, since if it is compulsory to select one, utopia seems more deterministic in the sense that it implies a

design of world which is exempt from all social conditions and all concrete incongruences at certain degree. With regard to the same issue, namely the avoidance of the genre by attributing determinism and centrality, Zizek (2001) labelled the ideas in the *Empire* as “pre-Marxist” due to lack of concrete analysis that creates incommensurability between Hardt and Negri’s intention to write “the Communist manifesto for the twenty-first century” and Deleuzian language employed by the authors. The solution Zizek proposed, in the face of digital capitalism and the struggles began in Seattle entailing organizational structure, is to return Lenin, but “not as the nostalgic name for old, dogmatic certainty, rather Lenin-in-becoming” (Zizek, 2001) that returns the discussion on the formation of political subject to the Gramsci’s new prince.

Manifesto, besides summoned for the formation of political subject, has also been called to understand, organize, and cure intensified political struggles and public oppositions. Though these struggles are also related with the issue of political subject, in this case the genre is invited as the means for political announcements rather than to discuss generic characteristics. Thus, events rising from Seattle captured Callinicos, like Zizek, with similar point of view on central organization, while social unrests at the end of 60s urged some British intellectuals from the New Left, and struggles began around 2011 created a field for Hardt and Negri in order to materialize their rejection of manifesto. These recurrences bring Engels’ claim on parallelism between the Manifesto and political struggles into mind (Marx and Engels, 1997), and reconfirm manifesto as a revolutionary genre. The manifesto genre was called in May 1967 to write a manifesto, titled as the *May Day Manifesto* by a group of people from the New Left, as against to the new capitalism and the deficient policies of the “Labour government of Harold Wilson” (May Day Manifesto Committee, 2013). Signed by seventy intellectuals from the New Left including Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson, Stuart Hall, Ralph Miliband, Terry Eagleton, and many other important names, the manifesto was announced to analyze the problems they faced with, and proposed solutions under fifty subtitles on the wide range of issues such as “inequality”, “poverty”, “education”, “communication”, “new capitalism”, “the international firm”, “Third World”, “Cold War”, “British economy”, “state”, “the Labour Party”, “unions”, and “radical groupings”, all of which were considered with reference to their present. In addition, rising protests, as in the most of the political manifestos, had great effect on the emergence of the May Day Manifesto which announced that “the sound of protest is rising again... and this is a

critical moment... we saw the hope and the possibility of a really new start... What we are seeking to define is an active socialism of the immediately coming generation” (May Day Manifesto Committee, 2013). Thus, where there is incongruence, as in here between rising struggles and existing political tendencies, the need to urge a manifesto began to shine. Provoked by another rising struggles began in Seattle in 1999, Callinicos (2004) launched his *An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto* to analyze the struggles characterized by anti-capitalism and heterogeneity, and to make suggestions by means of four principles, “justice”, “productivity”, “democracy” and “sustainability” constituting together socialist planning. In addition, Callinicos indicated to his inspiration from the Communist Manifesto, and the necessity of writing many other anti-capitalist manifestos. Devotion to manifesto form in Callinicos turns into rejection in Hardt and Negri’s (2012) analysis ignited by the “cycle of struggles” began and quickly mushroomed around 2011. Comparing these struggles with the movements began around 1999 preoccupied Callinicos (2004) and Zizek (2001) as mentioned above, the authors indicated to the difference between nomadic character of previous movements roaming around summit meetings and the sedentariness of the cycle of struggles rooted in local and national issues. In the belief that revolutions need constituent power to organize, Hardt and Negri putted some principles such as “inalienable rights”, “equality in the distribution of wealth”, and “the sustainability of the common” already born from the struggles. Hardt and Negri (2000), as mentioned above, felt more closer to Machiavelli’s Prince, despite its assumed deficiency, than Marx and Engels’ manifesto due to the “horizontally organized multitude.” Thus, concerning federalist models more proper than party, the authors discarded the genre as unsuitable form on the grounds that the current social movements reverse the content of the genre creating its own followers like “ancient prophets” (Hardt and Negri, 2012). Feeling intimidated by the spectre, the authors titled their texts as *Declaration*, and within the texts indicated a few times as “in this pamphlet” in order to escape very dangerous word, manifesto.

The wavy attitudes, embracement and rejection of manifesto, converges in Adorno and Horkheimer’s (2011) dialogues in 1956, subsequently titled as the *Towards a New Manifesto* that was mainly constructed on the relation between theory and practice besides many other subjects. The road, however, chase the possibility of new manifesto down an alley because of the familiar pessimistic gaze of the authors, albeit receding at intervals. Horkheimer, for instance, saw the condition of uncertainty under the absence

of party, and expected nothing more than the “versions of American system.” However, attitude flows when Horkheimer indicated to the need for a party, and Adorno to “a Leninist manifesto”, and then ebbs since according to both theorists, the atmosphere in the nineteenth century Marx wrote on completely vanished, and flows again when Adorno and Horkheimer came closer to Marx by rejecting to recipe but taking responsibility to write more concrete for the readers, and then ebbs one more time when they indicated to the impossibility of genuine political action in their age. Similar indecisive invitation to the genre reappears in Latour’s (2010) the “An Attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto” in which efficacy of manifesto was approved on the one hand, and the genre was defined as fusty on the other. This ambivalent attitude towards the genre stems from its potential to manifest the “subtle but radical transformation”, but at the same its relying on the idea of progress by predictability and inevitability. Within this understanding, Latour, by distinguishing between “progress” and “progressive” drawing from two French words “le futur” and “l’avenir”, claimed that when moderns recognized catastrophe they have created, they also capture that they have no future but many prospects. At this point, Latour likened his manifesto to the Communist Manifesto in terms of “search for common”, but differs by the ways to search that one is “slowly composed” and the other is “taken for granted and imposed”, and then saluted to the Manifesto: “A specter haunts not only Europe but the world: that of compositionism. All the Powers of the Modernist World have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter!” (Latour, 2010). The spectre of the manifesto summoned to introduce unfamiliar ideas to social science, as Latour did, continues to haunt social science by Haraway (2016a; 2016b) who called the spectre in order to scrutinize dualisms and the notion of origin by means of “cyborg” and “companion species.” To draw attention to the necessity of a feminist culture and theory located outside the dualisms on which the Western discourse is built on as well as science and technology, Haraway (2016a) employed “cyborg” belonging to the post-gender world that opens up a genuine space in order to overcome dualisms and the idea of origin. Through the same line, the author moved from cyborg to companion species in order to continue to scrutinize same dualisms, besides focused on the “significant otherness” by means of dog-human relations to understand co-history and co-evolution in “naturecultures” (Haraway, 2016b). Considering both texts, it can be asserted that she departed, unlike above examples, not from social uprisings or discussions on the validity of the genre, but long-lasting incongruences in thought and practice. In addition, Haraway

never discussed whether these texts can be labeled as manifesto or effectiveness of the genre, but just continued to write.

The manifesto genre has also repeatedly been disinterred from its grave to add new adjectives to social science. For instance, two articles added the adjective “relational” to sociology presented new ideas by bearing the title manifesto. In the first article, “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology” written by Emirbayer (1997), the word manifesto used four times, as three of them in inverted commas as if the author had tried to display the word. Believing that basic dilemma sociologists faced with is choosing between “substantialism” and “relationalism”, and drawing from Dewey and Bentley’s suggestions on two types of substantialist approaches which are “self-action” and “interaction”, the author added “trans-action” that implies functional roles of elements as the definer of meanings and identities. As in Latour’s manifesto, and in the subtitle used in this study, Emirbayer also borrowed from the Communist Manifesto in a footnote: “Lest this “manifesto” seem incomplete without one, I shall offer one final rallying-cry: Entities of the World-Relate!” (Emirbayer, 1997). As in the dialogues between Humanist Manifestos, answer given by de Saint Point to Marinetti, and prefaces of the Communist Manifesto, Donati (2015) gave an answer to Emirbayer with an article titled as the “Manifesto for a Critical Realist Relational Sociology” that defines social relations through which “morphogenesis of society comes about” as connections between agency and structure as opposed to the Emirbayer’s trans-action that reduces, according to Donati, social relations to interactions, exchanges, and interdependencies. Alike, in order to announce the role of “computational social science” in the remediation of the problems created by complex global society by the help of data gathered via information and communication technologies that make possible prediction and simulation supporting decision and policy making, Conte et al. (2012) wrote the “Manifesto of Computational Social Science.” In a similar tendency, the “Manifesto of Marine Social Sciences” (Bavinck and Verrips, 2020) was drafted in the “10th People and the Sea Conference in Amsterdam” in 2019 of which main theme was “Learning from the Past, Imagining the Future”, and announcements on topics, suggestions and methodologies are itemized, as in many other manifestos, under various subtitles. One more example is from an introduction of a book dedicated to the sociology of development. This text, “Introduction: A Manifesto for the Sociology of Development” (Cohn and Hooks, 2016), began with the problems the subject of development faced with, and then stressed on the

two-sided exclusion that are sociologists from policy, and the subject of development from sociology. From this base, the text bearing the title manifesto indicated that since the reduction of development to merely economic growth cannot obtain full-fledged knowledge, social and political factors must be included by sociology of development. Spectre continues to haunt social science by a text from the 1960s American sociology. “A Manifesto for Sociologists: Institution Formation- A New Sociology” (Etzkowitz and Schaflander, 1968) may be considered as one of the most manifesto-like texts compared to the other examples analysed in this subtitle. In this article, calling to action, emphasis on “we”, by means of “we are”, “we believe” “we call upon” “we refuse”, and “we call”, partly rejection and partly embracement of the past and the present of the sociological approaches and attitudes in American sociology gave the text more manifesto-like qualities. Moreover, in order to intervene the problems in American slums, authors indicated to the replacement of “sterile, neutral, non-involved, objective research-sociologists” by the “Institution-Formation sociologists” or “involved observer approach.” In addition, by analysing the various names such as “Kinsey, Lenski, Goffman, Mills, Coser, and Stein”, the authors selected some parts of the past that “The Congress of Industrial Organizations, an organization organized Black workers into labour union”, and “Albion Small’s conception of sociologists as social agitator.” Inspired by some parts of their past, they founded the “Community Cooperative Center” to intervene American slums (Etzkowitz and Schaflander, 1968). Social science continues to cling on manifesto not only by individuals but also by associations and a journal. For instance, “Barcelona Manifesto” (Alier et al., 2008) was published by the “Environment and Society Research Committee (RC24) of the International Sociological Association” in order to call scientists, governments, business sector and civil society to contribute sustainability, and make some propositions on plausible scenarios, policies, education, and action. As well, the spectre reappeared for a journal, “The Sociological Review”, to indicate that changes in the age entails sociologists’ interventions, and the tradition and aims of the journal through articles full of “we will” in a brief text titled as the “Our Manifesto” (Green, Michael, and Skeggs, 2014). One more example is posthumously labelled Durkheim’s “The Rules of Sociological Method” as manifesto in three senses that the text is “historical rupture in Western thought”, creates sociological object and moral reality, and intertwines sociology with phenomena it seeks (Cormack, 1996).

Since it is possible to encounter many other similar texts targeting the name or content of the genre, recurrence of invitation shows the effect of the genre on social science. However, relation with the genre has generally been established on the imputed revolutionary calling to the genre, or relatedly formation of the political subject, rather than temporal structure abovementioned examples of the genre predicated on. The ignorance of this opportunity offered by the manifestos to reflect on the relationship that social science establishes with time and the future is due to the fact that contemplations on time and the future in general, despite all their richness, is confined to the prevailing conception of the future. Therefore, with reference to the examples of manifestos analysed above, it may be a significant attempt to use opportunity to evaluate social science's relation with itself as well as time and the future by the help of temporal structure of the genre, which scrutinizes similar social and political issues with social science, and is repeatedly summoned.

4.4. The Lesson Taken from the Genre

On the base of the information about the manifestos' literary features, the analysis of temporal structure, texts from the field of social sciences referred to the manifestos, it is possible to contemplate more on what the lessons are social sciences should take for itself from the temporal structure of the genre. Manifesto is a genre that social science frequently invites, as in the few examples were presented above. However, despite the richness of the temporal structure it offers, the genre has been invited to social science not because of the temporal structure, but through different purposes and qualities. Firstly, manifesto genre generally transferred into social sciences as a call to action. Therefore, as in the case of Gramsci and Althusser, the manifesto-like quality of any text has been evaluated on the base of relation between subject and object, or action and agent. Due to these action-initiator and subject-formative qualities, manifesto has always been the first genre which comes to mind in the period of political uprisings. However, it can also be stated that in most cases, the genre has been hesitantly employed due to the reverential obedience to a certain political manifesto which has inspired and affected to social sciences. Another tendency to employ manifesto is to discuss the ossified and mainstream ideas in social sciences, because the genre is conceived as the most effective way to declare new ideas. It should also be added that this invitation was made with caution by some writers presented above on the grounds that manifesto is order from above. With

regard to this point, Ebert (2003) indicated that manifesto and polemic have been excluded from mainstream knowledge and academy because of being crude thinking, and dogmatic pronouncements. Even though it is interesting to see that not only mainstream but also some contrarians exclude the genre with similar claims, whether or not the manifestos are dogmatic is beyond the aim of this study that pay attention to what manifesto's temporality can contribute to the social sciences' perspective.

At this point, it may be meaningful to detail this temporal structure again, as the manifestos are handled by means of their temporal structure rather than their historical significance or literary characteristics in this study. The relation of the manifestos with the future, at least in the above-mentioned examples, presents a very different portrait of the future from that presented by the social sciences in the first two chapters. Therefore, two different futures appear that one is the future of social science which is placed at distance, and thus, only be related by predictions, expectations, hopes, intentions, and plans, and the other is the future of manifestos that is not separated from past and present, but also not collapse into them by preserving the distinctiveness each of them. In this situation, since the future in social science is considered as future which always remains the future in order to be future, it can be evaluated only through certain tendencies mentioned before. In addition, since the future is considered as stance rather than as subject in this study, the main significance of these two portraits stems from the fact that they impose two different perspectives. The future appeared through manifestos is disposed as a way of looking at the present through and simultaneously the future, rather than a desired future by looking over the present towards the horizon. This means a reversal of the prevailing attitude of social science that looks towards horizon while fixed on present, and thus cannot clearly see both. Contrarily, the present and the future of each manifesto are simultaneously defined instead of considering as straight line, while the present goes beyond merely being stuck with superficial understanding. By means of such a view, one can get a chance to reach a more detailed picture of the present by asking not only what the present looks like but also what it can possibly change to. As opposed to the claims, manifestos do not look into the pure and absolute future. The reason behind these claims is the ossified assumptions on the past, present, future, change, and the possibility of new. Contrary to the general opinion, however, the temporal structure of the manifestos shows that the present and the past are viewed with the future. Because of this view, some aspects of the present and the past are embraced while others are rejected.

Addedly, in that way, while what is new and future snap out of being fictional and descended from the sky, they do not lose anything from being new and future. Therefore, the first lesson that social science should take from the temporal structure of the manifesto is to aim to understand not only what the present and future is, but also what is congruent and incongruent in the present as well as where this incongruence might lead. Against this claim, an objection may be raised that the manifestos are texts of action, written with political aims, and such an attitude would violate the principle of neutrality of science. The normative attitude of social science, despite all its importance, is not a necessary condition of the futural stance that is tried to be defined in this study. However, if the main focus of social science is to define and understand the various aspects of the social, it is obvious that this definition and meaning requires asking different questions to the present and the past in order to be more inclusive and meaningful.

Another important conclusion drawn from the temporal structure of the manifesto is that the manifestos reach the future and the new from the definition of the present and the past. This indicates quite different attitude from the one that increasingly become prevalent in discussions of time as well as in other subjects of social science defined in the previous chapters that erects new blocks next to the existing one, and thus endlessly produces new adjectives without forcing the boundaries and content of the existing. In order to seek and propose the new and different, and to challenge to the old ones, questioning the content of the existing is an important quality for the temporal and futural perspective proposed in the study. This also means that, contrary to what is claimed, the manifestos are not blindly future-oriented texts, but by putting their feet on the present floor, look at the past and present over the future and vice versa. In other words, they present a temporal structure that neither gradually reaches the future by following already defined course, nor aims to change and define the present through the creation of images of the future. This is a very different temporal understanding from the inconsistent outlook which, on the one hand, criticizes the progressive conception of history, and on the other hand, unwittingly reproduces this progressive conception by fixing the future to a distant point. This implies two separate attitudes towards future, one is of social science's prevailing attitude that simultaneously criticizing and reproducing the notion of progress with its view of the future, and the other is of manifestos that draws the future to the present and the past, does not give up to retreat, and criticizes or applauds its

predecessors in order to go to the future it desires. While the first of these is to look into the future, the second provides a simple example of futural stance.

The foundation on which the temporal structure of the manifestos is built creates an opportunity for social science to consider not only its relationship with the social, time and the future, but also with itself. The examples of manifestos reviewed above, even the shortest “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste” (Burluk, et.al., 2011), appeal to their own predecessors and contemporaries in order to describe the incongruence of their presents and to call for a future appearing through this defined incongruence. This reference to the legacy by either appropriation or rejection is an important reminder to think about the temporal and futural character of social science’s relationship to itself. This lesson is on that if social science is going to question the situated assumptions and the content of the social, this question entails to connect with the heritage and to scrape out existing understandings in order to introduce the new, instead of unconnectedly presenting new discoveries by claiming that “because it does not already exist.” In other words, the new of the social science should be extracted by appealing to existing, and from the incongruence between the given definition of the social and neglected aspects of the social. Ultimately, the difference between the two futures and temporal structure is the difference between the evaporation of all that is solid and saying that all is vapour. In an atmosphere where everything is vapour and will always float in the air, there is nothing to recognize and talk about.

In brief, the temporality of manifesto, by contrast with general claims, can be considered as a navigation process in relation with perceived past and present rather than blindly attachment to the future. This future is not a future come from an unknown and imaginative source but from recognized incongruence within the existing conditions which in turn imply the conditions of future as potential, and the past inserting into present. In this framework, it can be asserted that manifestos examined in the study can be regarded as texts written to eliminate this incongruence. This temporality also presents a picture in which past, present and future are interwoven but still preserve their distinct qualities as opposed to the commonly-held claims on the manifesto genre. These claims, however, can be considered as the reflection of more dominant idea, which defines future as distant point and completely disconnected from present and past, that also reflects into social sciences. Thus, considering manifestos not as rejection of past and unconditional love of future, but as connection with the future by means of perceived past and present,

can contribute to relation between social science and future. In other words, to reach more comprehensive understanding not only for future but for past and present, social science should navigate around, within and among past, present and future rather than total embracement or rejection.

5. FUTURITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

The conclusion brought by the discussions and evaluations made all hitherto is that the relationship social science establish with the future is basically a question of perspective and stance. This issue, which is also fed by the image of the distant future, reveals that the main predicament is not the absence of a specific field, the sociology of the future, rather adoption of futural perspective. Thereupon, it should be reiterated that a similar distinction made between time and temporal is also drawn between future and futural in this study. Since one of the main reasons for the lack of futural perspective is the position of the future in thought, conducting a discussion on this position provided significant clues to contemplate on this perspective. In general opinion, the future begins where the present ends, but never begins because present never ends, and thus always remains abstract. In that case, it is only possible to talk about the future by means of hope, concern, risk, expectations, and outcomes through the individual's minds, the works of art, or techniques thought as all available in the present. Moreover, even to interest in the future through familiar means is not excused in most cases when it crosses the certain boundaries. This issue is not only related with the future, but also, and perhaps even more, with the present or current age which is considered the main and legitimate focus of social science, since the distant future let only to look towards the horizon by shielding hands over eyes. Inversely, a futural gaze can be considered as looking at both the future through the present and the present through the future, that is, scanning every aspect, and looking around. However, what is intended in here is not the gaze of social scientist who takes pleasure in looking at constantly made and broken networks, transience, and singularity, but looking in order to see. At this point, it must also be highlighted that the study does not attribute any superiority or privilege to the viewpoint of the social scientist. The best example of this is the existence of manifestos that capture such a stance better than the social sciences. More to the point, people who do not occupy privileged status such as manifesto writers or social scientists, can hold more strongly this stance.

In this final step to think about the qualities of the stance and perspective in question, it is necessary to look a little closer at the position of the future. Up to this point, this position has been scrutinized in terms of the first part of the social science, i.e., social. At this point, it will also be addressed to second part, namely the relationship between the principles of science and future. In this framework, a brief evaluation will be made on the relationship between science and the future in the first subtitle. Then, as seen before in

both the proliferation of the adjectives of time and the discussion on the politics of time, the solutions that create immune fields from the scientific principles and existing assumptions will be evaluated. After the evaluation of these solutions, the steps that can be taken for a meaningful relationship will be discussed. Finally, a general discussion will be made on the content of futural social science.

5.1. Social Science and the Future: Inadequacy and Excess

The concern for the future has existed in various forms throughout history by means of prediction, anticipation, control, plan, dream, and desire even though the scope, access, and depth of this concern vary. Social sciences occupied by future-related issues are not also exempt from this concern manifesting in theories of social change and social evolution, various comparative analysis, and the assumption of purposeful, intentional, and rational action. Although the future has been considered by dint of various tendencies, interest in the future, which is hesitantly expressed or completely discredited, is still confined to certain areas. This indecisive and hesitant attitude stems from the ambivalent position of the future, which simultaneously overflows from and dovetails with the framework of science. On the one hand, social scientists interested in the future which is considered as insufficient in terms of meeting the criteria of science, had to work under a different discipline, as mentioned before. On the other hand, since, as in the futures studies and the nineteenth century's social scientists, the occupation on future has been shaped by advising to governments and various organizations in some cases, the pursuit of future that has been generally associated with the social engineering practices, which is sometimes used as a derogatory term, is excluded from social science one more time. In other words, dealing with the future has been rejected on the grounds that it is not appropriate to science on the one hand, and both discrediting for the social sciences and more relevant to politics on the other. Unfortunately, since the future is equally found as inadequate to be scientific as well as a proper means to employ rigid scientific practices, social scientists attempting to study on future have been generally dismissed and degraded. In a similar vein, the interest in the future, even the approaches having crumbs of the future, has also been anathemized by the names of law, schema, teleology, and determinism. The more accepted tendency today, as mentioned before, is to reflect on the consequences of present actions with a concern for future generations. Although this concern has great importance, it does not mean to look at the present with the future, but

predict the future consequences of the present. To understand the difference between these two attitudes, it is necessary to take a closer look at the relationship between science and the future.

5.1.1. Fact, Value and the Future

The emergence and formation of social sciences in relation with the already matured natural sciences is oft-repeated story. What is not in detail evaluated and mentioned, however, is the connection this story with the unbalanced relation between social science and the future. As repeatedly mentioned before, the future, in both social scientific and daily usage, has been conceptualized as distant and onward point accompanied our steps forward almost impossible to catch, and a container of expectations, hopes, fears, concerns and all other future-related feelings and emotions. The only information we can be sure about the future, in that case, is the existence of this field, but this information can never be full-fledged in conventional sense, rather it is a strange, unnamed and undefined feeling since the future, in its assigned and familiar meaning, cannot be captured by the ways of scientific knowledge or can only be framed through certain acts such as prediction and forecast.

One of the main sources of this ambivalent position in the field of science is that the future does not comply with the principle of factuality. Science talks only about facts, or expressing explicitly, there can be no science talking about nonfactual subjects, thus the history of science can be read as the fact's accession to the throne against all other objects of thought. Since the fact defined as "something already happened or has happened, exist, experienced as against to believed, imagined, not yet happened" refers to "done" rather than "made" (Marett, 1934), the future is immediately and unquestioningly excluded from this definition. This exclusion was also reapproved in famous quotation, "there are no past possibilities, and there are no future facts" (Brumbaugh, 1966, as cited in Bell and Mau, 1973: 9). Incompatibility between facts and the future (and also science and the future) was strengthened by the distinction between "facta" and "futura" made by Bertrand de Jouvenel (1967, as cited in Poli, 2011: 69-70) one of the leading scholars in the futures studies. In this distinction, facta refers to "has already been" allowing scientific predictions while futura means "what is still going to be", that is, improper subject for scientific inquiry. From this point of view, de Jouvenel asserted that futura referring to cognition, thoughts, and expectations cannot be framed in

science. According to this understanding, as Adam (2008a) indicated, since the future cannot be transferred into sense data unlike the past reached by records, and the present by perception and observation, it is not included in factual-empirical studies. Thus, according to Adam, there is no academic discipline of the future, though it is continuously created in social life. The objections to the definition of factuality are also raised on the impartibility of the future in social life such as the effects of the images of future in decision-making (Iparraguirre, 2019), the potency of emergent future in the present thoughts and expectations (Bell and Mau, 1973), and the importance of socio-environmental future in daily life (Adam, 2008a). Thus, the solution proposed is the need of different understanding of factuality to cover non-empirical realm of future characterized by “latency”, “capacity”, “invisibility”, “immateriality”, and “in the making” (Adam, 2005). In a similar vein, the concept of “dispositionals” is employed to indicate potentiality as in the “capacity of glass to break embedded in its nature”, or in the “dispositional present” of the glass infiltrating to science through suffixes such as “-able”, “-ible”, and “-uble” as in the things “soluble, combustible, and expandable” as well as the study of people as “observable, teachable, and treatable” (Bell, 2009). All of the previous objections are right, but only partially, since the meanings of causal, empirical, material, and factual change in the field of social sciences. More importantly, replacing these concepts with some others such as latent, invisible, and non-material can make the relationship between social science and the future more unbalanced. Although such concepts seem to carry the future closer, they also make it a kind of reptile constantly slithering and gliding under the ground as well as create a weird sense of foreboding we never translate into the language of science. Thus, the first thing to do is not to undermine principles on which science is based, but to think a little bit more about their scope and contents with regard to social sciences.

The definition of fact, especially the contrast between done and made, deserved to be reconsidered in the realm of social facts that includes, besides many other things, “social roles, laws, morals, beliefs, rituals, and customs” all of which are not completely done, not directly observed, not easily measurable, and not stable, but in most cases are discovered and experienced through violation and punishment, and also change through time and across cultures (Herzog, 2018). This means that social facts have some distinct characteristics that cannot be framed in abovementioned definition. Yet, postulating a distinctiveness for social facts implies neither a hierarchy constructed on the line different

kind of knowledge passes through according to generality, simplicity, and independence of facts they concern for as Comte (2015) did, nor the assumed homogeneity of unknown, of “infinitely small”, and of unobservable as Tarde (2012) criticized. Since the main question of this study is about standpoint, specificity of social fact can be considered by means of the position of the attendants in relation to what they look at. What makes social fact distinct, in this sense, is the degree of the externality and internality of the relation between subject and object rather than being unmeasurable, unobservable, heterogenous, complex and variable. Nonetheless, implied externality and internality do not allude Simmel’s (1971a; 1971b) assessment on the possibility of society resultant from synthesis of isolated individual elements in unity by conscious process by means of Kant’s answer on the possibility of nature via the conception of nature. These two possibilities, of nature and of society, differ in their subject-object positions, since the former, according to Simmel, does not entail external observer but becomes from its own elements. Apart from the questionability of Simmel’s thought on the possibility of society, the problem created by the issue of exteriority and interiority with regards to the social science and the future exceeds Simmel’s understanding. When the facts are observable from the outside in its assumed entirety, it is possible to proceed from the relatively stable to the process, but for social facts, the observable at first hand is processual, dynamic and incomplete, i.e., in the field of social fact the relation is turned upside-down. Thus, the abovementioned objections to the definition of fact on the base of latency, in the making, immateriality, and processuality seems to forget that exposed faces of social facts exhibit themselves in motion before anchored. In that situation, the task becomes more challenging, since it entails firstly to capture what the commonality of diverse and restless, then to fathom into depth levels, and may need to find another commonality. Durkheim’s (1995) analysis on society, Weber’s (2012) historical individual, Marx’s (2010) relations of production, Simmel’s forms (1971c), or any subject social scientists are studying on today are all distinctive facts because of this feature. Thus, above all, this feature of social facts, i.e., allowing to see only a kind of processual and dynamics aspects in beginning, manifests the need of connections for temporal and futural understanding. For this concern, Durkheim’s (1982) definition of social facts with the characteristics of “coercive power”, “external constraint”, “generality” and “independent from individual manifestations” is very significant to show that social facts are combination of “done” and “made” although the potentiality of Durkheim’s definition of social fact, as in his ideas on time, has been

confined to only coerciveness. It is this extraction of coerciveness, constraint, and externality irritated Tarde (Vargas et al., 2008) who objected to Durkheim with such sentences: "...Nothing would be more social than the relationship established between victors and vanquished...nor would anything be less social than the spontaneous conversion..." However, the externality of social facts making them "things" is the way to enter into the disperse and dynamic events as in the "law is enshrined in legal codes, the events of daily life are registered in statistical figures and historical monuments, fashions are preserved in dress, taste in works of art" (Durkheim, 1982). In other words, since social facts present themselves in spontaneity and dispersion at first hand, their meanings and contents can be extracted and captured through their commonalities and connections. Since the distinctive feature of social facts, unlike other facts, is that they first present their variable, dispersed, processual and spontaneous faces, there is no need to such a mystification in latency, invisibility, and immateriality in order to claim on factuality of social facts and the future, but rather to find out what connects diversity and dispersion. Therefore, in spite of abovementioned objections and docile acceptances sticking themselves on the latency and processuality as against to "done", "observed", and "sensed", the gateway for time (and also the future) in order to enter to the realm of the factual may be the historicalness of social facts. Durkheim's social facts, for instance, are not only coercive and external but also historical at certain degree since according to Durkheim (1982) the normality and meaning of social fact is determined by the phase of its development, albeit this historical understanding is not the full-fledged one. This emphasis on history arouses a feeling to get back to the starting point which confines facts in "already done" due to the pastness implied by conventional understanding of history. Moreover, if facts entail pastness, then the question of the possibility to talk about the age we live in may arise. This idea is evocative of Weber's (2012) inferences, with reference to historian Meyer, on causal significance of present facts that can be determined only in the future since immediate present and experiences require time to become object as historical cause and historical individual in order to be objectively approached. The immediate result presented in here is that historicalness is equivalent to pastness, and thus it is an obstacle to look towards both present and past in its processual aspects. Yet, a futural and temporal perspective entails to look at present and what is still going on. After all, pastness is not a quality we can easily separate for at least some subjects. For instance, urban acquires a degree of pastness, but is also something that is still ahead of us and in

which we live that entail to speak from the very experience. This feature of social fact inconveniences to capture them at first glance, thus requires connections not only along time between past and present, but also behind and deepness their exposed faces. With regard to the immediacy of the present, Bloch (1996) stated that though the proximity of “the here and now” hampers to see and understand, it also makes things “distinct and surveyable.” This distinctiveness Bloch indicated was imputed by Weber (2012) only one type of historical fact, “historical individual”, that unique and has value, while other is “historical causes” to be only interested to capture the “causal determination of valued components.” This division of fact brings the issue to the principle of causality that also creates weird situation for the future.

The future is also excluded from the principle of causality. In the inseparable cause and effect pairs, the future can only be at the effect side, but as causality is accompanied by conventional factuality, the effect also can only be the past and the present which are characterized as perceptible, knowable, and observable. In other words, in conventional understanding, the future can hardly have a place even as an effect. In order to cure this deprivation, as in the principle of factuality, some solutions have been proposed by which the arrow has been reversed, pluralized, or reticulated. For instance, “probabilistic theory of causality” suggesting the plurality of causes was constructed on the idea that an effect is rarely emerged through a single cause in social sciences. Thus, according to this understanding, the evaluations in social realm must be based on increasing probability of the effect rather than compulsory occurrence (Marini and Singer, 1988). This plurality breaking the link between consequence and antecedent employed also by Mill, disturbed Durkheim (1982) inasmuch as it makes causal link inaccessible by negation of the principle of causality. In place of this, Durkheim proposed “the method of concomitant variations” that occur when phenomena are effect of the same cause, or third phenomenon exists between them. Additionally, the arrow is also pluralized through “self-organization or network causality” encapsulating all types of realities even non-living and non-biological systems (Poli, 2010). The prominent type of causality, however, science based on is the “efficient cause” that essentially implies time sequence and has expelled other forms of causality from the field of science. In fact, efficient cause was accompanied by three other causes, as putted by Aristotle, that are “material”, “formal” and “final” last of which had the determining force. Material cause was defined as “that out of which”; formal cause as “the account of what is to be”; efficient cause as “the primary source of

change”, and the final cause as “for the sake of which a thing is done.” Among this group of causes, the final cause was the primary one triggering the action of efficient cause. However, modern science left behind other three ones in order to be alone with efficient cause on account of the fact that formal and final causes were not comply with the experiment while material cause presumed in all natural phenomena (Crespo, 2016; Hodgson, 2017; Marini and Singer, 1988; Turner, 2003). Since the efficient cause of science logically excludes future, “retro-causality” or “backward causality” implying the effect of the future on the present or the precedence of effect over its cause reverses the arrow (Hodgson, 2017; Marini and Singer, 1988). Though this causality hardly survives in the scientific thought, it was welcomed in mythical understanding as seen in the example of “warrior wounded by an arrow, attends to his pain applying ointment to the arrowhead” (Hassard, 1990). Backward causation also recalls teleological explanations which are degraded by science but in return has haunted scientific explanations. For instance, it is claimed that the Enlightenment thinkers criticized teleological understanding on the one hand and embraced teleology through the notions of “organism”, “human nature”, “inevitable course of history”, “social scientific laws”, “forces”, “control”, and “energies” on the other (Adam, 2011; Marini and Singer, 1988; Turner, 2003). In consequence, the history of social thought can partly be seen as the arena of conflict between teleological and causal explanations from the very beginning. Durkheim (1982), for instance, as vigorous advocate of the efficient cause stoutly criticized both Comte’s “drive for progress” and Spencer’s “need for great happiness” on the grounds that both theorists understand phenomena through purpose. Contrarily, to Durkheim, it is necessary to seek the causes before their effects. Oscillating between two extremes in his entire thought, Simmel adopted a similar attitude between causality and teleology in accordance with his understanding of reality and sociation. According to Simmel (1971b), “causal nexus” implies that individuals as social elements are associated each other to produce the framework of community. However, from the perspective of individuals as social elements, the nexus becomes teleological since individuals see themselves as autonomous. This dual nexus, to Simmel, makes individuals social by means of consciousness. Simmel’s understanding fed by psychic and individual realm reverberates into, albeit with some differences, the future-concerned social scientists of today who have insisted on that the only way to reach into the future for social scientists is teleological explanations as seen in the notion of “purposive human action”, “rational

behavior”, and “intentionality of human” (Adam, 2011; Crespo, 2016; Marini and Singer, 1988; Turner, 2003). Besides confining and conceptualizing the future into the point attainable only by purposive and rational action, understanding human as rational and purposive also exterminates the possibility of fertile consideration on the future in the scope of social sciences. But this does not mean that all the ways to capture the future within the framework of social science have been exhausted. There is one more controversial attitude called as historical laws that has got into the fight between causality and teleology.

Social science, besides efficient cause, has also been shaped through the notion of “natural laws” that implies the essence of people and things reflecting the purposes of nature or God. Because of this essence-based approach signifying to “tendency towards”, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish law-based explanations from teleological ones (Turner, 2003). For that reason, law-based thoughts have been condemned on the base of similar reasons with teleology, even though both are different from each other. Comte (2015) presenting one of the outstanding law-based theory, asserted in “the law of three stages” that he discovers fundamental law through the study of the development of human intelligence. Since it is a law, each branch of knowledge has to successively pass through the “theological” (fictitious), “metaphysical” (abstract) and “positive” (scientific) stages. As mentioned above, Durkheim (1982) criticized Comte and Spencer as well as Mill by his insistence on the efficient cause that implies rejection to inner tendencies, and potentiality. On this base, according to Durkheim, the assumed potentiality is irreconcilable with variety and complexity of social forms. This does not mean, however, Durkheim excluded law, rather he laid stressed on “a solitary fact” if its sufficient enough, “can shed light on a law” (Durkheim, 1982). Thus, it seems that not the law but the principles laws constructed on was Durkheim’s enemy. In a similar vein, Weber (2005) emphasized on the “historical reality” grasped by putting together individual parts, not by general abstract formula, i.e., final concept must arise at the end of the investigation. However, because of his historical understanding based on “historical individual”, mentioned in the first chapter, Weber confused historical laws with “developmental sequences” that can only be ideal types. According to Weber, such constructs pave the way to confuse theory and history as “procrustean bed into which history is forced”, and real forces behind events in history. With regard to this issue, Simmel (1971c), as in many other subjects, adopted in-between position corresponding to form and content since,

according to Simmel, form ruled by its laws subsumes many different contents each of which can be examined in its specific context.

Simmel's distinction and combination between form and content which includes two different point of views, can be unified in the notion of law. Since the main problem with the excommunication of the law is that it is considered as an abstraction to be followed. This is also one of the elements that causes hesitation in dealing with the future, since law-like ideas invoke the idea of a successive and compulsory path. Interestingly, deterministic and law both of which has been used in pejorative sense as an obstacle to being scientific are also rejected by the scholars dedicated to the subject of future which is itself also rejected by science. For instance, Bell and Mau (1973), two future-enthusiastic scholars, gave the reality status to the future on the base of the present possibilities, for that reason they defined deterministic models as improper for these possibilities. Yet, what takes the law out of the science and principles of causality is what the law is based on rather than its existence. For example, although Comte (2015) who was rightly criticized by Durkheim, asserted that his intention is not proceeding diversity from one single principles and single law, but rather emphasis on "the unity of method and homogeneousness of doctrine", the drawback arises from the fact that the abstractness of principle Comte placed on the law he discovered, i.e., "the progressive course of the human mind." With regard to historical law, Engels (Marx, 1852/1972), in the preface of the "18th Brumaire", draw an analogy between the "law of motion of history" discovered by Marx, and the "law of transformation of energy" of natural sciences. Thanks to this law, according to Engels, Marx could understand the history of the "Second French Republic." The difference between this law and Comte's law of three stages stems from the grounds the basic principles constructed on. Yet, if law is understood as the resultant of concrete historical relations, it becomes a product made over the unity and relationship of various things, rather than an obligation that everything must obey, contrary to what Weber (2012) asserted. Thus, the assumed relationship is reversed, that is, the law does not force the singulars to obey itself, on the contrary, the singular ones concertedly give birth to the law. If law is to be understood as something deduced from a putative abstract principle and to which all history compulsorily obeys, then Mead's (1932) "passage in emergence", Tarde's (2012) "difference is the alpha and omega of the universe", Baudrillard's (2011) "unoriginated and unreal simulation", and even central place given to the cultural significance by Weber (2012) is no less law, in this sense, than Comte's.

Whenever the question of “why” cannot be clearly answered, or is abstractly answered, there is an assumed tendency or presupposition. Yet, interestingly, it is not these approaches that are condemned as laws. When understood as pre-determined orders that must be obeyed, as a guide for all history even followed by the future generations, and as tsunami that will swallow us all, the notion of law deserves to be strongly objected. After all, if the law has understood as predetermined and something must be obeyed, there will be nothing left for human to do. It also means that those who know the past of humanity will direct the future as they wish, that is, have a kind of superpower. On the other side, when the law is understood not as presupposition or ready-made schema, but a principle or commonality to be arrived at through connections, and open to be changed in compliance with the contents of connections change, even though it is not so easy to capture, the existence of such a principle is extremely significant for temporal and futural perspective. If the contingency of human action and the ascribed meaning to the word makes the law scary, the word can be replaced by some other ones such as principle, commonality, association, collaboration, and pattern.

The emphasis on human activity to change the future also confuses the third pillar of science. The future and science face with each other in that case via the principle of objectivity that has its own history through which this principle has been reduced to the principle of neutrality just as the principle of causality was reduced to the efficient cause. Indeed, there are different kinds of objectivity which are “ontological” referring to the fit between theory and the world, “mechanical” suppressing the judgements, and “aperspectival” eliminating human tendencies. The principle of objectivity that referred to the objects in the seventeenth century has been transformed into the aperspectival objectivity. This transformation began in the eighteenth century in moral and aesthetic philosophies, and then disseminated to the natural sciences in the nineteenth century (Daston, 1992; Keller, 1994). In the field of social science, Weber welcomes us on the door opened to the objectivity, more clearly, value neutrality. To Weber (2012), social scientists select their subjects on the base of value-relevance referring to the scientific interest. However, he clearly separated the realm of social policy as the “statements of ideals” and the realm of social sciences as the “analysis of facts.” In this distinction, he insisted on that scientific freedom is possible only by informing readers about whether scientist by analysis or evaluating person by sentiments speaks, that is, he distinguished between value-judgements and empirical knowledge. As mentioned in the first chapter,

it is claim that the normative tendencies combining social analysis and diagnosis as well as merging science and politics of the founders of social sciences had faded away (Adam, 2011; Bell, 1999). This disappearance was accelerated by the fact-value distinction that paved the way for further separation between “what is” and “what should be.” Although this separation is clearly seen in Weber’s thought, Durkheim also employed this distinction (Davydova and Sharrock, 2003). In this manner, one of the sociological rules putted forward by Durkheim (1982) was the abandonment of all preconceptions and political and religious prejudices since he believed that the laws of nature are constructed on the relations between facts in reality rather than the better way of their relation. However, since we are in the realm of social and historical laws that are also the part of the nature to some extent, both the meaning of law and fact as in the all concepts qualified by the adjectives “social” and “historical” transform. As Marett (1934) indicated, “Caesar may be dust, but Caesarism is with us still”, that is, established connection between facts and indifference partly reaches an impasse.

Futurity in social science cannot be established in the atmosphere that the principles of natural science directly transferred into social sciences or completely and uncaringly rejected and distorted. While the interest towards future can be stigmatized in the case of direct transmission of these principles, their complete rejection also causes science to remain groundless. On the other hand, the future as invisible, latent, and distant, even though proposed as challenge to open a place for the future, can also exterminate the possibility of futural social sciences. Regarding this point, Bloch’s (1996) consideration on the practice of thinking as “venturing beyond” in relation with “what already exist” gives a clue to the possibility of different atmosphere suitable for the peculiarities of social sciences and the future. As Bloch indicated that the habitual way of thinking fixed on contemplation has ignored “The Not-Yet-Conscious” and “Not-Yet-Become”, thus, this world is grasped only as “a world of repetition or of the great Time-and-Again” (Bloch, 1996). In order to establish a genuine relation, as in Bloch’s venturing beyond, with the future as not inventory of expectations and images, not as prediction, but the future that is too vague to be predicted and also too salient to be ignored, the first thing must be done is to deepen and transform scientific principles in accordance with the peculiarities of social sciences. However, the door which was closed for the future on the grounds that the future did not fit into the principles, locked second time to prevent the entrance of the same future under colour of the strict application of

the same principles. This second expulsion is the reflection of scientific practices called as social engineering.

5.1.2. Social Engineering

The concern for the future as mentioned before, has twinkled in social thought through various forms each of which waves the flag of the distant future signifying that the knowledge of the past and the present can be used to shape the future of society or turns its course to the desired direction. Holders of the key, in this scenario, are the social scientists. Besides well-known relationship between social sciences and the natural sciences, connections of science in general with power provides important clue as to which doors this key was designed to open. One of the striking historical examples of this relation is an understanding and a series of applications called as social engineering.

Comte (2015), emphasizing on the progress and order and aiming to overcome the crisis of his own age defined as moral rather than political, is one of the prominent examples of social engineering. To him, revolutionary crisis arising from intellectual anarchy could not be solved by the theological and metaphysical philosophies but by the positive one maturing from “the intellectual operation begun by Bacon, Descartes and Galileo.” This pure belief in deviating form of science and the view of social scientific laws as an ointment that can be directly applied to social problems, that is, considering social scientific reason as the means of liberation and development is the trademark of the Enlightenment (Eidlin and Appelbaum, 1987). Enlightenment thinkers, besides rationally organized the space, also dedicated themselves to control the future by scientific prediction, social engineering, and rational planning (Harvey, 1997). The optimistic view about the scientific knowledge and reason, however, has got fogged especially by the disappointing historical experiences at the beginning of the twentieth century as echoed in “yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002). In a similar disappointment, Virilio (2003) lamented for the transformation of science from “truth to effectiveness, only a few centuries after having been, with Copernicus and Galileo...” to the “techno-science” relinquishing truth and objective reality.

The blind faith in scientific knowledge turning science into magic and social scientists into sorcerers becomes salient in the social engineering practices. The term, social engineering, was defined as “arranging and channeling environmental and social

forces to create a high probability that effective social action will occur” (Alexander and Schmidt, 1996), or “a set of social policies aiming at designing social changes to improve social welfare and implement new worlds” (Akhabbar and Allisson, 2021). Social engineering shining through strict words such as “arranging”, “policies”, and “implement” in these definitions, besides its attributed monstrosity, has been used as a pejorative term. Thus, any social scientific attempt to go beyond taking a picture from the surface and adopt the futural position aiming to understand the source, depth and the future of social problems has been exposed to the sharp criticisms on the grounds that it employs such practices appearing under the guise of the interest in the future. Though this inferior status can be connected with the so-called principle of neutrality, behind the loud criticisms of planning and control lies another issue since it is known that expressions such as reasonable, purposive, intentional, and planned human action have always been embraced in social sciences. In other words, the main reason behind these sharp objections is not scientific but political, that is, not directed to the existence of control and plan, but rather the form of control and plan, or who plans and controls. More clearly, the term “social engineering” has been the taboo term in America as “democratic and liberal country” and generally associated with the Nazi regime and Soviet Russia labelled as totalitarian states. In addition, considering that Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper are indomitable critics of social engineering applications (Alexander and Schmidt, 1996), the issue becomes a little more enlightened. At this point, it must be stated that this scientific understanding and social engineering practices are not advocated here, but this background should be kept in mind in order to think about social sciences’ avoidance of the future.

This hatred and humiliation on the notion of social engineering serve as the basis to the mainstream historical narrative. In this narrative, roots are generally assigned to the utopian ideals, revolutionary tendencies and the left-wing politics. Thus, readers find themselves in the revolutionary atmosphere in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, encounter with Marxism labelled as “social engineering’s great inspiration” and meet with “Lenin, Stalin and Hitler as the great social engineers” of the great totalitarian states in the twentieth century. Background of this history is strengthened with another oft-repeated story about the disappointment that indicates shift from the optimism created by the social reformers and the founders of social sciences to the scepticism about social engineers (Alexander and Schmidt, 1996; Eidlin and Appelbaum, 1987; Lucassen, 2010).

Though this story is partly correct, it is also distorted and deficient, and having some missing parts. It is true that Nazi regime employed experts including lawyers, eugenicists, social scientists to rationalize and modernize society, and even Himmler himself launched and supported some social scientific projects and programs (Klingemann, 2005), and in the Soviet Russia, there was a strong attempt to raise new science based on engineer's knowledge and methodology, and Lenin supported to the foundation of Taylor's scientific management-inspired "Central Institute for Labor" aiming to increase the productivity of labour and efficiency (Akhabbar and Allisson, 2021). Yet, the missing part of the story is about the so-called democratic societies that are not exempt for social engineering applications. Following Parson's emphasis on solidarity, for instance, scholars in America leagued together as social engineers to advise governments. In this part of the story, the leading role in changing the position and content of social sciences with regard to policy belongs to the World War II. For example, in 1939 "War and Peace Studies" was created by the "Council on Foreign Relations", and in 1950s and 1960s "Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services" ("the predecessor to the CIA") employed many well-known scholars such as "P. Baran, A. Inkeles, H. Marcuse, B. Moore, Jr., W. W. Rostow, and P. Sweezy" as well as formed the "area-studies" (Engerman, 2010). Even the brief history of the futures studies presented in the first chapter of this study, unaidedly suffices to summarize this situation. Thus, the practices called as social engineering can neither be attributed to the dusty pages of history nor to totalitarianism. These practices can reappear in any period independently of the label social engineering. For example, the mechanism used in academies of Nazi regime is also very familiar to academy today such as "consulting fees, subsidies for research and publication, political influence over academic appointments" (Klingemann, 2005); eugenics as the most radical forms of social engineering clearly fitted in modernization projects and progressivist language (Lucassen, 2010), and the area studies humiliated as "Cold War scholarship" was spearheaded by Rockefeller Foundation with later supported by the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation (Engerman, 2010). Blessedly, social sciences found the solution to get rid of this label without giving up plan and intervention to the future and policy by invention the term "sociotechnics."

The term sociotechnics that is defined as "just and rational social changes in democratic and liberal societies" was coined to substitute for social engineering. The reason behind the invention of sociotechnics was the negative connotations of social

engineering as manipulation, exploitation, and control (Podgorecki, 1996). From this base, discipline of sociotechnics as modern study of social engineering began around World War II. Emerging as reaction to the tendency making social sciences irrelevant to political action and social life, its basic aim is defined as “to help unmask governmental social engineering stratagems” or as indicated in some other texts “to unmask communist regime’s social engineering stratagems” as an alternative to top-down social engineering tradition (Alexander and Schmidt, 1996; Hogsbro et al., 2009). This term was formed on the base of Popper’s distinction between “utopian social engineering” and “piecemeal social engineering” or more clearly between “the vision of ideal society leading disastrous consequences and cautious” and “reversible reforms” (Hogsbro et al., 2009; Podgorecki, 1996). Inspired by Popper’s distinction, Podgorecki (1996) as the leading figure in the sociotechnics, distinguished four types of social engineering that are “sociotechnics proper”, “self-made social engineering”, “quackish social engineering” and “dark social engineering.”³⁶ Historically, according to Podgorecki, totalitarian states applied dark sociotechnics while sociotechnics proper inspired by Popper does not obtain enough value even in democratic societies.

This brief story tells something about the future. As indicated above, human, throughout its history, has employed some methods to make living conditions better. These methods and endeavors, in some cases, applied by power and targeted to manipulate, control and directed people. It is also well known that these methods sometimes have created awful results in people’s life, thus social sciences (as in natural sciences) as part of this awful applications deserve to be harshly criticized and scrutinized. However, connecting the term social engineering only with some leftist ideas and tendencies, and putting in the same basket with fascism, whisper to the social scientists something about the futurity. This understanding means that social scientists can deal with politics, analyze past and present conditions to predict the future, advise governments, but only do in a certain way. Otherwise, social scientists take a risk to be stigmatized as puppet, militant, and social engineer. Social engineer, like the futurologist, stands by to be used as derogatory term in the volatile attitude of social sciences towards future. In this understanding, social sciences are too “scientific” to deal with the future

³⁶The first one formulates teleological understanding based on verified theses; the second one presupposes verified knowledge; the quackish social engineering is close to the practical recommendations rather than theory as in the practice of scientific Marxism, and the dark one refers to the sociotechnics proper or the self-made social engineering to produce harm as in Nazi regime, Lenin and Stalin (Podgorecki, 1996).

but “scientific” is too strict for social sciences. Thus, social engineering and policy-related tendencies are interpreted as “academic perversion” (Murphy, 1981) or scholars connected science with the desire for “good society” are labelled as “a naive utopian” (Eidlin and Appelbaum, 1987). Regarding this, Hogsbro et al. (2009) asserted that the reason behind the underdevelopment of applied branches stems from the association of the sociology with left wing politics. Thus, according to authors, sociologists should attempt to gain scientific respectability rather than applying sociological knowledge. In a similar vein, Turner (2001) indicated that sociologists generally oppose to the engineering since it evokes “Orwellian view of overregulation and control, Nazi-like experiments and repressive social arrangements” which make sociologists anti-science, relativist and the opponents of laws. This negative connotation of social engineering is also related with its technical reliance as Virilio’s (2003) abovementioned techno-science. It is also indicated that this technical-based understanding transforming political issues to the technical ones creates the political atmosphere in which only those who can hire experts have voices and others falls into the political apathy. This apathy has been fed by the general view that sees politics as “dirty word” and reduced politics to the passive participation. This means that people “prefer the antiseptic report of the expert to the dirty backroom dealing of narrow, partisan interests” (Appelbaum, 1977; Eidlin and Appelbaum, 1987). As opposed to degrading attitude, Urry (2016) insisted on that the problems people face with entails to summon planning, but under different names due to ideologically inflected meaning of plan. Similarly, Toffler (1970) invited planning under the name of “social futurism” that was defined as opponent to the technocratic planning based on “econocentric” Marxist and Keynesian understanding.

Though the social engineering practices deserve a longer discussion, it is briefly mentioned here to shed light on the reasons for the exclusion of the future from social sciences. However, it should be noted in the first place that reading only one aspect of science or any human action in general precisely led to miss the essence of the matter. Science has questioned existing assumptions and opposed to the power as much as it has been shaped in relation with the power. Moreover, tendencies called as “dark” in social engineering practices do not make science lesser, worse, or inferior science. As Klingemann (2005) indicated that “sociology in a dictatorial regime is not necessarily pseudo-sociology. It is rather the side of the discipline’s Janus-face which is turned to power.” Similarly, dealing with the future does not make science lesser or inferior science

as well as not assign science a saviour role. But it is certain that attitude shift can transform the meaning of science. In summary, discussions made in these two subtitles have drawn a strange picture of two different ways of dealing with the future which are paradoxically both unscientific and strictly scientific. From this point of view, it is possible to say that factuality, causality and objectivity in their current meanings make difficult to establish a profound relationship not only with the future but also with the current age. This entails to question these principles in keeping with the subjects and concerns of social sciences without total rejection. Moreover, social engineering practices stigmatized as the dark side of the science are still science, but not a whole of science. Thus, any endeavour to deal with the future as well as any criticism on the future should take into consideration this point in order to make the future scientific, and science futural. Additionally, it is extremely clear that these principles need to be discussed, questioned and deepened instead of removing or diluting, thus reversion of the arrow of causality or rejection of factuality means to steal the content of both the future and science. However, instead of deepening and scrutinizing these principles, some social scientists create autonomous and immune fields for the future that is not accessed and contaminated by the scientific principles. To understand this escape, it is necessary to visit these fields that can be briefly called as novelty, and as images.

5.2. Social Science and the Future: Obedience and Struggle

In the face of the situation that the generally accepted position of the future does not meet the criteria of science, the attitude of social science towards the future is either to exclude the future from analysis as much as possible, or to transform it into forms that are assumed to be suitable for science by means of various tendencies that have been mentioned many times before. Additionally, it is also attempted to pull the future closer with emphasis on its processuality and latency that is hidden in the present and waiting to be revealed in order to claim rights in the field of science. In other words, social science has sought various formulas for legitimate base in order to talk about the future that cannot be easily fit into the principles of science and to carry the future beyond planning. These endeavours seeking a legitimate base for the future, however, have made the mistake of either completely rejecting the principles, or submitting to the given definitions and frameworks in the face of the principles on which science is based. Yet, to take into account of the alteration in the meaning of these principles in the realm of

social, is significant for putting in a claim for right. Moreover, the relatively changing content of the principles in the field of social does not make them less valuable. The efforts to incorporate the future into science by emphasis on latency and potentiality, despite imperfect and contestable, has deserved to be celebrated to some extent because claim for the future in science is not an easy task, that is, in every claim about the future, it is possible to be accused of being unscientific, teleological, politician, social engineer, or of creating schemas and making up laws. On the other side, in the face of this risky situation, new fields are created to take shelter in order to interest in the future without disturbing the principles of science and without touching the existing. In the new areas that have been created instead of fighting against confirmed preconceptions of social science, the future sheltering in latency against factuality, teleology against efficient cause, normativity against objectivity moves back from the claims in scientific principles. The withdrawal towards these areas can also be thought of as social science's questioning its own roots against the understanding of science that goes hand in hand with notions such as progress and continuity. In this respect, the future which made a defective room for itself in the principle of causality by backward causation and teleological explanations, completely dissolves all existing connections to become absolutely new, unexpected, and surprise. Similarly, the struggle for the necessity of different kind of factuality is soothed through the allocation of the future to the realm of images, dreams and ideals. A brief look at these trends may provide important clues to think about social science and the future.

5.2.1 Novel/Abrupt/Surprising/Unexpected

The future, besides the distant point following the never-ending and ambiguous present, also implies to change as the inherent feature of the social as well as difference from what is existing. This change and difference that can be both constructive or destructive exhibit themselves in the theories of social change, narrative of modernization, concern for the potential risks, and unintended consequences of individual and collective actions. In short, change requires that what is revealed must be different in varying degrees from what is existing. Although assuming change and difference implicitly and indirectly involves a concern for the future, the future nevertheless calls for prudence because of its ambivalent relationship to science. In addition, change and difference reveal themselves in the efforts to control or direct the course of events as in

the social engineering, and sometimes in the feeling that the future is waiting at the door with the emphasis on processuality or latency that shows the imminence and continuity of change. It is important that both perspectives try to establish a link between science and the future, albeit have controversial aspects. However, it should be added that they undertake a very painful and difficult task, i.e., inclusion of the future into the field of science. Thus, one of the ways to get rid of this difficult task in order to conveniently talk about the future is to create isolated fields that are completely free and immune from the scientific principles instead of discussing or deepening the principles of science. One of the most fertile grounds for such a field is to consider the future in terms of new, unexpected, abrupt and surprise by stretching the boundaries of the familiar affinity between change and the future to the end point. In that case, it is not even possible to speak of a break, for either the new is continuous or is too new to have any connection with the old even through breaking. When the future is perceived in this way, either none of the forms of speech we already have can be proper for something completely new and unexpected, or the existence of such a new must be compulsorily accepted. Thus, change, time, social and the future all of which cannot be captured without new, become totally uncaptured in the case of absolute, continuous and surprising new, since the degree and content of the new directly affect the possibility of a temporal and futural perspective, as in other subjects such as fact, change and objectivity.

A future that is cropping up, never expected, surprising, and astonishing, and having no connection with anything familiar. Good or bad, although the new and surprise generally leave an optimistic imprint. A future that is a continuous creation, a ceaseless revelation, a stranger waiting to enter through an open door at any moment. A future that has nothing to do with what is past and present, with expectations, plans, and hope. Even though it is indisputable that such a vision of the future and the new is exciting, aside from the question of how it can make room for itself in the social, the important problem arose from this vision is which historical and social situation or event can correspond to surprise, suddenness, break or rupture. In this respect, it has become a habit in social sciences prevailing into all subject matters that any demand for change, as seen in the discussion on the manifestos, immediately brings to mind rupture, total rejection of the past, and absolute new. This can also be construed as the reflection of the division of time into two opposing parts that one is static and homogenous, and the other is dynamic and heterogeneous, on the future as rupture, unexpectedness and abruptness. The Greek

distinction between chronos and kairos, as mentioned in the second chapter, implying two different kinds of time, lies at the roots of this dual conception, one is stiff and the other is fluid. In this distinction, chronos refers to the succession and measure, and belongs to the science and logic while kairos signifies beginnings and ends, apocalypse, redemption, opportunity and life. The name of Kairos as the youngest son of Zeus is close to “kainos” implying new, fresh and novel, and kainos connects with “kinein” that means to move. In addition, it is also indicated that only Chronos of this twin terms continue to survive in various languages while Kairos remained in classical Greek (Jaques, 1990). Thus, there remains, on the one hand, an alien new, and on the other, an unchangeable and measurable uniformity with no beginning and no end. Besides, contrary to the claim on disappearance of Kairos in language, whenever thought needs to define something different from what is existing, philosophy and social science have frequently conjured up Kairos under the different names.

Bergson (1944), mentioned in the first chapter as the one of the sources of the constitutive approaches in social science, welcomes us on the way to the vision of continuous renewal. This philosophy rested on two different time, is characterized by an emphasis on endless creation, new and unforeseen. Thus, radical mechanism and radical finalism, according to Bergson, are skeptical about the unforeseeable new and endless creation due to the pre-given reality in the first and the prearranged program in the latter one. This vision Bergson presented was criticized by Gurvitch (1964) on the grounds that even though Bergson paid attention to the different densities of duration and degrees of qualitative time, he did not capture the multiplicity of time due to the lack of dialectical understanding, and also was a victim of his continuity through which nothing begins and ends. Thus, Gurvitch blamed Bergson of creating a “living eternity” in his struggle to dethrone eternity. Similarly, Bloch (1996) also criticized the new of Bergson that was labelled by him as “pseudo-Novum” because of the fact that it has not “possibility” and “finality” as the essential qualities of the Novum as well as being trapped in “rigidity of surprise.” The underlying cause of this, according to Bloch, is that Bergson developed his philosophy under the “capitalistic fashion-novelty” and late bourgeoisie.

The importance of Bergson’s philosophy in terms of the main question of the study stems from its impacts on the future and time in social sciences. This impact, as mentioned in the first chapter, leads to the loss of the new in continuous innovation, and give no other choice than just saying that everything is in constant renewal. In this respect,

it is possible to claim that Simmel has put forward an idea that can be considered as the twin of Bergson's thoughts in social sciences in some aspects. In Simmel's (1971d) thought, just as Bergson's (1944) "elan vital" that encounters with matter in its evolution dispersing various directions, life (or vital movement) of which essence is transcendence, is surrounded by forms, but it still overflows from these forms because its essence is transcendence. Thus, according to Simmel, "life is simultaneously flux and form... life opposes to form." The relation between life and form reveals itself, according to Simmel, in cultural change that is resultant of the conflict between life and formal rigidity of culture; in the opposition between fluidity of life and individuality as form, e.g., geniuses with few or no offspring; and also, in the decline of women's fertility during the emancipation periods. Aside from the inconsistency of presupposition of the transcendence of life with the temporal and futural framework proposed in this study, the problem it creates in terms of the new is that the capacity of transcendent life to produce an infinite number of forms. Since Simmel's understanding, albeit its profundity as mentioned before, employed an abstract principle, i.e., transcendence, life can constantly surprise us with the forms it will create and overflow. In this case, since we cannot know what the next form will be; why that form has emerged and not another, and how these forms contacts with each other, what is left for us is only the surprise character of the forms and a strange novelty created through forms. Similarly, as mentioned before, Mead's (1932) new characterized by ceaseless emergence and disappearance, is also highly dazzling, since the emergent stops being emergent as soon as it appears as an emergent, that is, it disappears before we notice it. In that case, Simmel's surprise through forms gives its place to unceasing genesis and absolute new by the help of explosive emergent before we can touch it. Moreover, emergent does not even allow us to experience the excitement of waiting for the unexpected and surprise.

Social divided into content and form by Simmel, and explained through emergence and disappearance by Mead, has both static and dynamic, continuous and discontinuous aspects. It is difficult to fully capture these aspects by dividing time and future into parts that makes impossible to reveal neither the new within the ossified nor the new as ossified. The future should be viewed as both planned and unexpected at least in the realm of social science to capture the subject matters. Otherwise, it means that institutional structures, traditions, and other molar types, all of which are fluid and new in their own right, can only be considered through measured, quantitative, planned, and

calculated time and future without any connection with the new, everyday life, social uprisings, and daily interactions. Such a social science may flourishingly deal with time and the future by means of various invented concepts, but without a futural and temporal understanding. The interest in the new in the face of the difficulties and rigidity of life is understandable since the notion of new is crucial to contemplate on and create a life that is different from the existing one. Moreover, social life is constantly changing. The problem is, however, to perceive the new in a state of continuous flow and absoluteness. If novelty is considered constant and absolute, it becomes impossible to catch, notice and talk about. This impossibility not only stems from the abundance of the new arising at every moment and from everywhere, but also necessity of familiarity and connection with our ways of knowing and thinking about the new. With regard to novel, Nietzsche (1888-89/1968) opens up an interesting space that there is no “eternal novelty” the world has, thus he claimed that the idea of goal-oriented world that deliberately protects itself from the repetition of old forms could be castigated. Rather, according to him, the world is defined as definite quantity and centres of force passing through certain number of combinations each of which is realized an infinite number of times. This vision of the world and life repeated itself is the world of “Zarathustra” (Nietzsche, 1883-85/2006) in which there is no accidents³⁷, no causality³⁸, no purpose³⁹, no opposition, but only the merge of peak and abyss, deepest and highest, and of the beginning and the end as in the “consummated death.” Thus, the rejection of eternal novelty does not mean to remain same, but to undertake the novel. Regarding this point, Deleuze (2005) warns readers about that the eternal return does not imply the returning of the same but selection, creation, destruction as well as production. It is already obvious that the eternal return is not the repetition of the same. However, even though the eternal return appears to be a different way of thinking about the new and breaks the idea of absolute novelty, it is blocked at the more or less similar point with Bergson’s adherence to the ceaseless new. Both have a vision of a constantly shivering, shaking, ever-moving world and life, and it is clear that this is extremely exciting vision. But in terms of relationship with the future,

³⁷“The time has passed in which accidents could still befall me, and what could fall to me now that is not already my own? I am standing now before my last peak and before what has been saved for me for the longest time” (Nietzsche, 2006).

³⁸“Let the future and the farthest be the cause of your today; in your friend you shall love the overman as your cause” (Nietzsche, 2006).

³⁹“By chance”- that is the oldest nobility in the world, I gave it back to all things, I redeemed them from their servitude under purpose” (Nietzsche, 2006).

both seem like the version of each other's upside down. At this point, it must be stated that this criticism is not about transferability of these visions to the language of social science or applicability to social life, anyway this will be unfair as well as ridiculous. The problem here stems from the contradiction in the vision of shaking or flowing world within itself. In Bergson, newness seems to exterminate itself by the eternality of impetus, and in Nietzsche though the path has no purpose, the purpose seems to have its own path. The objection with regards to the comment on Bergson may be raised on the grounds that *élan vital* is not a kind of first cause but a move. However, a move that is naturally in motion, always there, as Bloch (1996) meaningfully commented on Bergson that "the Novum as a whole in Bergson...contentless declaration of *élan vital* in and for itself." In this framework, Bloch indicated that *élan vital* never encounter with the new in its continuum in which everything is new and pre-arranged. This devaluation of the new stems from the fact that, according to Bloch, it does not possess "possibility" and "finality" as the essential qualities of the Novum. When come to Nietzsche, the future face with a dead end again, though Deleuze (2005) tried to persuade readers on which repetition in the idea of eternal return is not generality, resemblances, and equivalences, but, as the opponents of reminiscence and habitus, makes something new as the thought of the future and going beyond good and evil. Then, what throws this reminiscence and habitus out of repetition? One can think that they also can be the part of repetition and the new despite their immaturity or inadequacy. Because eternal return implying merging of opposites to some extent, it should not be determined which form can be embraced, thus habitus and reminiscence should also be welcomed within this return. Otherwise, as mentioned above, the path becomes the purpose of the end. In addition, if we consider return as in the gateway having two paths coming together at the moment which "draws after it all things to come? Therefore – itself as well" (Nietzsche, 2006), these two paths must touch to each other at least at two separate moments to create a wheel, in fact intertwined circles. This evokes what Derrida (1994) implies with the question of "whither" which both turns toward and comes from the future as experience of the past as to come. However, though future and past are not connected in linearity but future becomes past and past becomes future both in Derrida and Nietzsche, the problem stems from this eternally continuation and openness of the return as in Derrida's promise. Therefore, Bloch's (1996) criticism on Bergson by means of possibility and finality can be repeated for Nietzsche as well. "...regarding finality simply as the establishing of a

rigid final goal, rather than as the goal-determination of the human will, which first seeks precisely its “Where To” and “What For”, in the open possibilities of the future.” In other words, the future has openness not for the self-fulfilling purpose of the world, but in the sense that people can create something through their actions different from what is existing. This comment may be objected on the grounds that “overman” is a kind of Bloch’s “Where To.” It may be “where to” but only in plural form recurring, and consequently exterminating itself.

Then, what can be the novel, the unexpected, and surprising? Apart from the issue of reducing the future to the absolutely new, the unexpected, the rupture, leaving other fields of thought aside, what does all these mean for social science? The task is not to give strict definition of such a new since in any case the absolute new must be totally unknown and unfamiliar that cannot be captured by all the ways of knowledge and language. It is something that can only be talked about after it happens, gets old, when the excitement of surprise fades, and the unexpected becomes familiar. All these aside, why do we think about future through concepts such as ecstasy, surprise, and rupture? Maybe the future is too strict and stack to be recognized and noticed like standing in front of a huge mountain, or maybe the past and the present is more surprising than the future. What is the surprise, anyway? The unexpected coming, and knocking on the door? So, who or what can knock on the door of society or social? A natural disaster, an earthquake, let’s say an unexpected earthquake (although it is also calculated in a certain extent), can we reduce the future to exactly this earthquake because it is not expected? Thus, surprise and absolute new lost their meaning a little bit in the frame of social science. Social also flows, constantly changes, brings the new, but its own pace and in its own way without the need of any kind of mystification.

Far from being absolute, increase in the emphasis on new and definition of what is new are historical. As regards to this, Bloch (1995) pointed out the shift from forward dreaming of the Greek, and the images of distant islands in the pagan cultures to search for something totally new in the Rome. In this story about the emergence of the new, according to Bloch, Jesus “leaping to the new earth” represents the important break by which concern for restoration of this world was transformed into the dreams about the other world. In a similar vein, Eliade (1994), though warn readers that his book is not about the Greek myth or Nietzsche’s concept, gave important clues on thinking about the regeneration through repetition in religious rituals and ideologies of the archaic and

traditional societies. Each creation in these rituals repeats the creation of the world, and the time of each ritual coincides with the mythical time. This means that while “archaic humanity” defends itself against irreversibility and innovation, according to Eliade, the “modern historical humanity” has given weight to historical events, and novelty. The emphasis on the new which became evident especially when the French Revolution changed the meaning of the revolution to “going forward” (Luhmann, 1976) has been crystallized by the fact that social sciences were fascinated by the acceleration and instantaneity in social life (Virilio, 2003). In addition, it is possible to claim that the emphasis on the new has become stronger when social sciences question some notions such as progress and continuity, and cut off its own roots as if to start a new life naked without leaving anything behind. This is the world of emphases such as incredulity toward metanarratives” (Lyotard, 1984), “events that lose their meaning as soon as they appear” (Baudrillard, 2011) “transience and novelty as basic characters of new society” (Toffler, 1970). This new is not only dazzling, it is also a dangerous one. It is dangerous because in fact it is extremely tamed, since it is a new that has no real connection with the present, a new that should never happen and always remains new. It is like Derrida’s (1994) “future-to-come” as an openness never closed, a demand never met, a promise never fulfilled, has no connection with time, even it is not contrasted with the future in the ordinary sense. This openness is for entering of justice which should not enter into this openness to remain as justice, according to Derrida, connected with “a spectral moment” that is no connection with presence and time as “modalized presents.” This door which always remains open evokes the idea of being imprisoned in an eternal now, a present that lingers in anticipation and expectancy. Here is an absolute and constant, surprising, unexpected, and unfamiliar new that causes the future to always remain the future. It also creates a sense of continuity, but it is a boring, never-ending, infinitely diverging continuum, and such a continuity can only be disconnected, hence timeless and futureless. This is the companion of the constantly flowing new, and both of which does not allow to connect and think. Simmel (1971e) indicated that what is continuous and objective, even if it is sudden and new, cannot be fashionable that entails to disappear as soon appear. This accentuation requires to rethink the emphasis on discontinuity and rupture for temporality as against to continuity. In fact, continuity is a description of a situation or a form of association, thus what makes it temporal and futural, is the its connection with objectivity. Thus, the only continuity that can allow to contact with the new is the

one that arouse from connections established without assuming an unclosed door, transcendence, and constant emergence. Also, Simmel (1971e) related the emphasis on change and fashion with the emphasis on the present. With more or less similar accent, Habermas also defined the distinctiveness of modern as new that can be captured in the tendency of avant-garde to the “danger of sudden, ephemeral, and the cult of the new”, but, according to Habermas, modern still continue to preserve its secret tie with the classical (Habermas and Ben-Habib, 1981). When the new is understood in this manner, even if it is associated with continuity and transience, continuity ceases to be dizzying and comes to a ground that can be talked about. In addition, as mentioned above, although the new and the surprising are generally associated with the good and better, the new can also be evil. Concerning this point, Benjamin (1939/2002) defined newness as “quality independent of the use value of the commodity.” Since this quality connects the new with false consciousness, fashion, phantasmagoria, and bourgeoisie, according to Benjamin, art dedicated to make new continuous. This kind of art dedicated itself to the new can be exemplified in futuristic designs. For instance, comparing two cars design made of same materials, Iparraguirre (2019) defined novel as “the future seen for the first moment”, since the car labeled as futuristic is the one having the unknown forms. As such, the new leaves behind pure, unrecognizable and unexpected character. Thus, even if the new is intense break, this break signify connection that is important for temporal and futural stance. Regarding rupture and beginning, da Silva and Viera (2020) complain about that sociology does not open up enough space for beginnings as the discontinuity between the past and the future. What they mean by beginning is “radically contingent event, a rupture as against process”, not a beginning as a first point but a completely separate moment. Yet, to capture such a discontinuity, break, and pure beginning in the field of social science, we must jump out at another line, otherwise this purity may be contaminated by the continuum of events. An entirely separate moment, however, cannot go beyond praising the glamorousness of this moment, if only we can find words to express it in language and thought. For certain, this does not mean that language, thought, and the way of speaking of social sciences are unchangeable. Yet, this change can take place precisely in connection with the new, and in that way perhaps even become quite different. From this point of view, the search for and the ways to define the new becomes connected with the relationship established between people and their ages and the world they have lived in as well as the future, thus the new becomes historical and futural rather than absolute.

Moreover, the search for the new becomes barren when it shelters in the ever-flowing and ever-shining new. Capturing the novel entails to know both how and according to what it acquires this newness, since new or novel is not just a name but quality and difference that require the ability to relate to the current and past ages. “Capitalist private property as the first negation of individual property as founded on the labour of the proprietor”, for instance, is no less novel than Mead’s (1932) notion of emergence or ceaseless creation of Bergson (1944), since “capitalist production begets... its own negation. It is the negation of negation...not re-establish private property for the producer, but...property based on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production” (Marx, 2010). In this case, a new is a new that is grasped in process without being reduced to fleeting moments. This new is both new and familiar. Only such a new one can be the new in the field of social sciences, and to think of the new as such is not less exciting and more monotonous than the other.

At this point, it can be considered that since the new is always perceived in relation to the future, the quality of the new is lost in continuity as well as the diversity and contingency of the world does not conform to the temporality based on the idea of connections propounded in this study. Since the main subject of the study is the problem of the perspective of social sciences over time and the future, it should be said that the condition of looking without leaving diversity and contingency aside is only possible with such a connection. Just to describe the situation without considering the new mean that the description of the situation is incomplete, and to rely only on the idea of a permanent renewal brings along the fact that there is only renewal, but not being able to see what this new is. Moreover, the idea of connections, far from rejecting that the certain periods, events, and moments in the history create significant breaks, also opens up space to understand the value of these breaks and what they broke. Therefore, at this juncture, the issue comes back to temporality revealed by establishing connections and futural stance for a deeper understanding of the field targeted by temporality. At this point, it is necessary to return to Durkheim whose name has been mentioned many times in the study. Durkheim (1982), placed the notion of “social species” between varieties of societies and ideal concept of humanity in order to embrace simultaneously unity and diversity of societies. Although Durkheim’s understanding of history has some controversial aspects and is relatively closed to the futural view, as indicated before, his effort to bring diversity and similarity together opens up an important field to think about

connection without collapsing diversity. To seek answers in Durkheim also means that to look back at an old in order to find new of social science. This old one is that has been accused of creating a timeless society, despite his contribution to the introduction of time into social science. The new can be such, something that is hidden in the existing and requires looking again in order to see it. To consider on what the current age, which is shaken with instantaneity, flexibility and uncertainty, can give us as new entails moving away from a constantly flowing and dangerous new-creative gaze. The danger of this constant newness lies not only in the political, cultural, and economical problems it creates but also in that it distorts the perspective of the social sciences. Therefore, widening the rapids with connections is important in terms of understanding what is genuine new as it will distance the gaze. Looking into the present by searching for the new, presents a point where a temporal and futural stances can meet.

5.2.2. Images/ Intentions/Ideals

Throughout its history, human has concerned for and interested in the future in various ways. This means that before and during realizing, performing, and acting, human always imagines, designs, plans, wishes, and desires all of which open significant field for social science to think about the future. Therefore, ascribing an independent entity to images as if human lives in the castles in the sky, or total ignorance of images and ideals are equally controversial, since before, after and during imagination, people and society create and are created, as can be clearly seen in the famous and frequently cited comparison between architect and bee that the product of the former must be imagined before it becomes reality (Marx, 2010), or in the emphasis that society must periodically create an ideal as part of reality to recreate itself (Durkheim, 1995). However, just as the idea of novelty in constant flux, the second tendency invented to overcome the inability of future to connect with the principle of factuality, the future, or what is related to the future is completely assigned to the fields of images, ideals, and intentions. In this way, the search and claim for the new kind of factuality for the future disappear, as discussed above, since the exclusion of the future is reconfirmed when the future shelters in the safe field of images and ideals that science can never completely occupy. This second tendency hiding behind images is based on the conception that the present is related with choice and action, the past with facts, and the future with possibilities (Bell, 1999). Regarding this point, Adam (2008b) indicated that since the future is conceptualized in

the conventional understanding as “empty” and “open” filled with dreams, plans, and desires, to know this future entails to know these dreams, plans and desires. Within this scope, this second tendency has been shaped through analysis of and comparison between the utopias and science fictions as well as the images of the future.

Since the expectations and images of people and society are in relationship with the historical and social conditions they arose from, they are one of the important data for social sciences. Yet, to interpret entire history only through these expectations and images brings some predicaments. Polak (1973), prominent representative of such an understanding, evaluated the rise and fall of cultures with regard to the “images of the future” on the belief that people are simultaneously citizens of present and imagined world thanks to their mental capacity. Adopting an attitude in favour of idealism, Polak also asserted that driving forces of history are ideals, values, and norms rather than production and industry. Thus, once images having such a power, according to Polak, they become “time-bombs” that would explode somewhere in the future, for instance, the “Kingdom of God” as fundamental expectation in the Middle Ages has served both for religious ideas as well as for antireligious humanist and socialist images. In addition, these images can not only reach to distant future as in eschatological images but also idealize the past as in the “biblical paradise” or “unspoiled beginnings.” In this sense, Polak’s images of the future seem to behave, interact with, talk to, nourish and destroy each other as if they were independent entities. Other similar concepts with the images of the future are Laswell’s “developmental constructs” that depict the end points of social change (Bell and Mau, 1973), and “social imaginaries” that are defined as the “sets of symbolic representations on ways of thinking and acting of a social group in its daily life” (Iparraguirre, 2019). In a similar vein, Appadurai (2013) also emphasized on the role of imagination in the production of locality. To him, local emerges not only through customs and history but also imagination. In addition, images of the future can also take the form of images of the past reappearing under the guise of images of the future. The effect of images and ideals on the definitions of situations was also claimed by Merton (1948) inspired by W.I. Thomas’ theorem that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” Moving from this theorem, Merton defined the “self-fulfilling prophecy” as “a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true.” This means that people reacted not only to objective situation, but also primarily to meaning of this situation as clearly seen,

according to Merton, in the exclusion of black people from unions due to the prejudices of white Americans. With similar emphasis, Bell (1999), furnishing reference to Merton's "self-fulfilling prophecy" and Henshel's concept of "self-altering prophecy", complained about forgetting of such ideas in contemporary sociology on the grounds that theory cannot be full-fledged without such concepts.

As discussed at the beginning of the study, one of the most prominent tendencies to address to the future is the analysis of future-related genres. Thus, it is possible to find plenty of studies giving reference to these genres, for instance, the loss of interest in the future as resultant of the replacement of political utopias with technological ones (Goode and Godhe, 2017), the potential of utopias for sustainable development (Hedrén and Linnér, 2009), the role of science fiction in shaping our present (Jameson, 1982) and the possible contributions of science fiction to futurology (Bainbridge, 2003). Even though it is convenient to consider these genres in relation to the historical conditions in which they arose, in order to reach futural and temporal connections, caution should be exercised when analyzing and relating these genres as they offer an indirect expression of the present. Related to this, Jameson (2005) asserted that utopia, like trace which simultaneously belongs to past and present, maintains dual-life but at the other extreme, which belongs to future and present. The problem of utopia, which allows to establish connections by reaching simultaneously present and future from the window of Jameson, is that it does not fully belong to either from the different angle, thus it is difficult to capture to what extent the content of utopia depicted the present due to fiction it contains. At this point, it can be given ear to Schutz (2018) who distinguished conduct as "overt" (doing) and "covert" (thinking), and defined the covert action in which the intention is lack as "phantasm", and in other case as "purposive action" or "performance." On this base, Schutz also differentiated fancy from projecting that gives reference to the stock of knowledge at hand, since one can "fancy to be superman... in optative mode" while projecting implies not to optative but to potential. Inspired by Schutz's distinction, it can be asserted that since utopia is always in danger of being lost in this fancy at any moment, it is necessary to distinguish how much fancy and potential any utopia includes, and more importantly, what can be labelled as fancy or potential in an era. More or less similar emphasis with Schutz, Simmel (1971d) also distinguished between "mere wish" targeting to distant future, and "actual will" staying out the contrast between present and the future. Addedly, Durkheim (1995) suggested that ideal society is not an empirical fact, thus

conflict is not between ideal and real, but between different ideals. All these distinctions between fancy and real warn about deceptiveness of images, ideals and dreams. As clearly seen in the new form of production infiltrating by the old ones that serves as “wish images” to people to refrain themselves from the past and immature conditions they live in, images could be deflected (Benjamin, 2002). These images besides being deflected can also hide deeper meanings as in the “castles, palaces, cathedrals, fortresses” hiding the greatness and the strength of the people who built them and against whom they were built (Lefebvre, 1991). Relatedly, Baudrillard (2011) reminded the welcoming ceremony of the mummy of Ramses at the “Orly Airport” in order to explain the need to revitalize past in linear culture which only conceive its end through a visible past that reassures people about their end. Thus, according to Baudrillard, history, science and museum serves to revive the previous cultures that are left to decay by scientific methods. One more comment showing deceptiveness of hasty analysis on images and ideals comes from Jameson (1982) who inverted the conventional picture of the science-fiction from future-depicted genre to the demonstrator of “our incapacity to imagine the future.” For this reason, in order to arrive the present and the future taking place in the present to look into images and ideals amounts to take a risk of misapprehension. Yet, it should also be reiterated that ignoring these images as well as the future tendency of human, and considering them unscientific would also lead to similar result. In addition, even though the images and ideals are fed by social conditions, they can be misleading, that is, the content of the images can reflect the belief in the possibility to transcend existing conditions as well as they can disguise in extremely hopeful content as a way to escape the despair of this world. Moreover, the ways to reach these images can be people’s expressions or works they make, but in this case, what is told about images may present a distorted picture of real conditions. Relatedly, Bourdieu (2000) indicated that future expectations and plans are closely related with the objective conditions as a reflection of various forms of capital and present power relations. This broken link results in both individual and collective level. In order to make clearer this point, Bourdieu gave an example about the category of “subproletarians” that dreams about “establishing a facility in the Far East even though they have no money” since they have no practical strategies referring to forthcoming. As for the collective level, since this broken link creates the disengagement on realizable possibilities, people can adopt some millenarian hopes rather than the reformist and revolutionary tendencies. This vicious circle, according to

Bourdieu, can be broken by means of the relative autonomy of symbolic power that can open a space for political action through utopias, projects, and programmes. Even though in this comment Bourdieu traps into the symbolic power, this analysis reminds that moving from images, ideals or plans can be misleading. This connection between the subjective and the objective established by Bourdieu evokes that since images and ideals can freely ride through the sky, they should be cautiously incorporated into analysis in parallel with objective conditions. This also reminds Marx and Engels (1998) criticism on the “Young Hegelians” on the grounds that they consider conceptions and ideals as independent existence and “real chains of men”, and fight only against these illusions of consciousness. On this base, the authors contrasted their philosophy with the German philosophy as “descends from heaven to earth, here is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven” and continued:

...not of setting out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process... Morality, religion, metaphysics... have no history, no development; but men. It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness (Marx and Engels, 1998: 42).

This very famous and often quoted passage can guide to think about the place to be given to images in establishing a relationship between social science and the future. This does not mean that images, ideals, or future-related genres should be expelled from social science, on the contrary, it is important to include them in the analysis since the temporality and futurity can increase as the connections expands. Yet, these abstractions should not be treated as initial point or determining factor of analysis. In respect thereof, Marcuse (1970) asserted that utopia indicates impossibility in two senses. One of them is the deficiency of social situations, and second one means contradiction to the existing scientific laws such as return to the golden age. According to Marcuse, it is possible to label the second one as utopia since only this kind of projects are ahistorical, but even this ahistorical character has limits. The first one, on the other hand, provisionally impossible with regard to social conditions. Bloch (1996), also indicated two meanings of utopia that one is abstract used generally as debasing sense, and the other one is concrete. On this base, he also distinguished, roughly similar with Schutz’s phantasm and performance, and Simmel’s wish and will, between “atavistic premonition” and “productive premonition”, corresponding to “abstract utopia” and “concrete utopia”.

According to this distinction, the concrete utopia tends toward “Not-Yet-Consciousness” and anticipates the “Real-Possible”, while the former turns around fantasizing and “Empty-Possible.” Since the concrete utopia, according to Bloch, is accompanied by process, it entails not contemplation but “cooperative process attitude” genuinely embracing the “Novum.” This distinction, which Bloch established as abstract and concrete utopia implying two different perspectives that one of which is related to the empty-possible and the other to the real-possible, expresses, albeit by different terms, the emphasis on to look into the present via the future. It means that abstract can become meaningful data only when understood through connections, and even it can be extremely significant. Related to this issue, Durkheim (1982) indicated that moving from idea in order to arrive things cannot be appropriate means, but from past and present. Yet, Durkheim putted this proposition not to state that ideals cannot be included in the analysis, but to emphasize the problematic aspects of starting from a hypothetical principle like Comte. Ideas shaping behaviour of people were also invited to science as ideal type by Weber (2012) since these ideas empirically exist in people’s mind. Yet, Weber’s ideal types are themselves are ideal on the grounds that they are, according to Weber, “not hypothesis, not a description of reality, an idea of the historically given phenomena. This mental construct cannot be found in its conceptual purity empirically in reality. It is utopia” (Weber, 2012).

Based on the previous discussions, it can be stated that the inclusion of future-oriented images and ideals and the narratives about them into social science should be done without forgetting, as in Kafka’s story (Arendt, 1961) mentioned in the first chapter, what balances these ideals at the other extreme of the line. Images and ideals, on the other hand, do not have to be only future-oriented, thus historiography, idealized past, wishes for existing conditions to be different, or seeing what is existing from a distorted view can be evaluated in the same way. In addition, images and ideals do not only have to be in people’s minds, they can also become tangible by transferring into materials. Texts from the future-related genres, all kinds of works of art, and everything than human does can be understood in this way. Therefore, the same attention should be paid to the fascination in the face of all these or the images they present. At this point, it is possible to return to the oft-repeated story about the bee and the architect mentioned at the very beginning of this subtitle. In this comparison, the architect not only imagines before doing the job, but also, and more importantly, must also subordinate her/his will to the purpose.

Therefore, as Marx (2010) putted, the less attractive the work, the more attention should be paid to it. This shows that the main issue that separates the architect and the bee is not the ability of imagination, but the subordination of the will to the purpose. This difference reminds us once again why analyzes on the future should be careful in moving from images.

It is undeniable that the future is closely merged with images, dreams, wishes and desires all of which are the integral part of human action and life. However, what needs to be done is neither to see the images as pieces floating on their own in the air nor to squeeze the future into the field of these images, but attempt to capture what is factual in the images. Even though it should be paid attention to images, ideals, dreams and desires, attempt to understand future through, for example, moving from the eighteenth-century political utopias to the eighteenth-century political atmosphere, taking cyborgs as the image of the future or the repetitive “good old days” images to evaluate present conditions could leave the present and the future incomprehensible. In order to explain human’s relation with the future, Schutz (1959) narrated the story of Tiresias who was blinded because of seeing Athena as naked, but also endowed with soothsaying. Thus, the scenes Tiresias saw in the present still belongs to other’s future that are neither phantasms nor referring to past and present experiences differently from people that always give reference to their stock of knowledge. The conclusion that can be drawn from this story Schutz told is that the social scientists who do not refer to what they hold in their hands can also run the risk of becoming a sorcerer, even if their predictions would come true someday in the future.

5.3. Social Science and the Future: An Old-New Way

In its relationship with the future, social science has hesitantly approached to the future on the grounds that the future is not completely proper to the principles of science, stigmatized future-enthusiastic social scientists as social engineers or oracles using law-based explanations, and debased future-orientation as the contrarian of objectivity. Yet, social science cannot completely divorce from the spectre of the future, since future-orientation is part of social as well as of individuals. In this ambivalent situation, social science either tries to convert future into available data, or creates immune fields that never disturb the principles of science. In that case, while social science constructs the new fields for the future alongside the world of science, it still takes refuge in similar

considerations in the future but with a difference that the distant future is waited to reveal itself in its abruptness and unexpectedness rather than approached through planning and prediction. Alas, in both attitudes, the future does not find a genuine place in the field of social science, and therefore social science has not found a place in the future either. More importantly, the future as pre-existed or empty that can be predicted or shaped, or as absolute newness that is not even expectable, means that profound connection cannot also be established with the past and the present.

At the end of the discussion so far to reflect on such a relation, there are several points that must be consider. Even if it is not possible to give a strict formula, three important steps will be considered to think about the relation in question. First of all, whereas the importance of the position of the future for such a discussion has been frequently reiterated from the very beginning, there has been no general discussion on how to grasp this position as well as the future that occupies that position. Thus, it is necessary to decide whether the future can be conceived as an outcome, or a potential that either is waited to be revealed at the end of process, or is the epitome of process. Secondly, considering the questions social scientists ask to reveal what they concern for is also crucial since the question is like a magic sentence opening the door of forty thieves. As a last step, the attitude and act of social scientists to construct a genuine relationship with the future will be discussed.

5.3.1. Process, or Outcome

Two elements that are significant for futural perspective, namely the position of the future and the temporality revealed through connections, give birth to an important question. This is the question of whether the future should be grasped as potential hiding within the process, or as an outcome revealing at the end of the process. This question can also be thought as a question of relationship with the past, the present and the future, in the sense that, as has been said from the very beginning, the futural perspective, unlike the prevailing understanding, is not looking at the future, but simultaneously and even exceedingly at the present.

When the future is approached by prediction, considered through concepts such as unintended consequences and risk, understood as an end that will emerge through technological progress, although it is assumed that it will emerge as a result of some ongoing social processes, the future becomes something that appears after the process is

over and the fog is dispersed. On the other side, when it is considered as a process or a potential secretly flowing in the process, it is generally thought with the emphasis on latency, invisibility, and immateriality. In that case, it is not possible to talk about such a future, thus the only thing that can be done is to wait for the process to solidify somewhere. Regarding this point, Adam (2008a) pointed out that even though temporality entails to take into account the processual and the invisible, empirical understanding is based on the factual and before-after comparisons. For that reason, according to Adam, processes become attainable only by means of their outcomes and symptoms as in capturing the aging process via grey hair as a symptom, i.e., the processes are understood not by “foresight but hindsight.” If we accept this understanding for a while, can we claim on the process where “all that is solid melts into air” (Marx and Engels, 1997) that evaporation is a process since we only can see solid and vapour? Then, the future and time become the chemical reactions we cannot see that make up this evaporation, the past becomes the solid and the present becomes the steam. Fascinated by this melting, for instance, Berman (1999) found the force of historical materialism in its lighting on the modern spirituality, saw the real conflict as between solid and melting visions, asked about whether the social forces melting capitalism would also melt communism, and whether the whirlpool of bourgeois society could take it another direction. Such questions outstandingly show that being extremely caught on the language of latency, melting, flow, processuality, despite its charm, can easily distort the perspective of social science. At this point, it may be meaningful to take a brief outlook at the assigned meanings of the concept of process in social science. In fact, the concept of process has been used in various ways as a flexible concept that can be placed anywhere, such as to define any field (as in political process), to indicate outcomes (innovation process), to refer connected events (electoral process), to describe general types (judicial or ritual process), and to emphasis conflict rather than order (Vayda, McCay, and Eghenter, 1991). Although this flexibility renders difficult to make sense of the relationship between the concept of process and the future, it is beyond the aim of this study to give a definition or outline the concept of process. Here, the process is used only to elaborate on the connections and differences between processual and state-based explanations with respect to the future.

The future, as repeatedly mentioned before, has been defined by the various adjectives such as “latent” and “in-the-making” in order to indicate its processuality, that

is, although it is not material, it is real to some extent and still in the process. For that reason, it has been indicated that this kind of future is neither known through senses nor predicted but only captured our cells (Adam, 2008a; 2008b; Adam and Groves, 2007). What does “in the process” mean? A container? Like “in time.” And that we cannot see it from inside but just feel there is something. Just like the future that we believe but cannot see. A ghost? Regarding this issue, Poli (2011) defined “latents” as the “dimensions of reality below the surface of visible facts.” Five types of phenomena were listed as latents by Poli, which are “dispositions”, “seeds of the future”, “constraints imposed by social relations and their self-referential reproduction”, “constraints imposed by levels of reality”, and “constraints imposed by myths.” This emphasis on the “below the surface of visible facts” seems to make sense when it is considered something similar with Durkheim’s (1995) comment on categories that they have deeper meanings under their external features since “whole human history summed up in them.” Even though the emphasis on behind the surface is important for the possibility of a temporal and futural social science, the way the distinction between the visible and the invisible is established and the attribution of a kind of mystical power to the invisible, points to the quite different understanding from Durkheim’s idea of categories in which all human history is embedded. In other words, the connection between visible and invisible can create significant results for the future that can be easily turned into a kind of mysterious force even though this connection intended to pull the future closer. Thus, process seems to be conceived here as a resource operating under a superficial rigidity. This point brings the discussion back, not surprisingly, to the existence of two separate domains, one is more rigid and the other is more fluid, around which social science has been revolving from the very beginning. Creation of two separate worlds for processes and those created by processes can be seen, for instance, in Spinoza’s “*natura naturata*” (world as natural products) and “*natura naturans*” (processes and forces producing these products); “*Merkwelt*” (a world that is accessible to our senses, that is, the phenomenal world) and “*Wirkwelt*” (a world of processes and forces that is the source of visible outcomes) putted by Jakob von Uexküll and Georg Kriszat (Adam and Groves, 2007). In order to connect two realms, Adam (2005) emphasized that “futures-in-the-making” must be understood as both material and latent processes having distant outcomes that are beyond present-based empirical sciences as in the “genetic modifications, ozone-depletion, and carbon emissions.” But at this point, the question arises about how we can know the end or the

outcome of the process. In fact, understanding the concept of process as driven by hidden forces and leaves the matured or expired behind, converts the processes into transformative machine that turns liquids into solids. Relatedly, it is also claimed that such an understanding makes processes independent, autonomous, and reified as if they were “unitary entities with teleological properties” as well as ignores events and actions constituting processes (Vayda, McCay, and Eghenter, 1991). Then, how do we establish the relationship between processes and events? If the future is defined as process, how can it connect with events or actions apart from swallowing and trailing them behind? If the process is already latent, only the parts it drags becomes proper to talk about since it is not easy to recognize latency. If it can be captured only after it was materialized, then the process becomes a lizard that sacrifices the tail and lost parts can regenerate themselves.

The emphasis on the event that is irreducible to the process can be clearly seen in Mead (1932) according to whom time arises by the passage ordered by unique events that generates the past and the future as they appear in the present that is both “becoming and disappearing.” Thus, for instance, extending “the flash of meteor” in specious present into the whole processes eliminates its nature as an event. Contrarily, Braudel (1960/2009) highlighted continuities rather than events by contrasting the “*longue duree*” referring to the history of long duration with the “episodic history” as instantaneous and short term. However, Braudel was aware that he could be accused of emptying out the meaning of the event as an explosion, newness, disappearing and container of humanity. Relatedly, Arendt (1961), in her discussion on the immortality, complained about the shift in the focal point of historical understanding from single and great deeds and works in antiquity exemplified by Herodotus to the process swallowing everything and acquiring a monopoly in modern history. In this shift, the science in the seventeenth century, and prominent concepts of development and progress in the nineteenth century are great contributors. Thus, according to Arendt, single events and deeds lost their previous meanings, and become as “hammer and nail with respect to the finished table.” However, overemphasis on event and action could also reify and ascribe to a kind of mystic power to them. For that reason, when Arendt wrote that the process swallows everything and makes singular events meaningless, she seems to miss that the singular events may become meaningful within the process, the process may be the reason why these singular events are called as singular events, and that the process may be the one that breeds and

nourishes rather than swallowing and crushing. Then, what is the measure of greatness? Should we accept only great deeds, and military or political achievements as particular events, or can we also accept ordinary daily events that are indifferently repeated in every day? Which singular event should be considered as important and great? Are the single events only that of those who have the privilege of creating recognizable singular events (the artworks, deeds breaking the mundane) or can we consider the acts of those continue an ordinary life in the daily hustle as single events? The wavy relation between events and processes may be explained not by science, progress and development as Arendt did, but by the focal point in conformity with the changes in historical tendencies. Regarding this point Braudel (2009) explained the shift in temporality of history with the increasing importance of social and economic history, that is, the scale of day and year of political historian replaced by the longer time of production and demography. In addition, with regard to the relation between event and process, Vayda, McCay, and Eghenter (1991) asked that “should we consider Brutus’s stabbing... and first moonwalk as parts of one process?”, and answered that even these events can be connected but need methodological justification. Hence, it is possible to repeat the questions asked above for the events and deeds, since what deserves to be a process is equally important. At this point, Luhmann’s comparison between two kinds of processes can be helpful, though he made this comparison to explain system complexity. In this comparison, Luhmann (1978) contrasted the “lady process” referring to a lady wandering between showroom windows with the “fur process” including a fur coat in a showroom window attracting women. To him, it is easier to understand how the single events determine each other in the lady process, but what strikingly reduce the system complexity is the fur process. By means of this comparison, Luhmann asserted that processes are not series of facts but conducted through selectivity of events rather than effective causality. Even though this comparison was made to explain system complexity, and the emphasis on selectivity, it also can show that events of which processuality is not easily recognizable can also be processual.

In order to bring back the discussion lost between event, outcome, and process to the main question of the study, it is necessary to return to the issue of connections from which futural stance could be revealed. One of the underlying reasons of considering the process as eliminating and absorbing the singularities of all events, and as a necessary path for the future, is missing the processuality of process. In fact, it is possible to embrace change and the future without getting lost in flows and events, and without employing the

concept of process as banner just as being futural without ever using the word future. In addition, considering and speak of process is about not only transformations but also qualities, and transformations in qualities. For instance, capitalism can be interpreted as both state and process of capitalization and non-capitalization. In addition, this process includes other processes such as proletarianization, commodification, and alienation all of which contains and not swallow each other. Alike, Lefebvre (2002) conceptualized the process of accumulation as composed of several related processes such as knowledge, technology, and rationality all of which presupposes the accumulation of capital as a process. Moreover, all subject social sciences deal with can be simultaneously seen from both sides, that is, from the side of the outcomes and from the side of the processes. For example, the commodity is simultaneously the process of commodification and the congealed labour which is both the outcome and the process by means of the proletariat as the outcome of the process of proletarianization. Similarly, while the concept and process of urbanization implies the urban as state, the urban expresses urbanization, and both includes and included by ruralisation and rural. Thus, in order to be futural, social sciences should pay attention to the relationship between events, outcomes and processes; otherwise, they may capture the future in all these processes and states, but not be the futural. In a similar vein, Bloch (1996) conceptualized processes as dynamic relations that are not overcome by the "Become." In this understanding, real is understood as process passing over the "Possible at its processual Front." Thus, according to Bloch, since restriction of reality to the "Factum" was not realistic due to the processuality of reality, the knowledge must go with process rather than being merely contemplative in order to capture the "Real", that is, "the events produced by working people together with the abundant interweaving process-connections between past, present and future." The future revealed here becomes connected with both the process and the outcome, the process as the outcome and the outcome as the process.

This is the future that cannot be completely reduced to but includes planning and forecasting, not completely new and unexpected but still new and surprising, not confined to images but carry within itself what has been imagined. Such a future should encapsulate both a state different from and processual connection with what is existing. Focusing on only one of these two aspects destroys the possibilities of futural social science. In this respect, what is meant by the future as outcome is the approaches that only describe the world, take a picture of the world of years or centuries later, or interpret

the world by means of other created worlds in utopias, science fictions and various human products. On the other hand, understanding that sees the future in a purely processual way is to contemplate on the future through continuous flows, novelties, and explosions that are not possible to think and talk about as if we were all live in a kind of action thriller or entertainment centre, thus such an understanding is interesting but difficult to apply to life. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect on these two understandings in order to find a suitable way to deal with the future.

The future not as subject but as stance and perspective entails the concern for both the form and content of the process. However, this process should not be considered as self-flowing or as a process of which direction, content, and intensity are constant. Likewise, events should not be constructed as flat, disconnected, and autonomous entities. In the fields of social sciences, events can acquire their greatness precisely as part of processes while processes should be understood as the magnitude and uniqueness of events but more than any particular event. Therefore, futural attitude becomes possible only by establishing a relationship between the process and state, by considering the processual within states, and process as state. In that case, neither to give a prescription for the future nor to be stunned by constantly flowing becomes out of question. These are the glasses futural social sciences can wear when looking at any field.

5.3.2. Changing the question

From the discussions on whether the future can be considered as a process in continuous flow and potential, or as an outcome that emerges at some points of the process, the need for stance and language appears that is based on neither the excitement of flows and melting, nor the isolated outcomes. It is necessary to describe situations, but also simultaneously construct distinctiveness and connections of the future from and with the present. In addition, for the futural stance, the questions to be asked are as decisive as the discussion on the process and the outcome.

Social science's prevailing notion of the future invite familiar certain questions. If the future is regarded as the pre-existing field or outcome waiting to reveal, the question must be targeted to describe this field or outcome, and this description can only become possible by the help of "what" question and its derivatives. In this regard, Adam (2008c) pointed out that the question of what the future is entails to ask further questions on what kind of entity, sphere, or scape the future is, and to decide whether the future is "a sphere

of purposive action, of ideas, of imagination, of freedom” as well as whether the future is real, immaterial or visible. “What” question is also the main question of social science employed to analyse and understand the present, but it is a question that is left alone and therefore falls short in answers. As mentioned before, the tendency to define singular experiences in their own singularities left the answers of this question incomplete, and consequently, let alone the past and the future, the present cannot be genuinely understood. Moreover, the absence of connections does not allow to define the boundaries of the present in question as well as its intersections and separations with other presents, for certain, the same is valid for the past and the future. For instance, in physical time past and future are more expanded in contrast with the social realm (Lewis and Weigart, 1990). With regard to this but from different context, Simmel (1971d) indicated that present includes past and future at varying degrees depending on whether the present is personal, cultural, political or geological. Thus, the “what” question alone is not enough to understand the present, as well as the past and the future. On the other hand, the answers of a gaze hypnotized by processes cannot also be sufficient for a futural stance. If the future is conceived as just continuously flowing in latency, the major question becomes “how” and its derivatives (how is the process flowing, how fast is the process going) in order to describe this flow, though question becomes meaningless to some extent since, as indicated before, absolute new and continuous flowing cannot be genuinely captured and defined. In this case, recognition is only possible when events are thrown out of the process. In other words, the process cannot be understood, but only outcomes as soon as the process gets rid of its burden. For this reason, the question of “how” is impossible to answer when it is just attended to the only ever-flowing process.

For the future, the proper and adequate question cannot also be the question of “what if” as frequently asked in the fields of futures studies as in the scenario technique, but it is also employed in social science. For instance, Weber (2012) asked what might have happened if Bismarck did not decide to make war in order to understand the causal significance imputed to this decision in the context of numerous factors. Yet, inasmuch as causal significance proceeded from the cooperation of all elements that have already happened, when one single event is pulled out, other events would not be the same not only in terms of their results but also in terms of their content. This question may seem useful as a tool to some extent, but to draw cultural significance from the resulting change when a part is isolated means forgetting that in the absence of that part, the other parts

are not the same. Therefore, in the relationship between the future and social science, this question should be asked very cautiously. Likewise, the question of “what should be” is not the question sought by the future and social science relationship established in this study. This question, however, is not necessarily harmful for the answers for the question of “what is”, as Durkheim (1982) and especially Weber (2012) supposed. With regard to this issue implying normative attitude, Bell (1991) examined the concept of exploitation and asserted that the notion is both normative since “provides moral justification for class-hatred”, and scientific because is defined through “the relationship between surplus value and the wages.”

When the aforementioned questions are asked, the future may not be left out of social science as a subject, but social science cannot be futural as each of them focuses on the only one aspect of processes, events, the new, the past and the present. Instead, the first question proposed in this study to be asked in order to establish a relationship with the future is “where” question. This question might rightly remind of an anchorage at first glance. In other words, it may evoke the future as a distant point, and an understanding that does not make room for the new as well as ignore processes. Contrarily, answers given to the question “where” should change constantly according to the subject social scientists interested in and according to the changing content of the same subject. Thus, this location is not a fixed, but “according to and in contrast with” location since the position and content of the future is constantly changing in relation to what has already been and what is happening. In this manner, the question “where” is not a question with a fixed answer even maybe it is not a pure question that just shows that the future is not a surprise, already here in some parts, but still not yet in some other parts even some of these parts may have appeared in the past and then retreated behind the scenes. Therefore, the future is not only the not-yet, but also partially factual, it is undetected rather than unseen. But not a ghost; it is too concrete to be a ghost.

Although the first question is where, this question cannot be asked alone. This means that the position of the future can always be determined by the content of the subject under consideration, that is, by its current conditions and the past. For this reason, the future also excludes a definite answer to the question “how soon”, since this answer may refer to a distant or immediate future depending on the subject under consideration. At this point, the question may come to mind whether this means to reduce the future to the present and the past, and in connection with this, how to distinguish the future from

them. In order to make this distinction, the first thing to do is to ask the above-mentioned questions together. In other words, the questions “what”, “how”, and “why” must be constantly asked in order to expand connections established temporality. When the position of the future becomes clear with these questions, the other questions “where to” and “what for” borrowed from Bloch (1996) can be asked and it is precisely these questions that would distinguish the future. Bloch considered these two questions in relation to finality as the “goal determination of the human will, not a rigid final goal.” With quite similar emphasis, Marx (1844/1978) wrote that “for even if there is no doubt about the whence, all the more confusion reigns about the whither”, and continued that “not attempt dogmatically to prefigure the future, but want to find the new world only through criticism of the old.” This revealed again in Bloch (1996) as combination of “where from” and “where to” employed to understand being. All these emphases hail to the necessity to simultaneously ask the above-mentioned questions.

The question asked determines to some extent the content of the answer, but both the questions and answers are determined by the subject these questions and answers directed to. For this reason, the weight and frequency of the questions mentioned here depend on the content of the subject, and even the new questions may be added. More importantly, the first question asked about the position of the future, i.e., the question “where”, can be also posed to position and angle of social scientist from which the subject is approached. To put this in a different way, the answers to this where question should always be answered with according to and in contrast with. This question is also significant for the social scientists’ attitudes and act to approach to the future since in order to approach, it should first be considered on the location of the thing to be approached.

5.3.3. Attitude and act

For a futural social science, the proper attitude and act to be taken in questioning about the future is as important as how to evaluate the future’s processuality and the questions to be asked for the subjects. Future orientation can appear through different forms of act and attitude. For instance, Bloch’s (1995; 1996) future-dedicated thought is full of attitudes towards future such as urging, striving, longing, searching, drive, need, craving, wish and so on. With regard to issue, Simmel (1971d) indicated to simultaneously unconditional and conditional character of the boundaries that

correspondingly cause to boundary of the knowledge of consequences of action which can be gotten only to certain point. Thus, Simmel putted forward two acts, “speculation” and “calculation” that carry individuals outside of boundaries and sensible reality. In a similar vein, Schutz’s (2018) above-mentioned distinction between fancy and projecting clearly shows the abundance of future-related attitudes and acts. For this reason, the definition of such an attitude and an act is somewhat confusing, but in this case, not because of insufficiency of information and data, but because of the abundancy, since there are plenty of attitudes and acts towards future such as predict, forecast, expect, imagine, extrapolate, anticipate, envision, foresee, conjecture, prophecy, foretell, prescribe, guess, infer, build, speculate, plan, exploit, control, aspire, project and so on. Even, the future can be lost, gained, and forgotten. However, when the issue comes to social science only a few of these attitudes such as predict, extrapolate, and plan, albeit hesitantly, have been welcomed.

Even though social scientists have been preoccupied with the future in various ways, the future was assigned to futurology, and therefore social scientists, as indicated before, who are enthusiastic about the future have been generally considered futurists rather than social scientists, and consequently, have to take refuge in the field of futurology (Adam, 2008a). With regard to proper attitude towards future, Bell (1999), a futurist-sociologist experiencing such an exclusion, indicated that futurists aim to “invent, evaluate, and propose possible and probable futures in order to help people to explore their alternatives”, rather than primarily incline towards prediction. Alternative futures emphasized by Bell, are also extrapolated via trends, constructed through “If, then” statements, and understood by the help of the images of future (Bell and Mau, 1973). However, interest in invention alternative futures of which normative aspect is clear has not been considered as suitable for the framework of science. Thus, thinking on the attitudes and acts towards the future requires dwelling in the field of futurology and other related fields for a while. Since in this field, unlike social science, attitudes and acts towards the future has been discussed and evaluated in detail. For example, Love (2019) distinguished anticipation from expectation on the basis of action, and also divided anticipation into two parts that are “Christian anticipation” and “ordinary anticipation” in terms of relation between the future and the present. In a similar vein, anticipation is also distinguished as “cultural anticipation” and “phenomenal anticipation” that the latter implies anticipation beyond our interpretation such as “the fall of an autumn leaf or the

configuration of aging in our DNA” (Iparraguirre, 2019). The proper attitude towards the future is also evaluated according to the definition of future, for instance, constructed on three levels pursuant to the three concepts of future that are “future as analytical object” based on the not-yet as shapeable and the future as knowable as in scenario planning; “future as a conceptual object” as constitutive in relation with the contextual social experiences; and “future as object codified as a resource” as vantage point to direct current action and decisions (Selkirk, Selin and Felt, 2019). Similarly, Poli (2019) also constructed attitudes on three levels that are “forecasting” aiming short-term and long-term estimations by quantitative and continuity-based understanding; “foresight” focusing on the imaginaries of possible futures in order to challenge to the decision-makers by means of quantitative and discontinuous conceptualization; and “anticipation”, besides the categories of previous ones, employing “literacy and impredicative.” All these evaluations on attitude have been carried out within the scope of the futures studies. As for social science, it is often pointed out the uncertainty of the subjects of social science and the unpredictability of human behaviour as the insurmountable obstacles. From this base, the predictive model of natural sciences has been considered as improper for openness and changeability. Alike, the pursuit of prediction is also rejected due to the fact that prediction makes the future as outcome of technical conditions rather than choices and struggles that are not predicted but made (Adam, 2008b; Appelbaum, 1977; Eidlin and Appelbaum, 1987).

As for social science, on the other hand, discussions and evaluations on attitude and act is overwhelmingly knitted around whether the future-orientation as violation of scientific principles, especially of neutrality, rather than elaborations on attitudes as in the futures studies. Yet, there are some endeavours to elaborate proper attitudes in social science. For instance, Urry (2016) sorted three main approaches to anticipate social futures in social sciences. First approach is based on human action that ignores social connections and analyse future changes with regard to human behaviours. Second one, contrarily, understands futures as outcome of structures. Third approach, embraced by Urry, is the “complexity theory” that sees futures as irreducible to individuals or structures but understand as dynamic, processual, socio-material and unpredictable complex systems making prediction impossible. In addition, Huber and Bell (1971) defined the task of the sociologists of the future as “innovation and guidance” rather than description, explanation or prediction in order to promotes intervention through “the

invention, evaluation, and selection of policy alternatives.” Adam (2005), in a similar manner, accentuated on the task of creation instead of prediction. However, this normative tendency has hardly been absorbed in social sciences, and tasks defined as creation and promotion turns into the “duty ends when he has surveyed the world from China to Peru, not even required to show whether they have lived enjoyably in the given circumstances” (Marett, 1934). Those who dare to stray from this duty are accused of being “fanatical office-holding patriots” rather than being “cool against prevailing current ideals” (Weber, 2012). Thus, social scientists inclining to the future have often been titled as futurologist, utopian, revolutionary, and social engineer rather than Weber’s “cool professionals.”

One of the main reasons for this exclusion from science is that the verb “to know” which was not listed among the above-mentioned verbs. Because it is possible to deal with the future through many actions and attitudes, but the future, due to its position in the current understanding, cannot be included in the act of knowing, which is the most basic occupation of science. Even, one of leading scholar in the futures studies, Bertrand de Jouvenel (1967, as cited in Adam and Groves, 2007:17), announced that “knowledge of the future is a contradiction in terms.” Nonetheless, people have always searched to way to make future knowable to some extent. With regard to this point, Adam and Groves (2007) distinguished between attitudes according to assumed possessor of the future. If the owner is god(s), the ways to know are discovery and interpretation of fate, while the future connected to the cosmos, “calculation, prediction and extrapolation of planetary movements” becomes the proper acts. If the future is accepted to be belonged to people, according to Adam and Groves, “imagination may be employed for conjecture, creation, colonization and control.” In spite of these efforts to make the future knowable, the future is generally accepted as incompatible with knowledge because of its “indeterminacy, uncertainty and openness.” This unknowable status makes the future a kind of spectre haunting us. A spectre, which is “neither soul nor body... non-object, non-present-present, no longer belongs to knowledge” (Derrida, 1994). However, people do not refrain from talking, worrying and hoping about the future irrespective of its distance and latency, cannot see, but believe in its existence like Derrida’s spectre. The future, albeit being unknowable, can come as hope in the most disastrous era and as anxiety in the most hopeful times. When the issue comes to science, however, the future is neither completely welcomed nor totally leave out. This ambivalent attitude is rooted in the intellectual

tradition that “the anxiety of being in-between past and future, old and new, known and unknown” (da Silva and Viera, 2020) as well as in the attitude of scholars fed by this tradition expressed as “traditional scholar does not believe in ghost” (Derrida, 1994).

The attitude of an understanding that establishes a different relationship between the future and social science from the common understandings should be distinguishable from those listed above. This attitude should not exclude the future from science, and not leave the social sciences without future. The main obstacle appearing from here is the incompatibility between the intuitional-invisible subject, and the tendency of science to define and describe. However, considering the future as both process and state emphasizes simultaneously its emerging and already emerged aspects, and the question “where” places the future in a position that changes according to the subjects and ages studied on rather than dragging behind the past and the present. An attitude towards a future conceived in this way can be named as “sketch” though it is possible to find more proper names and to define more meaningful acts. Since the future is not something dropping out of the sky but maturing within the existing world, it is not possible to draw its complete picture but can only be sketched which is not a sketch of what is imagined, but of what appears as dimly lit and half-dark. Thus, it is “not attempt dogmatically to prefigure the future...” as in forecast and prediction, but “to develop new principles to the world out of its own principles” (Marx, 1978). In order to sketch the future, social sciences should scrutinize their subjects both as process and outcome, and ask their subjects “where” question. In that case, the future can cease to be a latent force advancing in secrecy, and a sphere that can be manipulated, predicted and prescribed. Accordingly, this may also help social scientists to leave behind the positions that only predict, plan, reject, avoid, prescribe, surprised, and stunned in order to establish meaningful relations first and foremost with the era they live in. Relatedly, Lefebvre (2007) asked that “is it possible to do a portrait of someone who does not yet exist, and which would have to help to bring about his existence?”, and answered that “yes, if one finds the traits that inscribe themselves on a face of the future, which will cast aside false resemblances, thus enabling us to foresee the dissimilarities.” When the attitude is defined through a futural stance as sketch, Lefebvre’s question can be answered as follows: It is possible to sketch a portrait of what not yet exist only simultaneously by doing the portrait of what exists.

5.4. Futural Social Science

Based on the assessments made throughout the study, it becomes possible to unpack the content of the future established as stance and perspective rather than a subject, which is scattered among the above discussions. Since this is a discussion of perspective and stance, the position of target, namely of the future, in thought, is one of the decisive elements of the study. In this framework, problematizing the not-yet and distant image of the future, which is convenient only to prediction, forecast and inferences in science, is the first step to consider the stance in question. Yet, interrogation on this position does not mean to fix the future to closer. Instances of the attempt to pull the future closer in social sciences are the emphasis on the latency flowing under the visible, the accent on the impact of the images of the future to the present, and the approaches assuming the constitutive time-social relation in the context of the immediate present. The futural stance, on the other hand, is fed by the idea of the changeability of the position instead of fixing the future closer or farther. The changeability of the future stems from the fact that the futural stance does not stare at the future in isolation, but simultaneously look at with, perhaps even more, the present. Thus, the position of the future changes according to the aspect of the present which is under consideration. At this juncture, the question may arise how the scope and boundaries of the present can be determined, while the position of the future changes. The defined scope of the present can be revealed according to the subject, or the part of the social in question, since the present and the future can be thought as components that would sprawl, converge and diverge as the subject is opened through connections rather than as the successive pieces of time. An emphasis on the present raises the further question on whether the future is reduced to the present, or how the future is distinguished and recognized. The future is reduced when one predicts the future, when the future is positioned as the horizon of possibilities of the present, and when an almost semi-automatic relationship is established through practice. On the contrary, futural stance, far from reducing the future, accentuates that the distinctive aspects of the future and the new can only become evident through the definition of the present. Only such a new and a future, as discussed above, can be genuinely connected in the field of social science. The future definitely implies to the different, the new, but the ground from which the new or the future arises is the present. At this point, another question and objection may arise in minds accustomed to the linear image in the order of past, present and future. It is an objection taken that the future will

be the present and the present will be the past until the new is revealed. Although it is difficult to change this perception because the future and the new are always considered as something uncatchable and unseen, the answer is that the futural stance does not tend to take a picture of the future, does not throw it into the distance as in the act of prediction, on the contrary, it tries to express the future in connection with the present.

This last answer, which is more difficult to grasp and express, refers to the temporality defined as the precondition of futurity in the first chapter. The trend towards the division of time into more and more isolated and tiny parts and in adjectives is the most important obstacle that prevents the approaches to time from being temporal. This claim is based on the proposed definition of the temporality conceptualized on the base of expansion and contraction through connections, as opposed to the common perception that accredits temporality to the continuous renewal, the distinct and the singular. In other words, the notion of connection through expansion and contraction does not imply to endless and arbitrarily spread all over as in the ceaseless flowing and renewal. Therefore, the question about the way to define the present in the above paragraph can be answered that the present becomes clearer by deepening instead of swallowing up all history. Again, if the related question about the destruction of the meaning of the singular by connections is remembered, it can be said that the meaning of the singular can only become visible by its position in these connections. This does not mean that neither the singular is less singular nor the new is less new. To rescue the discussion from abstraction and to clarify the meaning of futural, at this point, the study should turn to its own present, namely time literature evaluated in the first chapter with regard to temporality as the precondition of futurity.

Since the futural stance in collaboration with temporality, which is incremental depending on the quality and the scope of connections, implies the changeable position of the future, the question about the initial point of the connections may arise. The question on whether the connections will be established from the past to the present or in the opposite direction, or whether they will be revealed by the combination of various presents, is an important question as it has an impact on the position and the content of the future. At this point, to return the approaches discussed in the first chapter may guide to search an answer. Firstly, it can be asserted that the fertile ground in terms of temporality constructed by Durkheim, who is frequently referenced in this study and deserves more attraction because of his contribution to time and social science in general,

has debatable aspects in terms of futural perspective because of the questionability of his historical understanding. The problem of his understanding of history does not stem from, as the hasty criticisms assert, evolutionary vision based on the road from simple to the complex. Even, Durkheim (1982) frequently criticizes Comte in his discussion on methodology due to such an understanding. On the contrary, two methodological concepts, “efficient cause” and “concomitant variations”, suffice to see that his vision is not based on an evolutionary schema. First and foremost, Durkheim stated that searching all the causes of events in the past does not coincide with the diversity of societies, and therefore the succession of societies can be thought as “tree whose branches grow in divergent directions” (Durkheim, 1982) instead of straight line. In addition, his emphasis to compare “social species”, which was invented as opposed to the history as sequence of unrepeatable events and to the notion of humanity, in the same periods of their development brings a very interesting idea of contemporaneity in succession. Addedly, in the connection established between cause and effect, Durkheim broke the linear understanding by indicating that the effect takes its energy from the cause, but that the cause cannot disappear without being affected. When all these parts come together it becomes clear that this is not a simple evolutionary understanding. However, the problem of this historical understanding stems not from that he related the “nature of composite” with “the nature and number of elements” (Durkheim, 1982), but that he turned to elements, namely to the “simpler societies”, in order to capture the composite. In other words, the problem is that Durkheim, in his attempt to understand society likened to the tree by him, moved from the period when there is not even a seed in the soil yet. The futural stance suggested in the study, on the other hand, entails to move from the present in order to reach into the past. In other words, to capture the past can only become possible by capturing the present. This is the difference between Durkheim and Marx, both of whom presents strong temporal qualities. This difference stems from the fact that Durkheim (1995) started from the elementary forms and return to the present, while Marx illuminated the previous forms, namely, the entire history, through the analysis of the present, i.e., capitalism. And that is why Marx (1978) wrote, “what we have to accomplish in the present-I am speaking of a ruthless criticism of everything existing.” There is big difference between beginning from the clans in order to search the meaning of collective representations, and arriving previous forms of exploitation from its current meaning, in terms of the ground on which they stand. Thus, Durkheim hesitantly wrote on the future:

If today we have some difficulty imagining what the feast and ceremonies of future will be, it is because we are going through a period of transition and moral mediocrity. The great things of the past excited our father no longer arouse the same zeal among us, no replacement for them has yet been created. We would like one that is more vigorous but do not yet see clearly what it should be or how it might be realized in fact... It is the life itself, and not a dead past that can produce a living cult... A day will come when our societies once again will know hours of creative effervescence during which new ideals will again spring forth and new formulas emerge to guide humanity for a time... As to knowing what the symbols will be...is a question that exceeds human faculties of prediction and is beside the point (Durkheim, 1995: 429-430).

By contrast, Marx wrote about the future as follows:

Then it will transpire that the world has long been dreaming of something that it can acquire if only it becomes conscious of it. It will transpire that it is not a matter of drawing a great dividing line between past and future, but of carrying out the thoughts of the pasts. And finally, it will transpire that mankind begins no new work, but consciously accomplished its old work. (Marx, 1978:15).

Contrary to Durkheim's more cautious attitude, the reason behind that Marx could write such sentences even though he did not aim to paint a picture of the future, is precisely due to the difference in the ground they stand on. To proceed step by step in order to make sense of the present exhaust the energy, whereas standing on the age means to propagate energy to both sides. With regard to same point, Benjamin (1936/2007a) indicated to the prognostic character of Marx's analysis of capitalist mode of production since, according to Benjamin, "he went back to the basic conditions underlying capitalistic production, and through his presentation showed what could be expected of capitalism in the future." This means that the futural stance entails to stand on the middle on the line, rather than step out the line as umpire like Kafka's "he" (Arendt, 1961), mentioned in the first chapter. The criticism made in the first chapter that Weber's (2012) heuristic tools do not have the temporality stems from the fact that he always jumped out of the line, did not stand at the middle of the line, and broke both the present and what precedes it into pieces. Even though Weber (2005) persistently stated that religion is not the only reason in the relationship he established, namely, the spirit is not just the result of belief, the problem stems from the way he defined cultural significance. According to Weber (2012), although "the meaning of phenomenon cannot be found in its relationship with other phenomena", cultural significance becomes understandable by causal explanation of historical fact. Adding to this the emphasis that for the individuality of

phenomenon, causality is not a question of law, but of concrete causal relationships, that is, of “imputation”, the method is divided into “value analysis” and “causal analysis.” In this framework, value analysis which treats its object as static, and independent of all historical-causal significance, according to Weber, guides causal analysis by revealing the valuable components of the object. In addition, since Weber claimed that the future decides on whether present facts become historical cause and historical individual, a gap in time established by leaps between the parts of the remote past and relatively recent past emerges, unlike Durkheim and Marx. From this understanding, for instance, it can be possible to propound that capitalism’s calculable and planned future is fed by the struggle to reduce the ambiguity of a religious ethic that give no clue about God’s grace, although Weber never made such an interpretation. In keeping with his perspective, Weber wrote about the future as follows:

In Baxter’s view, the care for external goods...lie on the shoulders of the saint...cloak should become an iron cage...To-day the spirit of religious ascetism... has escaped from the cage. No one knows who will live in this cage in the future...or whether...new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals...But this brings us to the world of judgements of value and of faith, with which this purely historical discussion need not to be burdened... (Weber, 2005:124-125)

Simmel exhibits very confusing attitude with regards to the futural stance, since, as mentioned before, Simmel’s ideas does not overlap with temporality due to his presuppositions and immortality of form whereas his analysis on the fashion and the metropolis carry temporal qualities to some extent. Simmel (1971a; 1971b), unlike three names mentioned above, predicated his conception of history on the immediate experience and human mind, but suggested that individuals as makers of history are oppressed by their product which becomes “suprapersonal power”, and “external agency.” To Simmel, immediate context is the already source of everything, thus there is no such thing as society or interaction per se. Since the transformation of immediate experience, or the contents such as drive, interest, purpose and so on into history and sociation is constructed on the principles such as transcendence of life and being between two extremes, the fact is derived from the presuppositions that makes Simmel’s perspective unsuitable for temporality. Yet, as stated before, Simmel’s explanation of fashion through connections with various historical elements offers a fertile ground. The most interesting aspect of Simmel’s thought is proceeded from dual understanding in terms of futurity he presented. On the one hand, when the inside (i.e., content) of any

form is taken as reference Simmel's thoughts wink at futurity for an instant. But on the other hand, when the reference is the immortality of form with its boundaries, the unchangeability of form turns away futurity and temporality. Simmel's forms seem like Weber's (2005) iron cage, since even the individuals who avoid following fashion are still captured in the form due to the capability of forms to subsume antithesis of the content (Simmel, 1971e). In that case, to exit from a form becomes impossible which cause to think that the new is predetermined within these boundaries, and keeps swirling in the same form. For sure, the new is not total break and absolute new, but within the same form, the new create an impression of already given and determined. Like Simmel, Tarde (2012) also understood historical events by means of individual action, but especially the actions of inventive individuals which is reproduced in "thousands of copies." Accordingly, Tarde historicized social through the "imitation of one's compatriots and ancestors", and defined society as "reciprocal possession." On the base of the emphasis on possession, he contrasted "have" which implies more and less with "be" which negates the external reality. This understanding of history and social, which is approximate to Simmel's ideas, seems at first glance to go beyond Simmel's forms and open up a space for futural stance, precisely because it putted forward various mutual connections through possession. However, firstly, the contrast between "be" and "have" seems somewhat contestable due to not only his assumptions such as "to exist is to differ", and "everything must be avid" he placed his ideas on, but also, perhaps even more, the point of departure of his thought. This departure began with an assumption that every possibility tends to be realized and universalized, arrives to the three forms of invasion which are physical, vital, and social through the three forms of universal repetition as "wave-like", "generative", and "imitative" (Tarde, 2012). The problem of this conception of invasion in terms of futurity can be better understood by comparing with similar process, namely the "contagiousness of sacredness" propounded by Durkheim (1982; 1995), who also claimed that the tendency of invasion is not the cause but the consequence of the sociological character of imitation. Although it is difficult to explain, the difference between the two expansions is that one is characterized by the centripetally concentration and then radial dispersal of the state of effervescence, and the other implies the exponentially distribution from a center. Therefore, even though the latter seems to provide more connections due to its distribution, temporal and futural stance entails deepening through expansion and contraction from a focus, namely the present, as

mentioned in the first chapter, and thus the latter one seems contestable in terms of temporality and futurity.

Besides the above discussions on to reach the past from the present, the point of departure of the futural stance, i.e., the present, also raises the question on how the future is captured and revealed. To answer this question, the support can be received from Bourdieu and Giddens analyzed as the representatives of constitutive relation, since they departed from the reverse direction of Durkheim's starting point, namely whereas Durkheim departed from past to arrive the present, these two theorists move from the future in order to change the present. Bourdieu (2000; 2013), for instance, who established a significant connection between subjective expectations and objective conditions, placed agents on two order of properties, namely material and symbolic. Yet, the profundity of this dual position and the strong affinity between subjective and objective realms, faces with extinction when Bourdieu began to search to way to break the circle in the relative autonomy of the symbolic order, since this break is reduced to the capacity of symbolic power in order to contribute to the future by manipulating hopes and expectations to mobilize people in the present. In that case, the present is not captured by "where to" question of which answers alters according to changes in the present, but on the contrary, by manufactured possibilities at best. This idea gives an impression of Heidegger's (2006) *Dasein*, which comes to itself by undertaking its ownmost possibility. In fact, this view of Bourdieu stems from the division of future and past into two parts, and almost semi-automatic relation of immediate present with past and future via *habitus*. When the relation between present and future is conceived as a kind of circle, the only thing can do is to return to the present by mediating with images from the ground of the present. On the other side, Giddens (1996) presented such a circle, introduced the "utopian realism" based on the idea that anticipations can affect the present due to the counter-factuality and future-orientation of modernity. According to Giddens, the utopian realism, which entails the intervention of privileged, allows to "steer the juggernaut" by decreasing the openness of modernity. The problem of these views with regard to futurity stems not from political contents, since what is meant by the futural stance is not intervention and political stance of social science despite all its importance, but from jumping into the field that is assumed as the future. What is interesting in here is that Bourdieu seems to have abandoned all his rich insight and emphasis on objective conditions. Moreover, since the relationship established through *habitus* in the immediate

context is almost semi-automatic, it is an object of curiosity how the habitus can be broken with a manufactured vision of the future. Contrarily, it is not surprising that Giddens developed such an idea because he already constructed his view on the concepts such as “knowledgeability”, and “ontological security” of which causes and sources are inexplicable. What is more striking, on the other hand, is that this placement of visions seems the resurrection of Comte’s (2015) search for appropriate supporters for the positive philosophy. In this search, Comte believed that this new philosophy could be welcomed by those who are not blinded by education and other philosophies such as women and working class, rather than other classes inclining to metaphysical and theological philosophies. However, Comte can be excused to some extent when considering that he constructed his understanding of history and social change on the transformation of ideas. In addition, when the future is throwing away and then pulling back, it should keep in mind Schutz’s (2018) analysis on fancy, albeit his intention was quite different, since it is possible to create colorful visions of which realizability can only be determined in the present. In other words, whether a vision of the future is fancy or not can only be decided by the analysis of the present. Marx’s comment on the “unheard-of fiasco” of the French Revolution, clearly exhibits the defection of understanding the future in that way. “As ever, weakness had taken refuge in a belief in miracles, fancied the enemy overcome... in imagination, and it lost all understanding of the present in a passive glorification of the future that was in store for it...” (Marx, 1972). The importance of all these approaches in terms of futurity is that an analysis of the content of the present should begin by asking questions from the present in order to establish a relationship with the future, instead of traveling through time towards the future, and returning again to the present.

At this juncture, one more question may arise regarding to the futural perspective about the risk of ambiguousness of the answers given to the “where to” question, as the connections expand. As an answer to this question, first of all, it can be said that the relationship established with the future in the futural stance aims not to draw a picture of the future, but to sketch. Secondly, it can be asserted that the expansion can clarify both the present and the future rather than making them ambiguous. The reason behind is that looking from too close create the same problem with looking from too far, that is, blurring of the landscape. Yet, instead of waiting the future to reach clarity, or hoping that future generations would recognize, distance can be created by expanding it with connections.

This is a distance that does not disconnect the social scientist from the subject, but also clarifies the landscape. What Tarde (2012) asserted on the homogeneity of primitive nebula due to its distance is also valid for too closer. Related to this, Bloch (1996) pointed out that while “Here-and Now” causes disappointment due to the lack of distance, and even seems darker than the “dream-image”, distant drifting also brings more difficulties, because the “imago” is not in air, but in the “real-utopian possibility.” What Bloch called as searching the imago in the real-utopian possibility can be translated into futural perspective as searching in the present with expanding connections.

Another important point about the futural stance is the reference given to the legacy and common ground in relation to the fact that resources of individual social scientists can exhaust in the process of expansion. For certain, the strong emphasis on legacy does not intend to neither consecrate the predecessors nor hamper creativity. However, to leap over social science with the assumption that “already absent” in order to search for answers on the subjects which are difficult to understand or generally excluded from social science, can be considered as more consecrated. Therefore, futural stance should be equally critical about the legacy, which has many contestable aspects, and this jumping tendency. The subjects of future and time epitomize this tendency because the attempts departing from the inadequacy of existing assumptions either defect to another fields and terminologies, or leave aside important concepts such as social, society, and structure of which contents are partially contestable in order to find time and future in the flows and the singularities. These concepts may indeed unsuitable for time and the future, but in order to claim this unsuitability, they should first be scratched and pondered as much as possible. This, for sure, does not mean that social science should not expand into the other fields, as indicated in the self-criticism of this study which is defined as flawed since it does not expand into different fields and various forms of time in the universe. Yet, it can be asserted that this study at least starts from the correct point of departure, despite inadequacy of its connections. Returning to the main question, if there is to be an inquiry on the existing, even if it is imperfect, it is necessary to deal with the legacy first, but by looking at this legacy from vital problems of the present.

Since the aim of the study briefly putted as to think about the relationship between social science and the future reaches to the conclusion that more genuine relationship can be established by adoption of future as stance and perspective, which can create differences in the relation of social science with its own age, itself, and the social, it can

be disappointing for thought which is accustomed to imagine the future as infinitely open, distant and surprising. Yet, the futural stance does not propose anything about the character of the future and the degree of unexpectedness, but the way to capture the future in the framework of social science. Similarly, making claim for those excluded from temporality such as social, society, and structure in the face of general assumptions according to which only flows, experiences, life, and singularities are worthy of temporality, can also be disturbing. However, the future revealed through futural stance and perspective is no less future and less exciting than unexpected and abrupt future in their familiar sense. On the other side, if the future as stance and perspective seems difficult to grasp, and even to express, the main reason of this is the immaturity of linguistic and intellectual tools to capture such a future. For this reason, it is not easy to verbalize the future without some expressions such as “latency”, “in the making”, “immateriality” (Adam, 2005), “incubation”, “fermenting” (Bloch, 1995; 1996), “melting” (Marx and Engels, 1997), and seed (Bell, 1991). Alas, although the study criticizes these expressions due to several reasons, it also cannot escape from such expressions as “simmering”, “sprouting” and “maturing.” Even the inadequacy of the conceptual and intellectual tools to rescue future from the abstract, clearly exhibit that the future deserves to be more pondered.

6. CONCLUSION

The scope and content of the relationship established with the future, which can only find a place for itself through certain common tendencies as one of the most controversial and ambivalent subjects for social science, also affect the relationship of social science with itself, the current age, and the social due to the inseparability of future from human action and social in general. In spite of its significance, first of all, whether the future can be included in social sciences even as a subject and as a part of analysis has always been a highly disputatious issue. Yet, despite all the debates on legitimacy of the future as subject, it has been able to open a space for itself, albeit indirectly, in the guise of prediction, forecast or anticipation in theoretical discussions or through the analysis of data, because of its significance for the social. In this inclusion, however, the focus is generally on either the verifiability of available data gathered from what is considered as the present or the past, or what they would evolve into, thus, the prevalent attitude is looking towards an ambiguous and distant horizon by standing on a place called as the present or the past. The main predicament created by this attitude is that the scope and the content of social and the age of which definitions vary according to perspective, also remain limited and obscure. In other words, the concern for the relationship established between the future and social science mainly stems not from the quantity of invitation of the future to analysis, but from the quality. Based on this imputed significance to the future, the relationship between social science and the future has been pondered throughout the study. In the relationship that is tried to be established, the future has been considered as perspective and stance called as futural, rather than the specific subject of study. The character of the futural stance has been clarified by discussions on the position of the future in social thought, and the definition of temporality as the precondition of futurity.

Despite significance of the future for the social, the underlying causes of hesitancy and certain tendency of social science to the future stems from the two parts of the appellation of social science, i.e., from the assumed necessities of science and of the social. The role of natural sciences and the power in the history of emergence and foundation of social science is oft-repeated story. The missing part of the story is about how the future becomes scourge for social science. In this process, while the fundamental principles of science, namely factuality, causality, and objectivity, were transferred to the field of social science, the definition of the social had to be shaped in conformity with

these criteria. Furthermore, certain demarcations were needed in the face of the contingency of the social and human action. While the transfer of these principles makes the present and the past as the legitimate focus of social science (Durkheim, 1982; Weber, 2012), the other actor, i.e., power, opened the door for the future, albeit deficiently, to infiltrate social science through the attempts to present models and to give directions to social change as well as planning. Both of the factors have a part in the ambivalent position of the future that still continues today. The concern for and interest in the future has also been considered independently of whether this concern is for the power or for the subordinate, as the violation of the neutrality in some cases. Additionally, since the intervention of social science to social problems was in cooperation with the idea of progress especially in its initial phase, subsequent devastating historical experiences led to scrutinize progress, gradual understanding of history, models, and thus, indirectly the interest in the future. Therefore, emphasis on the future in most cases has been discredited as models, laws, politics, and social engineering. In this context, functionalism and structuralism as state-perspectives, and relatedly the uncertainty and the lack of confidence brought by the historical events in the first half of the twentieth century are generally pointed out as the causes of the disappearance of future orientation existed in the nineteenth century. The theoretical approaches and themes such as risk and unintended consequences, however, in which the future is implicitly included in social science partially invalidate both claims. Moreover, the future has seep into social science through various ways such as the theories of social change and of modernization, the notion of progress, social engineering, evaluations of scientific and technological developments, analysis of future-related genres, concern for the consequences of current actions, and, albeit rarely today, the future of social science, and the role of social science in shaping the future. For this reason, it can be propounded that the problem of the future in social science is a question of quality rather than quantity. Accordingly, the possibilities to establish a relationship with the future, the underlying causes of the gleaming of the sociology of the future in the second half of the twentieth century and then quickly transferring to the different field of study best known as the “futures studies” should be sought elsewhere.

This search is carried out in the study primarily through questioning the position of the future in social thought. The most suitable ground for this questioning is the discussions of time, which have found a relatively legitimate, settled and comprehensive

interest compared to the subject of the future. Since the future is considered as perspective and stance in the study, the analysis of the time literature has been made over according to the established relationship between social and time that is gathered on three distinct lines. The notion of social time, which is mainly fed by Durkheim's (1995) ideas on time and comprehends the relation between time and social in regulative axis, constitutes the most influential tendency. In the following processes, time in social science has reached a power that reflects the assumptions of this line, even without the title of social. In this first tendency, social serves as the basis for time which in return undertakes the task of regulation and organization of social life. In this understanding based on social circuit, social time is distinguished from other forms of time falling to the share of other fields of science such as astronomical, physical, psychological, biological, and natural due to its qualitative nature and function of common framework. An important break in this conceptualization emerged over a tendency to define social time as multiple in parallel with the emphasis on the heterogeneity of the social and the multi-level understanding of social reality. In addition, this line also reverberates into the attempt to construct a history, albeit imperfect, based on the comparison of the conceptions of time and future of different historical periods, societies, social positions, and individuals. The second line assumes a constitutive relationship between social and time. Since this line is exemplified by Mead (1932), Schutz (1959, 2018), Luhmann (1976; 1978; 1982), Giddens (1986; 1987; 1995; 1996), and Bourdieu (1990; 2000; 2013; 2018) in the study, it seems to include quite different perspectives at first glance. Yet, all these different approaches converge on the relation in question they established. Unlike the first line on which the future is only included in comparative tendency with the exception of Gurvitch (1964), this second line makes the past and the future part of the analysis. However, the past and the future were defined as auxiliary elements with their task of being horizon for immediate present, depending on the perspective, in the context of experience, consciousness, system, structuration and practice. Thus, while a semiautomatic relationship emerges between the future and the immediate present, this line also relies on the distinction between the near and distant future and the past. In other words, unlike the relation in the first line that social is the basis of time, and time organizes social life, the future participates in the formation of the social on this line, despite semiautomatically. On the third line revealed through analysis on approaches, time becomes companion of social and historical processes in different degrees and contents

according to the theoretical perspective. Time was transferred from one historical individual to the another in Weber, implied a balance in Simmel's thought oscillating between two extremes, and become faithful companion of historical transformations with the combination of regulative and constitutive aspects in Marx. In parallel with the characterization of historical changes with elements such as instantaneity, flexibility and speed in the later processes, an emphasis on the relation between social and time has emerged in which time is generally considered as monster that devours the space, in different degrees and contexts such as Giddens's (1986; 1995; 1996) "time-space distancing", Harvey's (1997) "time-space compression", Castell's (2008) "timeless time", Virilio's emphasis (2000; 2003) on instantaneity and speed, and Baudrillard's (2011) simulacra by which time, space and social lost all their grounds. Yet, it should also be noted that the distinctions between all these lines are not sharp as well as approaches to time can be evaluated on the very different lines.

These evaluations on time literature uncovers two important conclusions in terms of future as stance and perspective. The first of these is the tendency to divide time into parts and qualified it by adjectives which was initiated by the demarcation of social time and gradually intensified in the following processes. This tendency gained momentum with the emphasis on the heterogeneity of the social, and the comparison between different segments or types of society. Add to this, by the approaches called as the politics of time in the study, time gradually becomes richer in terms of adjectives which appear in parallel with the evaluations of time-related experiences and inequalities resultant of historical processes such as industrialization, modernization, capitalism, and rationalization. The tendency to qualify time with adjectives is acceptable, and even necessary to some extent in order to understand differentiations, inequalities, conflicts and historical changes in time experiences, as well as unevenness and heterogeneity of the social. However, the predicament of this tendency in terms of futural stance proceeds from the fact that as the outlook on social increasingly tends to depict specific experiences as isolated in their singularities, the invention of adjectives and division of time into parts becomes so arbitrary to the level that social experiences represented by these adjectives cannot be adequately connected. Eventually, while in the deficient attempt to construct history through comparison, the different forms of time somehow connect with each other, isolated parts can only be superficially and faultily defined. In addition, the fact

that there is no widespread discussion on the adjectives led to the immaturity of common ground despite all the richness of the time literature.

The problem of common ground between different aspects of social and of time, as well as between social scientists, opens the door to the second obstacle in terms of the futural stance and perspective. This obstacle is that time and temporal are alternately used in general even in the same text, and when they are distinguished, temporal is generally used to refer to the lived and experienced time, flows, constant renewal, and becoming. The problem created by this definition is that, on the one hand, the identification of temporality with experience, constant novelty, subjectivity, and singularity causes elements such as social, structure and social institutions to be considered outside of temporality, and on the other hand, although this identification associates experience and life with an unceasing fluidity, it also unwittingly makes them atemporal by attributing them an essence. The division of time as solid and fluid rooted also in philosophy, causes the social to be divided into two parts which has been pervaded into various subjects of social sciences as in the distinction between regulative and constitutive understandings. This division, which is extremely important for the definition and content of the social as well as the relationship established with the future, is primarily related to the problem of balance between society, culture, individual and nature. The notion of social time as the highly influential line in time discussions, for instance, has narrowed the room opened by Durkheim for the social, nature, and individual, by reducing time to regulator and confining the social to the function of the model for time. Yet, it must also be highlighted that the endless and arbitrary extension of the boundaries also opens the door to the similar obstacles in terms of temporality, though it is undisputable that the scope and content of the social needs to be discussed. The other related problem stemming from this division is the balance between experiences and the more comprehensive processes, structures and institutions. Undoubtedly, social and temporality entails to take into account experiences, but the reduction of the meaning of temporality to experiences of which meaning is confined to the immediate context and isolated fields ambiguates the connections both between isolated experiences and their relations with broader processes and phenomena. On the contrary, temporality is not realized only on the axis of subjectivity, body and cyclicity, but even the processes that suppress and surround us should also be included the definition of temporality. From this point of view, a distinction has been employed in the study between time and temporal which is the

precondition of futurity. While time as noun refers to the specific subject to be studied, temporal as adjective and as the precondition of futurity qualifies social science. Thus, this distinction implies that the temporality of an approach is independent of whether it focuses on the subject of time. Gurvitch (1964) who presented one of the comprehensive and rich studies on time, and accordingly defined eight types of time in accordance with his understanding of multileveled social reality clearly epitomizes this point. Temporal refers to the modalities, contemporaneity, historicity, the new, change and similar time-related aspects. For this reason, temporality has been considered in the study primarily through two interrelated qualities in order to cover as much as possible all those aspects that temporality signifies. These qualities were called in the study as connections and incrementality. The first one, connections, indicates to the expansion and deepening of the subject or the aspect of social under consideration into every possible field. This expansion refers to the second quality, namely the incrementality, which indicates that the temporality increases or decreases according to the scope, content and strength of the connections. Thus, some parts of any approach such as Simmel's (1971e) analysis of fashion independently of his general theoretical framework, or a concept such as Durkheim's (1995) categories absorbing entire history can display temporal qualities independently of other parts of the approach. The two points that must be stated in terms of the emphasis on expansion with connections are that the point of departure is the present of the focused part of the social or the subject, and the point of arrival is determined according to the subject. The expansion is balanced and limited by the third quality labelled as principle or commonality. This means that as any subject expands and deepens into different areas, that is, as the connections widens, commonality begin to emerge through clarity of mutual determinations and relations. Thus, the expansion turns into contraction after a point. However, contraction is not considered as the ultimate end of expansion, since it may be necessary to expand again as the focused subject is changing. At this point, there are two more important issues that need to be clarified. The first is that the emphasis on the continuity of expansion and contraction is not based on the transience, networks, and frames constantly being made and broken. Rather, the movement described here refers to the historicalness of connections and principles in parallel with the historical and social changes, but neither by absolutizing them and transforming into abstract framework, nor by surrendering the social to the continuous flows and renewal. The second is that temporality through expansion with connections

does not mean to exclude singular experiences from temporality, but rather to emphasize that singularity and distinctiveness of experiences can only be revealed through connections. For instance, the point of departure, or present, of a very limited research question on “the effects of a playground built in a neighbourhood on the socialization experiences of women residents” should be the narratives of the women experiences about these changes. Temporality of this question, on the other hand, can be increased by connections such as women’s positions vis-a-vis patriarchy, the economic sphere, political conjuncture, the urban affairs, and so on. Through the expansion, far from the disappearance of singularities, the meaning of women’s narratives and experiences can become more shining among the connections. At this juncture, another issue should be noted regarding temporality is that emphasis on expansion through connections could exceed the energy, time, and possibilities of individual social scientist. This point refers to the legacy as important element in terms of the temporalization of social science, since the legacy, or common ground has the potential to balance and guide connections established for temporalization. The colourfulness of the legacy due to the fact that any subject becomes temporal with different connections depending on perspectives, is quite different from the arbitrary denomination of each specific subject and experience as in the proliferation of adjectives of time.

Similar predicaments in terms of futural perspective, and temporality as precondition have been reproduced in another line of discussion, which has the power to be close to the field of practice, called as the politics of time in the study. Although the term, the politics of time, is used in various texts in the time literature, it is employed in this study to simultaneously refer to the three different meanings. One of them is the meaning on which the literature is overwhelmingly constructed, that is, the inequalities, conflicts, and differences that emerge through regulation, control and experience of time (as well as the future, the past, and the present). The second one implies to the formation of time in thought as dualisms which can be considered as the reflection of concrete experiences. This second meaning also reverberates on the many dualisms in social science including the distinction between regulative and constitutive functions in the relationship established between time and social. The third meaning, which is neither immune from other two meanings nor completely subordinate to them is the most proper one in terms of the study, expresses that the relationship established with time and the future acquires a political character in the sense that this relation affects the relationship

of social science with itself, the social, and its age. In the literature, inquiries about the political implications of time have generally been made on the basis of temporal inequalities, especially through the distinction between work time and leisure time, in parallel with the history of the trio of clock-time, linear time and standard time accompanied by various processes such as industrialization, capitalism, modernization, and rationalization. These given frameworks and concepts have been challenged by the emphases on that they do not encompass and overlap with women's time experiences on the one hand, and changes in labour processes vitiate the familiar work-leisure distinction, on the other. However, in the discussions on the politics of time, there emerge a tendency to evaluate specific situations and experiences in isolation without connected them with comprehensive processes or other experiences sprawls not only into time and future discussions but also into inquiries on every aspect of the social. While this tendency paves the way for the arbitrary proliferation of adjectives, it also reduces the visibility of time-related inequalities and conflicts. This situation clearly supports the emphasis in the study that the visibility of the singular can become more evident, far from being lost within connections. Moreover, with this tendency, while the political content of time becomes ambiguous, the possibilities of the temporality and futurity depicted in the study also decrease as the connections are broken. In addition, although the future as specific subject is included through the analyses on the future expectations, it has faded away as stance and perspective. Another fundamental problem in terms of temporal and futural stance and perspective is that the new blocks are erected next to the existing ones after skating around prevailing assumptions, even in the inquiries connected inequalities. To exemplify, very meaningful inquiries about women's time experiences generally raise a building of women's circularity next to the linear time. For certain, distinctiveness of women's time and the severity of their experiences of inequalities are undeniable. Yet, if the linear understanding, despite its negative implications and impacts, also opens the door to the idea of human intervention and of the changeability of conditions by human action, it may be more meaningful to claim a right on this frame without abandoning to question it, rather than totally rejecting. Otherwise, the convergence between circularity and linearity cannot be recognized while the circularity of women settles only into a victim position in the face of linearity. A similar problem arises when the working-leisure framework is questioned in terms of both women's experiences and changes in labour. In this case, scrutinization about working time almost turn into discrediting the very

meaning of working. In fact, what makes the distinction between working time and leisure time problematic is not the act of work itself, but the content of the work this distinction based on. Therefore, targeting the existence of work instead of the current content of work led to surrender the act of work, which is inseparable part of social and human action like the future and time, to the current definition of work. Moreover, as the focus is increasingly confined to the isolated and disconnected field of inquiries, the historicalness of dominant time forms as well as of women's time, working time, flexibility, and leisure is forgotten and becomes pre-given.

Approaches to time also provide important conclusions on the position of the future in terms of the attempt to establish the relationship between social science and the future as stance. The future, which is not sufficiently comprised in the social time discussions, finds a place for itself in the constitutive approaches, but as horizon and auxiliary element in the constitution of immediate context. On the other side, the future continues to be not-yet and distant even in the field of futures studies devoted to the future, even though the future is main focus through very detailed methods and concepts such as the Delphi method, scenario writing, the images of the future, and the distinction between "possible", "probable" and "preferable" futures (Bell, 2004; 2009). The position of the future in social thought and in general opinion is extremely resistant which remains unshakable in discussions of social change, analysis of future-related genres, evaluations on the technological developments, questioning current actions with the concern for posterity. While this position explains the existence of certain tendencies through which the future infiltrate social science, it also points to the important results in terms of inquiries about the present and the social. This position confines the scope of questions in "what", and in some cases includes "where from", but "where to" is not asked, or asked only as prediction. Consequently, the definition and analysis of the age and of the aspects of social are left as incomplete. In this case, the eyes looking at the distant future can neither see the thing at the distance nor fully grasp the ground dwelled on as the gaze fixed on the horizon. Since as the position alters, the direction of gaze and the possibility of seeing also changes, the futural stance first of all requires to question this position.

For such a gaze, this study turns its eyes to the field of manifestos and expands its connections. In terms of the main question of the study, there are several reasons for choosing manifestos rather than utopia, dystopia, and science-fiction which has been frequently analysed in social science. First of all, although other future-related genres also

reflect the circumstances they appear from and even generally written as a reaction or solution to the problems of their ages, the connections they established with their presents is the indirect one, and thus quite loose. On the contrary, manifestos depart from their presents depending on the issues they focus on, and relate to their ages with non-fictional idea of future and solutions that can be realized in this world, albeit seem extreme in some cases. In addition, manifestos share the common base with social sciences on the grounds that they question relatively similar realms despite differences in aims, approaches, and focuses. Addedly, while some texts written in the field of social sciences display manifesto-like qualities and the genre is occasionally invited to social science, some of the manifestos more deeply and comprehensively analyse the problems and subjects than some texts in social sciences. Although the manifestos are literarily analysed in general, it is their temporal structure that makes them significant for the study. Since the aim is not to analyse the genre, but to contemplate on social science by using manifestos as reflector, the ten examples of the genre were not selected according to the chronological order, the sub-genres they belong, political tendency, or particular historical period and geographical area. Instead, the examples were selected to be linked to each other through different criteria in compliance with the emphasis on the connections proposed in the study. The way this selection and the analysis are made reveals that manifestos highlight their singularities and distinctiveness by placing within the wide connections in the face of apprehension about disappearance of singularities within connections. It is also important to indicate that temporality appearing through connections does not merely refer to succession and linearity, not violates singularities, but also not completely exclude succession and linearity either. In addition, although literary genres or various works of art are generally used as a tool to capture the conditions they emerged from, this study does not also rely on this tendency. The very brief information about the aims and under which conditions manifestos were written was given to define the present of each manifesto as the point of departure of temporality. Although the temporal qualities attributed to the manifestos in the literature are built around themes such as rupture, call to the future and rejection of the past, the examples analysed in the study reveal a very different temporal structure from these attributions. Contrary to the general claims, this temporal structure is constructed on the partial appropriation and partial rejection of the past and the present on the base of defined incongruency with reference to the existing conditions, even in the Futurist Manifesto which bears open enmity towards the past. This

incongruency arises between inalienable rights of women and obstacles to benefit these rights, between productive forces and the relations of production, between ossified literary habits and the new literary desires, and between the potential of humanity and obstructive conditions. In this temporal structure, the calls for the future are fed precisely by these incongruencies. Thus, while the future closely connected with the present and the past, it still preserves the privilege of pointing out the new and the different. More importantly, while manifestos look at the present with the future, they also look at the future through the present, and simultaneously at both. In other words, this is not an attitude that uncombines the present and the future as in prediction or the images of the future. Rather, the future is revealed simultaneously with the present and through the present. This temporal structure, which also prevents the present from being compressed into a contentless and superficial description, exhibits a quite different framework than one offered by the analysis of time literature. Moreover, these manifestos quite clearly answer the question of how the singular can be included in the face of the expansion to become temporal and futural. At this point, it should be noted that the temporal structure appeared in here is valid only for these examples, since both the boundaries of the genre is still a matter of debate, and the main objective of the study is not the analysis of the genre. Furthermore, the manifesto genre has been occasionally invited to social science as content and/or a title not because of its temporal structure, but in order to discuss the formation of political subject, to understand and intervene political uprisings and movements, and to challenge to ossified assumptions. It is quite thought-provoking that manifestos have received much less attention by their temporal structure compared to the other future-related genres. Thus, there are lessons social sciences should take from manifestos which present a simple example of the temporal and futural stance. First of all, since the anchorage of the future to the horizon distorts the gaze, the simultaneous focus of manifestos on the past, present and future, and present from future and vice versa, destroys the strict linearity, and does not surrender time and future to the understandings based on instantaneity, networks, and transiency. Secondly, this reminds the importance of legacy and common ground, just as in the questions on the individual social scientist's energy to expand connections, and on endless proliferation of time-related adjectives, since even the shortest of the selected texts did not hesitate to refer to its predecessor, and the proposed novelty shined as it expands into the legacy.

One of the reasons for the loose connection of the future with the present in social science is the position of the future in the face of science, which also affects the definition of social. Moreover, the ambivalent position of the future becomes even more evident since on the one hand, the future does not easily fit into the principles of science, and on the other hand, the future becomes an element of the use of science to control, intervene, and direct as in the social engineering practices. Thus, since the future placed in ambivalent position between being non-scientific and being part of the strict use of science, social scientists interested in the future get their share this ambivalence and accused of being futurists, politicians, social engineers and relying on the laws and the schemas. This situation, first of all, requires to understand that the content of the principles of science has changed in the field of social science, and these changing contents does not make social science less science. In the face of this ambivalence, some solutions have been tried to offer. One of these efforts is to emphasize the presence of the future in order to make room in the field of scientific principles by means of processuality, latency, potentiality, immateriality, and the effect of the images of the future. Even if the contestable aspects of these emphases are clear, efforts to open a space for the future in the face of scientific principles are still important, because another tendency confines the future into the continuous and absolute novelty or images and ideals as the immune fields from science. Among the many problems created by these immune fields, the most important ones in terms of futural and temporal stance are that impossibility of recognizing the new within this constant renewal, of establishing connections, and of constructing the relation between the present and the future. On this basis, a few important points emerge that need to be considered in order to open a space for the future and to make it perspective and stance. One of them is whether the future should be considered as process or as an outcome that the process solidifies somewhere or leaves behind. From a futural perspective, the answer is both, since while continuous flow and latency mystify the future and how to capture the latent remains unanswered in that case, outcome and state means to entrench and reduce future to the fixed point. Moreover, the social and all its aspects are both processes and outcomes. For that reason, the future should be considered in relation to both the process and the outcome, the process as the outcome and the outcome as the process, depending on which aspect of the social is scrutinized and the content of the connections. The second important point is the impact of the questions to be asked from the futural perspective, because the questions asked are

important for the answers received. Since the one of the main issues is the position of future in terms of futural stance, besides familiar questions, “where” question, which is always answered as according to and in contrast with the present, should be asked. Additionally, “where to”, “where from”, and “what for” questions borrowed from Bloch (1996) can also be asked to capture the future. Asking these questions together means that “what” question is answered more deeply, and consequently the present is defined more broadly. Another important point is to define proper attitude and act for futural stance. In this framework, as against to the attitudes generally employed in social science such as prediction and planning which refer to the future fixed at distance, the appropriate action and attitude for the futural stance is labelled as “sketch” which implies to neither strict predictions nor the abstract field, but approaching to the future through the present deepening with connections, and to the extent that it is a sketch, the changeability of the future as the present changes.

The content of the futural stance and perspective has emerged through the evaluations on the position of the future in thought and temporality as precondition. First of all, even though the starting point is to question the distant future, the aim is not to pull the future closer, as in the emphasis on the horizon of immediate present, on latency, and on the images of the future. On the contrary, the futural perspective is fed by the idea of the changeability of the position. This changeability means that the position of the future may vary depending on which aspect of the present or the social is focused. In other words, it refers to the historicity and interconnection of the future and the present, rather than perspective constructed on constantly made and broken networks, transience, instantaneity, and flexibility. This emphasis on the history and the present in terms of the future can be disappointing for thought which is accustomed to capture the future either on the straight line and through prediction and foresight, or as absolute new, abrupt and abstract. Yet, the future revealed by the futural perspective is not less future or less exciting than the other. Just as the singular shines through the connections in the emphasis on temporality, the future becomes evident within the connections and refers to the new and different. Another point that should be noted in terms of the future’s relationship with connections and temporality is the direction of connection towards the past and the future. In this framework, the connection with the past from a futural stance refers to the idea that the past is only captured through the illumination of the present, as opposed to reach the present through the illumination of the past. These two opposite directions of

extension indicate to the difference between Durkheim and Marx in terms of the potential of futural perspective, despite the theories of both clearly exhibit temporality. Similarly, the emphasis on that to create the images and visions of the future in order to influence the present actions which is very common in the futures studies but also employed in the social science, is equally problematic for the futural perspective. On the contrary, extension towards both the past and the future from the present allows to spread in both directions. Moreover, opening up with connections can also clarify the meaning and visibility of the focus by giving distance to the gaze and allowing to see from a broad perspective.

The discussion on the relation in question arrived to the point at which future becomes stance and perspective. This destination can cause a loss of excitement or disappointment for our minds, which are accustomed to think about the future as new, rupture, surprise, and distant. But on the contrary, the futural perspective can make not only the future but also the present more exciting by removing them from the field of narrow definitions. In addition, the emphasis on the current age and especially the analysis of manifestos which is the call for action does not mean that the futural stance compulsorily refers to the normative stance. Undoubtedly, the importance of normative attitude is undeniable, but the futural stance does not necessitate it. If there is a feature that makes the futural and temporal stance challenge, it is that this stance places social, society, connections, principle, structure and similar concepts excluded from temporality at the focus, as opposed to the general tendency which attributes temporality to the constant renewal, flows, becoming, experiences, and images. Another related problem is that marginalized or totally excluded subjects including time and future are handled through either constructing new blocks of concepts and ideas next to the existing ones, or leaping forward to the other fields and manner of speaking by claiming “already absent.” As opposed to these tendencies, the futural stance can also be seen as a challenge due to its emphasis on legacy in order to temporalize and futurize social science itself. It is necessary to question, reject and change existing assumptions, but to reject entails to look carefully at first. In addition, as in this study that finds different meanings in texts by wearing temporal and futural glasses, to see may entails to change the angle. Thus, it should be remembered that ideas which question ossified ideas may also become ossified. At this juncture, it should also be stressed that there are many different ways to engage with social science. Therefore, the emphasis on connections and commonalities does not

allude that perspective which focuses on singularities without connections is less social science. Moreover, an approach that define temporality and the futurity from a different angle may found the framework constructed in this study atemporal. Finally, it should be strongly highlighted that this study thinking on social science via futurity and temporality does not attribute superiority to social science and the gaze of social scientists. It is evident that this study found stronger futural stance in manifestos instead of social science, but those who are not manifesto writers or social scientists can also hold more profound futural stance.

For certain, at this juncture, the temporality and futurity of this study can also be questioned. First and foremost, it is possible to claim that this study is deficient in terms of temporality because it has not sufficiently expanded into the discussions of time in physics and philosophy both of which have great impact on social science, and into the different temporalities by taking refuge in a narrow definition of the social. However, since the present of the main question of the study is the time and future literature in social science, it can be asserted that the study began to be temporalized and futurized from the proper point of departure. More importantly, though the application of the stance and perspective propounded here on a subject is important to recognize the deficiencies of the constructed framework, this exceeds the scope and purpose of the study. Yet, it should be indicated that this is the most urgent and important need to make this framework itself temporal and futural.

It should also be remarked that this study, which tries to draw the relationship between the future and social science from the field of distant, absolute new, images and expectations to the more concrete one by connecting the future with the present, does not introduce a full-fledged final outcome. This mainly stems from the difficulties to explain a subject like the future without relying on the absolute new, unexpected, utopias, or predictions, that is, on the prevailing tendencies of social science. The underlying reason of this is the inadequacy of the tools and concepts in language and thought to concretely express the future, i.e., to carry the future to a more concrete ground related to the present. For this reason, efforts to bring the future down from the sky to the earth have to resort to expressions such as latency, processuality, non-materiality, melting, incubation, fermentation, and seed. Even, this study criticizing these expressions for various reasons, cannot avoid using similar words such as simmering, maturing and sprouting. Therefore, the lack of linguistic and intellectual tools to express the future in different ways is

sufficient to reveals that the future deserves to be more discussed and pondered. In this sense, this study can be considered as small step in the endeavours to develop new concepts and ideas to more concretely connect with the future which cannot find a genuine place for itself in the science of the social, despite being an integral part of social and human action. At this point, it is necessary to leave the final words to Bloch (1996), who devoted his ideas to alter existing language and thought for a genuine future: “Philosophy will have conscience of tomorrow, commitment to the future, knowledge of hope, or it will have no more knowledge.”

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